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 1 
Preface 
There is a broad consensus among economists that trade openness is beneficial for 
countries in the long run. This is also true for developing countries, whereby a strong 
integration into the world economy may significantly contribute to the development 
process (Winters et al. 2004). Furthermore, according to the Stolper-Samuelson-
Theorem, the poor low-skilled workers that are the relatively abundant production factor 
in developing countries should especially gain from increased trade openness in terms 
of wage income. However, evidence from recent periods of trade liberalization in de-
veloping countries indicates that distributional changes went into the opposite direction 
leading to a rise in wage inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). Poor low skilled pop-
ulations in developing countries could reap much less of the income gains from trade 
than expected. 
Thus far, the literature has offered several explanations for this paradox. The most 
prominent one is that trade liberalization caused an increase in the demand for skilled 
labor leading to a rise in the skill premium in developing countries. Among the explain-
ing factors for this increase in the demand for skilled labor are trade-induced skill biased 
technological change (Wood 1995, Thoenig and Verdier 2003, Attanasio et al. 2004, 
Acemoglu 2003, Harrison and Hanson 1999, Aghion et al. 2005), capital inflows and 
complementarity of capital and skilled labor (Cragg and Epelbaum 1996, Behrman et al. 
2000), outsourcing and trade in intermediate goods (Feenstra and Hanson 1997, 2003), 
firm heterogeneity (Bernard and Jensen 1997, Zhu 2005, Verhoegen 2008) as well as 
distortions in factor and product markets (Topalova 2010, Chiquear 2008, Wacziarg and 
Wallack 2004). Another explanation is that trade liberalization in developing countries 
disproportionally affected sectors with a higher share of unskilled labor leading to a 
relative decline of the industry wage premium or an increase of informal employment to 
the disfavor of poor unskilled workers (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2005, 2007).  
In this dissertation, I present evidence on another type of explanation for why poor low-
skilled workers in developing countries do not benefit as much from globalization as 
expected: political economy factors that influence the way how poor low-skilled work-
ers in developing countries can participate in the global economy. Thereby, I focus on 
both sides of the international trade relationship. On the one side, I investigate how 
trade protectionism following an economic crisis in a developed country, namely the 
United States, affected imports from developing countries. Employing a newly con-
structed dataset on U.S. import refusals and a gravity estimation framework, I find that 
during the recent Subprime Crisis and its aftermath the U.S. has used the enforcement 
of product standards to disproportionally protect its domestic industries against imports 
 2 
from developing countries. Because exports from many developing countries to the U.S. 
predominantly consist of food products, which are produced by poor unskilled rural 
populations, this recent episode of rising trade protectionism had adverse effects on 
poor and unskilled workers in developing countries. 
On the other side of the trade relationship, I focus on a poor land-locked developing 
country in Central Asia, namely Tajikistan, and investigate how rent-seeking of local 
officials and authorities influences whether poor unskilled agricultural laborers in the 
cotton sector benefit from a global cotton price surge. Using a newly constructed 
household panel dataset and a difference-in-difference estimation framework, I find that 
rent appropriation mainly works through political interference in the labor market 
branch of the production process. Managers of large para-statal farms, local politicians 
and cotton gins collude and appropriate the rents from cotton exports by coercing em-
ployees of state-owned enterprises, hospitals and schools as well as students and school 
children to work in the cotton harvest for very low picking wages. On those large para-
statal farms, the cotton price surge has led to a strong increase in the profits of manag-
ers, whereas wages of poor unskilled cotton pickers did not change. Interestingly, I find 
that on small private farms, which were created during the privatization process pushed 
by international donors and where incentive structures are more market-oriented, wages 
of cotton pickers positively responded to the cotton price surge. Those small private 
farms do not command the political connections necessary to access the pool of coerced 
labor and face competitive local labor markets, whereby labor supply consists of land-
less female laborers from local villages. The earnings of small holder farmers and wages 
of cotton pickers on small farms significantly increased in response to the cotton price 
surge.  
In the first chapter which is co-authored by Christoph Moser, I present a newly gathered 
and constructed dataset that links disaggregated U.S. import flows with U.S. import 
refusals due to non-compliance with U.S. product standards. This novel dataset com-
prises U.S. import flows and import refusals for 93 food and non-food product groups, 
164 trading partners of the U.S and the years 2002 to 2012. The main challenge for the 
construction of this novel dataset has been to match the unique product classification for 
import refusals from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the Harmonized 
System (HS) product classification for international trade flows used by the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC). I employ this dataset and a sectoral gravity equation 
to estimate the costs of non-compliance with U.S. product standards. The results indi-
cate that import refusals significantly decrease exports to the United States. This trade 
reducing effect is driven by developing countries, whereas for developed countries there 
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are no negative effects. Even more important, the trade reducing effect of refusals is 
dominated by refusals without any product sample analysis, in particular during the 
Subprime Crisis and its aftermath. Because FDA officers inspecting imported shipments 
at the U.S. border have considerable legal leeway and are allowed to reject import 
shipments that only appear to violate U.S. product standards, this result is worrisome. It 
indicates that the U.S. might have used the enforcement of product standards to protect 
domestic industries during the Subprime Crisis and its aftermath. Especially worrisome 
is that this countercyclical, hidden protectionism mainly affected imports from develop-
ing countries. By focusing on a non-tariff barrier to trade (NTB) that has not been in the 
research focus thus far, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of NTBs on 
trade flows taking into account the endogeneity of protectionism (Trefler 1993, Essaji 
2008 and Bown and Crowley 2013).  
The second chapter which is co-authored with Alexander Danzer, exploits a surge in the 
world market price of cotton in 2010/11 combined with Tajikistan’s geographic varia-
tion in the suitability for cotton production to identify the causal effect of cotton prices 
on employment and wages of agricultural workers in the cotton sector. For this analysis, 
I constructed a novel household panel dataset that is based on data from the Tajikistan 
Living Standards Survey (TLSS) conducted by the World Bank in 2007 and 2009 and 
the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS) in 2011. To identify cotton 
communities, I use information on crops grown in the community from the TLSS 2007 
as well as information on the suitability of areas for cotton production from the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) - Global Agricultural and Ecological Zones Data-
base (GAEZ) that I matched with the geo-referenced communities in the TLSS. Because 
Tajikistan is only a small producer on the world market of cotton, the surge in the world 
market price of cotton in 2010/2011 can be treated as exogenous to Tajikistan. Employ-
ing a difference-in-difference estimator that exploits the geographic variation in the 
suitability for cotton production and the time variation of world cotton prices, I find that 
the cotton price surge led to substantially higher labor demand and wages for female 
cotton pickers, who form the most vulnerable part of the workforce. The price hike 
benefits only workers on small entrepreneurial family farms, whereas cotton pickers of 
big parastatal enterprises miss out. 
Interviews and additional data collected in Tajikistan in March and November 2014 
indicate that the pass-through of price fluctuations depends on the competitive structure 
of local labor markets. Managers of big para-statal farms exploit their political connec-
tions to access a pool of coerced labor that consists of employees of state-owned enter-
prises, hospitals and schools as well as students and school children that are forced to 
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work in the cotton harvest for very low picking wages. In contrast, small private farms 
face competitive local labor markets, whereby labor supply consists of landless female 
laborers from local villages. Hence, this paper shows that so far the privatization pro-
cess in Tajikistan has succeeded in establishing a more competitive and entrepreneurial 
agricultural sub-sector that created new income opportunities for poor landless women 
in rural villages. 
In the third chapter of my dissertation, I exploit the natural experiment of the cotton 
price surge to identify the effects of a positive transitory income shock on consumption 
and investment decisions of poor rural households in the cotton regions of Tajikistan. 
Analyzing how poor households in developing countries respond to short run income 
fluctuations due to trade openness is crucial for evaluating the overall effects of globali-
zation and trade on poverty (Winters et al. 2004). Particularly in the short run, changes 
in trade openness cause adjustment processes and income fluctuations that might have 
strong impacts for poorer households, especially in developing countries (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik 2007). Although important parts of the population in developing countries are 
strongly exposed to income risk caused by world price fluctuations, the literature has, 
thus far, mainly focused on how households in developing countries deal with income 
risk induced by weather shocks or illness (Wolpin 1982, Paxson 1992, Gertler and 
Gruber 2002). This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the impacts of a 
trade-induced positive income shock on household consumption and investments. Using 
a newly constructed household panel dataset and a difference-in-difference estimator 
that exploits the geographic variation in the suitability for cotton production and the 
exogenous time variation of world cotton prices, I find that the cotton price surge in-
creased real monthly income of agricultural households in cotton regions by over 70 
percent. This positive transitory income shock led to a significant increase in household 
consumption, which indicates that rural households in Tajikistan cannot fully insure 
against transitory income shocks (Morduch 1995). However, I find evidence that several 
types of consumption smoothing strategies exist. Potentially investment or savings re-
lated disbursements for non-food products increase much more than disbursements for 
simple consumption motives (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Attanasio and Szekely 
2004). Furthermore, the results indicate that poor rural households in Tajikistan try to 
smooth future consumption by sending more migrants abroad (Yang and Choi 2007) or 
by investing in social relationships that might act as insurance device in lean times 
(Grimard 1997). I also find that the positive transitory income shock lead households to 
increase investments in human capital, i.e. spending for medical treatment of household 
members and education of children. 
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1 Hidden Protectionism? Evidence from Non-tariff Barriers 
to Trade in the United States1 
1.1 Introduction 
Non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) like product standards and technical regulations have 
increased in importance compared to tariffs that are at historical lows.2 NTBs are char-
acterized by two opposing trends. While some countries aim at harmonizing product 
standards to reap further gains from trade (e.g., trade talks between the United States 
and European Union), fear of protectionism has led to a close monitoring of NTBs 
worldwide during the Great Recession (e.g., Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). 
Product standards are imposed to overcome market failures and protect the health and 
safety of domestic consumers. In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) is responsible for ensuring the safety of domestic and foreign products. Those 
import shipments not complying with U.S. product standards are refused entry into the 
market by the FDA. In this study, we collect a new data set that combines disaggregated 
import data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) with import refusals 
from the FDA.  
This paper provides estimates on the costs of non-compliance with U.S. product stan-
dards at different times of the business cycle. We show that the trade costs associated 
with non-compliance with U.S. product standards are substantial for poorer countries. 
While there is a negative impact of import refusals on imports to the United States for 
non-OECD countries, OECD countries are largely unaffected. Our estimates imply that 
a one standard deviation increase in refusals reduces short- and long-run exports from 
an average developing country by USD 6 to 11 billion. We gain further insights by ex-
amining the type of inspection that underlies a given import refusal. It turns out that the 
trade reducing effect is mainly triggered by refusals without any product sample analy-
sis and the implied trade costs quadruple during the Subprime Crisis and its aftermath. 
We conclude that these results for the United States are consistent with the hypothesis 
that product standards are counter-cyclical protectionism in disguise. 
                                                 
1
 This chapter was co-authored by Christoph Moser. While we developed the empirical strategy and, more generally, 
the paper together, the original idea for this research project was mine. It was also mainly my task to investigate and 
summarize the institutional background of the FDA and, more importantly, to gather a novel dataset that allows us to 
link disaggregated U.S. import flows with disaggregated U.S. import refusals. The main challenge was to make the 
different classification systems of the ITC and FDA comparable and to carefully match the corresponding product 
groups. 
2
 Similarly, Baldwin’s famous quote says that “[t]he lowering of tariffs has, in effect, been like draining a swamp. 
The lower water level has revealed all the snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away.” 
(Baldwin, 1970, quoted in Baldwin, 2000). 
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We estimate a bilateral gravity model for 93 imported product-groups to the United 
States for the years 2002 to 2012. We proceed in three steps by reporting OLS esti-
mates, standard fixed effect estimates and, then, dynamic panel estimates. The last and 
preferred specification does not only allow us to control for past import flows and use 
lagged import refusals as internal instruments for our non-compliance measure (as sug-
gested by Essaji, 2008), but we can also extend the framework to include additional, 
external instruments drawn from the EU - Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(RASFF) database. Since EU refusals and notifications are plausibly exogenous to U.S. 
import demand, but likely to be correlated with U.S. refusals, they constitute a valid 
instrument. 
Why are thousands of shipments blocked from entering the U.S. market each year? The 
FDA names two main reasons for import refusals: adulteration and misbranding. Recent 
reports on blocked U.S. imports of toys containing lead fall in the first category with 
products being inferior and entailing substantial health risks.3 But adulteration can also 
simply stem from differing product standards between trading countries. Second, a 
product might be denied entry into the United States due to misbranding, i.e., U.S. la-
belling standards are not met or necessary certificates for conformity assessment are not 
provided by the exporter. 
The FDA might be also subject to lobbying and political pressures.4 In one of its most 
controversial moves, the FDA issued an outright ban of all grapes from Chile in March 
1989 due to a non-lethal contamination of two grapes with cyanide (Engel, 1999; Haw-
thorne, 2005). It remains unclear to date, whether the FDA simply overreacted or the 
U.S. government aimed for a weakening of the Pinochet regime. Similar to technical 
regulations (see Trefler, 1993 and Essaji, 2008), stricter product standards and border 
inspections may be imposed for protectionist motives in the United States. Lamb (2006) 
provides anecdotal evidence that political pressure from U.S. avocado producer associa-
tions has been driving the boycott of Mexican Hass avocados until 1997. More recently, 
U.S. catfish producers have lobbied for more frequent inspections of catfish imports to 
protect their industry.5,6 According to Watson and James (2013) regulatory protection-
                                                 
3
 Decker, Brett and William Triplett “China’s Poisonous Exports: PRC Products Aren't just Cheap, They're Danger-
ous,” The Washington Times, November 16th, 2011. 
4
 After all, the FDA is a government agency, its commissioner a political appointee and the revolving door also spins 
at the FDA. For the U.S. Department of Defense, Luechinger and Moser (2014) show that conflicts of interest can 
arise due to the revolving door. The Government Accountability Office indeed acknowledges a staff turnover rate at 
the FDA above the federal government average in 2002 (cited in Hawthorne, 2005, p. 30). 
5
 Nixon, Ron, “Number of Catfish Inspectors Drives a Debate on Spending,” The New York Times, July 26th, 2013. 
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ism exists in the United States and Baldwin (2000) is especially concerned about its 
effect on developing countries. 
Figure 1.1 sheds some first light on the enforcement of U.S. product standards. This 
figure shows that the total number of shipments inspected by the FDA increased hand in 
hand with the unemployment rate due to the Subprime Crisis from less than 140,000 in 
2008 to close to 280,000 in 2011. These FDA-inspections include inspections with and 
without a product sample analysis. Even more striking, incidences of non-compliance 
with U.S. product standards rose sharply in the aftermath of the crisis, with import re-
fusals without any product sample analysis being the main driver. Our regression analy-
ses will further deal with this type of inspection that is arguably most prone to potential 
hidden protectionism.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we contribute to 
the recent empirical literature on protectionism (see Rose, 2013; Bown and Crowley, 
2013; Kee et al., 2013) by highlighting another channel through which governments 
might temporarily seek import protection: a stricter enforcement of product standards. 
Most importantly, we are to the best of our knowledge the first to link the effect of im-
port refusals to the business cycle and to consider the type of inspection leading to im-
port refusals. Second, we add to the trade and development literature by quantifying the 
short- and long-run costs of forgone exports due to non-compliance with U.S. product 
standards. Most alternative measures of product standards, e.g., notifications to the 
WTO, are based on technical regulations that are most favoured nation (MFN) measures 
without variation across exporters. In contrast, our measure substantially varies across 
countries, product-groups and time. This allows us to factor in that any potential import 
protection is trading partner- and product-specific and to control for country-product-
specific factors that are often omitted in other studies. Third, we contribute to the litera-
ture on import refusals by demonstrating how important it is to account for the endoge-
nous nature of refusals.7 Thereby, endogeneity can arise due to import protection or 
risk-guided inspections. Product-groups with increasing imports are more closely moni-
tored and inspected by the FDA.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the related 
literature, the institutional background of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
                                                                                                                                               
6
 Jouanjean (2012) provides evidence that U.S. producer associations influence U.S. market access regulation for 
imports of fresh fruits and vegetables. As exemplified for Russia, product standards and stricter inspections at the 
border might be even used for foreign policy purposes. See Kramer, Andrew, “Chocolate Factory, Trade War Vic-
tim,” The New York Times, October 29th, 2013; Herszenhorn, David, “Russia Putting a Strong Arm on Neighbors,” 
The New York Times, October 22th, 2013.  
7 In contrast to other studies, we quantify the impact of import refusals not only for food products, but also for phar-
maceuticals, cosmetics and manufacturing products. This is a smaller contribution to the literature. 
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(FDA) and some descriptive statistics for the new import refusal database. Section 4 
provides a description of our data set and an outline of the empirical strategy. Section 5 
presents the empirical results and Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
1.2 Related Literature  
Our paper is related to the literature on endogenous protectionism, the theory on product 
standards and the effect of non-tariff barriers to trade, in particular for developing coun-
tries.  
In a seminal paper, Trefler (1993) argues that the level of trade protection is not exoge-
nous but increasing in import competition and domestic lobbying efforts. Similarly, the 
paper closest to our study is Essaji (2008) who analyzes the effects of technical regula-
tions for a cross-section of sectoral trade flows to the United States. To address potential 
endogeneity of technical measures, Essaji (2008) instruments U.S. technical regulations 
with such regulations of countries with similar regulatory processes, but different im-
port patterns. Both important contributions clearly show that the effects of protection-
ism are economically large, once endogeneity is taken into account.  
Several recent empirical papers investigate whether countries fall back into protection-
ism in bad economic times. The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. While Rose 
(2013) argues forcefully that protectionism – as measured by a broad set of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers – has neither been counter-cycle in the United States nor worldwide 
after World War II, Bown and Crowley (2013) and Kee et al. (2013) offer a more nu-
anced picture. Kee et al. (2013) conclude that only few countries have markedly in-
creased their tariffs from 2008 to 2009, but the relatively modest U.S. trade policy reac-
tion has been an NTB, namely antidumping.8 Bown and Crowley (2013) investigate the 
relationship between the business cycle and another NTB for five OECD countries. The 
most relevant result for our paper: Bown and Crowley (2013) provide evidence that the 
number of disaggregated product groups affected by temporary trade barriers increases 
with negative macroeconomic shocks in the United States. In particular, the domestic 
unemployment rate proves to be an important determinant of this NTB before and after 
the onset of the Subprime Crisis. 
The theoretical literature mainly views differing product standards as protectionist, 
since higher quality standards increase the compliance costs for foreign firms relative to 
domestic ones. Fischer and Serra (2000) argue that standards chosen by a domestic so-
cial planner are always protectionist. In a similar framework, Marette and Beghin 
                                                 
8 In another study, based on the Global Trade Alert (GTA), Boffa and Olarreaga (2012) conclude that countries have 
not retaliated during the Great Recession. 
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(2010) show that domestic standards are not necessarily protectionist, if domestic and 
foreign producers differ in meeting these costs. However, this only holds for foreign 
producers being more efficient, an unlikely assumption for developing countries export-
ing to the United States. Essaji (2010) is interested in the interplay between trade liber-
alization and the use of product standards. Sturm (2006) offers a political economy 
model, where uncertainty about the optimal safety level might open the door for hidden 
domestic transfers.  
Our paper is obviously also related to and builds on the empirical literature on product 
standards.9 Moenius (2004) provides an important early account on the effects of stand-
ards on trade between OECD countries at the industry-level. Several studies exploit the 
number of notifications of newly imposed product standards by importing countries 
under WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
agreements or counter-notifications under the SPS for a cross-section or panel of trade 
flows (see Disdier et al., 2008; Crivelli and Gröschl, 2012; Fontagne et al., 2013). 
Crivelli and Gröschl (2012) find for a disaggregated gravity model for agricultural and 
food products that SPS measures decrease the probability of market entry, but positively 
influence the intensive margin of exporters. For a rich panel data set of French export-
ing firms, Fontagne et al. (2013) show that restrictive SPS measures in the importing 
country negatively affect the extensive margin of firms and, in contrast to Crivelli and 
Gröschl (2012), also the intensive margin of trade. 
1.3 Background 
1.3.1 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is located within the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services.10 The FDA is responsible for enforcing the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act of 1938 and other laws designed to protect con-
sumer health. The following product categories fall under FDA jurisdiction: food, 
drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, electronic items that emit radiation, vaccines, blood 
and biologics, animal feed and veterinary, and tobacco products. To ensure that prod-
ucts from these categories comply with U.S. product standards, the FDA has the author-
ity to inspect domestically produced and imported products and eventually refuse entry 
                                                 
9
 We focus here on the most closely related papers. Other studies differ in their measurement of product standards, the 
sectors and time covered as well as their approach to the endogeneity issue. The earlier literature focuses on one 
particular standard in a given product-group (see for instance Otsuki et al., 2001, on African groundnut exports to 
Europe; Anders and Caswell, 2009, on U.S. seafood imports; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009, on vegetable exports 
from Senegal; Baylis et al., 2010, on seafood exports to the EU).  
10
 For an excellent overview of the FDA, see for instance Buzby et al. (2008), Josling et al. (2004), Hawthorne (2005) 
and Liu (2010). 
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into U.S. markets. An inspected domestic product is refused entry if it violates U.S. 
product standards. However, an imported product can already be refused entry “if it 
[only] appears to violate” a certain U.S. product standard (Buzby et al., 2008; Liu, 
2010). This formulation in Section 801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
(FD&C) Act leaves room for discriminatory action of FDA officials with respect to im-
ports.11 The FDA separates violations into two main categories: adulteration and mis-
branding. According to the FD&C Act, adulteration means that due to the addition of a 
substance a product is inferior, impure and not genuine. Most violations for adulteration 
deal with safety, packaging integrity or sanitation, but differing product standards be-
tween trading partners might also be the cause.12 Besides adulteration, a product might 
also be denied entry in the United States due to misbranding. Misbranding includes un-
truthful or misleading statements on product labels or products missing appropriate la-
beling or packaging (Buzby et al., 2008). This category also comprises products that 
were rejected by the FDA due to the lack of necessary certificates for conformity as-
sessment. 
According to the FD&C Act, every importer of an FDA-regulated product has to file an 
entry notice with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which then notifies the 
FDA of the entry. The import requests are collected and processed by the computer-
based system “Operational and Administrative System for Import Support (OASIS)”. 
The FDA uses OASIS to review the entry documents and to make admissibility deci-
sions. If the FDA does not wish to inspect the entry, the product will proceed into U.S. 
commerce. If the FDA decides to examine the entry, the importer will not be allowed to 
further distribute the shipment until the result of the inspection is received. Two types of 
inspections exist: field exams and sample analysis involving a laboratory test of product 
samples. The overwhelming majority of inspections are field exams at the ports of en-
try, whereby FDA inspection officers mainly use organoleptic testing (e.g., appearance 
and smell) to decide whether a product complies with U.S. product standards.13 If the 
product appears to violate these standards, the importer will be given the opportunity to 
submit a petition to recondition the product into compliance (Buzby et al., 2008; Liu, 
2010; FDA, 2011a).14 
                                                 
11
 Imported products can be refused without any physical evidence, e.g. just on the basis of bad reputation due to past 
events of non-compliance at the firm or country-product level (see for instance Jouanjean et al., 2012). 
12
 Non-food products can also be refused due to adulteration, i.e., if product-specific regulations are not met. 
13
 Barrionuevo, Alexei  “Food Imports Often Escape Scrutiny,” The New York Times, May 1st, 2007. 
14
 Many law firms in the U.S. are specialized on contesting FDA decision of detentions and refusals (e.g., 
FDAimports.com, LLC: http://www.fdaimports.com/). The services of these law firms are expensive and it is 
hard(er) for exporters from developing countries to cover such legal costs. 
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Based on OASIS, the FDA collects information on all ultimately refused shipments in 
the Import Refusals Report (IRR). The IRR database is available from the beginning of 
2002 onwards and includes the exact date of the refusal, name, address and country of 
origin of the exporting firm, an FDA-specific product code and the product description, 
port of entry, reason for the refusal and the type of inspection. The database does not 
include information on the quantity, weight or value of refused shipments, but it is the 
best source of information on import refusals due to non-compliance with U.S. product 
standards. 
It is important to bear in mind that the FDA´s decision to inspect an entry is not random. 
The FDA is only able to inspect about 1% of all imported products under its jurisdiction 
(Buzby et al., 2008; FDA, 2010). To economize its resources for inspections, the FDA 
employs risk-based criteria to guide its inspections. Using the OASIS database and past 
import refusals, the FDA identifies exporting countries, product-groups, products or 
certain firms that have a higher risk of violating U.S. product standards. To react to ur-
gent risks, the FDA additionally issues import alerts that place a product from a certain 
country or a particular firm on detention without physical examination. Thus, subse-
quent shipments from this company or country-product-group will be refused automati-
cally, unless the importer can present evidence to overcome this violation.15 The FDA 
may also use external information to identify risk products such as the information from 
the EU-RASFF authorities (Jouanjean et al., 2012). Import surges in a given country-
product-group can also trigger more inspections, since any non-compliance represents a 
higher risk for U.S. citizens. Another reason for an increase in inspections of country-
product-groups with higher imports may be protectionism (Trefler, 1993; Essaji, 2008; 
Baylis et al., 2009).  
The United States is an important export market for many countries and about 20% of 
the overall U.S. imports fall under the jurisdiction of the FDA.16 25 cents of every dollar 
spent on commodities by U.S. consumers are for products regulated by the FDA (FDA, 
2011b). A growing share of these products comes from developing countries.17 In 2010, 
15% of food products, 28% of drugs and 52% of medical devices sold in the U.S. mar-
kets were imported. Import lines of FDA regulated products have grown from 6 million 
in 2001 to 24 million in 2011, corresponding to a 15% annual increase (FDA, 2011b). 
                                                 
15
 It can be quite costly, in particular for exporters from developing countries, to obtain the necessary documents for 
conformity assessment from accepted certification bodies (Jaffee and Henson, 2005). 
16
 The FDA estimates this share to be over 10%, but only considers food, drugs and cosmetics (FDA, 2011b). Hence, 
our estimate of around 20% in the year 2011 also includes medical devices, electronic items emitting radiation, ani-
mal feed and animal drugs and biologics under the jurisdiction of the FDA. 
17 Emerging markets like China, India and Mexico have increased their exports in FDA regulated products to the U.S. 
significantly in the last years. Drugs, medical devices and electronic items emitting radiation are the product catego-
ries that have experienced the strongest rise in imports from developing countries (FDA, 2011b). 
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Note that the resources dedicated to the FDA and the funding provided for FDA officers 
in the field (who are responsible for product inspections) vary over time. In the after-
math of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the Subprime crisis in 2008, the 
U.S. Congress granted more authority and additional resources to the FDA. The majori-
ty of the FDA investigators are assigned to inspect domestic products and facilities.18 It 
is difficult to identify the number of FDA officers assigned to the border from official 
documents. 
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Imports and Import Refusals 
Figure 1.2 shows total U.S. imports in FDA regulated products and the total number of 
refused shipments (total refusals) for the years 2002 to 2012. Except for the Great Re-
cession, U.S. imports have been steadily increasing and the overall volume of imports in 
FDA regulated products more than doubled during the sample period.19 In contrast to 
imports, import refusals exhibit more variation over time. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 allow for 
a comparison between OECD and non-OECD countries. There are two main takeaways. 
First, both country groups share a similar growth pattern in imports, but non-OECD 
countries account for on average USD 250 billion or about twice the overall import vol-
ume of OECD-countries. Second, while both groups had to face an increase in import 
refusals after the Subprime crisis, this increase is more pronounced for poorer countries 
and starts from a higher level of total refusals (around 10,000 vs. 4,000 refusals in the 
year 2009). Furthermore, non-OECD countries are responsible for the noticeable spike 
in import refusals in 2004/2005. 
To shed more light on the distribution of U.S. import refusals across product-groups, 
Table A1.8 in the Appendix shows import refusals at a more disaggregated product lev-
el. Food products play a prominent role among those products most often refused during 
the sample period. Fish products, fruits and vegetables, sugar confectionary, bread and 
pastry as well as sauces, mixed dressings and condiments are among the top ten most 
refused product-groups. However, the two product categories with most import refusals 
are other drugs and medical devices. Table A1.9 in the Appendix includes the ten most 
frequent reasons for import refusals from 2002 until 2011, showing that import refusals 
due to adulteration are less frequent than refusals due to misbranding or missing certifi-
cations. 
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 Racino, Brad (2011), “Inspectors Struggle to Keep Up with Flood of Imports,” News 21 
(http://foodsafety.news21.com/2011/imports/border/; download on October 29th, 2014). 
19
 Note that the shares for five aggregated product-groups have been quite stable over time (Fig. A1.6), i.e., the 
growth in imports is fairly spread over different sectors. Furthermore, the non-food product-groups pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics and other manufacturing goods combine for about 75% of total imports in FDA regulated products and are 
responsible for an increase in total import refusals during the sample period (Fig. A1.7). 
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To emphasize the importance of FDA regulated products for countries exporting to the 
U.S., we compute the share of FDA regulated products in total exports to the U.S. for 
2012. For most countries, FDA regulated products comprise more than 20% of total 
exports to the United States, whereby for some developed and developing countries like 
Ireland or Denmark and Ghana or Thailand this share rises above 50%. Tables A1.10 
and A1.11 provide further descriptive statistics on OECD and non-OECD countries. 
1.4 Data and Empirical Strategy 
1.4.1 Data 
This paper is based on a newly collected data set. We carefully gather detailed infor-
mation from two main data sources. Since the FDA uses its own unique product classi-
fication system, the main challenge has been to combine the FDA’s Import Refusals 
Report (IRR) database with disaggregated international trade data (c.i.f.) as provided by 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). The raw data provided by the FDA 
reports incidences of import refusals at the firm- and product-level. We aggregate im-
port refusals to the most fine-grained product-group for which a consistent match be-
tween the FDA and the Harmonized System (HS) classification is possible. Our guiding 
principle for this careful matching procedure has been that any FDA product code 
uniquely falls into the assigned HS product categories. We have succeeded in matching 
all FDA regulated products to the corresponding HS categories. The exact mapping for 
our 93 food and non-food product-groups is documented in Table A1.17 in the Appen-
dix.20 
Our panel data set starts with the first year for which the IRR data is available, covering 
on a yearly basis all country-product-groups with at least one notified refusal during the 
sample period 2002 to 2012. For an important extension of our baseline regression 
model, we draw on an additional data source. We use EU notification data from the 
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) database to instrument for U.S. refus-
als.21 The RASFF database uses yet another own production classification system and 
covers only food products and animal feed. After another careful match, this leaves us 
with 17 aggregated product-groups that consistently combine our 78 food and animal 
                                                 
20
 In principle, we match FDA product codes to HS 4 digit codes and preserve as much detailed information as possi-
ble. For some matched groups, we have to use additional HS 5 or HS 6 digit information. We have succeeded in 
creating 93 matched product-groups. Note that for medical devices and radiation emitting products, the constructed 
product-groups may include more HS products than necessary for matching, because it was not possible to isolate 
FDA regulated products at the HS 6 digit or even at the HS 10 digit classification. 
21
 We use all the information available in the RASFF notification database (i.e., import refusals and information on 
detentions, import alerts and firms own inspections) to construct our instrument, since all these types of information 
are relevant for inspection authorities at the U.S. FDA (Jouanjean et al., 2012). 
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feed product-groups with 35 broad product-groups by the RASFF. The exact mapping is 
presented in Table A1.18 in the Appendix.  
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy 
We proceed in three steps. We start with OLS and standard fixed effects estimates. 
Then, we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and estimate a dynamic panel model, where 
variations within the country-product-group are used for identification. The Arellano-
Bond estimator is a natural choice against the background of large N and small T, a dy-
namic data generating process and concerns about potential endogeneity. Our bilateral 
gravity model for disaggregated import flows to the United States covers up to 93 prod-
uct-groups per country for the years 2002 to 2012, with 166 exporting countries enter-
ing our baseline regression. We estimate the following reduced form model: 
 ln ,,	 = ∑  ln ,,	 + 	,,	 + 	 + , + ,,	,        (1.1) 
 
whereby the dependent variable measures the real value of imports (in logarithm) from 
country i’s product-group k at time t to the United States. We control in all our main 
specifications for time fixed effects (µ t) and for country-product-group fixed effects 
(γi,k).  
Our coefficient of main interest is β, which captures the effect of import refusals on 
sectoral trade flows to the United States. Following the literature, we employ two dif-
ferent measures for import refusals in our empirical analysis. First, we use a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one, if in a given product-group k from country i at 
least one incidence of a refusal has been recorded at time t. Second, we use the 
log(1+refusals) in order to account for the intensity of import refusals, i.e., the total 
number of refusals in such a country-product-group in time t. The refusal indicator en-
ters equation (1.1) with a lag for two main reasons. First, export contracts tend to be 
signed a few months in advance and cannot be cancelled short-term. Second, we meas-
ure imports to the United States as the import value (c.i.f.), i.e., cost, insurance and 
freight implies among other things that export shipments to the U.S. that have been re-
fused by the FDA still enter the import statistics in a given year. 
Note that the time fixed effects capture time-varying characteristics of the importing 
country, global macroeconomic conditions and factors affecting trade costs for all ex-
porting countries to the United States alike. This time fixed effect also absorbs any 
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changes in FDA inspection capacity in the United States. Furthermore, the country-
product-group fixed effects control for the time average of the multilateral resistance 
terms at the country-product-group level and time invariant country-product-group 
characteristics, like trade costs or production levels. Since the country-fixed effects are a 
linear combination of these country-product-group specific effects, we are not able to 
either include country dummies or distance to the United States (a classical gravity vari-
able) separately in the regression.22 
The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator allows for using internal and external instruments. 
On the one hand, we instrument endogenous refusals with lagged refusals as internal 
instruments. Essaji (2008) argues that in a panel data setting lagged values of technical 
regulations in the U.S. represent plausible instruments for these regulations. In our con-
text, this strategy is even more sensible, since FDA inspections are inter alia guided by 
past incidences of refusals. To foresee two important specification tests of our dynamic 
panel estimates, the null hypothesis of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions of 
the Sargan and Hansen tests will indeed never be rejected. On the other hand, in an im-
portant extension, we additionally incorporate EU notifications from the RASFF data-
base as external instruments. We generate our variables for non-compliance with EU 
product standards analogously to the U.S. ones. 
EU notifications constitute a valid instrument for U.S. import refusals, since U.S. FDA 
agents are reported to also use external information to identify high-risk products to 
guide their inspections. It is reassuring for our empirical strategy that Baylis et al. 
(2009) show that EU import refusals are indeed one important determinant of U.S. im-
port refusals. Furthermore, EU notifications in a certain exporting country-product-
group should not be correlated with U.S. import demand in the same country-product-
group. EU notifications are collected from individual EU member states with heteroge-
neous import demand structures. More generally, the United States and the European 
Union are quite different with respect to their overall openness to trade, their major trad-
ing partners and their import demand structure. Hence, EU refusals and notifications are 
plausibly exogenous to U.S. import demand and constitute a valid instrument in our 
context. 
  
                                                 
22
 Note that we will report below robustness checks including further fixed effects controlling for time-varying coun-
try dummies (multilateral resistance term) and time-varying aggregated sector dummies. 
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1.6 Empirical Results 
1.6.1 Baseline Results 
We now turn to our main results. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present the estimates for a number 
of baseline regressions. In Table 1.1, we use the dummy refusal and in Table 1.2 the 
refusal intensity log(1+refusals) as our measures for non-compliance with U.S. product 
standards.  
In both tables, we benchmark our preferred dynamic panel model in Column (4) with 
pooled OLS and simple fixed effects estimates in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. 
Compared to Column (4), Column (3) takes the allegedly wrong assumption of refusals 
being exogenous. Our preferred specification in Column (4) is based on the two-step 
Arellano-Bond estimator with the dependent variable entering with its first and second 
lag. These lagged dependent variables are instrumented with their first through third 
lags. Furthermore, for our refusal indicator variable, we also use its first through third 
lag as internal instruments. To avoid weak instrument problems, we reduce the number 
of instruments by collapsing the instrument matrix (Roodman, 2009). Furthermore, we 
follow Bazzi and Clemens (2013) and open the “black box” of GMM in order to assess 
the strength of our instruments for our preferred specifications in Column (4). It is reas-
suring that these (unreported) additional specification tests show that we can reject the 
null hypotheses of underidentification and weak instruments.23 Finally, all our main 
results are robust to the exact lag length of our instruments (as shown in Tables A1.19 
and A1.20 in the Appendix). 
There are two main findings from Tables 1.1 and 1.2. First, the disaggregated U.S. im-
port flows exhibit substantial persistence over time. Our estimates show that the first 
and the second lag of the dependent variable enter our regression significantly. This 
corroborates our decision to use a dynamic panel estimator. Furthermore, the null hy-
pothesis of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions is rejected neither for the 
Sargan- nor the Hansen-test in any main regression, indicating that our preferred speci-
fication is well-specified. 
Second, import refusals are indeed endogenous to import flows. When we control for 
lagged import flows and country-product-group fixed effects using the Arellano-Bond 
estimator in Column (3), the positive and significant impact of refusals on import flows 
of the simple OLS in Column (1) disappears. Once we additionally instrument our im-
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 In particular, we employ the tests for underidentification and for weak instruments as proposed by Kleinbergen and 
Paap (2006) and Stock and Yogo (2005) as well as Yogo (2004), respectively. In the latter case, we follow Bazzi and 
Clemens (2013) and test for the null hypothesis that the bias is greater than 30 percent of the OLS bias. 
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port refusals indicator with lagged refusals, the point coefficients become negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level (see Column (4) of Table 1.1 and 1.2). 
These results demonstrate that the endogeneity of trade barriers leads to a strong upward 
bias in the estimated coefficient and an underestimation of trade costs, if the empirical 
strategy does not address these endogeneity issues. Trefler (1993) finds that accounting 
for endogeneity of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs), the estimated negative impact of 
NTBs on U.S. imports is ten times larger than in estimations not addressing the 
endogeneity issue. Similar to our paper, Essaji (2008) shows that the effects of U.S. 
technical regulations on U.S. imports are significantly negative when accounting for 
endogeneity of technical regulations to import flows. In the case of not addressing the 
endogeneity issues, he reports positive effects of technical regulations on imports. 
1.6.2 Developing vs. Developed Countries 
In this section, we go beyond the overall impact of import refusals and present a more 
nuanced picture by distinguishing between different product-groups, types of refusals 
and - in particular - country groups.  
We report our preferred specification of Table 1.2, Column (4), in the first column of 
Table 1.3 for comparability. We refer to this estimation as our baseline estimation. Col-
umn (2) allows the slope coefficient for import refusals to vary by product-group. We 
distinguish between food-products and non-food products. The point coefficients for 
both product-groups are negative, but (due to the large standard error for non-food 
products) only the coefficient for food-products is significantly different from zero.  
We continue with an important part of our analysis. In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 
1.3, we investigate, whether there is a differential effect of import refusals between de-
veloped and developing countries for food and non-food products. Thereby, we distin-
guish between OECD and non-OECD countries. While the first group of countries in-
cludes all industrialized countries with a very high standard of living, the second group 
encompasses developing and emerging markets with on average a lower GDP per capi-
ta.24 Note that we apply the same specification as in Column (2) once to OECD coun-
tries and once to non-OECD countries in Columns (3) and (4), respectively. This sample 
split reveals that the negative impact of refusals on imports is driven by poorer coun-
tries. Similarly to the baseline, the point coefficients for food and non-food products are 
                                                 
24
 Note that we employ the “classical” definition of OECD countries from the beginning of the 1990s (before emerg-
ing markets like Mexico and Chile joined), since it provides a sharper distinction between rich and poor countries. 
None of our main results hinges on the exact definition.  
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negative for non-OECD countries and in the same ballpark, but only the former coeffi-
cient is also significantly different from zero. 
Furthermore, we offer results for the type of refusals in Table 1.4. We group refusals 
according to the type of non-compliance into refusals due to adulteration and refusals 
due to misbranding and allow the slope coefficient for refusals to vary by refusal type. 
For all countries, both point coefficients are negative and not significant. For non-
OECD countries, we find negative point coefficients of roughly similar size, with the 
coefficient on adulteration being significant at the 5% level. 
1.6.3 Is there Evidence for Protectionism? 
To recap our empirical results thus far: We find that import refusals negatively affect 
disaggregated trade flows to the United States, in particular for non-OECD countries. 
But our empirical analyses have not offered any indication for hidden protectionism yet. 
We will argue in this section that the type of inspection can shed some light on hidden 
protectionism. Remember that an imported product can be refused entry, if it simply 
“appears to violate” U.S. product standards. Hence, there is considerable leeway for the 
FDA to enforce these standards, opening the door for less honorable motives than pure 
health or product quality concerns. It is reasonable to assume that this leeway is most 
pronounced, if a refusal is not based on any laboratory tests but solely on the judgment 
of an FDA officer. We will proceed in two steps in this section. First, we will distin-
guish between refusals with and without any product sample analysis. Second, we are 
interested in examining to what extent refusals and the negative trade effect of the in-
spection type varies over time. 
Table 1.5 presents the results for different types of inspection that lead to import refus-
als. The results in Column (2) indicate that those refusals that are not based on any 
product sample analysis are driving the negative effect of (the total number of) refusals 
on imports for the overall sample. Even worse, when comparing the results in Column 
(3) and (4), it becomes evident that solely non-OECD countries suffer from this discre-
tionary room for refusal decisions. To be clear, many of these refusal decisions might be 
well-grounded, for instance if a product is obviously rotten. But the room for discrimi-
natory action is considerable in this category and it is worrisome that solely developing 
countries are suffering from these potentially arbitrary refusals.25 It is exactly this type 
                                                 
25
 Various cases of discriminatory action of U.S. authorities against imports from developing countries are document-
ed in the literature. For instance, U.S. authorities have banned Mexican Hass Avocados from entering the U.S. market 
for 79 years due to pest concerns, though officials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture have repeatedly certified 
Mexican growing areas as pest free during that time period (Lamb, 2006). 
 19 
of non-tariff barrier to trade that might fly under the radar, since it is hard to identify 
and measure.  
In an intermediate step, Table 1.6 sheds some light on the evolution of refusals over 
time. While the estimates of these simple regressions should not be interpreted causally, 
they clearly indicate a positive correlation between the number of refusals and the Sub-
prime Crisis and its aftermath in the United States. This significant rise in refusals and 
(in unreported results) refusals without any product sample analysis provides further 
evidence consistent with hidden protectionism during crisis times.26 This argument is 
further supported by Levchenko et al. (2011), who show that the product quality of U.S. 
imports did not decline during the Subprime Crisis and its aftermath.  
Finally, we show in Table 1.7 how the results for both types of inspection for OECD 
and non-OECD countries vary over time. For comparability, Columns (1) and (4) report 
the baseline results for both country groups for refusals based on product sample anal-
yses and refusals without such analyses. More importantly, we provide in Columns (2) 
and (3) as well as (5) and (6) a sample split along the time dimension, whereby the first 
period spans the years from 2004 to 2008 for a similar instrumentation length. The se-
cond period from 2008 to 2012 encompasses the Subprime Crisis and its aftermath in 
the United States.27 Hence, both sample periods are directly comparable in sample size 
but differ in a crucial dimension. The average unemployment rate in the United States 
rose from 5.87 to 8.34%. 
The results of Table 1.7 are striking. Non-OECD countries generally suffer from import 
refusals without any product sample analysis and they suffer all the more when unem-
ployment rates in the U.S. are at historical highs. In stark contrast, import refusals do 
not have any statistically significant impact on export flows for OECD countries to the 
United States during any time period. In addition, Figure 1.5 offers another interesting 
insight. The share of FDA-inspections based on a product sample analysis (out of all 
FDA-inspections with and without product sample analysis) has decreased over the last 
few years, even though the total FDA budget for field activities (i.e., product inspec-
tions) and the number of FDA-officers in the field have increased. In our view, the re-
                                                 
26
 The Subprime Crisis and its aftermath (2008-2012) also coincide with a rise in the unemployment rate and an 
increase in the number of inspections and of FDA field officers as well as the FDA budget more generally. Since all 
these variables are highly, positively correlated, it is not sensible to enter them simultaneously in such a regression. 
Note that these variables only vary over time but not across country-product groups and are captured in all our main 
regressions by the time fixed effects. 
27
 While we feel that these two subsamples are well suited for such a comparison due to sample size and efficiency 
reasons, the results on the type of inspection hold more generally for 5-year rolling windows for OECD and non-
OECD countries (see Appendix Tables A1.21 and A1.22). 
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gression results are consistent with the hypothesis that the enforcement of U.S. product 
standards is hidden protectionism in disguise at the cost of poor countries. 
1.6.4 The Costs of Non-Compliance with U.S. Product Standards 
The size of the negative effects of U.S. import refusals on U.S. imports is substantial. 
An increase of the refusal intensity by 10% reduces U.S. imports in a certain country-
product-group by 3.2% (see Table 1.2, Column 4).28 Trefler (1993) and Essaji (2008) 
also report large economic effects of U.S. non-tariff barriers to trade. For instance, 
Trefler (1993) found that NTBs in the manufacturing sector reduced manufacturing im-
ports to the United States by 24% in 1983.  
In our paper, the negative trade effects of import refusals are confined to emerging and 
developing countries. It seems intuitive that it is more difficult for poorer countries to 
comply with product standards in the United States. At the same time, it is important to 
note that our empirical exercise allows us to quantify the costs of non-compliance with 
U.S. product standards for poorer countries in the short- and long-term. An increase in 
the number of refusals by one standard deviation decreases imports to the United States 
from non-OECD countries by about real USD 385 million (in 2005 terms) per country 
and product-group (based on Column (4) of Table A1.12, which presents the preferred 
specification of Table 1.2 for non-OECD countries). Since for non-OECD countries on 
average about 15 product-groups underlie the identification of this effect, the short-run 
costs of non-compliance amount to around USD 6 billion per exporting country. Turn-
ing to the long-run effects, we find that developing countries lose over USD 11 billion 
in export flows to the United States. 
Our empirical results confirm and qualify that product standards represent a challenge in 
particular to developing countries (Essaji, 2008). The fixed costs to enter a foreign mar-
ket are higher for producers in developing countries and their production costs are more 
sensitive to a tightening of product standards.29,30 Poorer countries often lack the public 
infrastructure, investment sources and human capital to meet the product standards and 
conformity assessment requirements of a developed importing country. Hence, product 
                                                 
28
 Note that an alternative measure for the intensity of import refusals, namely log(refusals), would reduce our main 
sample from about 23,000 to just over 7,000 observations. For this reduced sample and this alternative measure, our 
estimates on the implied trade costs are still in the same ballpark. 
29
 For instance, Maskus et al. (1999), Jaffe and Henson (2005) and Jaud and Kukenova (2011). 
30 The literature stresses the costs incurred to meet the precise technical regulation (product re-design) and costs for 
verifying that regulations are met (conformity assessment). Maskus et al. (1999) claim that conformity assessment 
costs pose by far the larger technical barrier to trade for exporting firms in developing countries. They also state that 
the recognition of conformity assessment certificates leaves room for protectionism. 
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standards negatively affect import flows especially for developing countries (Henson 
and Loader, 2001; Disdier et al., 2008; Essaji, 2008).31   
Returning to the key results of Table 1.7, we compare the negative trade effects for non-
OECD countries’ import refusals without a product sample analysis before and after the 
Subprime Crisis. For a change of one standard deviation in refusals, the negative short-
term and long-term costs for non-OECD countries rise by more than four times, from 
1.8 billion to 8.9 billion and 3.6 billion to 16.1 billion, respectively. Note that this jump 
in costs of foregone exports is driven by a doubling in the point coefficient and an in-
crease in variation of import refusals in the later period. 
1.6.5 Further Results 
We conclude the discussion of our empirical results with some further robustness 
checks and an excursus on European Union member states. In Column (1) of Table 
A1.13 in the Appendix, we start by reporting our baseline results for all countries for 
comparability. In Column (2), we add EU refusals and other notifications within the 
same country-product-group as additional external instruments (on top of the internal 
instruments of the GMM estimator).32 This specification is based on 78 food and animal 
feed product-groups for which we can construct the external instruments. The results in 
Column (2) indicate that our main results are robust to using additional external instru-
ments for U.S. import refusals with the coefficients being significant and in the same 
ballpark as our benchmark results. 
Turning to Columns (3) and (4) of Table A1.13, we check whether our main results are 
robust to the inclusion of further fixed effects. Note that these two specifications are 
based on those countries that export at least 20 (out of 93) product-groups to the United 
States. This restriction is necessary, because more cross-sectional variation within coun-
tries is required for these more demanding specifications. Column (3) adds sector-year 
fixed effects to the baseline specification in Column (1).33 This specification is further 
extended by country-time fixed effects, whereby we consider two-year periods in each 
case. Column (4) of Table A1.13 presents the results for the most demanding specifica-
tion, where time-, country-product-, sector-year and country-time-fixed effects are in-
cluded at the same time. Hence, in the order of fixed effects, this specification controls 
                                                 
31
 For the shrimp industry in Bangladesh and Nicaragua, Jaffe and Henson (2005), Cato et al. (2000) and Cato and 
Lima dos Santos (2003) provide numerical examples for the sizable adjustment costs developing country exporters 
face due to non-compliance with U.S. product standards. 
32
 We use the first and the second lag of the intensity of EU notifications to instrument for the first lag of our refusal 
intensity measure. 
33
 We define 5 aggregated sectors for our 93 product-groups: fish products, fruits and vegetables, other food products 
and animal feed, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics and other manufacturing products. 
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for macroeconomic shocks in the United States, any time-invariant country-specific 
product characteristics, any time-varying global factors at a more aggregated product-
level and any time-varying characteristics at the country of origin. We perform the same 
set of specifications for the main results for non-OECD countries, including the baseline 
results as well as the specifications for refusals with and without product sample anal-
yses (as reported in Tables A1.14 and A1.15 in the Appendix). It is reassuring that all 
our main results are insensitive to these alternative specifications, with the point esti-
mates being in the same ballpark and significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, we provide further empirical results in light of the ongoing negotiations on a 
free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. Since the re-
duction in and harmonization of product standards is a central part of these negotiations, 
it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at the effects of U.S. import refusals on Euro-
pean Union member countries (as opposed to non-European member countries). We 
estimate the main specifications in Columns (4) of Tables 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 for the 
27 EU member states. Any negative and significant effects for EU member countries 
could be interpreted as evidence for potential gains from reforms in product standards 
between the United States and the European Union. The results presented in Table 
A1.16 do not give any such indication. 
1.7 Conclusions 
This paper assesses the impact of U.S. import refusals on U.S. sectoral import flows for 
a rich data set of 93 product-groups for over 160 trading partners from 2002 to 2012. 
Our estimates show that non-compliance with U.S. product standards can exhibit sub-
stantial trade costs. This trade reducing effect of enforced product standards is driven by 
non-OECD countries, whereby our empirical results indicate that a one standard devia-
tion increase in refusals reduces short- and long-run exports from developing countries 
by USD 6 to 11 billion. Hence, non-compliance with product standards can be very 
costly for poorer countries and might hinder their economic development. 
Furthermore, we find striking evidence that the intensity of FDA inspections and import 
refusals as well as the negative effect of import refusals on U.S. imports have increased 
in the aftermath of the Subprime Crisis. During this time period, the unemployment 
rates in the United States have also markedly increased, suggesting that there is a busi-
ness cycle element to the non-compliance of imports with U.S. product standards. 
Most importantly, we find that the sharp increase in import refusals is driven by those 
refusals that are not based on any product sample analysis. It is exactly this sort of in-
spection that offers most leeway for FDA officers. In many instances these refusals are 
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for sure warranted, but it is puzzling that these types of refusals are counter-cyclical, 
suggesting that the FDA, like any other U.S. agency, might not be immune to political 
pressures. We conclude that our empirical results are consistent with the existence of 
counter-cyclical, hidden protectionism due to non-tariff barriers to trade in the United 
States. Hence, this paper corroborates worries raised by Baldwin and Evenett (2009) 
about a rise of murky protectionism. 
  
 24 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1.: U.S. Imports and Refusals Dummy – Different Estimators 
Variables OLS Fixed  
effects 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1)    0.739**   0.410**   0.443**   0.470** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) 
Log Imports (t-2) 
  0.233**   0.030*   0.061**   0.070** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dummy refusal (t-1)   0.047**  0.023° -0.005 -0.850* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.42) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous No No No Yes 
AR(1)   0.000 0.000 
AR(2)   0.712 0.745 
Sargan-test   0.231 0.794 
Hansen-test   0.605 0.883 
Number of instruments   13 15 
Number of groups   3304 3304 
Number of countries 166 166 164 164 
Number of observations 26858 26858 23242 23242 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable dummy refusal 
takes the value of one, if in a given product-group k from country i at least one refusal incidence is recorded in year t. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The estimates in Column (1) and (2) are based on pooled OLS and (country-product) 
fixed effects, with standard errors being clustered at the country-level. Columns (3) and (4) employ a two-step Arellano-Bond 
estimator with robust standard errors. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the first through third lag. In Column 
(3), we define dummy refusal as exogenous. In Column (4), we allow the dummy refusal to be endogenous and instrument it 
with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively 
Table 1.2.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Different Estimators 
Variables OLS Fixed  
effects 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1)   0.737**   0.410**   0.443**   0.448** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Log Imports (t-2) 
  0.231**   0.030*   0.061**   0.064** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Refusals (t-1)   0.035** 0.011 -0.004 -0.323* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous No No No Yes 
AR(1)   0.000 0.000 
AR(2)   0.713 0.629 
Sargan-test   0.230 0.656 
Hansen-test   0.605 0.869 
Number of instruments   13 15 
Number of groups   3304 3304 
Number of countries 166 166 164 164 
Number of observations 26858 26858 23242 23242 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers 
to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The estimates in Column (1) and (2) are based on pooled OLS and (country-product) 
fixed effects, with standard errors being clustered at the country-level. Columns (3) and (4) employ a two-step Arellano-Bond 
estimator with robust standard errors. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the first through third lag. In Column 
(3), we define the variable refusals as exogenous. In Column (4), we allow the variable refusals to be endogenous and instrument 
it with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.3.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Food vs. Non-Food Products 
Variables Baseline All countries OECD-
countries 
Non-OECD-
countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.448** 0.460** 0.480** 0.404** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.064** 0.066** 0.019 0.073** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Refusals (t-1) -0.323*    
 (0.13)    
Refusals (non-Food) (t-1) 
 
-0.449 
(0.74) 
 
0.159 
(0.35) 
-0.760  
(0.61)  
Refusals (Food) (t-1) 
 
-0.256* 
(0.11) 
 
-0.026 
(0.10) 
-0.457* 
(0.21) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.629 0.575 0.745 0.349 
Sargan-test 0.656 0.653 0.775 0.902 
Hansen-test 0.869 0.661 0.953 0.937 
Number of instruments 15 18 18 18 
Number of groups 3304 3304 929 2375 
Number of countries 164 164 23 141 
Number of observations 23242 23242 6980 16262 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers 
to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estima-
tions are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged depend-
ent variable is instrumented with the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrument-
ed with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. In Column (1), we report the baseline estimates for all 
refusals from Table 2, Column (4), for comparability. Column (2) allows for different slope coefficients for refusals for food and 
non-food product-groups. Columns (3) and (4) report the same specification for OECD-countries and non-OECD-countries, 
separately. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.4.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Type of Refusal 
Variables Baseline All countries OECD-
countries 
Non-OECD-
countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.448** 0.454** 0.525** 0.409** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.064** 0.063** 0.029 0.070** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Refusals (t-1) -0.323*    
 (0.13)    
Refusals (Misbranding) 
(t-1) 
 
-0.324 
(0.30) 
 
0.144 
(0.55) 
-0.468  
(0.33)  
Refusals (Adulteration) (t-
1) 
 
-0.190 
(0.12) 
 
-0.086 
(0.32) 
-0.341* 
(0.15) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.629 0.552 0.769 0.368 
Sargan-test 0.656 0.573 0.763 0.371 
Hansen-test 0.869 0.561 0.972 0.398 
Number of instruments 15 18 18 18 
Number of groups 3304 3304 929 2375 
Number of countries 164 164 23 141 
Number of observations 23242 23242 6980 16262 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers 
to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estima-
tions are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged depend-
ent variable is instrumented with the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrument-
ed with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. In Column (1), we report the baseline estimates for all 
refusals from Table 2, Column (4), for comparability. Column (2) allows for different slope coefficients for refusal types adulter-
ation and misbranding. Columns (3) and (4) report the same specification for OECD-countries and non-OECD-countries, sepa-
rately. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.5.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Type of Inspection 
Variables Baseline All countries OECD-
countries 
Non-OECD-
countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.448** 0.460** 0.522** 0.425** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.064** 0.065** 0.029 0.072** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Refusals (t-1) -0.323*    
 (0.13)    
Refusals (Sample) (t-1) 
 
0.349 
(0.23) 
 
-0.170 
(0.35) 
0.427  
(0.28)  
Refusals (no Sample) (t-1) 
 
-0.310* 
(0.12) 
 
0.082 
(0.14) 
-0.546** 
(0.19) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.629 0.463 0.708 0.230 
Sargan-test 0.656 0.641 0.683 0.812 
Hansen-test 0.869 0.651 0.924 0.819 
Number of instruments 15 18 18 18 
Number of groups 3304 3304 929 2375 
Number of countries 164 164 23 141 
Number of observations 23242 23242 6980 16262 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers 
to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estima-
tions are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged depend-
ent variable is instrumented with the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrument-
ed with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. In Column (1), we report the baseline estimates for all 
refusals from Table 2, Column (4), for comparability. Column (2) allows for different slope coefficients for the type of inspec-
tion leading to a given refusal. We distinguish between refusals without any product sample analysis and refusals after an FDA 
or private product sample analysis has been provided. Columns (3) and (4) report the same specification for OECD-countries and 
non-OECD-countries, separately. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.6.: U.S. Refusals and the Subrime Crisis – A First View 
Variables OLS Fixed  
effects 
Fixed  
effects 
Fixed  
effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crisis   0.026*   0.039**   0.036**   0.037** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log Imports     0.028**   0.027** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Refusals (t-1)    0.050** 
    (0.01) 
Time FE No No No No 
Country-Product FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous No No No No 
Number of groups 3304 3304 3304 3304 
Number of countries 164 164 164 164 
Number of observations 23242 23242 23242 23242 
Notes: Dependent variable refusals refers to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and 
enters as the log(1+refusals). The variable Crisis is a dummy variable taking the value of one for the years 2008 to 2012 and zero 
otherwise. Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. Standard errors are clustered at the country-
product-level are reported in parentheses. The estimates in Column (1) and Columns (2), (3) and (4) are based on pooled OLS 
and country-product fixed effects, respectively. All estimates are based on the same sample as the main sample (see Table 2). **, 
* and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.7.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Evidence for Hidden Protectionism? 
 
 OECD-countries Non-OECD-countries 
Variables Baseline 2004-2008 2008-2012 Baseline 2004-2008 2008-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.522** 0.451** 0.445** 0.425** 0.432** 0.385** 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.029 0.049 -0.017 0.072** 0.056° 0.064** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Refusals (Sample) (t-1) -0.170  
(0.35)  
0.042  
(0.14)  
-0.383 
(0.53)  
0.427  
(0.28)  
0.252 
(0.27) 
0.354  
(0.26)  
Refusals (no Sample) (t-1) 0.082 
(0.15) 
0.017 
(0.14) 
-0.086 
(0.17) 
-0.546** 
(0.19) 
-0.243° 
(0.14) 
-0.549* 
(0.26) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.708 0.586 0.503 0.230 0.189 0.225 
Sargan-test 0.683 0.558 0.015 0.812 0.322 0.863 
Hansen-test 0.924 0.288 0.797 0.819 0.134 0.923 
Number of instruments 18 15 15 18 14 15 
Number of groups 929 914 908 2375 2183 2281 
Number of countries 23 23 23 141 141 141 
Number of observations 6980 4358 4371 16262 8033 10272 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t 
and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the 
first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. In Column (1) and Column (4), we report the 
estimates for the whole time period from Table 5, Columns (3) and (4) for comparability. Columns (2) and (3) and Columns (5) and (6) split the OECD and non-OECD sample into two time periods of compara-
ble size, whereby the later sample period encompasses the Subprime Crisis and rising unemployment rates in the United States. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1.1.: U.S. Unemployment Rate and Hidden Protectionism? 
 
Figure 1.2.: Total U.S. Imports and Refusals of FDA Regulated Products 
10
00
0
14
00
0
18
00
0
22
00
0
26
00
0
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
U.
S.
 
Un
e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (%
 
La
bo
r 
Fo
rc
e)
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
U.S. unemployment rate (in percent)
Total number of refusals
Total number of refusals (w/o sample analysis)
Total number of FDA-inspections/10
Sources: OASIS, ITC, WEO and own calculations; FDA Budget Authority, various years.
10
00
0
14
00
0
18
00
0
22
00
0
26
00
0
To
ta
l N
u
m
be
r 
of
 
R
ef
u
sa
ls
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
45
0
50
0
55
0
To
ta
l I
m
po
rts
 
(in
 
bi
llio
n
s)
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Total imports (in billions)
Total number of refusals
Sources: OASIS, ITC and own calculations.
 31 
 
Figure 1.3.: U.S. Imports and Refusals for OECD Countries   
 
Figure 1.4.: U.S. Imports and Refusals for non-OECD Countries 
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Figure 1.5.: FDA-budget for Field Activities, FDA-officers in the Field and FDA-inspections 
with Product Sample Analysis 
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Appendix 1 A Tables and Figures 
Appendix Table A 1.8.: Number of U.S. Import Refusals per Matched Product-group 2002 – 
2012 (Top Ten out of 93 Product-groups) 
Product-
group Num-
ber 
Description Number of Im-port Refusals 
84 Other medicaments, except antibiotics and hormones 32623 
90 Medical instruments, machines and other medical devices 27889 
74 Skin care and make up 8197 
36 Bread and pastry, pudding, other baker ware 7998 
2 Fish, dried, salted, smoked or in brine 7467 
46 Sugar confectionary without cacao 6781 
3 Crustaceans, fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, smoked or in brine 6323 
60 Sauces, mixed dressings and condiments 5986 
8 Fruits used as vegetables, fresh or chilled 5352 
1 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 5247 
 
Appendix Table A 1.9.: Reasons of U.S. Import Refusals (Top Ten Reasons from 2002 - 2011) 
FDA Reason 
Code FDA Reason Description 
Number of Import 
Refusals  
NOT LISTED It appears the drug or device is not included in a list required 
by Section 510(j), or a notice or other information respecting 
it was not provided as required by section 510(j) or 510(k). 
27113 
UNAPPROVED The article appears to be a new drug without an approved new 
drug application. 26699 
FILTHY The article appears to consist in whole or in part of a filthy, 
putrid, or decomposed substance or be otherwise unfit for 
food. 
18743 
NUTRIT LBL The article appears to be misbranded in that the label or label-
ing fails to bear the required nutrition information. 16119 
NO PROCESS It appears that the manufacturer has not filed information on 
its scheduled process as required by 21 CFR 108.25(c)(2) or 
108.35(c)(2). 
14637 
UNSAFE COL The article appears to be a color additive for the purposes of 
coloring only in or on drugs or devices, and is unsafe within 
the meaning of Section 721(a). 
12500 
SALMONELLA The article appears to contain Salmonella, a poisonous and 
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health. 11073 
NEEDS FCE It appears the manufacturer is not registered as a low acid 
canned food or acidified food manufacturer pursuant to 21 
CFR 108.25(c)(1) or 108.35(c)(1). 
10015 
LIST INGRE It appears the food is fabricated from two or more ingredients 
and the label 
does not list the common or usual name of each ingredient. 
9857 
PESTICIDES The article is subject to refusal of admission pursuant to sec-
tion 801(a)(3) in that it appears to be adulterated because it 
contains a pesticide chemical, which is in violation of section 
402(a)(2)(B). 
9510 
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Appendix Table A 1.10.: Share of FDA Regulated Products in Total Exports to the U.S. for 
OECD Countries (Year 2012) 
Country 
Total ex-
ports to the 
US (in Mill. 
USD) 
Total ex-
ports of 
FDA prod-
ucts (in 
Mill. USD) 
Share of 
FDA prod-
ucts in total 
exports 
Share of 
FDA food 
products in 
total exports 
Share of 
FDA non-
food prod-
ucts in total 
exports 
Canada 328719.27 34057.84 10.36% 5.88% 4.48% 
Germany 110612.00 23195.66 20.97% 1.40% 19.57% 
Ireland 33436.44 19309.24 57.75% 2.47% 55.28% 
Japan 150401.18 13811.87 9.18% 0.51% 8.67% 
Switzerland 25955.55 12031.50 46.35% 3.38% 42.97% 
France 42339.07 11962.74 28.25% 9.90% 18.36% 
United Kingdom 55975.68 10941.81 19.55% 4.24% 15.31% 
Italy 38145.46 8789.33 23.04% 10.12% 12.92% 
Netherlands 22937.61 5115.52 22.30% 8.80% 13.51% 
Denmark 6894.37 4065.58 58.97% 3.32% 55.65% 
Belgium 17701.04 3408.08 19.25% 3.51% 15.75% 
Spain 12221.53 2940.42 24.06% 11.97% 12.09% 
Austria 9695.12 2751.44 28.38% 6.58% 21.79% 
Sweden 10490.75 2572.59 24.52% 4.97% 19.55% 
Australia 9851.58 2474.72 25.12% 11.65% 13.47% 
New Zealand 3623.29 1620.19 44.72% 29.65% 15.06% 
Finland 5317.83 1185.18 22.29% 1.35% 20.94% 
Norway 6754.39 880.99 13.04% 5.14% 7.90% 
Turkey 6605.28 833.31 12.62% 9.33% 3.29% 
Greece 1051.89 382.30 36.34% 25.79% 10.55% 
Portugal 2706.28 300.29 11.10% 4.64% 6.45% 
Iceland 299.94 214.86 71.63% 51.82% 19.81% 
Luxembourg 579.99 151.79 2.87% 0.02% 2.86% 
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Appendix Table A 1.11.: Share of FDA Regulated Products in Total Exports to the U.S. for non-
OECD Countries (Year 2012, Top 10 by Region) 
Country Group Country 
Total ex-
ports to the 
US (in 
Mill. USD) 
Total exports 
of FDA prod-
ucts (in Mill. 
USD) 
Share of 
FDA 
products in 
total ex-
ports 
Share of 
FDA food 
products in 
total exports 
Share of 
FDA non-
food products 
in total ex-
ports 
Africa Cote d`Ivoire 1138.81 778.28 68.34% 68.20% 0.14% 
  
South Africa 8861.26 404.37 4.56% 3.23% 1.34% 
  
Ghana 304.87 199.83 65.55% 65.08% 0.47% 
  
Morocco 995.25 169.41 17.02% 14.83% 2.19% 
  
Tunisia 759.33 140.18 18.46% 15.74% 2.72% 
  
Kenya 404.57 110.90 27.41% 26.17% 1.24% 
  
Egypt 3104.64 109.71 3.53% 2.39% 1.14% 
  
Ethiopia 189.43 101.39 53.52% 53.34% 0.18% 
  
Nigeria 19523.41 83.25 0.43% 0.41% 0.02% 
  
Malawi 69.30 63.11 91.07% 91.03% 0.04% 
Asia and Oceania China 444469.15 161000.61 36.22% 1.52% 34.70% 
  
Thailand 27051.56 13972.76 51.65% 14.68% 36.97% 
  
Japan 150401.18 13811.87 9.18% 0.51% 8.67% 
  
India 41910.57 12166.13 29.03% 5.30% 23.73% 
  
Malaysia 26651.97 11074.61 41.55% 7.04% 34.51% 
  
Korea 60979.15 9630.99 15.79% 0.92% 14.87% 
  
Taiwan 40215.10 9037.19 22.47% 1.06% 21.41% 
  
Israel 22344.66 7628.57 34.14% 1.23% 32.91% 
  
Singapore 20455.01 5018.75 24.54% 0.60% 23.94% 
  
Indonesia 18839.70 3749.06 19.90% 13.70% 6.20% 
Americas Mexico 280024.55 71343.35 25.48% 5.81% 19.67% 
  Canada 328719.27 34057.84 10.36% 5.88% 4.48% 
  Brazil 33227.22 4155.34 12.51% 10.62% 1.89% 
  Chile 10096.59 4101.42 40.62% 39.74% 0.88% 
  Costa Rica 12303.03 2873.76 23.36% 13.87% 9.49% 
  Guatemala 4843.69 2200.18 45.42% 44.69% 0.74% 
  Argentina 4577.60 1975.51 43.16% 39.11% 4.04% 
  Dom. Rep. 4481.03 1920.90 42.87% 20.96% 21.91% 
  Colombia 25224.60 1867.75 7.40% 6.72% 0.68% 
  Ecuador 9896.24 1788.58 18.07% 17.93% 0.15% 
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Appendix Table A 1.12: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Different Estimators, Non-OECD Countries 
Variables OLS Fixed  
effects 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1)   0.725**   0.396**   0.412**   0.400** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
Log Imports (t-2)   0.240**   0.040**   0.068**   0.072** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Refusals (t-1)   0.039** 0.006 -0.005 -0.514** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous No No No Yes 
AR(1)   0.000 0.000 
AR(2)   0.525 0.427 
Sargan-test   0.341 0.822 
Hansen-test   0.648 0.915 
Number of instruments   13 15 
Number of groups   2375 2375 
Number of countries 143 143 141 141 
Number of observations 18898 18898 16262 16262 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to 
the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The estimates in Column (1) and (2) are based on pooled OLS and (country-product) fixed ef-
fects, with standard errors being clustered at the country-level. Columns (3) and (4) employ a two-step Arellano-Bond estimator 
with robust standard errors. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the first through third lag. In Column (3), we define 
the variable refusals as exogenous. In Column (4), we allow the variable refusals to be endogenous and instrument it with its first 
through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
 37 
Appendix Table A 1.13.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Further Fixed Effects 
Variables Baseline 
External In-
strument 
Further 
Fixed  
Effects I 
Further 
Fixed  
Effects II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.448** 0.490** 0.399** 0.365** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.064** 0.065** 0.048* 0.038° 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Refusals (t-1) -0.323* -0.235* -0.359* -0.362* 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country-time FE No No No Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.629 0.558 0.673 0.564 
Sargan-test 0.656 0.844 0.758 0.626 
Hansen-test 0.869 0.936 0.781 0.716 
Number of instruments 15 17 47 239 
Number of groups 3304 2588 2761 2761 
Number of countries 164 149 65 65 
Number of observations 23242 18109 19987 19987 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to 
the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are 
based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable 
is instrumented with the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first 
through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed.  In Column (1), we report the baseline results from Table 2, Column (4), for 
comparability. Column (2) reports the results for the baseline specification, where we additionally use EU refusals as external 
instruments (which are available for 78 out 93 product-groups). Columns (3) and (4) allow for further fixed effects. Since these 
specifications require more cross-sectional variation within countries, we restrict the sample to countries with export flows to the 
United States in at least 20 product-groups. Column (3) extends the baseline with sector-year fixed effects, where all product-groups 
are classified into five more aggregated sectors. Column (4) also includes these sector-year fixed effects and additionally country-
time fixed effects, with time being defined as two-year spells. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively.  
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Appendix Table A 1.14.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Further Fixed Effects, Non-OECD Coun-
tries 
Variables Baseline 
External 
Instrument 
Further 
Fixed  
Effects I 
Further 
Fixed  
Effects II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.400** 0.467** 0.328** 0.309** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.072** 0.079** 0.054* 0.046° 
 (0.15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Refusals (t-1) -0.514** -0.435** -0.547** -0.512* 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.22) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country-time FE No No No Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.427 0.859 0.446 0.366 
Sargan-test 0.822 0.651 0.864 0.794 
Hansen-test 0.915 0.834 0.854 0.799 
Number of instruments 15 17 47 179 
Number of groups 2375 1899 1858 1858 
Number of countries 141 127 45 45 
Number of observations 16262 12974 13186 13186 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to 
the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are 
based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable 
is instrumented with the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first 
through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed.  In Column (1), we report the baseline results from Table 4, Column (1), for 
comparability. Column (2) reports the results for the baseline specification, where we additionally use EU refusals as external 
instruments (which are available for 78 out 93 product-groups). Columns (3) and (4) allow for further fixed effects. Since these 
specifications require more cross-sectional variation within countries, we restrict the sample to countries with export flows to the 
United States in at least 20 product-groups. Column (3) extends the baseline with sector-year fixed effects, where all product-groups 
are classified into five more aggregated sectors. Column (4) also includes these sector-year fixed effects and additionally country-
time fixed effects, with time being defined as two-year spells. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively.  
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Appendix Table A 1.15.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Further Fixed Effects, Non-OECD Coun-
tries, Evidence for Hidden Protectionism? 
Variables Baseline 
External 
Instrument 
Further 
Fixed  
Effects I 
Further 
Fixed  
Effects II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.425** 0.488** 0.357** 0.344** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.072** 0.073** 0.053* 0.048° 
 (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Refusals (Sample) (t-1) 0.427 0.746° 0.236 0.224 
 (0.28) (0.39) (0.25) (0.24) 
Refusals (no Sample) (t-1) -0.546** -0.668** -0.507** -0.437* 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector-year FE No No Yes Yes 
Country-time FE No No No Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.230 0.547 0.289 0.256 
Sargan-test 0.812 0.944 0.820 0.785 
Hansen-test 0.819 0.977 0.776 0.743 
Number of instruments 18 20 50 182 
Number of groups 2375 1899 1858 1858 
Number of countries 141 127 45 45 
Number of observations 16262 12974 13186 13186 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to 
the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are 
based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable 
is instrumented with the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first 
through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed.  In Column (1), we report the baseline results from Table 4, Column (1), for 
comparability. Column (2) reports the results for the baseline specification, where we additionally use EU refusals as external 
instruments (which are available for 78 out 93 product-groups). Columns (3) and (4) allow for further fixed effects. Since these 
specifications require more cross-sectional variation within countries, we restrict the sample to countries with export flows to the 
United States in at least 20 product-groups. Column (3) extends the baseline with sector-year fixed effects, where all product-groups 
are classified into five more aggregated sectors. Column (4) also includes these sector-year fixed effects and additionally country-
time fixed effects, with time being defined as two-year spells. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively.  
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Appendix Table A 1.16.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – European Union (EU 27) 
Variables Baseline Food vs. 
non-Food 
Refusal  
Type I 
Refusal 
Type II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.453** 0.491** 0.484** 0.412** 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.038 0.047 0.061 0.015 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Refusals  (t-1) -0.125    
 (0.33)    
Refusals (non-Food) (t-1)  0.564   
  (0.57)   
Refusals (Food) (t-1)  0.041   
  (0.17)   
Refusals (Misbranding) (t-1)   0.714  
   (0.96)  
Refusals (Adulteration) (t-1)   -0.276  
   (0.36)  
Refusals (Sample) (t-1)    1.216° 
    (0.66) 
Refusals (no Sample) (t-1)    -0.317 
    (0.48) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.748 0.964 0.512 0.737 
Sargan-test 0.056 0.288 0.547 0.669 
Hansen-test 0.580 0.824 0.880 0.948 
Number of instruments 15 18 18 18 
Number of groups 696 696 696 696 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 
Number of observations 5055 5055 5055 5055 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to 
the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are 
based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable 
is instrumented with the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first 
through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed.  In Column (1), we report the baseline results from Table 4, Column (1), for 
comparability. Column (2) allows for different slope coefficients for refusals between food and non-food product-groups imported 
from EU27-countries. Column (3) allows for different slope coefficients for refusal types adulteration and misbranding. Finally, 
Column (4) distinguishes between refusals without any product sample analysis and refusals after an FDA or private product sample 
analysis has been provided. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Appendix Figure A 1.6.: U.S. Imports by FDA Product-groups (as % Total Imports) 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 1.7.: U.S. Import Refusals by FDA Product-group (as % Total Refusals) 
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Appendix Table A 1.17.: Mapping of 93 Product-groups 
Description FDA codes HS product codes 
1 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 16A (except 32, 99, 21, 35, 01, 45, 22, 33, 15),  
16X (except 30, 20, 40, 42, 31, 32, 33, 21, 41). 
301, 302, 303, 304 
 
Note that this table currently only displays the first and last line. The exact matching code for all  
93 product-groups (including food and non-food FDA regulated products) will be made available at a later stage. 
 
93 Microwave heaters 96. 851650, 851660, 851420, 
851430, 851440, 851490, 
84193, 84198. 
Notes: Parentheses after two or three digit FDA codes specify subgroups (third digit or fourth and fifth digit, respectively). FDA codes are comprised of a two digit numerical industry code, a one digit subgroup code (capital 
letter) and a further two digit numerical product index. Note that the FDA product group 54Y99 is excluded from the analysis, since it was not possible to match it. 
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Appendix Table A 1.18.: Mapping of EU-RASFF Product-groups and Our 93 Product-groups 
Description RASFF product categories 
Product- groups used  
in this paper 
1 Alcoholic Beverages Alcoholic Beverages 
Wine 
66, 67, 68, 69 
 
 
Note that this table currently only displays the first and last line. The exact matching code for all  
72 product-groups for which corresponding EU-RASFF categories exist will be made available at a later stage. 
 
 
17 Animal Feed Animal by-products 
Feed additives 
Feed premixtures 
Feed materials 
Compound feeds 
86, 87, 88, 89 
Notes: Note that this external instrument, which is used on top of the internal instruments, only exists for product-groups in the food and animal feed sectors. 
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Appendix Table A 1.19.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Robustness of IV lag Structure (Dummy Refusal) 
  
Variables Baseline 
Additional  
Lag I 
Additional  
Lag II 
Additional  
Lag III 
Additional  
Lag IV 
Baseline without Col-
lapse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.470** 0.469** 0.470** 0.464** 0.455** 0.398** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.070** 0.068** 0.068** 0.066* 0.063** 0.048** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dummy refusal (t-1) -0.850* -0.773* -0.815* -0.747* -0.685* -0.594* 
 (0.42) (0.37) (0.35) (0.34) (0.32) (0.24) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.607 0.550 0.547 0.514 0.454 0.303 
Sargan-test 0.794 0.159 0.301 0.375 0.274 0.000 
Hansen-test 0.883 0.565 0.763 0.823 0.754 0.178 
Number of instruments 15 17 19 21 23 58 
Number of groups 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 
Number of countries 164 164 164 164 164 164 
Number of observations 23242 23242 23242 23242 23242 23242 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable dummy refusal takes the value of one, if in a given product-group k from country i at least one 
refusal incidence is recorded in year t. All estimations are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with 
the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. In Column (1) of Online Appendix 5, we 
report the baseline estimates for all refusals from Table 1, Column (4), for comparability. In Columns (2) to (5), we allow step by step for an additional lag of our instruments. Finally, Column (6) is based on the 
full set of potential instruments. It is important to note that the point coefficients are quite stable over the different sets of instruments and that the specification tests clearly favor our more parsimonious specifi-
cation of instruments. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table A 1.20.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Robustness of IV lag Structure (Refusals) 
  
Variables Baseline Additional  Lag I 
Additional  
Lag II 
Additional  
Lag III 
Additional  
Lag IV 
Baseline without 
Collapse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.448** 0.458** 0.463** 0.457** 0.452** 0.396** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.064** 0.065** 0.066** 0.065** 0.063** 0.049** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Refusals (t-1) -0.323* -0.237* -0.145 -0.184* -0.215* -0.167* 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.629 0.582 0.658 0.619 0.582 0.443 
Sargan-test 0.656 0.023 0.025 0.054 0.055 0.000 
Hansen-test 0.869 0.152 0.136 0.204 0.238 0.087 
Number of instruments 15 17 19 21 23 58 
Number of groups 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 
Number of countries 164 164 164 164 164 164 
Number of observations 23242 23242 23242 23242 23242 23242 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year t 
and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the 
first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed.  In Column (1) of Online Appendix 6, we report 
the baseline estimates for all refusals from Table 2, Column (4), for comparability. In Columns (2) to (5), we allow step by step for an additional lag of our instruments. Finally, Column (6) is based on the full 
set of potential instruments. It is important to note that the point coefficients are quite stable over the different sets of instruments and that the specification tests clearly favor our more parsimonious specification 
of instruments. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table A 1.21.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Evidence for Hidden Protectionism? OECD Countries (5-year Rolling Windows) 
  
Variables Baseline 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009 2006-2010 2007-2011 2008-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.522** 0.715 0.512* 0.451* 0.439** 0.602** 0.359** 0.445** 
 (0.11) (0.44) (0.21) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.029 0.063 0.078 0.049 0.030 0.067 0.025 -0.017 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Refusals (Sample) (t-1) -0.170 0.282 0.125 0.042 -0.001 0.088 0.131 -0.383 
 (0.35) (0.69) (0.38) (0.14) (0.17) (0.34) (0.27) (0.53) 
Refusals (no Sample) (t-1) 0.082 -0.249 -0.017 0.017 -0.087 0.143 0.145 -0.086 
 (0.14) (0.39) (0.19) (0.14) (0.21) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.708 --- 0.813 0.776 0.586 0.758 0.497 0.503 
Sargan-test 0.683 0.880 0.763 0.431 0.558 0.950 0.080 0.015 
Hansen-test 0.924 0.874 0.804 0.495 0.288 0.943 0.881 0.797 
Number of instruments 18 9 13 14 15 15 15 15 
Number of groups 929 883 891 904 914 915 908 908 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of observations 6980 1742 2609 3484 4358 4365 4369 4371 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year 
t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with 
the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. In Column (1) we report the baseline esti-
mates for OECD countries from Table 7, Column (1). In Columns (2) to (8), we report the results for the same specification for different 5-year windows. It is important to note that the number of instruments 
and observations is comparable for the last four columns, whereby Columns (5) and (8) of Online Appendix 7 are reported in the Table 7. **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively. 
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Appendix Table A 1.22.: U.S. Imports and Refusals – Evidence for Hidden Protectionism? Non-OECD Countries(5-year Rolling Windows) 
 
Variables Baseline 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009 2006-2010 2007-2011 2008-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log Imports (t-1) 0.425** 0.308* 0.430** 0.432** 0.449** 0.406** 0.458** 0.385** 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Log Imports (t-2) 0.072** -0.002 0.064° 0.056° 0.062* 0.077** 0.094** 0.064* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Refusals (Sample) (t-1) 0.427 0.269 0.084 0.252 0.198 0.173 0.253 0.354 
 (0.28) (0.83) (0.30) (0.27) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) 
Refusals (no Sample) (t-1) -0.546** -0.152 -0.296 -0.243° -0.220° -0.374** -0.251° -0.549* 
 (0.28) (0.79) (0.38) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.26) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Refusals endogenous Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.230 --- 0.087 0.189 0.377 0.729 0.583 0.225 
Sargan-test 0.812 0.752 0.271 0.322 0.191 0.585 0.719 0.863 
Hansen-test 0.819 0.691 0.441 0.134 0.489 0.416 0.661 0.923 
Number of instruments 18 9 13 14 15 15 15 15 
Number of groups 2375 2041 2114 2183 2256 2267 2267 2281 
Number of countries 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Number of observations 16262 3964 5990 8033 10099 10194 10243 10272 
Notes: Dependent variable: Log imports of 93 product-groups to the United States from 2002-2012. The variable refusals refers to the total number of refusals in a given product-group k from country i in year 
t and enters as the log(1+refusals). All estimations are based on the two-step Arellano-Bond estimator with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with 
the first through third lag. The variable refusals is allowed to be endogenous and is instrumented with its first through third lag. The instrument matrix is collapsed. In Column (1) we report the baseline esti-
mates for non-OECD countries from Table 7, Column (4). In Columns (2) to (8), we report the results for the same specification for different 5-year windows. It is important to note that the number of instru-
ments and observations is comparable for the last four columns, whereby Columns (5) and (8) of Online Appendix 8 are reported in the Table 7.  **, * and ° denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix 1 B Data Cleaning and Matching 
For the empirical analysis described in the main part of this chapter, I constructed a new 
dataset on U.S. import refusals and import flows at the product group level. For this 
dataset, I had to match the unique product classification of import refusals from the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the Harmonized System (HS) product clas-
sification of import flows from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). This 
task was not trivial, because both product classifications follow completely different 
classification principles. As far as I know, there has not been any researcher yet trying 
to undertake the task I completed during my dissertation. In this Appendix, I give an 
overview on the matching procedure I applied to merge both datasets. 
During my Ph.D., Christoph Moser from the ETH Zürich and I decided to work together 
to estimate the trade effects of U.S. import refusals on U.S. imports from all countries of 
the world with a special focus on potential protectionist motives of U.S. authorities. At 
the beginning of this project in fall of 2011, the Import Refusals Report (IRR) database 
from the U.S. FDA was not publicly available and we were allowed to use the data the 
UN-ECLAC Washington Office had requested and received from the U.S. FDA through 
a special information request (Artecona and Flores 2009). However, in July 2012, the 
U.S. FDA started to publish the historical IRR data from 2002 until 2011 on its website 
and has regularly updated the database with recent refusal incidences since then. We 
decided to use this data from the FDA website, because it included an additional varia-
ble on the type of sample that underlies a given refusal, which was not included in the 
data the UN-ECLAC had received. As described in the paper, this variable is very im-
portant for our empirical analysis. The detailed data on sectoral U.S. import flows at the 
6 and 10 digit level of the HS product classification we obtained from the website of the 
U.S. ITC. The main challenge for the project has been to match the unique product clas-
sification of the U.S. FDA to the HS product classification used by the U.S. ITC at a 
sufficiently disaggregated level. This task proved to be non-routine and the necessary 
careful matching procedure by hand took me more than 8 month. I succeeded in map-
ping the FDA and HS product classification into 93 new product groups. In the follow-
ing, I will describe the matching procedure as well as the necessary cleaning procedures 
for the raw data in detail. 
I am highly indebted to United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (UN-ECLAC) Washington Office and their staff members Fernando Flo-
res and Raquel Artecona, who gave me the opportunity to work with the Import Refus-
als Report (IRR) Database of the U.S. FDA during an internship in 2009/2010. During 
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the internship, I started to use this data to investigate the trade effects of U.S. product 
standards on my own initiative. Joint with Raquel Artecona from the UN-ECLAC 
Washington Office, we wrote a working paper on the effects of United States food safe-
ty and agricultural health standards on agro-food exports from Latin America and the 
Caribbean using the FDA import refusals database (Artecona and Grundke 2010). For 
this project, I had matched the unique product classification of the U.S. FDA to the 
Harmonized System (HS) product classification used by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC) at a very aggregate level resulting in 8 matched product sectors 
(Artecona and Grundke 2010). 
Matching procedure combining product classifications from the FDA and the 
Harmonized System (HS) 
As described in the data section of the chapter, I tried to aggregate import refusals to the 
most fine-grained product-group for which a consistent match between the FDA and the 
Harmonized System (HS) classification is possible. The guiding principle for this care-
ful matching procedure has been that any FDA product code uniquely falls into the as-
signed HS product categories. In general, I tried to match FDA product codes to HS 4 
digit codes and preserve as much detailed information as possible. For some matched 
groups, I had to use additional HS 5 or HS 6 digit information. I succeeded in matching 
all FDA regulated products to the corresponding HS categories. For medical devices 
and radiation emitting products, the constructed product-groups may include more HS 
products than necessary for matching, because it was not possible to isolate FDA regu-
lated products at the HS 6 digit or even at the HS 10 digit classification. The exact map-
ping for our 93 food and non-food product groups is documented in Table A1.17. 
For the matching procedure, I used the Harmonized (HS) Tariff Schedule of the United 
States (U.S. ITC 2012) and information on FDA product codes from the FDA product 
code builder (FDA 2012a, FDA 2012b). The FDA product code consists of five ele-
ments. The first element is a two digit industry code that ranges from 02 (whole and 
milled grain and starch) to 98 (tobacco products). The range of products included in the 
FDA product classification is smaller than in the HS classification because the FDA 
regulated products only comprise food, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, electronic 
items that emit radiation, vaccines, blood and biologics, animal feed and veterinary, and 
tobacco products (see the background section in the chapter). The second element of the 
FDA product code is the product class, an alpha character describing a sub-group of 
products that is specific to each industry code. For example, the seafood products indus-
try (industry code 16) comprises the product classes fresh, smoked and breaded fish 
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among others. The third element of the FDA product code defines the product sub-class 
that again is an alpha character and specific to each industry and product class. For most 
products, the sub-class describes the material the container or the packaging of the 
product consists of. The fourth element of the product code is the Process Indicator 
Code (PIC) that describes the manufacturing process of the product or the storage type. 
This PIC is also specific to each product industry and class. Finally, the fifth element of 
the FDA product code consists of two characters that may contain numeric or alpha val-
ues and indicate the detailed product. For example, in the fishery products industry and 
the product class smoked fish one specific product could be swordfish, tuna or tilapia 
among others. The HS product classification system is a classification system common-
ly used in international economics and I will not describe this product classification 
system in detail (see U.S. ITC 2012).  
In principle, I tried to match the first two elements of the FDA product codes, which 
comprise 2 digits and on alpha character, to HS 4 digit product categories. However, 
due to the fundamentally different classification system of the FDA, for many products 
it was impossible to establish this correspondence. For example, although the industry 
code 16 (seafood products) includes product classes like C (Fish, Cakes, Balls, etc.) and 
D (Smoked fish) that could easily be allocated to HS 4 digit categories 1604 and 0305, 
respectively, it also includes product classes like A (fish), W (Mixed Fishery/Seafood 
Products), X (Aquaculture Harvested Fishery/Seafood Products) and Y (Fishery Prod, 
n.e.c.) that include all kinds of fresh and prepared seafood products (indicated by the 
fifth element of the FDA product code). For example, 16A includes fresh swordfish 
(16A42) but also Korean dried fish seasoned with spices (16A99). 16X includes all 
kinds of different seafood like shrimps, alligators, salmon, catfish etc. Thus, to be able 
to maintain a sufficient level of disaggregation for the product classification mapping, I 
had to use the fifth element of the FDA product group code (in addition to the first and 
second element) for matching the product classes 16A, 16W, 16X and 16Y to corre-
sponding HS categories. This was quite time consuming because every product class 
contained over 200 single products. I had to look at every single product in the FDA 
classification to decide to which HS 4 or 6 digit category it corresponds. In many cases, 
I had to look up product names and descriptions in the internet to gather sufficient in-
formation for this decision. For vegetables and fruits, I even had to use the third and 
fourth element of the FDA product code (in addition to the first, second and fifth ele-
ment) to be able to match the products to HS 4 or 6 digit categories. 
It was also very complicated and in some cases impossible to locate single products 
within the HS classification even at the 10 digit level (especially for medical devices 
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and electronic items emitting radiation). Thus, I often had to choose more aggregated 
HS categories as correspondence (mostly at the 4 and 6 digit level), where I could be 
sure that the respective FDA listed product is inside this HS category with certainty. 
The consequence of this procedure is that some of our newly constructed product 
groups may include more HS products (and thus more trade flows) than necessary for 
matching. However, we think that this is the better alternative compared to a matching 
procedure where FDA product categories from one newly constructed product group 
may partly correspond to trade flows in another newly constructed product group. In our 
matching procedure all newly constructed product groups include all corresponding 
trade flows for the assigned FDA product categories with certainty. The detailed map-
ping of FDA and HS product classification for two of our newly constructed product 
groups can be found in Table A1.17. My Co-Author and I decided not to publish the 
complete mapping table before the article is published in a scientific journal. Currently, 
we are working on the revision of the article because we received an invitation for a 
revise and resubmit at the Journal of International Economics.  
Data cleaning and other matching procedures 
After having established the detailed mapping between the FDA and the HS product 
classification, I still had to clean the FDA import refusals data, construct several new 
variables and match the data with the U.S. sectoral import flows from the U.S. ITC by 
country, year and newly constructed product group.34 In addition, I matched the con-
structed database that combines U.S. import refusals and import flows at the product-
group-level with several other databases. Most of these additional databases we used for 
earlier empirical specifications are not shown in the current paper, because the fixed 
effects in our specification already control for all those variables. However, the Europe-
an Union Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (EU-RASFF) database, which includes 
import refusals and notifications for food and animal feed products for all EU member 
countries, comprises an important part of our empirical strategy. The EU-RASFF data-
base uses yet another unique product classification and I had to match this classification 
to our newly constructed product groups (Tab. A1.18). These procedures together took 
another six months, especially due to many coding errors in the refusals database, dif-
fering country codes across datasets and the time consuming cleaning and matching 
                                                 
34
 Furthermore, I matched U.S. import refusals with U.S. import flows by port of entry (in addition to country, year 
and newly constructed product group), which required an exact mapping of U.S. ports of entry from the FDA classifi-
cation with ports of entries reported by the U.S. ITC. I also prepared a dataset that matches U.S. import refusals and 
import flows on a monthly basis, which was possible because the U.S. ITC reports U.S. trade flows on a monthly and 
a yearly basis. This matching was not straight forward due to many products not appearing every month in the FDA 
database and I had to change the matching do-files. However, in the current paper we decided to use neither the in-
formation at the port level nor the monthly data, but we plan to do so in future projects. 
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procedures. In the following, I will describe the data cleaning for the import refusals 
data and the different matching procedures. 
The raw data of the Import Refusals Report (IRR) from the FDA website does not in-
clude an exact definition of a refused shipment regarding the quantity of the shipment. 
One inspected and refused physical shipment of goods may result in different entries in 
the IRR database, because each item with a different tariff description has to be listed in 
a separate line in the entry documents at the U.S. border (the import line or “entry 
line”). We follow Buzby et al. (2008) in defining each entry line in the IRR database as 
a refused shipment. As stated in the paper, there is no information on the quantity or the 
value of the refused item in the IRR database. The raw data I obtained from the UN-
ECLAC in 2011 included several hundred observation pairs with the same entry line but 
different dates as well as observations that were absolutely identical. I had to apply a 
cleaning procedure to correct that. In addition, if an imported item was refused due to 
several charges, each charge appeared as a separate entry in the database from the UN-
ECLAC. Thus, I reshaped the database defining each item with a unique entry line as 
one shipment independent from the number of charges that led to the border rejection. 
This reshaping and the data cleaning procedure were not necessary for the data we ob-
tained from the FDA website in 2012 because this data was already consolidated. How-
ever, one problem still existed in the data from the FDA website. In 2011, twenty inci-
dences were reported for the same firm from Mexico exporting medical devices to the 
U.S. that recorded several thousand different refused entry lines (imported items) at the 
same date due to the same refusal charge of “No notification to FDA” for the same 
product (surgery tray). On 10 August 2011, there were 20684 refused items and on the 
other 19 dates around 2000 to 3000 refused items were recorded. Because the average 
number of refusals for Mexico per year across all product categories is around 2000, we 
had to exclude those cases from the analysis. I had contacted the responsible person for 
the IRR database at the FDA and he could not explain those cases. A possible explana-
tion could be that FDA officers at the border changed their approach for registering the 
items of surgery trays during those 20 incidents for this special company from Mexico 
and opened the surgery trays to register each single item separately. After excluding 
those cases, the raw data from the IRR database from 2002 to 2012 was reduced from 
268212 to 209334 refused entry lines.  
After finishing the data cleaning, I constructed new variables that include the sum of 
refused items per exporting country and year for different levels of aggregation of the 
FDA product code. Using those variables, I applied the matching code described above 
and presented in Table A.1.17 to aggregate refusals into our newly constructed product 
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groups. The next step was to download the U.S. import flows for several levels of ag-
gregation of the HS classification system from the U.S. ITC website and aggregate the 
trade flows of single HS categories to our newly constructed product groups. To match 
import refusals with import flows by country, year and newly constructed product 
group, I still head to deal with the issues of differing country codes and countries not 
appearing in one or the other dataset. Country codes for countries from Ex-Yugoslavia, 
for Burma, South-Sudan, Palestine, North Korea, Taiwan and several island states dif-
fered between the datasets. I could also retrieve missing country information for around 
200 observations in the FDA dataset from other string variables in the FDA dataset. 
Furthermore, in the FDA dataset, overseas territories from Great Britain, France, the 
Netherlands or the U.S. appeared that were subsumed under the former colonial power 
in the U.S. ITC trade flow dataset. I assigned import refusals of those overseas territo-
ries to the former colonial power to be able to consistently match refusals with U.S. 
import flows.  
For the empirical specification, we decided to additionally distinguish between refusals 
due to different groups of charges as well as between refusals based on a product sam-
ple analysis and refusals without such sample analysis. We used two classifications for 
groups of charges. The first one is included in the FDA dataset and categorizes charges 
into adulteration and misbranding. Because many refused items report several charges 
for the refusal decision, we decided to assign a refusal into the adulteration group, if at 
least one charge was an adulteration charge. Thus, refusals fall into the misbranding 
group, if no adulteration charge was reported. For the second classification, I looked 
closely at the description of every single charge of the 230 different charges reported in 
the FDA dataset and created a third category (next to adulteration and misbranding) that 
includes charges due to missing certificates of conformity assessment. However, due to 
insufficient descriptive information on some single charges in the dataset, we opted for 
the classification provided by the FDA to avoid introducing measurement error. To dis-
tinguish between refusals based on a product sample analysis and refusals without such 
sample analysis, we used a variable included in the dataset that indicates whether a pri-
vate sample analysis, an FDA sample analysis or no sample analysis had been conduct-
ed to inform the refusal decision. We aggregated refusals based on a private and on an 
FDA product sample analysis into one group. To construct the dataset for those differ-
ent types of refusals, I used the same procedure as described in the last paragraph sum-
ming refusals per exporting country, year, FDA product code and additional classifica-
tion variable for refusal charges or for product sample analysis. It was not trivial to 
apply the programmed matching code for these subsets of refusals, because not all FDA 
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products were included in each subset of the data and I had to adjust the programmed 
matching code accordingly.  
Another important task was to match the constructed database with additional infor-
mation from external databases. The most important one was, as already mentioned 
above, the EU-RASFF database, which includes import refusals and notifications for 
food and animal feed products for all EU member countries. The EU-RASFF database 
does not use any product classification and only includes the product description within 
a longer text, which also describes the reason for the refusal, the corresponding legisla-
tion, the reporting country and the source country of the refused product (EU-RASFF 
2012). Due to time constraints for my Ph.D., it was impossible to isolate the product 
description from the text and match every single product to our newly constructed prod-
uct groups. Instead, I matched the classification of products into 36 aggregated product 
groups in the RASFF database with our 93 newly constructed product groups into 17 
new aggregated product groups (Tab. A1.18). In addition, I matched the constructed 
database to several other external databases. The main issue for matching was that coun-
try codes differed between databases and I had to match different country classifica-
tions. I matched our database with data on variables commonly used in gravity equa-
tions from the French research institute CEPII, with data on trade cost and country 
variables from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, with macro data 
at the country level from the World Economic Outlook database of the International 
Monetary Fund, with trade data on total exports for all countries of the world from UN-
COMTRADE and the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) from the World Bank, 
with variables for institutional quality from a dataset used in La Porta et al. (1999) and 
with data on typical gravity equation variables used in Helpman et al. (2008). Because 
we decided to use country-product, country-time, sector-time and country-group-sector-
time fixed effects in our final empirical specifications, we could not include all those 
additional variables in the specification because they are picked up by the fixed effects. 
 
 
 55 
2 Export price shocks and rural labor markets: The case of 
cotton in Tajikistan35 
2.1 Introduction 
Much of today’s consumption relies on a global supply chains that link consumers to 
producers worldwide. Occasional media attention reminds consumers in industrialized 
countries of the weakest link in this supply chain: Workers in the labor-intensive manu-
facturing, agriculture and mining sectors of developing countries who toil for little pay 
under harsh working conditions. Workers (and firms) are especially vulnerable in sec-
tors such as staple food, cotton and mining where global commodity prices are fluctuat-
ing.  
The welfare enhancing effect of trade is among the fundamentals of economics. A 
growing literature has analysed the wage effects of openness, especially with respect to 
shifts in skill requirements (Costinot, Vogel and Wang 2012). This literature has docu-
mented ambiguous wage effects across skill groups (Wood 1997; Attanasio, Goldberg 
and Pavcnik 2004; Krishna, Poole and Zeynep Senses 2012), production stages (Costi-
not, Vogel and Wang 2012) and gender (Juhn, Ujhelyi and Villegas-Sánchez 2013). The 
largest part of the literature has focused on structural changes in manufacturing follow-
ing waves of trade liberalization. Recent papers have taken a closer look at the effect of 
trade liberalization on local labor markets (Kovak 2013) and the role of exporting firms. 
Firms have been thought to contribute to wage inequality either through export premi-
ums (Krishna, Poole and Zeynep Senes 2012) or through heterogenous wage setting 
mechanisms (Amiti and Davis 2011). Another strand of the literature has exploited ex-
change rate and world market price fluctuations to study short-run shocks to trade. 
World market prices in agriculture have become especially volatile owing to weather 
shocks and misguided trade policies, often with ambiguous effects on the poor (Ivanic 
and Martin 2008; Anderson et al. 2013). In this paper we demonstrate how short-run 
world market price fluctuations affect the lives of the poor at the bottom of a global 
supply chain. Our focus on cotton sheds light on the agricultural sector, which has re-
ceived disproportional attention in trade studies (Costinot, Vogel and Wang 2012) while 
providing the major source of income for three quarters of the world’s poorest (World 
Bank 2007). Our focus on non-food agriculture allows identifying the effect of price 
changes on workers welfare, because fluctuating prices have unambiguous effects on 
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 This chapter was co-authored by Alexander Danzer. While we wrote the introduction, the background and the 
results section together, it was my task to write the remaining sections and to design the theoretical model. The idea 
of the research project and the empirical strategy were developed jointly. Alexander Danzer accessed the TLSS 2011 
dataset, while I collected all additional datasets. It was my task to clean and construct the panel dataset, to perform 
the regressions and to organize and conduct the field research stay in Tajikistan. 
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the poor. Hence, our research circumvents some of the problems of analyzing staple 
food production in which many households in the developing world are involved both 
as producers and consumers (Barrett and Dorosh 1996; Swinnen and Squicciarini 2012). 
Our use of labor force and household data complements a literature that has mostly re-
lied on industry level data. And finally, our focus on short-run effects of cotton world-
market price fluctuations fills a gap in the literature concerning the shock exposure of 
the weakest link in global production. The history of price hikes in the global cotton 
market goes back to the American Civil War and has experienced several ups and 
downs since then (Deaton 1999). The last cotton price surge took place during the 
2010/2011 season, when China (the largest cotton producer and consumer) had to dou-
ble its cotton imports after a severe crop failure (Table 1). 
Our paper exploits this last price episode to investigate the following questions: First, 
how do market fluctuations for internationally traded commodities affect the weakest 
link of the global production chain in the garment and textile industry: the cotton pick-
ers? Second, how do market distortions in export oriented sectors in developing coun-
tries affect the pass through of world market price fluctuations? We will particularly 
focus on the heterogeneity between big and small firms, because large (parastatal) cot-
ton farms are strongly controlled by local political elites and face perfectly elastic labor 
supply (relying on political connections to recruit workers, students and children during 
harvest time). Small private farms hire cotton pickers in local labor markets which are 
characterized by upward sloping supply curves. They tend to act more entrepreneurial 
on the productive side and have clearly defined individual land titles. The Stolper-
Samuelson theorem suggests that a relative rise in the price of cotton increases the rela-
tive remuneration of the factor intensively used in the production of cotton (labor). We 
want to relate this important implication to the heterogeneity in local labor market con-
ditions. Since cotton is mostly produced by women, distributional effects are given spe-
cial consideration. Our paper illustrates how political interference in the labor market 
branch of the production process of export commodities inhibits the economic empow-
erment of poor farmers and landless agricultural laborers, and hence adds to a huge lit-
erature that has so far predominantly focused on political influences in the export proc-
ess.  
To answer the questions empirically we exploit regional differences in cotton produc-
tion in Tajikistan. We combine this variation with a nationally-representative longitudi-
nal household survey from 2007-11 that contains harvest labor earnings and wages of 
agricultural workers over time. The analysis is based on a difference-in-differences ap-
proach. The 2010/2011 world market price surge for cotton implied an exogenous shock 
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to the Tajik economy in which cotton is the most important export sector (next to alu-
minum) and generates roughly one third of total exports (FAO 2011). Owing to this 
price shock, the Tajik cotton production increased by 34 percent between 2010 and 
2011 (FAO 2011, Fig. A2.6). Since Tajikistan is at the same time a small exporter of 
cotton (accounting for only 1 percent of total world exports), global price fluctuations 
are truly exogenous to the country.  
Our paper contributes to the literature focusing on the link between trade exposure and 
poverty (Winters et al. 2004). While trade openness, trade liberalization and price fluc-
tuations seem to have strong distributional consequences, the micro-level evidence re-
garding household farms and local labor markets is scarce (Goldberg and Pavcnik 
2007). Notable exceptions are the studies of the impact of rice price fluctuations on 
child labor and household labor supply in Vietnam by Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005; 
2006) which, however, feature households as joint producers and consumers of the ex-
ported commodity. By focusing on cotton, our paper can more directly disentangle pure 
price effects on income and employment. Our research further adds to the literature em-
ploying exogenous price variation and regional differences in the production structure 
of countries to identify exogenous labor demand shocks (Acemoglu et al. 2013; Angrist 
and Kugler 2008; Black et al. 2005; Chiqiar 2008; Kovak 2013; Topalova 2010). Unlike 
ours, none of the aforementioned recent papers has focused on a low income country 
despite the fact that these economies have been long known to suffer from especially 
narrow economic export structures (Massell 1964) that have made them highly vulnera-
ble to commodity price fluctuations (Jacks, O'Rourke and Williamson 2011). At the 
same time it addresses the recently emerging empirical literature that exploits exoge-
nous labor demand shocks to investigate local labor and production markets (Autor, 
Dorn and Hanson 2013; Kaur 2012; Greenstone and Moretti 2003; 2011). Another 
strand of literature that we contribute to focuses on the gender dimension of the labor 
market in developing countries. Our paper shares an important feature with the study by 
Qian (2008) who analyses the effect of increases in the price of tea on the sex imbalanc-
es in China: Similar to tea, cotton is predominantly picked by women, allowing us to 
focus on the economic fortunes of the most vulnerable group on the labor and produc-
tion market. Finally, there exists a literature on export prices and their effects on house-
holds, which mostly employs CGE modeling to evaluate the effects of export taxes (e.g. 
Warr 2001, Warr 2002; for an econometric study see Hudson and Ethridge, 1999). In-
terestingly, Tajik authorities discussed the implementation of an export tax in 2011 to 
mitigate the effects of rising cotton prices for the small domestic cotton processing in-
dustry. 
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Our results indicate that the cotton world price hike benefitted workers in the cotton 
sector, but not in other agricultural production. In line with the predominant employ-
ment of women in cotton picking, we find that women benefit strongly from the price 
shock, while men gained close to nothing. At the same time, we observe an expansion 
of employment in the cotton sector at the extensive margin. While more women entered 
the labor force and paid employment, working hours at the intensive margin only slight-
ly decreased. These findings suggest that the substitution effect dominated the income 
effect at the household level—which is in line with previous evidence for other develop-
ing countries (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006).36 The results of our falsification exercise 
indicate no relative changes in the remuneration of non-agricultural workers in cotton 
compared to non-cotton regions, suggesting that there are no unobserved omitted re-
gional wage trends. A Placebo-Test for the pre-shock period 2007-2009 shows no dif-
ferential effects in agricultural wages between cotton and non-cotton regions and lends 
further credibility to our results. 
Interestingly, our findings are dominated by workers on small private family farms. 
Workers on big cotton farms do not gain from the price shock, although harvest labor 
demand increased on both farm types. This indicates that the effect of the price shock 
operates through the heterogeneity in local labor markets. In order to attract more work-
ers for the increased cotton production, small family farms use economic incentives. 
This translates very directly into higher wages of cotton pickers on these farms. Thus, 
the cotton price hike does not only benefit smallholders and their families, but also the 
poor landless females from local villages, who work in the cotton harvest as daily labor-
ers. Workers on big cotton farms, to the contrary, do not gain from the export price hike 
because they emanate from perfectly elastic labor pools or from coerced labor. Further-
more, we find that monthly earnings of managers of big cotton farms increase strongly 
in response to the price shock, whereas earnings of small farm managers do only slight-
ly increase. The results of our quantitative analysis are supported and complemented by 
qualitative interviews with farmers and other public and private agents in the Tajik cot-
ton sector, which we conducted in Tajikistan in March and November 2014.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview over 
the case study, Tajikistan and its cotton sector. Section 3 presents the empirical method-
ology and the new panel data set. Section 4 describes and discusses the preliminary re-
sults, while Section 5 concludes. 
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 In one sub-section of the next chapter, I will analyze this issue in more detail.  
 59 
2.2 Tajikistan and the cotton sector 
Tajikistan is a landlocked lower income country in Central Asia, located between Af-
ghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In the year 2011, the country ranked 150 
out of 185 in terms of GDP per capita PPP according to the IMF. Hence, Tajikistan’s 
GDP per capita PPP is less than one fourth of China’s and only one twenty-fourth of the 
USA. Tajikistan is populated by 7.6 million inhabitants. Around 67 percent of its work-
ing population is employed in agriculture, the least paying sector of the economy (van 
Atta 2009). In rural areas, where the economically active population mainly consists of 
women this share comes close to 100 percent (FAO 2011). Male labor is missing due to 
large-scale labor emigration (Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010). Most of Tajikistan’s territo-
ry is hilly or mountainous, making cotton production only feasible in some sharply de-
fined regions. Cotton relies on specific climatic and geographic preconditions leading to 
a concentration of growing areas in the few flat regions below 1000m above sea level 
which command irrigation as well as transport infrastructure (Fig. 2.1). In 2007, 29 per-
cent of the total cultivated area of 891126 ha was cropped with cotton (TajStat 2012). 
Apart from cotton, wheat, fruits and vegetables are important crops in Tajikistan that 
grow on all parts of the cultivated land (FAO 2009). Nevertheless, Tajikistan is highly 
dependent on wheat imports from Kazakhstan and other neighboring countries and the 
world price for wheat strongly affects domestic prices (USAID 2011). Production of 
vegetables (mainly potatoes) and fruits takes predominantly place at household plots 
and for local consumption (FAO 2011). 
In the world market for cotton lint, Tajikistan is a small player exporting only around 1 
percent of total world exports (Table 2.1). Given Tajikistan’s minor role on the global 
stage, we treat the export price for cotton as exogenous to Tajikistan. In the agricultural 
season 2010/2011 the world market for cotton was disturbed by a serious drought in 
China: The global leader in cotton production (around 30 percent) and consumption 
(around 40 percent) doubled its cotton imports from 2010 until 2011. From July 2010 
until March 2011 the world cotton price more than doubled (Fig. 2.2). This led to an 
increase in cotton production in Tajikistan in 2011 by almost 40 percent (Fig. A2.6), 
reversing the decade long declining trend that was owing to the country’s lack in in-
vestments to modernize irrigation and infrastructure and the shift towards food produc-
tion (Akramov and Shreedhar 2012). The cotton area harvested increased by almost 30 
percent in 2011 (Fig. A2.6), whereas the area harvested with wheat and other crops de-
creased by the same amount (FAO 2011, Fig. A2.8, TajStat 2012).  
Tajikistan’s most important export commodity (next to aluminum) is cotton which is 
produced in a ‘contract farming’ relationship between strong futurists, farm managers, 
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political decision makers and weak small private farmers as well as agricultural labor-
ers.37 The structure and deficiencies of cotton production in Tajikistan share many simi-
larities to the sector worldwide (Brambilla and Porto 2011; Kranton and Swamy 2008). 
Although the country generates around 30 percent of yearly export revenues from cot-
ton, it remains a small producer globally (FAO 2011). During the Soviet era the cotton 
industry comprised big state-owned farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) which recruited 
additional agricultural laborers during harvest time. Forced labor of students and child 
labor were widespread (ILRF 2007). Five years after independence in the year 1991, the 
privatization of cultivated farmlands was officially initiated for all 832 state-owned 
farms. Until 2007, the central government had turned 77 percent of the cultivated area 
of Tajikistan into private ownership. 23 percent were still cultivated by big state owned 
collective farms, which are officially registered as agricultural enterprises. They pre-
dominantly grow cotton and accounted for 37 percent of the total cotton production in 
2007 (Sattar and Mohib 2006, FAO 2009, Fig. A2.20). 
The privatized farmland comprises small household plots as well as bigger peasant 
farms (in Tajik dehkan farms), whereby 22 percent of the cultivated area was distributed 
to household plots and 55 percent to dehkan farms in 2007 (Fig. A2.9-A2.11). House-
hold plots, which had already existed before 1991 cultivating around 10 percent of 
farmlands, have an average size of 0.3 hectare and exclusively produce food crops for 
subsistence consumption and local domestic markets (Lerman 2012; FAO 2009). In 
contrast, dehkan farms are larger entities created during the privatization process that 
produce, besides wheat and other crops, 63 percent of the total cotton production in Ta-
jikistan (FAO 2009). Regarding farm size and organizational structures, a strong heter-
ogeneity exists within dehkan farms that can be categorized into two main types: indi-
vidual/family dehkan and collective dehkan farms (Lerman 2012, FAO 2009). 
Collective dehkan farms are large (generally > 20 hectares) private (or parastatal) coop-
eratives created by the state farm restructuring method: The land was officially trans-
ferred to the cooperative of farmers which had previously formed a brigade. Farming 
decisions are taken by a farm manager who in most cases had already headed the bri-
gade of the state-owned farm and who is de facto authorized by the local government 
for life. In effect, these farms experienced little change in their incentive structures and 
strongly resemble the state owned agricultural enterprises. Individual farmers and work-
ers receive a low wage that is mostly paid on a daily basis for specific activities. Thus, 
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 Futurists are intermediate cotton traders that pre-finance cotton production by supplying inputs in kind to farmers 
and taking the future cotton harvest as collateral. Mostly, those futurists collude with local cotton gins and in kind 
credits have to be repaid in raw cotton (Sattar and Mohib, 2006, van Atta 2009). 
 61 
monthly wages are not fixed and vary according to seasonal farm activities. In addition, 
individual farmers are allowed to use a small share of the collective land to grow food 
crops for subsistence consumption. The farm manager decides on the procurement of 
crop inputs, marketing of outputs and financial management, e.g. on how to share prof-
its within the collective dehkan farm (Sattar and Mohib 2006). In addition, strong recip-
rocal relationships exist between the farm manager and local governments. In many 
sub-districts, collective dehkan farms still support social services like hospitals, schools 
and kindergartens, for which the state owned collective farms had been responsible in 
Soviet times. During the privatization process, these social services have officially been 
transferred to local governments, but without compensating them with sufficient finan-
cial resources (Sattar and Mohib 2006, Kassam 2011). In exchange, local governments 
support the cotton harvesting activities on collective dehkan farms and state owned en-
terprises by sending state employees, students and school children to the cotton fields 
(van Atta 2009, ILRF 2007, Appendix 2 D). Furthermore, strong rent seeking networks 
exist between farm managers of big farms, local governments, cotton ginneries and trad-
ing firms that are explained in more detail below. 
Officially, the individual farmers of the collective dehkan farm are shareholders of the 
farm and have the right to opt out of the collective using their respective land shares. 
However, individual property rights on land do not exist in Tajikistan. The State Com-
mittee for Land and Geodesy (SCLG) issues a collective land using certificate in the 
name of the farm manager with a list of the shareholder names. This collective land us-
ing right is valid for a period of 5 up to 20 years and only specifies the size of the plot 
for each shareholder (on average around 0.6 hectares), but no precisely defined land 
claim. Thus, if shareholders want to opt out of the collective dehkan farm, the farm 
manager has a strong incentive to only hand out marginal plots with low soil quality and 
bad irrigation infrastructure (van Atta 2009, Appendix 2 D). Other factors impeding 
shareholders to opt out of the collective dehkan farms are credit constraints, lack of ag-
ricultural and entrepreneurial knowledge, social norms and political pressure. In reality, 
shareholders and their families are strongly tied to the collective dehkan farm and are 
exploited to increase the rents from cotton exports appropriated by their managers, local 
governments, futurists and cotton gins (Sattar and Mohib 2006, van Atta 2009). The 
situation on state owned agricultural enterprises strongly resembles the one on collec-
tive dehkan farms and we will classify those two farm types as one farm type of big 
farms (>20 ha) throughout this paper.38  
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 Interviews with GIZ officials in Tajikistan as well as World Bank (2012) suggest that the only reliable criterion to 
identify collective dehkan farms and agricultural enterprises (with their specific organizational and incentive struc-
ture) is farm size, specifically a farm size bigger than 20 hectares or a number of shareholders bigger than 25.  
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In contrast, private individual and family dehkan farms have sizes ranging between 2 
and 20 hectares and command well defined and inheritable land using rights for 99 
years. During the privatization process, international donors have pressured the Tajik 
government to further split up collective dehkan farms into smaller entities with better 
defined land titles to reduce the government influence in growing decisions and to in-
crease the market orientation of agricultural production (Sattar and Mohib 2006, World 
Bank 2012). Alongside efforts of other institutions, the World Bank has implemented a 
Farm Privatization Support Project (FPSP) in several pilot districts, where 10 state 
owned collective farms covering around 17 000 hectares were split up. Equal per-capita 
acreage (on average about 0.6 hectares) was distributed to all members of a brigade of 
the privatized state-owned farm by lottery and inheritable but not tradeable land use 
certificates were allocated to individual farmers (Sattar and Mohib 2006). Farmers also 
received training on the entire set of farming tasks on demonstration plots, because in 
Soviet times farming was highly specialized and individual farmers had very little gen-
eral agricultural knowledge. Mostly, members of the same family pooled their land 
shares and founded a family dehkan farm that ranges between 2 and 20 hectares. Share-
holders of these small private individual and family dehkan farms command much more 
freedom over production and investment decisions on their land than shareholders on 
bigger collective dehkan farms (Sattar and Mohib 2006, World Bank 2012). Unlike in 
big farms, there is a direct pass-through of cotton proceeds to the farmers. Hence, due to 
less political interference and well-defined land using rights, they act more entrepre-
neurial and this may explain why there are no productivity differences between the farm 
types, in spite of possibly larger effects of scale on bigger collective dehkan farms and 
state owned agricultural enterprises (Tab. 2.2, World Bank 2012).39 Throughout this 
paper, we will classify private individual and family dehkan farms as small private 
farms (<20 ha).  
Regarding the division of the cultivated area into state owned agricultural enterprises, 
dehkan farms and household plots, the privatization process came basically to a halt 
since 2007. The share of the area cultivated by big state owned agricultural enterprises 
has only slightly decreased from 23 percent in 2007 to around 18 percent in 2011 (Fig. 
A2.10). The share of land cultivated by private and collective dehkan farms increased 
from 55 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2011 and the share cultivated by household 
plots remained around 22 percent during that time period (Fig. A2.9, A2.11). Unfortu-
nately, the Tajik Statistics Agency does not report any statistics for sub-categories with-
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 Importantly, changes in productivity which are typical for post-privatization periods will not influence our esti-
mates of the price shock which took place in 2011 (Pavnik 2002). 
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in the dehkan farm category. However, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
reports that in 2006 and 2010 two thirds of the area under dehkan farms was cultivated 
by small private dehkan farms and one third by collective dehkan farms (FAO 2009, 
2011; Tab. 2.16). This indicates that the privatization process with respect to further 
splitting up the collective dehkan farms has not progressed much from 2007 until 2011. 
Furthermore, during a research stay in Tajikistan we obtained statistics from the Tajik 
State Committee for Land and Geodesy (SCLG) on the number of SCGL-certificates 
handed out to new private farms with less than 25 shareholders at the sub-district level 
for the years 2007 until 2011. From 2007 until 2011, the SCLG project was the biggest 
project trying to further split up collective dehkan farms into smaller private family 
dehkan farms (Lerman 2012).40 Measured by the number of newly issued certificates, 
the privatization process decelerated from 2009 until 2011 compared to 2007 until 2009 
(Fig. A2.12). We use these statistics at the sub-district level to control for the heteroge-
neity of the privatization process across sub-districts in our regressions. Furthermore, 
we control for all institutional changes at the province level by including province-year 
dummies and for all time-invariant institutional characteristics at the district level using 
district dummy variables. 
Effectively, the cotton growing sector fragmented into two types of farms (small private 
vs. big para-statal farms) which use comparable production techniques and land quali-
ties. Cotton yields and efficiency are comparable between small and large farms (World 
Bank 2012, Tab. 2.2). This is also reflected in the output shares: From 2007 until 2011, 
the share of Tajikistan’s cotton production originating from dehkan farms and state-
owned enterprises closely tracks their respective share in area devoted to cotton produc-
tion (Fig. A2.19, A2.20).41 In most sub-districts, both farm types exist (Kassam 2011, 
Fig. A2.14). During the harvest season, all types of farms require additional wage work-
ers for cotton picking, which is the most labor intensive production step. It is predomi-
nantly performed by women (and children) because male labor is missing (due to the 
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 Although we do not dispose of statistics from other privatization projects like the World Bank Land Registration 
and Cadastre System for Sustainable Agriculture Project (LRCSP), we think that the SCLG statistics are the best ones 
to describe the privatization on the ground in terms of real changes in the organizational and incentive structure of 
farms. In contrast to the LRCSP certificates that were handed out for free, farmers had to pay half of a monthly aver-
age wage of around 300 Somoni for a SCLG certificate for around 2 hectares. Because those certificates are only pre-
requisites for founding a new farm, farmers that obtained the SCLG certificate are more likely to really start their 
own family farm. In an interview with the former head of the commission responsible for the LRCSP, it became 
obvious that in most cases handed out LRCSP certificates did not actually lead to founding a new farm. Organiza-
tional structures of the collective dehkan farm did not change, although individual farmers had obtained the LRCSP 
certificates (also see van Atta 2009). 
41
 Unfortunately, official statistics do not report figures for small vs. big collective dehkan farms. In Figures A2.19 
and A2.20, the province around the Tajik capital Dushanbe (RRP) has a much higher share of cotton production and 
area on state owned enterprises. This is mainly due to the fact that still around 30 percent of the cultivated area is 
under state owned enterprises that mainly produce cotton. In addition, as far as allowed by local authorities, dehkan 
farms in this province produce other crops like fruits and vegetables because of the low transportation costs to the 
Dushanbe market.  
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Civil War 1992-97 and due to labor migration to Russia) and because of women’s al-
legedly higher degree of dexterity. With a monthly pay of around 38 USD, cotton pick-
ing is among the worst paid economic activities in Tajikistan.42 To the firms, wages 
make up between 3 and 10 percent of cotton proceeds within the production and market-
ing chain (Sattar and Mohib 2006). Integrated labor markets do barely exist in rural Ta-
jikistan because managers on collective dehkan and state-owned farms exploit their own 
shareholders and their families as well as political connections to recruit cotton pickers. 
In effect, farm managers have access to an unlimited (sometimes involuntary) pool of 
workers from other parastatal and state-owned enterprises, universities and schools 
(ICG 2005, ICLG 2007).43 Family dehkan farms hire at the local labor market and in the 
extended family. Mobility across local labor markets is extremely untypical as women 
in rural Tajikistan command a severely limited geographic action space and are often 
not allowed to work outside the local community. This is mainly due to the Islamic re-
vival that prevents women from travelling without males from their family, who mostly 
migrated to Russia for work. 
We will now describe the remaining facts on the institutional context of the Tajik cotton 
sector. Official cotton quotas which had existed since Soviet times were somewhat re-
laxed in 2007 (Akramov and Shreedhar 2012). Together with rising international wheat 
prices and a severe domestic shortage due to a drought in 2008, this lead to an immedi-
ate shift towards wheat production across all cotton growing regions and farm types in 
2009 (FAO 2009, TajStat 2012, Fig. A2.8). Although private family farms have official-
ly been granted free crop choice (not least to support the country’s precarious food situ-
ation), local authorities, cotton future companies and cotton ginneries still try to push 
private farmers into cotton production through political pressure and the control of input 
supplies and credit (ICG 2005; van Atta 2009).44 The system continues to resemble a 
futurist- and state-financed quasi-command agriculture (van Atta 2009) in which district 
authorities generate the largest fraction of their tax revenues from local monopsonistic 
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 In many cases, cotton pickers also receive the cotton stalks as in kind payments, which they use for heating (van 
Atta 2009). We also run regressions using wages in cash and in kind as the dependent variable and our results do not 
change. Results are not shown, but can be requested from the author. 
43
 “Local officials do use coercive methods on teachers and children.” "The kids have problems getting their books if 
they don't go pick cotton," Babadjanova said. "During exams and finals, they might have problems with their grades. 
Or there have been some cases, very rare, when the students [were] expelled from school for not going to pick cot-
ton.” (van Atta 2009) “Some adult government employees, including doctors and teachers, were required by Tajik 
authorities to pick cotton.” (Department of State 2010) 
44
 Another argument put forward is that farmers ‘voluntarily’ grow cotton because this is the only way to get access 
to loans for purchasing inputs (Kassam 2011).However, our interviews and collected data from farm head surveys in 
Tajikistan show that unofficially cotton quotas still exist in Tajikistan and are enforced by local authorities to ensure a 
steady supply of raw cotton for rent extraction (Tab. A2.17, A2.25).  
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ginneries.45 Local futurist companies and cotton gins collude and provide credit and 
inputs for cotton growing at inflated prices while forcing farmers to enter future con-
tracts with often unrealistically high production targets and low output prices. This fu-
turist system of cotton financing resulted in increasing indebtedness of farmers over the 
last decade (van Atta 2009). Although these debts were written off in 2008, credit con-
straints still force farmers to grow cotton and use the crop as collateral for credit (van 
Atta 2009, Kassam 2011). For the period under consideration in this paper (2007-11), 
private family and collective dehkan farms as well as state-owned agricultural enterpris-
es did not differ with respect to market power: All of them faced regional monopsony 
power of cotton ginneries.46 Accordingly, farm profits and wages were suppressed at the 
expenses of ginning and loan costs, whereby managers of big collective dehkan and 
state-owned farms participated in the rent extraction system (Sattar and Mohib 2006).47 
Cotton yields in Tajikistan are low by international standards, mostly due to aged or 
destroyed irrigation infrastructure. Somewhat simplified, the raw cotton is harvested, 
sold to the local cotton gin, processed and then paid according to the spot rate for cotton 
at the Liverpool Stock Exchange minus transportation costs (ILRF 2007; Kassam 2011). 
In 2006, there were 38 cotton gins in Tajikistan; every gin has a local monopsony for 
the surrounding district due to political pressure and quality constraints in transporta-
tion.48 Most of the previously state owned ginneries were privatized in the year 2000, 
but are intertwined with cotton future companies and collude with local authorities to 
extract rents from cotton farmers (van Atta 2009). Tajik cotton ginneries are also quite 
inefficient compared to international standards. The turnover rate of raw to ginned cot-
ton is about 30 percent at maximum (Kassam 2011). The ginneries exert their 
monopsonistic market power often by evaluating the quality of the cotton as too low 
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 The tax on ginned cotton is collected and can be exclusively spent by district authorities. Furthermore, many dis-
trict authorities are heavily intertwined with the cotton sector (stakeholders of cotton gins or trading companies). 
Thus, district authorities have a strong incentive to prevent that farmers sell the raw cotton to gins in other districts. In 
2011, district authorities were still closing the borders to neighbouring districts in harvest time (Kassam 2011, World 
Bank 2012, Interviews conducted in Tajikistan).  
46
 Note a crucial difference to the market structure of the US: While the organization in collectives with horizontal 
market structures helped overcome the monopsonistic exploitation in the cotton sector of the Southern States, collec-
tives in Tajikistan operate in vertically organized markets. Hence, farmers and collectives remain fully dependent on 
ginneries and trade intermediaries. 
47 As of 2014, small holders can now more freely make growing decision because credit constraints have been re-
laxed and local officials interfere less in the growing decision; nowadays ginneries and future companies provide 
incentives to small farmers to continue growing cotton. However, our interviews conducted in early 2014 in Tajiki-
stan suggest that the internal market ‘liberalization’ started only in 2012/2013, hence after our observation period. 
48 As described above, local authorities force farmers to sell to the local cotton ginnery because they generate most of 
their tax revenues from ginneries and are often involved in the local cotton business. In addition, during transporta-
tion the quality of the raw cotton deteriorates decreasing the price paid by the ginnery. Selling the raw cotton to the 
ginnery of the neighboring district is very costly for the farmers (Kassam 2011).  
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and thus paying inadequate prices per ton of raw cotton. Finally, the processed cotton is 
exported.49,50  
2.3 Theory 
Based on the insights from the background section, we present a simple model in Ap-
pendix 2 C that captures the main features of the Tajik cotton sector and describes the 
pass through of the world cotton price surge to wages of cotton pickers. In this section, 
we will briefly introduce the model and discuss its implications that we test in our em-
pirical analysis. We assume that there are two representative types of farms (small pri-
vate vs. big para-statal farms) that produce cotton or wheat.51 Both farms command the 
same constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology using the produc-
tion factors land and labor.52 The total land endowment per farm is fixed, because land 
markets do not exist in Tajikistan and farmers cannot increase land endowments in the 
short and medium run (van Atta 2009, Lerman 2012). Thus, the fixed amount of land is 
allocated between cotton and wheat production (Shumway et al. 1984). The second pro-
duction factor labor is mobile between cotton and wheat production within the same 
farm type, whereby cotton is more labor intensive than wheat, particularly during har-
vest time. However, both farm types differ with respect to the characteristics of their 
labor supply curves. Small private dehkan farms face a competitive local labor market 
that comprises landless females from local villages, who are often not allowed to work 
outside the local community. In harvest time, small private dehkan farms in local labor 
markets compete for those female agricultural workers and, thus, their labor supply 
curve is upward sloping. In contrast, big para-statal farms are still heavily intertwined 
with local governments and receive harvest workers sent by the local government, 
which comprise workers employed in the public administration, schools, hospitals and 
other para-statal enterprises as well as students and school children (van Atta 2009, In-
terviews in Tajikistan). Those workers and the shareholders of the big farms are forced 
to work at the cotton harvest for minimum picking wages that are announced by district 
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 Tajikistan is only now trying to establish a textile industry. Major international customers of Tajik cotton are Rus-
sia, China, Latvia, Iran, and Switzerland. Tajikistan does impose a sales tax on cotton lint of 10 percent for exports 
and domestic sales, but non-tariff barriers do not exist. On March 2, 2013, the country has become the 159th WTO 
member and will gradually reduce tariffs on cotton and cotton fabrics (bound rate to decline from 25 to 20 until 2017) 
as well as on cotton yarn (bound rate to decline from 20 to 15 until 2016).  
50
 The domestic freight traffic is operated by small private firms in a competitive environment (based on medium-
sized trucks) (WFP 2005). Tajikistan is landlocked and its integration in international transport systems is inefficient 
due to a lack of investment. In the early 2000s, more than 80 percent of exports were exported by Tajik Railways 
through Uzbekistan which controls export routes and charges high tariffs (WFP 2005). 
51
 Wheat is the main alternative crop grown by farms in cotton regions of Tajikistan (FAO 2009, 2011). In the model, 
we could also interpret wheat as an aggregate of other alternative crops.  
52
 For simplicity reasons, we exclude other inputs like seeds or fertilizer. However, it is straightforward to include 
these additional inputs and the results of the comparative statics do not change. 
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authorities for each harvest season.53 Hence, we assume that big para-statal farms face a 
completely elastic labor supply curve at the level of the official district-specific mini-
mum wage.  
As described above, cotton gins are regional monopsonists that do not discriminate be-
tween farm types. They collude with futurists to obtain the raw cotton from local farm-
ers paying the same farm gate price for raw cotton to all farm types. After processing 
the raw cotton into ginned cotton, ginneries export the ginned cotton and receive the 
FOB export price, which basically equals the spot rate for cotton at the Liverpool Stock 
Exchange minus transportation costs (Kassam 2011, Fig 2.2).54 Although ginneries ap-
ply several strategies to exert their market power, we think that the traditional mecha-
nism of reducing the purchased quantity to lower input prices is the dominant strategy 
(van Atta 2009, Kassam 2011).55 Thus, both farm types are price takers of the farm gate 
price for raw cotton offered by the local gin. Wheat and other crops are exclusively sup-
plied to the domestic market, whereby both farm types are also price takers. They max-
imize their profits by deciding over the optimal share of land allocated to wheat and 
cotton production as well as the optimal use of labor given the production technology, 
output prices for cotton and wheat as well as the interest rate. Both farm types need to 
pre-finance the payments for the use of the production factor labor with the help of fu-
turists and gins, because they solely receive the revenue from crop production several 
months after the harvest (Kassam 2011). As explained above, we simplify the model 
assuming that ginneries colluding with futurists do not exert their market power by in-
fluencing the interest rate, but through reducing the farm gate price for raw cotton. For 
aggregation and computation of the comparative statics, we further simplify the model 
by assuming that the area controlled by the local cotton gin equals the area of the local 
labor market, whereby both representative farms are active in this area and the total 
farmland is shared between both. Thus, both representative farms are aggregates of all 
single farms of their type within the local labor market and their labor demand equals 
the total labor demand of farms of that type in the local labor market.56  
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 Shareholders on big collective dehkan farms comprise the other part of the coerced labor pool big farms are able to 
exploit. Those mostly female shareholders are bound to the big farm by strong social and traditional norms, a lack of 
human capital and conscience about the agricultural reforms and their shareholder rights as well as missing economic 
resources (van Atta 2009). 
54
 There are not more than ten big futurist companies operating in Tajikistan that also own or collude with the vast 
majority of gins (van Atta 2009, Interviews in Tajikistan). These futurist companies organize the export of the ginned 
cotton through their connections to international cotton traders.  
55
 Kassam (2011) assumes that ginneries colluding with futurists additionally exert their market power through in-
creasing the costs of credit for inputs or increasing input prices. However, this makes the model considerably more 
complex and does not provide additional insights on the labor market mechanism we focus on. 
56
 This simple aggregation is possible, because we assume constant returns to scale. 
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It is straightforward to show that in this simple setting the monopsonist increases the 
farm gate price in response to a surge in the cotton export price to increase its profits by 
securing a rising supply of raw cotton (Appendix 2 C). The relative increase of farm 
gate prices for cotton relative to wheat leads farmers to enlarge the area sown with cot-
ton and to reduce the area sown with wheat. Due to cotton being more labor intensive 
than wheat, this increases the labor demand for harvest workers on both farm types. 
Because small private family farms compete for picking workers at local labor markets, 
wages for picking workers on these farms rise in reaction to the cotton price surge. Big 
para-statal farms face a completely elastic labor supply curve and wages do not rise on 
those farms. This simple comparative static result is presented in Fig. 2.3 (for details see 
Appendix 2 C).  
Thus far, descriptive statistics and qualitative evidence collected during a research stay 
in Tajikistan support important parts of this pass through mechanism. As argued above, 
the surge in the world market price of cotton from August 2010 until March 2011 by 
over 100 percent can be treated as exogenous to Tajikistan (Tab. 2.1, Fig. 2.2). The 
model predicts that this rise in the cotton export price should lead gins to increase the 
farm gate price for raw cotton. Indeed, during interviews conducted in Tajikistan in 
2014, farmers and ginnery managers told us that the farm gate price had strongly in-
creased in the harvest of 2010 as well as in future contracts offered by futurists and gins 
in the sowing period of 2011. Domestic prices for wheat and other crops did not show 
such increases (FAO 2011, Fig. A2.7). As predicted by the model, the relative increase 
of cotton farm gate prices led farmers to enlarge the area cropped with cotton in ex-
change for area cropped with wheat and other crops in 2011 (FAO 2011, Fig. A2.6, 
A2.8). In fact, Figures A2.15-A2.18, A2.21 and A2.22 show that small private as well 
as big collective dehkan farms and state owned agricultural enterprises increased the 
area cropped with cotton (FAO 2011).57 Thus, farm managers of big farms as well as 
small private farmers seem to closely follow the world prices of cotton and base their 
growing decisions in early spring time on this information. This is further corroborated 
by Table A2.17 that shows that 71 percent of small farmers and 75 percent of managers 
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 As already mentioned above, the Tajik Statistics Agency does not report statistics for sub-categories of the dehkan 
farm category. However, in interviews with officials of the Tajik Statistics Agency, we obtained the presented data in 
Figures A2.21 and A2.22 on area cropped with cotton for dehkan farms smaller and larger than 20 ha at the province 
level. Unfortunately, we did not receive data on the number of small vs. big farms (or area cultivated by this farm 
types) at the province level and, hence, had to weight the data on cotton area harvested by some measure indicating 
the percentage of cotton area cultivated by small and big farms. We decided to use the share of agricultural workers 
on small farms per province computed from the TLSS dataset. Figures A2.21 and A2.22 corroborate the findings 
from Figures A2.15-A2.18 showing that agricultural enterprises as well as dehkan farms had increased area under 
cotton in 2011. 
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on big farms closely follow the world price of cotton.58 Because harvesting cotton is 
much more labor intensive than harvesting wheat or other crops grown in Tajikistan 
(FAO 2009, 2011), the model predicts that the relative rise in area cropped with cotton 
should strongly increase the harvest labor demand on both farm types. However, due to 
both farm types facing different labor supply curves, this should only increase wages on 
small private farms, but not on big para-statal farms. Because cotton picking is mainly 
done by female, the wage increases on small farms should be mainly due to female agri-
cultural workers. Furthermore, we expect that profits of managers on big para-statal 
farms should strongly increase in response to the export price shock. In the remaining 
part of this paper, we will test these predictions empirically using the dataset and identi-
fication strategy described in the following section. 
2.4 Empirical methodology and data 
Our data basis comprises the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (TLSS) conducted by 
the World Bank and UNICEF in 2007 and 2009 and a follow up survey for 2011 con-
ducted by the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS). All three waves 
were collected during the cotton harvest season so that we have comparable measures of 
labor market participation in cotton picking. In addition, the survey contains an array of 
household and individual level characteristics. The first wave in 2007 comprises a rep-
resentative sample of 4,860 households living in 270 primary sampling units (PSUs). In 
the second and third wave, the sample consists of a representative sub-set of 167 PSUs 
and 1,503 households (Danzer, Dietz and Gatskova 2013). For the empirical analysis, 
we only use the households living in the 167 PSUs that are included in all three waves.59 
Unfortunately, the three waves of this potential panel household survey had not been 
matched at the individual level so far. During the matching procedure, we found many 
inconsistencies and errors in the identifiers at the individual, household and PSU level 
as well as in many other variables. The applied cleaning and matching procedures are 
described in Appendix 2 E. Using the corrected identifiers, I was able to match 6,097 
individuals across all three waves, 1987 individuals across 2007 and 2009, 1,052 indi-
viduals across 2009 and 2011 and 769 individuals across 2007 and 2011. 10,088 indi-
viduals only appear in 2007, because the number of households per PSU was reduced 
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 In addition, during interviews in Tajikistan in 2014, many farmers told us that they base their growing decision in 
the sowing period (January until March) on the prices that prevailed during the last harvest period and until the sow-
ing period. Farmers that do not have access to this price information mostly base their growing decisions on the prof-
its made by themselves or by neighbors planting different crops during the last agricultural season. 
59
 As a robustness check, we run regressions including the households living in the 103 PSUs excluded after 2007 and 
our results do not change. The results of this robustness check can be requested from the author. 
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from 18 to 9 in the TLSS 2009 and 2011 (Danzer et al. 2013).60 Thus, our panel dataset 
includes 22,616 individuals and 38,618 individual-year observations, whereby 10,202 
individual-year observations reported working.  
We define cotton regions based on information about primary sampling units (PSUs/ 
communities) in the 2007 community survey that was conducted alongside the TLSS. 
PSUs in which cotton was reported as the first or second most important crop, are de-
fined as cotton PSUs. Non-cotton PSUs are all remaining PSUs which are predominant-
ly characterized by agricultural production (see Fig. 2.4 and Tab. A2.18 and A2.19).  
As expected, cotton PSUs are characterized by lower altitude, better connectivity to 
federal or district capitals and by better infrastructure (roads, irrigation) than non-cotton 
PSUs while population size and school enrolment do not differ significantly (Tab. 
A.20).61 Workers employed in agriculture in cotton PSUs comprise the treatment group. 
The control group contains agricultural workers in non-cotton PSUs. Table A2.21 pre-
sents summary statistics for the treatment and the control group in the year 2007. Build-
ing on the heterogeneity in labor supply faced by different farm types, we further refine 
our treatment and control group to agricultural workers in cotton PSUs at small private 
family vs. big para-statal farms, respectively. Summary statistics for this second defini-
tion of treatment and control group are presented in Table A2.22 for the year 2007. As 
robustness check, we use two additional definitions for cotton PSUs using external GIS 
data from the FAO GAEZ data base (FAO 2013) as well as a definition based on alti-
tudes below 1000m sea level. The GIS data employ different criteria for soil quality, 
climate and other geographic characteristics to determine the suitability of arable land 
for cotton production (for details of these definitions see Appendix 2 B). We merge the 
GIS data with the geo-referenced PSUs in the TLSS 2007 survey.62 As additional ro-
bustness check, we define treatment at the district level, whereby any PSU in a cotton 
district is defined as cotton PSU. We classify a district as a cotton district, if more than a 
certain percentage of PSUs in that district are defined as cotton PSUs. As thresholds we 
use 30, 50, or 70 percent.  
Because of the cotton price spike in 2010/2011 and the increased cotton production in 
2011, labor demand for cotton pickers should have increased strongly in cotton growing 
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 For more details see the Appendix 2 E. The selection procedure for selecting 9 out of the 18 households in the 
revisited 167 PSUs for the TLSS 2009 and 2011 was based on random sampling and should not influence our results 
(Danzer et al. 2013). However, we run regressions excluding the households that only appear in 2007 and our results 
do not change. These results can be requested from the author. 
61
 In robustness checks, we control for these community level variables as well as control variables at the sub-district 
level for the year 2007 and our results do not change. 
62
 The geo coordinates for PSUs in the TLSS 2007 were highly erroneous and we had to retrieve the correct infor-
mation from Tajik websites and other open source websites (see the Appendix 2 E for more details). 
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regions in 2011. We expect wages of the treatment group (agricultural workers in cotton 
PSUs) to increase from 2009 until 2011 relative to the control group (agricultural work-
ers in non-cotton PSUs). From 2007 to 2009, cotton prices slightly decreased and we 
expect a negative or no effect on wages of the treatment group relative to the control 
group (Fig. 2.2). Our empirical analysis uses two main specifications. We estimate the 
following model by OLS using only the sample of agricultural workers: ln	(realwageph))*= α + β(cottonPSU × year09) + β7(cottonPSU × year11)+ β9cottonPSU + β:year09 + β;year11 + X)*=γ + τ + u)*					(2.1) 
for individual i at time t. 
The dependent variable is the contemporary log real net wage per hour for individual i 
in year t.63 As regional CPIs are unavailable, we deflate wages by national CPI and con-
trol for province-year dummies in the model (which also pick up other differential time 
trend across provinces). We interact the year dummy for 2011 with a dummy for cotton 
PSUs to capture the effect of the rising cotton price on the treatment group β2 in the year 
2011. The coefficient β1 tests whether the wage growth between cotton and other agri-
cultural workers differed already in the pre-price hike period from 2007 to 2009. In ad-
dition, the dummies for the years 2009 and 2011 and the cotton PSU dummy are includ-
ed separately. The vector of control variables X includes gender, age, two dummies for 
middle and higher education (secondaryedu and tertiaryedu), three dummy variables for 
occupational group (occhigh stands for one-digit occupational codes 1-3, occ4578 
stands for one-digit occupational codes 4, 5, 7 and 8, occagriskilled stands for skilled 
agricultural occupations), a dummy for firm size indicating whether a firm has more 
than 50 employees (firmbig), and a dummy for state owned enterprises (statefirm). In 
addition, we include district fixed effects τ that control for all time invariant district spe-
cific characteristics, e.g. institutional characteristics that differ between districts but do 
not change in time.64 The included province-year dummies control for time varying 
characteristics at the province level like economic activity, institutional changes and 
differing weather conditions. We also control for dummies of the interview month to 
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 In the survey, the variable wage is reported for the past month and hours worked for the last two weeks. As cotton 
pickers are paid daily wages, we use this information to compute the average hourly wage for the last month. Other 
information on labor market participation is measured for the last two weeks. However, wage payments in kind are 
reported for the last year. In a robustness check, we include average monthly in kind payments in the dependent 
variable wage and the results do not change. The results can be requested from the author. 
64
 Tajikistan comprises 5 provinces (Oblasts), 58 districts (Hukumats/Raions) and 406 sub-districts (Jamoats). 
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capture seasonal effects.65 In addition to the OLS estimation, we estimate each specifi-
cation with individual fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the indi-
vidual level. Standard errors are clustered at the PSU/community level throughout all 
specifications. 
The second specification is based on the full sample of agricultural and non-agricultural 
workers:  ln(realwageph))*= α + β(cottonPSU × year09) + β7(cottonPSU × year11)+ β9cottonPSU + β:year09 + β;year11 + βC(agri × year09)+ βE(agri × year11) +	βF(agri × cottonPSU) + 	βGagri+	βH(cottonPSU × year09 × agri)+	β(cottonPSU × year11 × agri) + X)*=γ + τ+ u)*																													(2.2) 
The treatment effect is now captured by β11, which reports the effect of the cotton price 
shock on agricultural workers (agri) in cotton PSUs compared to agricultural workers in 
non-cotton PSUs. The coefficient β10 tests whether there was a differential effect on 
agricultural wages in cotton PSUs compared to non-cotton PSUs in the pre-shock peri-
od. To investigate differences between small family vs. big para-statal farms, we will 
split the sample of all workers into workers at small (<25 employees) vs. big firms (>25 
employees).66 For an additional robustness check, we enrich the second specification by 
interactions with a dummy for working at a firm with less than 25 employees (small). 
To analyze labor supply adjustments to the price shock, we employ probit and linear 
probability specifications with a dummy indicating work in agriculture as dependent 
variable. In these specifications, we use the same explanatory variables as before and 
additionally include individual and household level characteristics that influence the 
labor supply decision.67 The estimation uses the full sample of working age adults to 
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 The interviews in all three waves were conducted from September until November, whereby in 2011 a higher share 
of interviews was collected towards the end of the harvest season. Depending on the province, the cotton harvest 
starts at the end of August and lasts until mid of November. Because at the start of the harvest season a higher quanti-
ty and quality of cotton can be picked per day, daily wages are higher. Weather conditions in terms of rain also influ-
ence the quality of the picked cotton and, thus, daily wages earned. Because wages in the survey are reported for the 
last month, we control for seasonal variation in cotton picking wages by including dummies for the month of the 
interview in all specifications. Excluding those month dummies does not change the size of the coefficients and gives 
even smaller standard errors.  
66
 As mentioned above, the only reliable criterion to identify collective dehkan farms and agricultural enterprises 
(with their specific organizational and incentive structure) is farm size, specifically a farm size bigger than 20 hec-
tares or a number of shareholders bigger than 25 (World Bank 2012, Interviews with GIZ officials in Tajikistan). 
67
 We exclude occupation dummies that are highly endogenous to the dependent variable working in agriculture. We 
additionally control for PSU and sub-district level characteristics in 2007 that may influence the labor supply deci-
sion. For robustness checks, we estimate the participation equation using only control variables appearing in the wage 
regressions and results do not change. The results of the wage regressions are also highly robust to including addi-
tional controls at the individual, household, PSU and sub-district level.  
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test whether new workers entered agriculture following the labor demand shock induced 
by the price shock.  
Furthermore, we conduct various robustness checks for our main specification using 
additional datasets obtained during a field research stay in Tajikistan (see Appendix 2 
B). We control for additional characteristics at the PSU and sub-district level before the 
price shock in 2007. We also test whether the privatization process may explain our 
results by controlling for the number of newly issued certificates for small farms at the 
sub-district level. Furthermore, we check whether our results may be explained by mo-
nopsony power of big para-statal farms in specific local labor markets by controlling for 
the share of agricultural workers on small farms per PSU. Further regressions address 
possible selection issues, look at profits of managers and try to identify the exact chan-
nel of the labor market mechanism by controlling for the area cropped with cotton per 
district. In addition, we estimate a measure of the price pass-through as the elasticity of 
wages with respect to the cotton price in an OLS framework:  ln(realwageph))*= α + βln	(p	) + β7(cottonPSU × ln(p	)) + β9(agri × ln(p	))+ β:(cottonPSU × agri × ln(p	)) +	β;(agri × cottonPSU) + 	βCagri+ βEcottonPSU + X)*=γ + τ + u)*																													(2.3) 
For cotton PSUs, we define the price pt as the average cotton FOB export price in year t. 
For non-cotton PSUs, we define pt as the average wheat CIF import price in year t, be-
cause wheat is the main crop grown in non-cotton regions of Tajikistan and domestic 
wheat prices closely follow international prices (USAID 2011). Thus, β4 measures the 
pass-through of cotton prices to agricultural wages in cotton PSUs compared to the 
pass-through of wheat prices to agricultural wages in non-cotton PSUs. In this specifica-
tion, we use the same explanatory variables as before. Instead of average yearly prices, 
we also run these regressions using average prices during the sowing period (January 
until March) as well as the average harvest price that prevailed two weeks before the 
respective interview. For robustness checks, we use world market prices for cotton and 
wheat instead of Tajik export and import prices. 
2.5 Results 
The world cotton price hike had profound consequences both for labor force participa-
tion as well as workers’ incomes. 
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2.5.1 Results I: Participation in cotton harvesting 
According to our theoretical considerations, high cotton prices during the sowing period 
of 2011 let many farmers shift their agricultural production from other crops (predomi-
nantly wheat) to cotton. This implies an expansion of agricultural area devoted to cotton 
and hence larger areas to be harvested in late 2011. Since the cotton harvest is much 
more labor-intensive than the harvest of other crops, farmers have to adjust their work-
force in order to account for the larger crop areas. Based on these considerations we 
have predicted a relative expansion of the agricultural workforce.  
Indeed, participation in the agricultural sector has substantially increased in areas which 
are suitable for cotton production (Table 2.3). Compared to the base year, the probabil-
ity that an individual of working age was working in agriculture (note we have no par-
ticular information regarding the actual crops workers are dealing with) in cotton areas 
went up by 8 percentage points. This effect was concentrated among women whose at-
tachment to agricultural employment increased by 10 percentage points (or 53 per-
cent).68 This is unsurprising as women form the vast majority of cotton pickers. These 
effects remain identical irrespective of whether we include individual fixed effects or 
whether we control for the district share of workers on small farms (in the total agricul-
tural workforce). The unaffected result after including the latter control suggests that the 
workforce expansion took place across all cotton areas, no matter whether they were 
predominantly characterized by smallholder or parastatal farming structures.69  
2.5.2 Results II: Effects on agricultural wages 
Our main question of interest is whether cotton pickers actually benefitted from the 
global cotton price hike of 2011. Female agricultural workers in cotton PSUs experi-
enced significant hourly wage growth at the times of high cotton prices, hence, capital-
izing on the improved conditions for producers in the global production chain. Estimat-
ing specification (2.1) for the sample of agricultural workers, we find that the hourly 
wage rates of women in the agricultural sector increased by significant 44 log points 
due to the cotton price shock (Tab. 2.4 col. 3). Including all workers in the sample and 
estimating specification (2.2), we find that wage rates even increased by highly signifi-
cant 61 log points (col. 9). The effect for male agricultural workers during the cotton 
price hike period is basically zero, again reflecting the fact that almost only women en-
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 Table A2.23 shows that 19 percent of working age female in cotton PSUs were working in agriculture in 2007. 
69
 For robustness checks, we also used the share of workers on small farms (in the total agricultural workforce) at the 
PSU level. The results are the same and can be requested from the author. Table A2.26 shows that the results hold, if 
we only use the control variables that are also included in the main wage regressions (gender, age and education 
dummies).  
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gage in cotton picking. Also note that there are no wage effects for the wave prior to the 
treatment year (2009) and for non-agricultural workers (col. 4-6), similar to the em-
ployment regressions. This supports our identification strategy which crucially relies on 
the common trend assumption between cotton and non-cotton PSUs. Once we account 
for potentially confounding unobserved heterogeneity by including individual fixed 
effects, the wage effects from the cotton price hike become even more pronounced in 
size and significance (Tab. 2.5). This result is important as our OLS estimates might 
potentially suffer from composition effects: If newcomers to cotton-picking were signif-
icantly more productive than the previous workforce, the positive wage rates could re-
flect productivity effects; however, all qualitative evidence from our focus group dis-
cussions suggests that famers tend to pay the same (hourly) wage rate to all of their 
pickers. 
We now focus on the separate response between cotton pickers on small vs. big farms. 
To accomplish this we split the sample by farm size, defining small farms as those with 
less than 25 employees. As mentioned above, we chose this cut-off based on results 
from our focus group discussions and evidence from GIZ data, but also experiment with 
other cut-offs such as 16, 25 or 50 employees.70 First, we estimate specification (2.2) 
separately for the subsample of small (<25 employees) and big firms (>25 employees) 
(Tab. 2.6). Second, we split the sample of agricultural workers into workers on small vs. 
big farms using the same cut-off and estimate specification (2.1) for each subsample 
separately (Table A2.27). Irrespective of the cut-off, we find wage gains for hourly and 
monthly wages exclusively for women on small farms while agricultural laborers on 
large farms and men do not benefit (Tab. 2.6, A2.28, A2.29).71 The wage response ap-
pears quite substantial. Given that labor costs make up only 10-15% of total production 
cost in the cotton sector (Sattar and Mohib 2006), there is plenty of scope for other win-
ners from the cotton price hike, and we will turn to other effects in subsection 3. 
Elasticities 
In order to quantify the effect of the cotton price shock in a more intuitive manner, we 
estimate the cotton price elasticity of agricultural wages using specification (2.3). We 
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 The TLSS dataset does not include information on the area cultivated by farms. The only available variable is the 
number of employees per firm, whereby we know whether the firm is an agricultural or a non-agricultural firm. As 
mentioned above, the only criteria to categorize farms into small private and big para-statal farms is farm size with 
the common thresholds being 20 hectares or 25 employees.  
71
 Table A2.28 presents the results from Table 2.6 including individual fixed effects. The coefficient sizes are in the 
same ballpark, but standard errors increase. In addition, we also included a dummy for working at a small firm and its 
interactions with the cotton PSU, agri and year dummies in specification (2.2) and estimated this quadruple difference 
estimation with OLS. The results are very similar to the sample split results and can be requested from the author. 
Furthermore, we defined a small private farm using another question in the survey indicating whether an individual 
worked at a household enterprise. Using this definition gives similar results that can also be requested from the au-
thor. 
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construct a price measure that equals the average cotton FOB export price for cotton 
PSUs and the average wheat CIF import price for non-cotton PSUs during the year of 
the interview (alternatively, we also use average sowing and harvest prices) and regress 
real hourly log-wages on this measure.72 The results show a slightly inelastic wage re-
sponse for the average yearly and sowing price respectively, while during harvest time 
the response of female agricultural wages to changes in the cotton export price is slight-
ly above unit-elastic (Tab. 2.7). According to our theoretical considerations, the sowing 
price elasticity should be the most relevant one, because wages in cotton PSUs rise due 
to an increase in area cropped with cotton and subsequent higher harvest labor demand. 
Using this elasticity, we can rationalize the results from Table 2.4 column 9, since ∆ × KLM × N = 250% × 0.42 ≈ exp(0.61) − 1, 
where ∆ is the cotton price change between the sowing periods of 2007 and 2011, KLM 
is the cotton price elasticity of agricultural wages and the expression behind the approx-
imately equal sign is the result from Table 2.4 column 9 expressed in percent.73 
Income generation 
Finally, we turn to the effect of the cotton price hike on income generation more broad-
ly. By analyzing monthly earnings, we can shed light at intramarginal responses to in-
creased wages (Tab. 2.8, 2.9). For instance, cotton pickers might well use their in-
creased wage rates to afford more leisure, i.e. reduce monthly working hours. In 
essence, the tremendous changes to wage rates may not fully translate into income 
gains. We find some evidence on such a behavioral response: While monthly earnings 
increase for female cotton pickers in the fixed effects model (Tab. 2.9), the OLS results 
show only moderate increases which are not significantly different from zero at conven-
tional levels (Tab. 2.8). This indicates that workers already working before the cotton 
price shock do only slightly reduce working hours. However, workers entering the labor 
force due to the cotton price hike work fewer hours than workers already on the labor 
market in 2007 and 2009. 
2.5.3 Effects on other labor market subgroups 
Besides female agricultural laborers, other labor market subgroups might have been 
directly affected by the price changes of cotton. Child labor in cotton picking has a long 
tradition in Tajikistan and beyond. During harvest time, entire schools were temporarily 
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 Results using the world prices of cotton and wheat yield basically identical results.  
73
 As farmers and workers are predominantly paid on spot markets, using the elasticity w.r.t. the harvest price may be 
also reasonable. In this case, the estimated pass through would indicate a wage increase of around 150%, which 
seems to be too high compared to the estimates in Table 2.4.  
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closed in order to send school children to the fields (van Atta 2009, ILRF 2007). While 
this phenomenon has been on decline for several years, reports of involuntary child la-
bor in cotton picking have not fully disappeared. We define child labor for youth below 
18. Table 2.10 indicates a significant expansion in the incidence of child labor in cotton 
PSUs in the year of the cotton price hike. Across both sexes, the probability that adoles-
cents work during the reference week in the harvest period is roughly ten percentage 
points higher. This effect becomes slightly larger once we control for the structure of 
farms in the district (i.e., by controlling for the share of small farm workers per district). 
But were cotton pickers the only beneficiaries of the cotton price hike? In fact, if large 
parastatals were exploiting their political connections in order to attract cheap labor, 
where would the sharply rising revenues go? Our qualitative interviews suggest that 
farms increased their profits and that farm managers were benefitting from this. Just to 
illustrate this point, several small private farmers explained that managers of big farms 
purchased big cars as a consequence of higher revenues.74 Here, we want to test this 
more formally by analyzing managers’ earnings. Fortunately, we can additionally iden-
tify farm managers by combining individual occupation (e.g., manager or farm owner) 
with sector of operation (e.g., agriculture). We adjust our previous estimation strategy in 
a way to distinguish between employees and farm owners/managers. We estimate a 
quintuple difference estimator by enriching specification (2.2) with a dummy for work-
ing in a small firm and a dummy for being a manager (or the owner) as well as all inter-
actions between these two dummies and the dummies for cotton PSU, working in agri-
culture and the year dummies.75 We present the estimates for managers and employees 
separately for small vs. large farms in Table 2.11.  
The earnings of farm managers increased disproportionally during the cotton price hike 
on both farm types, no matter whether we condition on individual fixed effects or not. 
In effect, while on small farms workers and managers see an increase in earnings, the 
only beneficiaries on large farms are managers.76 Yet, the effect is fully concentrated in 
the male subsample. For women, who hold little management/ownership positions in 
our sample (only 37 percent of farms are run by a women), the estimate is imprecisely 
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 In general, profits of managers on big farms are much higher than for small holders (Sattar and Mohib 2006). The 
FAO farm dataset illustrates this point by showing that in 2005 the net profits on big farms were disproportionally 
higher than on small farm (Tab. A2.24) 
75
 We could not estimate the regression for the subsample of managers/owners, because there are too few manag-
ers/owners in the dataset. 
76
 In Table A2.30 and A2.31, we present results for the estimation of our main wage regressions from Table 2.4, 2.5 
and 2.6 using the sub-sample of employees defined by the occupation question. The results show strong wage in-
creases for female employees on small farms due to the cotton price shock. Wages for female employees on big farms 
and male employees do not increase. We did not use these regressions as our main regressions, because the reported 
answers for the occupation question were not always consistent with other information on activities on the job. Thus, 
we opted for estimating the main regressions for all individuals that indicated having a job. 
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estimated for small farms.77 On large farms, we observe no single women in a manage-
ment position, resulting in missing estimates for this category. On first sight, male man-
agers on small farms seem to earn disproportionally more than managers on large farms; 
however, this effect reverses once we account for potential labor supply adjustments by 
analyzing monthly earnings rather than hourly wages. On a monthly basis, only manag-
ers of large farms reap substantial benefits from the cotton price hike. This may even be 
understated due to likely underreporting of profits by big farm mangers involved in the 
rent seeking networks of the cotton sector.  
2.5.4 Analysis of political connections on large parastatal farms 
So far we have simply assumed differences in political connections between managers 
of small vs. large farms. Now, we illustrate the differences more formally. We use the 
GIZ Survey of Political Leaders data set of 2011 and compare answers of 672 district 
(Hukumat) and sub-district (Jamoat) politicians regarding the political influence on 
farming decisions. Naturally, politicians’ answers to such delicate questions might not 
correctly reflect the true extent of political influence; however, finding differences be-
tween regions in which more or less large parastatal farms operate should be indicative 
of actual differences in political interference. Figure 2.5 shows that politicians in dis-
tricts which predominantly contain large farms are much more likely to favor political 
intervention in production planning and to report politically prescribed production tar-
gets.78 In general, there is mounting evidence that production targets for cotton are es-
pecially attractive for district leaders (van Atta 2009, Kassam 2011, Tab. A2.25). 
2.5.5 Robustness checks 
The following section rules out three potential alternative explanations: The first hy-
pothesis suggests that the privatization process might be responsible for the observed 
pass-through patterns; the second explains the wage effects by productivity differences 
between small and big farms; and, the third suggests that the absence of wage gains af-
ter the cotton price hike can be explained by monopsony power rather than by political 
connections.  
One potential threat to our identification could stem from disproportionate privatization 
of land between the survey years 2009 and 2011. As discussed in the background sec-
tion, we use data from the Tajik State Committee for Land and Geodesy (SCLG) on 
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 Another explanation may be that many women on small farms report being the farm head, because their husbands 
seasonally migrated to Russia. Those women may not be fully responsible for handling the profits of the farm. 
78
 Small farm districts are districts with more than 50 percent of agricultural workers working on small farms. Most 
of the presented differences between small and large farm districts are significant at the 5 percent level (Tab. A2.25). 
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newly issued land use certificates for farms with less than 25 shareholders to investigate 
the privatization process over the period between 2007 and 2011. As Figure A2.12 illus-
trates, there was a substantial expansion in the number of newly issued SCLG land use 
certificates before the year 2009, but not after that year.79 To lend further robustness to 
our results we repeat our main analysis and include a control variable that reflects the 
number of newly issued SCLG land use certificates per municipality (Jamoat). As ex-
pected, this does not change our finding of significantly higher wages for female cotton 
pickers (col. 7-12 in Tab. 2.13 and 2.14). This indicates that the privatization process is 
not driving our results. 
If wages fully reflected labor productivity, wage differences between farm types may 
simply reflect a selection of more productive workers in small private farms. To test this 
potential explanation, we compare labor productivity differences in the GIZ farm survey 
for the year 2013 (Tab. 2.2). For this we relate a measure of cotton yield per hectare to a 
measure of worker per hectare, resulting in cotton output per unit of labor input. It turns 
out that the average worker on large and small farms produces 968 kg and 964 kg of 
cotton, respectively.80 
A monopsony power explanation of the missing wage effects in large farms would re-
quire that large farms artificially suppress the labor intensity (per hectare) on its farms 
in order to put pressure on wages. We use data from the farm survey conducted by the 
GIZ to study differences in labor intensity in the cotton sector. Table 2.2 reveals that the 
number of workers per hectare (i.e., the labor intensity of production) on big and small 
farms is almost identical; this is also true for female workers per hectare, the most rele-
vant group once it comes to cotton picking. Similarly, the cotton yield in 100 kg cotton 
per hectare is very similar. In fact, small and big farms use as input very similar labor-
to-land ratios, making the use of monopsony power on big farms a very unlikely expla-
nation (Tab. 2.2). Furthermore, we test the monopsony power explanation by including 
the share of agricultural workers working on small private farms per district (and per 
PSU) as control variable in our main wage regressions (col. 1-6 in Tab. 2.13 and 
2.14).81 A higher share of workers on small farms should indicate a higher degree of 
competition between farms in local labor markets and vice versa. The results show that 
the degree of competition in local labor markets does not explain our findings of in-
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 Computing the share of agricultural workers on small farms per province using the TLSS, we also find that the 
privatization process mainly happened from 2007 until 2009 (Fig. A2.13). 
80
 Given a total net harvest period of roughly four weeks the total daily productivity in Tajikistan is similar to Ante-
bellum productivity per worker in America, where one person picked around 100 pounds per day. 
81
 The results for the share of small farm workers per PSU are not shown here, but can be requested from the author. 
The results are very similar to the ones presented in Table 2.13 and 2.14.  
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creased agricultural wages in cotton PSUs compared to non-cotton PSUs from 2007 
until 2011.  
However, according to our theoretical considerations, the pass-through of the cotton 
price shock to agricultural wages in cotton regions should not be completely independ-
ent of the degree of competition in local labor markets. A higher degree of competition 
leads to a steeper labor supply curve for small private farms and, thus, the exogenous 
increase in harvest labor demand due to the cotton price surge should translate into 
higher wage increases. In Table 2.12 (col. 7-9), we test this hypothesis by including the 
area cropped with cotton per district, the share of agricultural workers working on small 
farms per district and the interaction between both variables in specification (2.1), 
which we estimate for the sub-sample of agricultural workers (excluding the interaction 
terms between cotton PSU and the year dummies). The results show that for female 
agricultural workers the wage increases due to a rise in the area cropped with cotton are 
significantly larger when the degree of competition in local labor markets is higher. For 
area sown with wheat, we do not find such effects (col. 10-12). These results provide 
further support for our hypothesis that the cotton price surge affected wages of cotton 
pickers on small private farms through competitive local labor markets.  
A related question is whether local labor market conditions are reflected in wage re-
sponses: In more responsive (i.e., functional) labor markets faced by small private farms 
we would expect a negative correlation between the level of unemployment and wage 
levels. On big parastatal farms that command a pool of coerced labor, wages should not 
react to local labor market conditions. Indeed, we find that wages on smaller and more 
market-oriented farms decrease with rising unemployment rates while the correlation is 
zero for wages on large farms (Tab. 2.15 col. 7-12). This is another indication of struc-
tural differences between labor markets faced by small private vs. big parastatal farms. 
Furthermore, we test the robustness of our results with a number of alternative specifi-
cations. Specifically, we exploit different definitions of cotton-suitable areas (according 
to production capacity in the FAO GAEZ data or according to altitude based measures; 
see Appendix 2 B for details) as well as different aggregation methods for cotton areas 
(at district rather than PSU level). Employing these alternative treatment definitions 
leads to the same strong results as in the main regressions (Tab. A2.32, A2.33). Fur-
thermore, we include additional control variables at the individual, household, PSU and 
sub-district level (Tab. 2.15) and we restrict our estimation sample only to laborers who 
were working on small private and big parastatal farms before and after the cotton price 
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hike, respectively. None of these alternative approaches casts doubt on our main re-
sults.82  
2.6 Conclusion 
Exploiting the unexpected doubling of the world market price of cotton in 2010/2011 
this paper has identified the commodity price effect on wages of cotton pickers. Using a 
new household panel from Tajikistan, we employed a difference-in-differences strategy 
based on variation in geographic suitability for cotton production as well as price varia-
tion over time. The wage increase following the expansion of the cotton production is 
substantial. While women, who form the largest part of the cotton workforce, gain from 
the price hike (real hourly wages increase by 84 percent), no comparable benefits can be 
detected for men. The increase in wages also led to a substantial take-up of agricultural 
work by women who were previously out of the labor force.  
These changes in employment and wages have substantial social implications: While 
women who work in the cotton sector are normally considered the most deprived part of 
the workforce without social benefits (International Crisis Group 2005), the cotton price 
hike clearly benefitted them. Moreover, the growth in paid labor market participation of 
women will most likely have benefitted their absolute and relative economic standing 
and bargaining power within households and within the society as a whole. 
Our findings suggest that the positive effect of the price shock operates through the la-
bor market: While female workers on private family (dehkan) farms gain from the cot-
ton price shock, their peers on big cotton farms gain close to nothing. Workers on fami-
ly farms have to be recruited for the harvest season on the local labor market while big 
farms exploit their political connections to coerce workers of other state-owned enter-
prises, university students and school children into cotton picking. The fact that only 
workers on small family farms gain from the price shock indicates that the pass-through 
of cotton proceeds depends on the market structure. Perfectly elastic labor supply for 
big para-statal farms let the wages of their workers stagnate during the cotton price 
surge in 2011. Our regression results as well as interviews which we conducted in early 
2014 in Tajikistan suggest that the higher cotton proceeds and farm profits on big farms 
were appropriated by farm managers rather than distributed to workers. 
This paper sheds light on the link between international trade and the labor market con-
ditions of some of the most disadvantaged workers in basic tradable commodity markets 
in developing countries. While working conditions in the cotton sector of Tajikistan are 
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 The results on the estimation for the sub-samples of workers who were working on small private and big parastatal 
farms before and after the cotton price hike can be requested from the author. 
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generally harsh, we observe strong wage adjustments following increased demand in the 
market oriented branch of the cotton production sector. This result is not confounded by 
changing skill requirements or compositions of the workforce as illustrated by our mod-
el that controls for individual heterogeneity. Our results are short-run estimates of the 
pass-through of world-market price fluctuations on labor inputs. In the long run, firms 
might in theory adjust their capital stock, which however is less likely for credit-
constrained small-holders who are found to behave in correspondence with market in-
centives. Big cotton farms seem to be severely plagued by rent-seeking behavior of 
managers, cotton ginneries and local politicians. This leads to the surprising situation 
that big farms are not more efficient in cotton production than small-holders. According 
to our results, the global hunger for basic commodities benefitted some of the poorest 
workers as long as basic market rules are respected. Hence, this paper shows that so far 
the privatization process in Tajikistan has succeeded in establishing a more competitive 
and entrepreneurial agricultural sub-sector that created new income opportunities for 
poor landless women in rural villages. 
The presented case study clearly shows how a strong external dependence on exports 
results in labor market risks for a substantial fraction of the local workforce and poten-
tially pushes the boundaries of national social security institutions. While this time, the 
rise in the world market price of cotton benefitted the population, an equally likely drop 
in the world market price might produce massive social costs in Tajikistan. At this 
stage, it remains an open question whether export taxes or subsidies on cotton (as cur-
rently discussed in Tajikistan) are useful policy instruments to stabilize producer prices 
at the farm gate. However, decreasing cotton prices would probably push small private 
farmers to substitute from cotton to wheat and other crops thus mitigating the negative 
impacts of a potential cotton price slump. Therefore, an adequate strategy to mitigate 
the risk of cotton price fluctuations is to effectively secure free crop choice for farmers.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1.: Regional variation of cotton production in Central Asia and Tajikistan 
Source: FAO - GAEZ – Production capacity index for cotton (for current cultivated land 
and intermediate input level irrigated cotton) 
 
 
Figure 2.2.: Cotton world market price (100=2000) 
Note: The vertical lines mark survey dates. Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices (Cotton Outlook 'A 
Index', Middling 1-3/32 inch staple, CIF Liverpool, US cents per pound) and Statistical Agency of Tajiki-
stan. 
Figure 2.3.: Labor market equilibriums for small private and big para
The figure shows the stylized comparative statics of the model in response to an increase in the world 
market price of cotton. For more details see 
 
Figure 2.4.: Regional variation of cotton production in Tajikistan (cotton/non
Note: Cotton/non-cotton communities (PSUs) from TLSS 2007 (in green/white), cotton communities are 
communities that grow cotton as first or second most important crop. FAO 
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index for cotton (for current cultivated land and intermediate input level irrigated cotton). Administrative 
units are districts (hukumats or raions); there are 58 districts in Tajikistan. 
 
 
Figure 2.5.: Indicators for political influence on farming decisions (GIZ Political 
Leader Survey 2011) 
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Table 2.1.: Cotton exports and imports by country 
Share of world export for ginned cot-
ton (lint) Ranking according to 2011 
Cotton imports (in 1’000 480 lb. Bales) 
Ranking according to 2011 
 Country  2010  2011 
 
Country  2009 2010  2011 
1 United States 40.5% 25.5% 1 China 10,903 11,979 24,533 
2 India  14.1% 24.1% 2 Bangladesh  3,900 3,700 3,200 
3 Brazil 5.6% 10.4% 3 Turkey 4,394 3,350 2,382 
4 Australia 7.1% 10.1% 4 Indonesia 2,500 2,400 2,300 
5 Uzbekistan 7.5% 5.4% 5 Vietnam 1,695 1,569 1,625 
6 Pakistan 1.9% 2.7% 6 Thailand 1,806 1,752 1,263 
7 Malaysia n.a. 2.2% 7 South Korea 1,010 1,038 1,170 
8 Greece 2.1% 2.2% 8 Malaysia 271 290 1,125 
9 Turkmenistan 3.1% 1.6% 9 Mexico 1,393 1,196 1,000 
10 Mali 1.3% 1.4% 10 Pakistan 1,574 1,443 900 
12 Tajikistan 1.1% 1.1%      
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
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Table 2.2.: Farm Characteristics from the GIZ 2013 farm head survey 
  
Group Means Difference (Big-Small) 
p-value of the 
twosided  T-
Test 
  
Small Farms 
(<20 ha) 
Big Farms 
(>20 ha)     
        
  
Shareholder per 
ha under cotton 
2.417886 2.439044 0.0211579 0.84 
  
(0.055328) (0.092848) (0.0211579) 
 
  
    
Female share-
holders per ha 
under cotton 
1.437603 1.531426 0.0938234 0.195 
  
(0.0328423) (0.0644221) (0.0723106) 
 
  
    
% of farm area 
cropped with 
cotton (in 2013) 
0.469952 0.5105713 0.0406193 0.008 
  
(0.0085186) (0.0129321) (0.0154856) 
 
  
    
Cotton yield in 
100 kg per ha 
(in 2011) 
23.32 23.62 0.3014078 0.25 
  
(0.1198784) (0.2317064) (0.2608806) 
 
          
Number of 
observations 3384 869     
Source: GIZ Survey of farm heads 2013 
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Table 2.3.: Participation in agriculture (working age population) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Working in agriculture 
             
District share of agri. workers on small farms    0.03 0.05 0.02    0.04 0.07° 0.02 
    (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)    (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
cottonPSU*year2009 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.08* 0.05 0.10* 0.08* 0.05 0.11* 0.07° 0.05 0.09* 0.08° 0.05 0.11* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
sex -0.00   -0.00         
 (0.01)   (0.01)         
age 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01° 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
secondaryedu 0.02* 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 0.03** -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
tertiaryedu -0.06** -0.06** -0.05** -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** -0.01 0.03 -0.06* -0.01 0.03 -0.10* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -0.13 -0.08 -0.13 -0.15 -0.68** -0.45* -0.07 -0.03 -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.19) (0.22) (0.12) (0.20) (0.15) (0.16) (0.26) (0.20) 
Individual and household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PSU and sub-district controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,856 9,505 10,351 17,016 8,182 8,834 19,856 9,505 10,351 17,016 8,182 8,834 
R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Number of panelid       12,044 5,686 6,358 10,836 5,134 5,702 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is an indicator whether the person works in agriculture or not, whereby we use the full sample of the working age population. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, 
dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU and the year of the interview. Individual and household level controls include dummies for the ethnicity and the marital status of the individual as 
well as household size. PSU and sub-district level controls are for the year 2007 and include the distance of the PSU to the province capital, a dummy for urban location, measures for the importance of agriculture and male 
unemployment in the PSU as well as the unemployment rate, the dependency ratio, the share of economically active population and the share of households living below the poverty line at the sub-district level. Columns 1-6 
show OLS estimates and columns 7-12 individual FE estimates. Columns 4-6 and 10-12 additionally include the district share of agricultural workers working on small private farms (out of all agricultural workers). 
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Table 2.4.: OLS wage regressions for hourly wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Agricultural workers Non-agricultural workers All workers 
 Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female 
 
   
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Log of the real wage per hour 
          
cottonPSU*year2009 -0.10 -0.27 -0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.14 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.24) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.22 -0.02 0.44* -0.01 -0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.20) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2009       -0.27 -0.42 -0.18 
       (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011       0.27 0.01 0.61* 
       (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) 
sex -0.16**   -0.39**   -0.35**   
 (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.02)   
age 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.17** 0.23** 0.00 0.11** 0.18** -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
tertiaryedu 0.15 0.23° -0.19 0.41** 0.38** 0.44** 0.34** 0.33** 0.40** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.24) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
firmbig -0.22* -0.21* -0.20* 0.19** 0.23** 0.09 0.03 0.11** -0.10 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.21** -0.15° -0.27** -0.55** -0.51** -0.53** -0.43** -0.42** -0.41** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
occhigh 0.26* 0.22 0.04 0.17** 0.13* 0.27** 0.19** 0.14* 0.32** 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.30) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) 
occ4578 0.35* 0.29 0.15 0.20** 0.13** 0.36** 0.26** 0.17** 0.42** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.34) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
occagriskilled -0.06 -0.16 -0.05 -0.41* -0.41* -0.34 -0.11 -0.25** 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.18) (0.51) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
Constant 0.20 0.91 0.57 0.53** 0.08 -0.19 0.43** 0.04 -0.34° 
 (0.17) (0.93) (0.46) (0.11) (0.12) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) 
          
Observations 2,371 1,137 1,234 5,758 4,270 1,488 8,129 5,407 2,722 
R-squared 0.38 0.34 0.43 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.39 0.32 0.42 
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.299 0.402 0.238 0.173 0.250 0.386 0.307 0.396 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU 
and the year of the interview. Columns 7-9 additionally include a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and its interactions with cotton PSU and the year dummies. Columns 1-6 show OLS estimates for the Dif-in-Dif of 
specification (1) for agricultural workers (col. 1-3) and non-agricultural workers (col. 4-6). Col. 7-9 show OLS estimates for the Dif-in-Dif-in-Dif from specification (2) for the sample of all workers.  
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Table 2.5.: Individual FE - wage regressions for hourly wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Agricultural workers Non-agricultural workers All workers 
 Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female 
 
   
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Log of the real wage per hour 
          
cottonPSU*year2009 -0.09 -0.50 0.34 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.07 
 (0.35) (0.43) (0.32) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.24 -0.21 0.72** -0.13 -0.12 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11 -0.20 
 (0.30) (0.39) (0.25) (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2009       -0.60 -0.94° 0.21 
       (0.43) (0.49) (0.35) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011       0.16 -0.25 0.98** 
       (0.36) (0.42) (0.30) 
age -0.04 -0.20* 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03° -0.04° 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
secondaryedu -0.13 -0.18 -0.13 0.16° 0.17 0.13 0.02 0.05 -0.07 
 (0.11) (0.25) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
tertiaryedu -0.59* -0.62° 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.39) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
firmbig -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 -0.05 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
statefirm -0.11 -0.02 -0.21 -0.27** -0.29** -0.18 -0.18** -0.18** -0.19° 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.17) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) 
occhigh 0.47 0.29 0.54 0.15 0.09 0.27 0.17° 0.10 0.35° 
 (0.39) (0.42) (0.43) (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.18) 
occ4578 0.61* 0.34 0.76 0.16° 0.16° 0.12 0.21** 0.18* 0.24° 
 (0.28) (0.34) (0.52) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) 
occagriskilled -0.13 -0.46° 0.19 -0.42 -0.26 -1.08 -0.15 -0.31* 0.10 
 (0.18) (0.27) (0.21) (0.31) (0.29) (0.91) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) 
Constant 0.70 7.15° -2.05 1.17° 1.23 0.85 1.03° 1.74* -0.42 
 (1.52) (3.69) (1.30) (0.70) (0.94) (1.05) (0.56) (0.77) (0.80) 
          
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,371 1,137 1,234 5,758 4,270 1,488 8,129 5,407 2,722 
Number of panelid 1,978 956 1,022 4,114 3,030 1,084 5,773 3,706 2,067 
R-squared 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.17 0.16 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.367 0.354 0.167 0.152 0.279 0.225 0.229 0.281 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU 
and the year of the interview. Columns 7-9 additionally include a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and its interactions with cotton PSU and the year dummies. Columns 1-6 show FE estimates for the Dif-in-Dif of 
specification (1) for agricultural workers (col. 1-3) and non-agricultural workers (col. 4-6). Col. 7-9 show FE estimates for the Dif-in-Dif-in-Dif from specification (2) for the sample of all workers.  
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Table 2.6.: OLS hourly and monthly wages for sample split small vs. big firms (all workers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Big firms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) Big firms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage 
             
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.39 -0.42 -0.21 -0.20 -0.48 0.07 -0.39 -0.25 -0.34 -0.15 -0.37 0.08 
 (0.30) (0.34) (0.34) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.25) (0.31) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29) (0.30) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 -0.31 -0.34 -0.10 0.25 -0.06 0.90** -0.20 -0.18 -0.06 0.00 -0.16 0.55° 
 (0.27) (0.36) (0.33) (0.25) (0.28) (0.31) (0.20) (0.28) (0.27) (0.22) (0.26) (0.30) 
sex -0.36**   -0.29**   -0.46**   -0.46**   
 (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   
age -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.15** 0.25** -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.17** 0.24** 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
tertiaryedu 0.19** 0.03 0.43** 0.41** 0.46** 0.33** 0.21** 0.07 0.40** 0.41** 0.45** 0.32** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
firmbig 0.04 0.07° 0.01    0.06° 0.11** 0.01    
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)    (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)    
statefirm -0.36** -0.36** -0.27** -0.53** -0.50** -0.51** -0.42** -0.42** -0.32** -0.53** -0.48** -0.54** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
occhigh 0.20** 0.16° 0.30** 0.23** 0.17** 0.36** 0.14* 0.04 0.32** 0.18** 0.10° 0.38** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) 
occ4578 0.33** 0.17* 0.50** 0.24** 0.17** 0.32* 0.40** 0.21** 0.53** 0.27** 0.22** 0.39** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) 
occagriskilled -0.25* -0.39** -0.19 0.03 -0.14 0.19 -0.19* -0.38** -0.07 -0.02 -0.20* 0.16 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) 
Constant 0.88** 0.54** -0.10 0.15 -0.15 -0.57° 6.19** 5.77** 4.93** 5.61** 5.23** 4.35** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.24) (0.15) (0.13) (0.32) (0.13) (0.15) (0.23) (0.13) (0.13) (0.25) 
             
Observations 3,111 1,788 1,323 5,018 3,619 1,399 3,137 1,806 1,331 5,060 3,645 1,415 
R-squared 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.30 0.25 0.36 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.38 0.30 0.38 
Adjusted R2 0.519 0.452 0.492 0.287 0.233 0.316 0.534 0.461 0.479 0.373 0.282 0.337 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month (col. 1-6) and the log of the wage in the last month (col. 7-12). All specifications are estimated for the sample of all workers and include district 
dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton 
PSU and the year dummies.  
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Table 2.7.: Output price elasticities of wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Yearly prices Sowing period prices Harvest period prices 
 Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female 
 
   
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Log of the real wage per hour 
          
lnprice 0.28* 0.17 0.71** 0.12 0.05 0.37** 0.22 0.13 0.66** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) 
lnprice*cottonPSU -0.00 0.09 -0.37* 0.09 0.14 -0.11 0.28 0.34 -0.07 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) (0.22) (0.25) 
lnprice*agri 0.39° 0.78** -0.29 0.27° 0.50** -0.10 0.46 0.93* -0.36 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.33) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) (0.31) (0.36) (0.43) 
lnprice*agri*cottonPSU 0.05 -0.33 0.72* 0.06 -0.17 0.42° 0.41 0.01 1.14* 
 (0.24) (0.29) (0.34) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.42) (0.50) (0.49) 
sex -0.35**   -0.35**   -0.34**   
 (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
age 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.12** 0.21** -0.00 0.12** 0.21** -0.00 0.12** 0.21** -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
tertiaryedu 0.35** 0.35** 0.39** 0.35** 0.36** 0.40** 0.36** 0.36** 0.40** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
firmbig 0.03 0.11** -0.11° 0.03 0.11** -0.11° 0.03 0.11** -0.12° 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.44** -0.42** -0.42** -0.44** -0.42** -0.42** -0.44** -0.42** -0.42** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
occhigh 0.19** 0.14** 0.33** 0.19** 0.14** 0.33** 0.19** 0.14** 0.32** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) 
occ4578 0.27** 0.18** 0.41** 0.27** 0.18** 0.41** 0.26** 0.18** 0.41** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
occagriskilled -0.12° -0.25** -0.00 -0.12° -0.25** -0.00 -0.14* -0.25** -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
Constant 1.00** 0.42 0.98** 0.71** 0.21 0.40 0.87* 0.33 0.90* 
 (0.28) (0.31) (0.36) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.35) (0.41) (0.43) 
          
Observations 8,129 5,407 2,722 8,129 5,407 2,722 8,129 5,407 2,722 
R-squared 0.38 0.30 0.41 0.38 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.30 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.293 0.389 0.378 0.292 0.388 0.376 0.291 0.384 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, 
a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and the interaction between agri and cotton PSU.  
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Table 2.8.: OLS wage regression for monthly wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Agricultural workers Non-agricultural workers All workers 
 Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female 
 
   
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Log of the real wage per hour 
          
cottonPSU*year2009 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.12 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.10 0.04 0.17 -0.03 0.01 -0.22 -0.04 -0.03 -0.18 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2009       -0.25 -0.30 -0.20 
       (0.21) (0.24) (0.27) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011       0.12 -0.00 0.39 
       (0.19) (0.21) (0.29) 
sex -0.26**   -0.54**   -0.48**   
 (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.02)   
age 0.01** 0.00° 0.01** -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.20** 0.23** 0.08 0.14** 0.18** 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
tertiaryedu 0.20* 0.28* -0.43* 0.41** 0.38** 0.45** 0.35** 0.33** 0.39** 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.22) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
firmbig -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 0.26** 0.29** 0.17** 0.12** 0.19** 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.19** -0.14° -0.23** -0.55** -0.49** -0.57** -0.44** -0.42** -0.40** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
occhigh 0.31** 0.22° 0.55* 0.12** 0.02 0.32** 0.13** 0.05 0.35** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.24) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
occ4578 0.31* 0.29° -0.13 0.24** 0.16** 0.43** 0.30** 0.21** 0.48** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.31) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
occagriskilled -0.05 -0.15° -0.00 -0.36* -0.47** 0.08 -0.11° -0.27** 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.31) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
Constant 5.11** 5.57** 4.35** 5.95** 5.44** 4.66** 5.81** 5.36** 4.54** 
 (0.16) (1.20) (0.24) (0.11) (0.11) (0.21) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) 
          
Observations 2,372 1,137 1,235 5,825 4,314 1,511 8,197 5,451 2,746 
R-squared 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.23 0.37 0.44 0.35 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.235 0.246 0.325 0.216 0.336 0.431 0.336 0.378 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU 
and the year of the interview. Columns 7-9 additionally include a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and its interactions with cotton PSU and the year dummies. Columns 1-6 show OLS estimates for the Dif-in-Dif of 
specification (1) for agricultural workers (col. 1-3) and non-agricultural workers (col. 4-6). Col. 7-9 show OLS estimates for the Dif-in-Dif-in-Dif from specification (2) for the sample of all workers.  
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Table 2.9.: Individual FE - wage regressions for monthly wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Agricultural workers Non-agricultural workers All workers 
 Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female 
 
   
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Log of the real wage per hour 
          
cottonPSU*year2009 -0.04 -0.27 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.10 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.35) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.30 0.02 0.72** -0.12 -0.12 -0.19 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.27) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2009       -0.50 -0.69° 0.02 
       (0.36) (0.40) (0.39) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011       0.20 -0.07 0.80* 
       (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) 
age -0.02 -0.12 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02° -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
secondaryedu -0.12 -0.19 -0.07 0.15* 0.15° 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.22) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
tertiaryedu -0.71** -0.60* -0.98** 0.15° 0.17° 0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.07 
 (0.27) (0.30) (0.36) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) 
firmbig 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.08° 0.10° 0.05 0.10* 0.13** 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.06 -0.00 -0.18 -0.29** -0.30** -0.26** -0.22** -0.22** -0.24** 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
occhigh 0.47 0.22 1.45** 0.04 -0.04 0.26° 0.10 0.01 0.34* 
 (0.32) (0.33) (0.41) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) 
occ4578 0.47* 0.18 1.22** 0.17* 0.14 0.22 0.24** 0.19** 0.36** 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) 
occagriskilled -0.12 -0.40* 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.27* 0.09 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.33) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) 
Constant 5.23** 9.27** 3.97** 6.14** 6.22** 5.98** 6.03** 6.46** 5.24** 
 (1.23) (3.21) (1.23) (0.60) (0.77) (0.83) (0.47) (0.65) (0.64) 
          
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,372 1,137 1,235 5,825 4,314 1,511 8,197 5,451 2,746 
Number of panelid 1,979 956 1,023 4,152 3,053 1,099 5,807 3,726 2,081 
R-squared 0.16 0.26 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.37 0.24 0.26 0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.247 0.176 0.192 0.172 0.363 0.235 0.251 0.286 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU 
and the year of the interview. Columns 7-9 additionally include a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and its interactions with cotton PSU and the year dummies. Columns 1-6 show FE estimates for the Dif-in-Dif of 
specification (1) for agricultural workers (col. 1-3) and non-agricultural workers (col. 4-6). Col. 7-9 show FE estimates for the Dif-in-Dif-in-Dif from specification (2) for the sample of all workers.  
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Table 2.10.: Participation of children (below 18) in agriculture 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Working in agriculture 
             
District share of agri. workers on small farms    0.01 0.02 -0.02    -0.01 0.12 -0.13 
    (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)    (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
cottonPSU*year2009 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.09* 0.10° 0.10* 0.10* 0.11° 0.11* 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) 
sex 0.03**   0.04**         
 (0.01)   (0.01)         
age 0.04** 0.04** 0.03** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04** 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
secondaryedu 0.04* 0.01 0.07* 0.04° 0.00 0.09* 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) 
tertiaryedu 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00       
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
Constant -0.78** -0.62** -0.72* -1.19** -0.87** -0.95* -0.28 -0.22 -0.36 -0.33 -0.30 -0.39 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.32) (0.27) (0.20) (0.39) (0.42) (0.67) (0.48) (0.50) (0.76) (0.65) 
Individual and household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PSU and sub-district controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,445 1,253 1,192 2,102 1,089 1,013 2,445 1,253 1,192 2,102 1,089 1,013 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.13 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.0913 0.160 0.109 0.0828 0.149 0.0939 0.194 0.105 0.105 0.229 0.118 
Number of panelid       2,113 1,078 1,035 1,840 948 892 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is an indicator whether the person younger than 18 works in agriculture or not, whereby we use the sample of all under 18 year old individuals. All specifications include district dummies, province-
year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU and the year of the interview. Individual and household level controls include dummies for the ethnicity and the marital status of 
the individual as well as household size. PSU and sub-district level controls are for the year 2007 and include the distance of the PSU to the province capital, a dummy for urban location, measures for the importance of 
agriculture and male unemployment in the PSU as well as the unemployment rate, the dependency ratio, the share of economically active population and the share of households living below the poverty line at the sub-
district level. Columns 1-6 show OLS estimates and columns 7-12 individual FE estimates. Columns 4-6 and 10-12 additionally include the district share of agricultural workers working on small private farms (out of all 
agricultural workers). 
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Table 2.11.: 5 DIF wage regressions for employees vs. manager/owners 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Full sample Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full sample Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES Log of hourly real earnings Log of real earnings per month 
             
CottonPSU*2011*agri*big*employee -0.00 0.02 0.25 0.04 0.06 0.29 -0.01 -0.07 0.37 0.05 0.01 0.38 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.19) (0.26) (0.15) (0.16) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24) 
CottonPSU*2011*agri*big*owner 0.58** 0.54**  0.39* 0.43**  0.89** 0.82**  0.55** 0.55**  
 (0.15) (0.15)  (0.16) (0.16)  (0.13) (0.14)  (0.14) (0.16)  
CottonPSU*2011*agri*small*employee 0.06 0.02 0.38 0.07 0.03 0.39 -0.47** -0.43* -0.10 -0.46** -0.41* -0.12 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.14) (0.17) (0.22) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) 
CottonPSU*2011*agri*small*owner 0.68** 0.86** 0.59 0.72** 0.88** 0.56 0.15 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.28 0.08 
 (0.20) (0.27) (0.36) (0.19) (0.27) (0.35) (0.19) (0.19) (0.49) (0.20) (0.20) (0.46) 
sex -0.34**      -0.47**      
 (0.02)      (0.02)      
age 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00° 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.11** 0.18** -0.00 0.10** 0.18** -0.01 0.13** 0.18** 0.06 0.12** 0.17** 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
tertiaryedu 0.33** 0.32** 0.41** 0.31** 0.31** 0.35** 0.33** 0.32** 0.39** 0.30** 0.30** 0.33** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
firmbig 0.06 0.11* 0.01 0.05 0.11* 0.01 0.08* 0.14** 0.01 0.07* 0.13** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
statefirm -0.45** -0.45** -0.37** -0.44** -0.44** -0.35** -0.49** -0.46** -0.43** -0.47** -0.44** -0.41** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
occhigh 0.17** 0.12* 0.32** 0.17** 0.12* 0.32** 0.12** 0.03 0.34** 0.11* 0.02 0.34** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
occ4578 0.26** 0.17** 0.38** 0.26** 0.17** 0.37** 0.30** 0.21** 0.45** 0.29** 0.21** 0.42** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
occagriskilled -0.10 -0.26** 0.05 -0.10 -0.27** 0.07 -0.11* -0.28** 0.06 -0.12* -0.29** 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
Constant 0.45** 0.09 -0.40° 0.45** 0.09 -0.21° 5.84** 5.39** 4.56** 5.85** 5.39** 2.29** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.20) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
             
Individual FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,069 5,365 2,704 8,069 5,365 2,704 8,137 5,409 2,728 8,137 5,409 2,728 
R-squared 0.41 0.34 0.43    0.45 0.36 0.41    
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.323 0.409 . . . 0.443 0.350 0.387 . . . 
Number of panelid    5,745 3,689 2,056    5,780 3,709 2,071 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, 
the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri), a dummy for working in a small firm, a dummy for being the owner (or the manager) of the firm and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU, the year 
dummies, the small and the owner dummy. Columns 1-3 and 7-9 show OLS estimates and columns 4-6 and 10-12 individual FE estimates.  
 97 
Table 2.12.: OLS including area cropped with cotton and wheat per district (sub-sample of agricultural workers) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Big farms (>25 employees) Small farms (<25 employees) All agricultural workers All agricultural workers 
VARIABLES Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
             
 Dependent variable: Log of the real wage per hour 
             
Cotton area per district 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00    
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
District share of agri. workers on small farms       -0.10 0.39 -1.10* 0.14 0.39 -0.32 
       (0.38) (0.43) (0.49) (0.36) (0.53) (0.36) 
Cotton area*Dist. share of small farm work.       0.02 -0.01 0.07*    
       (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)    
sex -0.14**   -0.07   -0.16**   -0.15**   
 (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.04)   
age 0.00** 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.16 -0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
tertiaryedu 0.17 0.20 -0.01 0.23 0.42* -0.43 0.15 0.23° -0.15 0.18 0.24° -0.19 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.26) (0.17) (0.20) (0.43) (0.12) (0.14) (0.25) (0.11) (0.13) (0.25) 
firmbig -0.15* -0.20° -0.12    -0.20* -0.17° -0.21* -0.20* -0.18° -0.22* 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)    (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
statefirm 0.03 0.20 -0.12 -0.31* -0.22 -0.40 -0.20** -0.14° -0.25** -0.19** -0.13 -0.24** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.27) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
occhigh 0.36* 0.33° 0.40 0.33° 0.32 -0.11 0.27* 0.23 0.07 0.27* 0.22 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.41) (0.19) (0.21) (0.42) (0.11) (0.15) (0.31) (0.12) (0.15) (0.30) 
occ4578 0.44* 0.34 0.07 0.30° 0.22 -0.11 0.36* 0.31° 0.16 0.36* 0.30° 0.14 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.17) (0.23) (0.44) (0.14) (0.18) (0.34) (0.14) (0.18) (0.35) 
occagriskilled -0.17 -0.20 -0.17 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.07 -0.15 -0.04 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
Wheat area per district          0.03 0.03 0.03° 
          (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Wheat area*Dist. share of small farm work          -0.00 -0.02 0.01 
          (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -1.09** -1.54** 0.48 0.85 0.12 0.82 0.28 0.42 2.28** 0.04 0.43 2.10** 
 (0.38) (0.31) (0.34) (0.97) (1.62) (0.64) (0.40) (1.04) (0.50) (0.39) (1.15) (0.47) 
             
Observations 1,142 459 683 1,229 678 551 2,371 1,137 1,234 2,371 1,137 1,234 
R-squared 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.44 0.38 0.34 0.44 
Adjusted R2 0.337 0.308 0.336 0.326 0.255 0.437 0.356 0.298 0.405 0.360 0.299 0.410 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications are estimated for the sub-sample of agricultural workers and include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for 
the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU and the year of the interview. Area under cotton and wheat is measured in 1000 hectares.  
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Table 2.13.: OLS wage regressions controlling for the privatization process and monopsony power 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Full samp-
le 
Male Female Full samp-
le 
Male Female Full samp-
le 
Male Female Full samp-
le 
Male Female 
             
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage 
             
District share of agri. workers on small farms 0.18 0.16 0.19 -0.02 0.05 -0.19       
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)       
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.31 -0.45 -0.27 -0.29 -0.33 -0.30 -0.28 -0.43 -0.18 -0.25 -0.31 -0.20 
 (0.24) (0.28) (0.30) (0.21) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 0.25 0.01 0.53* 0.08 -0.01 0.27 0.28 0.01 0.63* 0.12 0.00 0.39 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21) (0.28) 
sex -0.35**   -0.49**   -0.35**   -0.48**   
 (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
age 0.00* -0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.10** 0.17** -0.00 0.13** 0.17** 0.06 0.11** 0.18** 0.00 0.14** 0.18** 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
tertiaryedu 0.35** 0.35** 0.41** 0.35** 0.33** 0.39** 0.34** 0.34** 0.40** 0.35** 0.33** 0.39** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
firmbig 0.02 0.12** -0.12° 0.11** 0.20** -0.04 0.03 0.11** -0.09 0.12** 0.19** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.41** -0.40** -0.38** -0.41** -0.39** -0.38** -0.43** -0.42** -0.41** -0.44** -0.42** -0.41** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
occhigh 0.17** 0.09 0.40** 0.11* 0.02 0.37** 0.18** 0.13* 0.32** 0.13** 0.05 0.35** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
occ4578 0.29** 0.18** 0.50** 0.32** 0.23** 0.48** 0.26** 0.17** 0.42** 0.30** 0.21** 0.48** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
occagriskilled -0.10 -0.26** 0.04 -0.11° -0.28** 0.07 -0.11 -0.25** 0.02 -0.11° -0.27** 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
Nr. of issued SCLG certificates per sub-district       0.09 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.03 -0.03 
       (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13) 
Constant -0.22 -0.64* -0.60* 5.84** 5.35** 4.04** 0.43** 0.04 -0.34° 5.81** 5.36** 4.54** 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.23) (0.12) (0.14) (0.24) (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) 
             
Observations 7,011 4,693 2,318 7,071 4,734 2,337 8,129 5,407 2,722 8,197 5,451 2,746 
R-squared 0.40 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.35 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.397 0.320 0.404 0.436 0.346 0.362 0.386 0.307 0.397 0.431 0.336 0.377 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month (col. 1-3 and 7-9) and the log of the monthly real wage (col. 4-6 and 10-12). All specifications are estimated by OLS and include district dum-
mies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU 
and the year dummies. Columns 1-6 additionally include the share of small farm workers per district and columns 7-12 the number of newly issued SCLG land use certificates per sub-district.  
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Table 2.14.: FE wage regressions controlling for the privatization process and monopsony power 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Full sam-
ple 
Male Female Full sam-
ple 
Male Female Full sam-
ple 
Male Female Full samp-
le 
Male Female 
             
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage 
             
District share of agri. workers on small farms 0.10 0.02 0.34* -0.14 -0.12 -0.17       
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14)       
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.64 -0.97° 0.09 -0.58 -0.76° -0.18 -0.61 -0.95° 0.22 -0.49 -0.68° 0.02 
 (0.43) (0.49) (0.39) (0.36) (0.40) (0.36) (0.44) (0.49) (0.37) (0.36) (0.40) (0.38) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 0.17 -0.21 0.94** 0.16 -0.09 0.65° 0.16 -0.24 0.99** 0.19 -0.07 0.79* 
 (0.36) (0.42) (0.34) (0.32) (0.36) (0.34) (0.36) (0.42) (0.31) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) 
age -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03° -0.04° 0.00 -0.02° -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
secondaryedu -0.02 0.03 -0.16 -0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
tertiaryedu -0.10 -0.03 -0.29 -0.05 0.01 -0.25° -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.07 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) 
firmbig -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09° 0.14* 0.04 -0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.10* 0.13** 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.16* -0.17* -0.13 -0.21** -0.21** -0.23* -0.18** -0.18** -0.17° -0.23** -0.22** -0.24** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
occhigh 0.19° 0.11 0.38° 0.12 0.04 0.35* 0.17° 0.10 0.35° 0.10 0.01 0.34* 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.22) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) 
occ4578 0.31** 0.25** 0.48** 0.30** 0.25** 0.44** 0.21** 0.18* 0.25° 0.24** 0.19** 0.35** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) 
occagriskilled -0.13 -0.31* 0.11 -0.11 -0.26* 0.10 -0.14 -0.31* 0.11 -0.12 -0.27* 0.08 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) 
Nr. of issued SCLG certificates per sub-district       0.06 0.06 0.20 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 
       (0.09) (0.11) (0.21) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) 
Constant 0.61 1.63 -1.39° 5.74** 6.26** 4.83** 1.02° 1.73* -0.48 6.04** 6.46** 5.25** 
 (0.73) (1.07) (0.82) (0.56) (0.87) (0.73) (0.56) (0.76) (0.80) (0.47) (0.65) (0.64) 
             
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,011 4,693 2,318 7,071 4,734 2,337 8,129 5,407 2,722 8,197 5,451 2,746 
Number of panelid 5,161 3,336 1,825 5,193 3,356 1,837 5,773 3,706 2,067 5,807 3,726 2,081 
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.224 0.281 0.223 0.247 0.259 0.225 0.229 0.283 0.236 0.252 0.286 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month (col. 1-3 and 7-9) and the log of the monthly real wage (col. 4-6 and 10-12). All specifications include individual fixed effects, province-year 
dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU and the year dum-
mies. Columns 1-6 additionally include the share of small farm workers per district and columns 7-12 the number of newly issued SCLG land use certificates per sub-district.  
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Table 2.15.: Wage regressions including additional control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 All workers Big firms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage log of the real wage per hour log of the real wage per hour 
             
Share of pop. economic. active in sub-district 0.02° 0.01 0.05** 0.01° 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Share of fem. pop. econo. active in sub-district -0.01* -0.01 -0.04** -0.01° -0.00 -0.03* -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Unemployment rate in the sub-district -0.02** -0.02** -0.04** -0.01** -0.01* -0.03** -0.02* -0.03* -0.01 -0.02* -0.01 -0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.12 -0.19 -0.15 -0.10 -0.09 -0.22 -0.47 -0.48 -0.24 0.13 -0.11 0.44 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.39) (0.24) (0.25) (0.33) (0.36) (0.40) (0.48) (0.32) (0.39) (0.41) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 0.42° 0.15 0.65* 0.14 -0.06 0.48 -0.72* -0.69* 0.10 0.54° 0.17 0.99* 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.28) (0.23) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.24) (0.28) (0.32) (0.38) 
sex -0.31** 0.00 0.00 -0.44** 0.00 0.00 -0.30** 0.00 0.00 -0.27** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00° -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.06 0.09 -0.00 0.09* 0.11* 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.14° -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
tertiaryedu 0.26** 0.24** 0.32** 0.29** 0.26** 0.34** 0.20* 0.06 0.44** 0.27** 0.32** 0.20 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) 
firmbig 0.05 0.10* -0.03 0.12** 0.16** 0.05 0.07 0.11* 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
statefirm -0.43** -0.41** -0.45** -0.45** -0.42** -0.45** -0.30** -0.30** -0.25* -0.55** -0.54** -0.58** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
occhigh 0.18** 0.14* 0.30** 0.12* 0.05 0.34** 0.07 0.02 0.21 0.32** 0.29** 0.39** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) 
occ4578 0.26** 0.20** 0.31* 0.30** 0.23** 0.39** 0.24** 0.10 0.32° 0.28** 0.23** 0.30° 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.05) (0.06) (0.15) 
occagriskilled -0.15° -0.28** 0.00 -0.12° -0.30** 0.09 -0.25° -0.32* -0.21 -0.04 -0.21° 0.19 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
Constant 0.69 -0.25 0.22 4.16** 4.55** 3.96* -0.00 -0.62 -0.13 0.88 -0.66 4.47° 
 (1.01) (1.00) (2.28) (1.28) (0.99) (1.74) (1.61) (2.72) (2.14) (1.53) (1.37) (2.68) 
Individual and household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PSU and sub-district controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,856 9,505 10,351 17,016 8,182 8,834 19,856 9,505 10,351 17,016 8,182 8,834 
R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month (col. 1-3 and 7-12) and the log of the monthly real wage (col. 4-6). All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies 
for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU and the year dummies. Individual and 
household level controls include dummies for the ethnicity and the marital status of the individual as well as household size. PSU and sub-district level controls are for the year 2007 and include the distance of the PSU to 
the province capital, a dummy for urban location, measures for the importance of agriculture and male unemployment in the PSU as well as the unemployment rate, the dependency ratio, the share of economically active 
population and the share of households living below the poverty line at the sub-district level. 
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Appendix 2 A Tables and Figures 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.6.: Cotton production and land area harvested (100=2000) 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.7.: Wheat world market price (100=2001) 
Note: Vertical lines mark survey dates. Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices (Wheat, No.1 Hard Red 
Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric ton) and Statistical Agency of Tajikistan 
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Appendix Figure A 2.8.: Wheat production and land area harvested (100=2000) 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.9.: Share of cultivated area under dehkan farms per province 
Source: TajStat 2012 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.10.: Share of cultivated area under state owned enterprises per 
province 
Source: TajStat 2012 
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Appendix Figure A 2.11.: Share of cultivated area under household plots per prov-
ince 
Source: TajStat 2012 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.12.: Number of newly issued SCLG land use certificates per 
province (2007=100) 
Source: Tajik State Committee for Land and Geodesy (SCLG) 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.13.: Share of small farm workers (out of all agricultural work-
ers) by province 
Source: TLSS 2007-2011 
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Appendix Figure A 2.14.: Histogram for the share of small farm workers (out of all 
agricultural workers) per PSU (for all cotton PSUs in 2007); TLSS 2007 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.15.: Area cropped with cotton on state owned enterprises per 
province (in ha) 
Source: TajStat 2012 
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Appendix Figure A 2.16.: Area cropped with cotton on dehkan farms per province (in 
ha) 
Source: TajStat 2012 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.17.: Cotton production on state owned enterprises per province 
(in tons) 
Source: TajStat 2012  
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.18.: Cotton production on dehkan farms per province (in tons) 
Source: TajStat 2012  
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Appendix Figure A 2.19.: Share of area cropped with cotton on state owned enter-
prises (out of total area under cotton) per province 
Source: TajStat 2012  
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.20.: Share of cotton production on state owned enterprises (out 
of total cotton production) per province 
Source: TajStat 2012  
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Appendix Figure A 2.21.: Area cropped with cotton on big farms (>20 ha) per prov-
ince (2007=100) 
Source: Statistical Agency of Tajikistan (Interview); Note: The index is weighted by the share of big farm 
workers (out of all agricultural workers) per province to account for varying cultivated area on big farms.  
 
 
Appendix Figure A 2.22.: Area cropped with cotton on small farms (<20 ha) per prov-
ince (2007=100) 
Source: Statistical Agency of Tajikistan (Interview); Note: The index is weighted by the share of small 
farm workers (out of all agricultural workers) per province to account for varying cultivated area on small 
farms.  
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Appendix Table A 2.16.: Data on number of private vs. collective dehkan farms for 
whole Tajikistan 
  
Number of entities 
 
Arable land cultivated in ha 
  
  2006 2010 2006 2010 
Private Dehkan Farms 18040 18300 324724 320000 
Collective Dehkan Farms 9000 8300 162000 165000 
HH and Presidential  Plots 1115400   274908   
State enterprises 193   62146   
Note: HH plots and Presidential plots grow mainly crops for subsistence consumption and do not grow cotton (average size is 0.2 
ha). Source: FAO Mission reports 2009 and 2011  
 
Appendix Table A 2.17.: Farm Head Survey GIZ 2011 
Indicators and variables  
Group Means Difference (Big-Small) 
p-value of the 
twosided  T-
Test 
  
Small Farms 
(<20 ha) 
Big Farms 
(>20 ha) 
    
  
        
% of family heads working 
abroad (of total families being 
shareholders) 
0.6504386 0.4636383 -0.1868003 0.001 
  
(0.0484872) (0.0284314) (0.0561239)   
Losses are added to farm debts, 
farm manager does not take on 
the debts 
0.2619048 0.4094488 0.1475441 0.01 
  
(0.0393254) (0.043807) (0.0588688) 
  
Farm head is regularly receiving 
information about world price of 
cotton 
0.7063492 0.7480315 0.0416823 0.46 
  
(0.0407352) (0.0386766) (0.0561715)   
Jamoat, hukumat or futurists 
influence  decisions on the farm 0 0.039 0.039 0.02 
 
(0) (0.017) (0.017)   
Fear of consecuences if I reduce 
cotton area 0.3333333 0.3385827 0.0052493 0.93 
  
(0.0421637) (0.0421585) (0.0596248)   
Spending for social responsibili-
ties from income of Manager 
1418.294 3803.787 2898.389 0 
  
(250.3035) (498.2477) (626.1253)   
Farm Manager elected by 
hukumat 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.16 
  
(0) (0.0110913) (0.011)   
Number of observations 126 127     
Source: GIZ farm head survey 2011; Note: Standard errors in parenthesis  
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Appendix Table A 2.18.: Two most important agricultural crops in cotton and non-
cotton communities (communities included in the TLSS) 
  First crop in PSU Second crop in PSU 
  
Non-cotton 
PSUs 
Cotton 
PSUs 
Non-cotton 
PSUs 
Cotton 
PSUs 
Cotton-growing 0 44 0 60 
Gardening 5 1 20 2 
Grain crops 32 6 8 26 
Plant growing 3 1 0 0 
Vegetable growing 21 51 33 16 
Vineyard 2 1 0 0 
Legumes 0 0 2 0 
Total 63 104 63 104 
Source: TLSS 2007 
 
Appendix TableA 2.19.: Two most important economic activities in cotton and non-
cotton communities (PSUs) 
  First economic activity 
in PSU 
Second economic activ-
ity in PSU   
  
Non-cotton 
PSUs 
Cotton 
PSUs 
Non-cotton 
PSUs 
Cotton 
PSUs 
Agriculture 55 56 1 2 
Mining 5 6 2 5 
Manufacturing 0 5 2 5 
Energy, Gas and Water 0 1 1 1 
Construction 1 1 3 9 
Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 1 30 13 21 
Transport 0 1 3 5 
Finance, Real Estate and Insurance 0 0 0 2 
Public Administration and Defense 0 0 2 2 
Education 0 3 29 14 
Health and Social Services 0 0 0 8 
Other Services 0 0 0 11 
Other 1 1 3 1 
Total 63 104 59 86 
Source: TLSS 2007   
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Appendix Table A 2.20.: Comparison of Cotton and Non-Cotton communities  
(Double T-tests or Rank-sum-tests) 
Variable Cotton PSUs  Non-Cotton PSUs 
P-Value for group 
comparison test 
(H0: no difference) 
Population  6600 7210 68% 
Altitude 684m 1301m 0% 
Distance to Dushanbe 152km 257km 0% 
Hours to drive to Dushanbe 5.9h 9.8h 1% 
Distance to District Capital 13km 25km 0% 
Hours to drive to District 
Capital 0.24h 1h 4% 
School enrolment  same median same median 97% 
Weeks school close because 
of agriculture 0.4 0.2 15% 
Share of population working 
in agriculture lower than median higher than median 0% 
Quality of Roads better worse 1.6% 
Part of crops planted on irri-
gated fields higher than median lower than median 2% 
Source: TLSS 2007  
Appendix Table A 2.21.: Agricultural workers in cotton regions (treated) vs. agricul-
tural workers in non-cotton regions (control) in 2007 
Variable 
Mean Con-
trol Group 
Mean Treat-
ed Group 
Difference 
SE of Differ-
ence 
P-value 
N Con-
trol 
N Treat-
ed 
Wage 
159.58 133.81 25.77 23.92 0.28 302 1005 
Dummy for being 
female 0.46 0.56 -0.10 0.02 0.00 880 1229 
age 
35.65 33.29 2.36 0.61 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for primary or 
no education  0.34 0.28 0.06 0.02 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for secondary 
educ. 0.61 0.69 -0.07 0.02 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for tertiary 
educ. 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.27 880 1229 
Dummy for working in 
a small firm (<25 
employees) 0.86 0.46 0.40 0.02 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for working in 
a very big firm (>50 
employees) 0.07 0.29 -0.21 0.02 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for working in 
a state owned firm 0.07 0.17 -0.10 0.01 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for high 
occupation 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.50 880 1229 
Dummy for occ. group 
4,5,7 and 8 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for skilled 
agricultural occupation 0.84 0.89 -0.05 0.02 0.00 880 1229 
Dummy for unskilled 
occup. 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.00 880 1229 
Hours worked per 
week 40.45 46.45 -6.01 0.75 0.00 880 1229 
Source: TLSS 2007 
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Appendix Table A 2.22.: Agricultural workers in cotton regions on small farms 
(treated) vs. agricultural workers in cotton regions on big farms (control) in 2007 
Variable 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
Treated 
Group 
Differ-
ence 
SE of 
Differ-
ence 
P-
value 
N Con-
trol 
N 
Treat-
ed 
Wage 94.78 201.09 -106.32 28.79 0.00 636 369 
Dummy for being 
female 0.60 0.51 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.60 0.51 
age 32.39 34.35 -1.95 0.75 0.01 32.39 34.35 
Dummy for pri-
mary or no educa-
tion  
0.29 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.54 0.29 0.27 
Dummy for 
secondary educ. 0.69 0.69 -0.01 0.03 0.84 0.69 0.69 
Dummy for 
tertiary educ. 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.31 0.03 0.04 
Dummy for work-
ing in a small firm 
(<25 employees) 0.00 1.00 -1.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 
Dummy for work-
ing in a very big 
firm (>50 em-
ployees) 0.53 0.00 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.53 0.00 
Dummy for work-
ing in a state 
owned firm 
0.23 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.10 
Dummy for high 
occupation 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.03 
Dummy for occ. 
group 4,5,7 and 8 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.05 
Dummy for 
skilled agricultur-
al occupation 
0.92 0.86 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.92 0.86 
Dummy for 
unskilled occup. 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Hours worked per 
week 50.87 41.22 9.65 0.87 0.00 50.87 41.22 
Source: TLSS 2007  
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Appendix Table A 2.23.: All female individuals in cotton (treated) vs. female in non-
cotton regions (control) in 2007 
Variable Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
Treated 
Group 
Differ-
ence 
SE of 
Differ-
ence 
P-value N Con-trol 
N Treat-
ed 
wage 127.87 154.02 -26.16 14.24 0.07 356 1099 
Dummy working 
in agriculture 
(working age 
population) 
0.17 0.19 -0.02 0.01 0.12 2313 3617 
age 26.23 25.52 0.71 0.39 0.07 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
primary or no 
education  
0.60 0.58 0.02 0.01 0.03 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
secondary educ. 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.01 0.87 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
tertiary educ. 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.00 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
working in a 
small firm (<25 
employees) 
0.13 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
working in a 
very big firm 
(>50 employees) 
0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.00 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
working in a 
state owned firm 
0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.00 3786 6029 
Dummy for high 
occupation 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 3786 6029 
Dummy for occ. 
group 4,5,7 and 
8 
0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
skilled agricul-
tural occupation 
0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.03 3786 6029 
Dummy for 
unskilled occup. 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.73 3786 6029 
Hours worked 
per week 38.15 42.74 -4.58 0.81 0.00 642 1284 
Source: TLSS 2007  
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Appendix Table A 2.24.: Net profits on small vs. big farms in Tajik Somoni 
 Group Means 
(SE in parenthesis) 
Difference 
(Big-Small) 
p-value of the 
T-Test 
(Diff>0) 
 Small Farms 
(<20 ha) 
Big Farms 
(>20 ha) 
  
Netprofits per farm in USD 1765.872 
(336.3672) 
60732.93 
(29978.71) 
58967.05 
(39665.08) 
0.07 
Number of observations 47 82   
Source: FAO Farm data set (Caccavale 2005)  
Appendix Table A 2.25.: GIZ Survey of Political Leaders 2011 
Indicators for political repression 
and coerced labor  Group Means 
Difference 
(Big-
Small) 
p-value of 
the twosided  
T-Test 
  
Respondents in small 
farm districts (TLSS 
district share of small 
farm workers > 50%) 
Respondents in big 
farm districts (TLSS 
district share of small 
farm workers < 50%)     
District target for area cropped with 
cotton (% of total cultivatable area) 0.5655857 0.5352559 -0.0303298 0.03 
  (0.0115419) (0.0073749) (0.0136969)   
To fulfill district production targets, I 
directly communicate with farmers and 
agro-processors, procure and distribute 
farm inputs and charge Jamoat officials to 
support farmers 0.5008319 0.5915493 0.0907173 0.15 
  (0.0204124) (0.0587511) (0.0621962)   
To implement freedom to farm we set 
specific targets for Jamoats and farms 0.1547421 0.2394366 0.0846945 0.12 
  (0 .0147647) (0.0510051) (0.0530991)   
Freedom to farm reform will decrease 
agricultural production due to lack of 
instructions to farmers by district officials 0.0965058 0.1971831 0.1006773 0.04 
  (0.0120549) (0.0475548) (0.0490589)   
Cotton debt resolution will only increase 
work load for local governments to 
control cotton farm activities 0.0266223 0.1126761 0.0860538 0.03 
  (0.0065719) (0.0377927) (0.0383598)   
Freedom to farm reform will increase 
local authorities control of farms and the 
involvement in farm decisions 0.0898502 0.1408451 0.0509948 0.24 
  (0.0116746) (0.0415774) (0.0431854)   
Cotton debt resolution will increase local 
authorities control of farms and the 
involvement in farm decisions 0.0332779 0.1267606 0.0934827 0.02 
  (0.0073224) (0.0397658) (0.0404343)   
      
    
Number of observations 601 71     
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Appendix Table A 2.26.: Participation in agriculture without additional control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Working in agriculture 
             
District share of agri. workers on small farms    0.06 0.08* 0.04    0.07 0.09* 0.04 
    (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)    (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
cottonPSU*year2009 0.05 0.02 0.07° 0.04 0.02 0.07° 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.08* 0.06° 0.09* 0.08* 0.06 0.10* 0.07* 0.05 0.10** 0.08* 0.05 0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
sex -0.01   -0.01         
 (0.01)   (0.01)         
age 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
secondaryedu 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02° 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03° -0.01 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
tertiaryedu -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.09** -0.08** -0.09** -0.01 0.02 -0.05* -0.01 0.02 -0.07* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.16* -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.18) 
             
Individual FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,398 11,205 12,193 20,534 9,868 10,666 23,398 11,205 12,193 20,534 9,868 10,666 
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Number of panelid       14,113 6,653 7,460 12,896 6,097 6,799 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is an indicator whether the person works in agriculture or not, whereby we use the full sample of the working age population. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, 
dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU and the year of the interview. Columns 1-6 show OLS estimates and columns 7-12 individual FE estimates. Columns 4-6 and 10-12 additionally 
include the district share of agricultural workers working on small private farms. 
  
 115 
Appendix Table A 2.27.: OLS Small vs. big firms (sub-samples firms in agriculture and non-agriculture) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Agricultural workers Workers in non-agricultural enterprises 
 Small farms (<25 employees) Big farms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) Big firms (>25 employees) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
 
    
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Log of the real wage per hour 
             
cottonPSU*year2009 -0.19 -0.41 0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 -0.10 
 (0.27) (0.33) (0.28) (0.20) (0.24) (0.23) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.15) (0.18) (0.24) 
cottonPSU*year2011 0.15 -0.09 0.49° -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.06 -0.03 -0.14 
 (0.24) (0.30) (0.26) (0.17) (0.19) (0.30) (0.11) (0.11) (0.27) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) 
sex -0.08   -0.14**   -0.33**   -0.46**   
 (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.04)   
age 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.00** 0.00 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.00° -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.08 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.20** 0.28** -0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.12 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) 
tertiaryedu 0.22 0.40° -0.44 0.17 0.21 -0.01 0.47** 0.48** 0.41** 0.23* 0.06 0.39** 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.42) (0.15) (0.18) (0.26) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) 
firmbig    -0.15* -0.21° -0.12    0.12** 0.14** 0.13* 
    (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)    (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
statefirm -0.31* -0.21 -0.46° 0.02 0.18 -0.13 -0.61** -0.56** -0.57** -0.53** -0.50** -0.49** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.26) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
occhigh 0.33° 0.31 -0.03 0.36* 0.32° 0.41 0.21** 0.16* 0.30** 0.17* 0.13 0.21° 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.40) (0.15) (0.19) (0.41) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) 
occ4578 0.29 0.18 -0.10 0.44* 0.33 0.07 0.18** 0.15** 0.30* 0.21** 0.08 0.35* 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.45) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10) (0.14) 
occagriskilled -0.03 -0.15 -0.07 -0.17 -0.19 -0.16 -0.32 -0.36° -0.07 -0.62* -0.60* -0.95* 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.26) (0.22) (0.71) (0.24) (0.27) (0.47) 
Constant 0.84 -1.20** 0.88 -1.06** -1.52** 0.45 0.24 -0.10 -0.48 1.14** 0.66** 0.28 
 (0.97) (0.16) (0.64) (0.37) (0.33) (0.35) (0.15) (0.14) (0.34) (0.17) (0.22) (0.27) 
             
Observations 1,229 678 551 1,142 459 683 3,789 2,941 848 1,969 1,329 640 
R-squared 0.37 0.33 0.50 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.24 0.19 0.31 0.33 0.27 0.38 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.26 0.44 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.22 0.16 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.30 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU 
and the year of the interview.  
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Appendix Table A 2.28.: Individual FE hourly and monthly wages for the sample split in small vs. big firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Big firms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) Big firms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage 
             
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.19 -0.52 0.14 -1.07 -1.58* 0.59 -0.21 -0.31 0.05 -0.87 -1.23* 0.07 
 (0.35) (0.48) (0.28) (0.67) (0.77) (0.60) (0.32) (0.44) (0.26) (0.53) (0.62) (0.51) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 -0.05 -0.15 -0.68 -0.14 -0.60 0.96 0.07 0.09 -0.94* -0.18 -0.54 0.75 
 (0.39) (0.47) (0.46) (0.54) (0.61) (0.68) (0.41) (0.49) (0.43) (0.44) (0.50) (0.56) 
age -0.04° -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
secondaryedu -0.11 -0.27 -0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.17 -0.04 -0.19 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.11) (0.20) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
tertiaryedu -0.00 -0.12 0.09 -0.07 0.01 -0.57 0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.29 
 (0.16) (0.26) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.35) (0.13) (0.21) (0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (0.24) 
firmbig -0.04 0.02 -0.11    0.03 0.12 -0.06    
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)    (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)    
statefirm -0.10 0.05 -0.28° -0.21° -0.26* 0.05 -0.13 -0.02 -0.28* -0.28** -0.28** -0.23 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.24) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) 
occhigh 0.17 0.15 0.09 -0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.25) (0.12) (0.13) (0.31) (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.10) (0.11) (0.25) 
occ4578 0.06 0.11 -0.12 0.21* 0.20* 0.50* 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.18* 0.16° 0.47* 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.24) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.20) 
occagriskilled -0.06 -0.30 0.22 -0.12 -0.18 0.10 -0.08 -0.23 0.25 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.14) (0.19) (0.22) (0.29) (0.15) (0.21) (0.19) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) 
Constant 1.72° 1.86 0.30 0.89 0.57 1.55 6.43** 7.23** 4.12** 5.93** 5.67** 6.52** 
 (0.93) (1.37) (1.47) (0.87) (0.95) (2.44) (1.01) (1.37) (1.47) (0.66) (0.74) (1.71) 
             
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,111 1,788 1,323 5,018 3,619 1,399 3,137 1,806 1,331 5,060 3,645 1,415 
Number of panelid 2,552 1,449 1,103 3,956 2,752 1,204 2,572 1,465 1,107 3,978 2,762 1,216 
R-squared 0.38 0.44 0.39 0.19 0.19 0.31 0.37 0.44 0.38 0.21 0.21 0.39 
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.429 0.380 0.181 0.183 0.297 0.362 0.433 0.371 0.206 0.208 0.377 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month (col. 1-6) and the log of the wage in the last month (col. 7-12). All specifications include individual fixed effects, province-year dummies, dum-
mies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU and the year dummies. 
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Appendix Table A 2.29.: Different thresholds for the sample split in small vs. big firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Big firms Small firms Big firms Small firms 
 >25 
employees 
>50 
employees 
<16 
employees 
<25 
employees 
<50 
employees 
>25 
employees 
>50 
employees 
<16 
employees 
<25 
employees 
<50 
employees 
           
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour 
           
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.21 -0.13 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.14 0.11 -0.25 0.59 0.62 
 (0.34) (0.46) (0.45) (0.34) (0.34) (0.28) (0.65) (0.62) (0.60) (0.47) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 -0.10 0.35 0.96* 0.90** 0.70* -0.68 -0.68 0.16 0.96 1.19** 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.42) (0.31) (0.27) (0.46) (0.80) (1.19) (0.68) (0.43) 
age 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.03) 
secondaryedu 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.15 -0.17 -0.13 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.25) (0.23) (0.19) (0.11) 
tertiaryedu 0.43** 0.40* 0.27* 0.33** 0.36** 0.09 -0.04 -0.80° -0.57 -0.29 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.19) (0.23) (0.47) (0.35) (0.24) 
firmbig 0.01     -0.11     
 (0.05)     (0.08)     
statefirm -0.27** -0.19° -0.50** -0.51** -0.51** -0.28° -0.12 0.04 0.05 -0.22° 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.24) (0.29) (0.24) (0.13) 
occhigh 0.30** 0.26 0.32* 0.36** 0.34** 0.09 1.05° -0.03 0.08 0.15 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.25) (0.55) (0.44) (0.31) (0.21) 
occ4578 0.50** 0.46** 0.34* 0.32* 0.37** -0.12 1.14* 0.42 0.50* 0.30 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.56) (0.28) (0.24) (0.20) 
occagriskilled -0.19 -0.00 0.20 0.19 0.05 0.22 -0.03 -0.06 0.10 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.28) (0.43) (0.29) (0.22) 
Constant -0.10 -0.23 -0.42 -0.57° -0.46° 0.30 0.47 1.10 1.55 1.15 
 (0.24) (0.28) (0.35) (0.32) (0.26) (1.47) (2.03) (4.50) (2.44) (1.18) 
           
Individual FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,323 731 974 1,399 1,991 1,323 731 974 1,399 1,991 
Number of panelid      1,103 651 850 1,204 1,613 
R-squared 0.52 0.56 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.62 0.32 0.31 0.31 
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.511 0.244 0.316 0.359 0.380 0.607 0.299 0.297 0.298 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications are estimated for the sample of all female workers and include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the 
month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU and the year dummies. Columns 1-6 show OLS 
estimates and columns 7-12 individual FE estimates. 
  
 118 
Appendix Table A 2.30.: OLS wage regressions for employees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female Full sample Male Female 
 log of the real wage per hour log of the real monthly wage 
             
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.21 -0.26 -0.31 -0.39 -0.61 0.17 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.34 -0.47 0.06 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) (0.46) (0.53) (0.37) (0.24) (0.26) (0.32) (0.37) (0.40) (0.41) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 0.34 0.05 0.62* 0.29 -0.15 0.97** 0.15 0.01 0.42 0.32 0.02 0.88** 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.35) (0.44) (0.29) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30) (0.32) (0.36) (0.33) 
sex -0.35**      -0.48**      
 (0.03)      (0.02)      
age 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
secondaryedu 0.10** 0.16** 0.02 -0.00 0.04 -0.09 0.12** 0.14** 0.07° 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
tertiaryedu 0.35** 0.32** 0.43** -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.34** 0.30** 0.41** -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) 
firmbig 0.05 0.13** -0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.14** 0.21** 0.02 0.10* 0.14* 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.43** -0.41** -0.39** -0.13* -0.12 -0.18 -0.44** -0.41** -0.39** -0.17** -0.15* -0.22* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
occhigh 0.15** 0.07 0.31** 0.16 0.05 0.32 0.10* -0.01 0.37** 0.08 -0.04 0.36* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
occ4578 0.23** 0.12* 0.40** 0.20* 0.16 0.15 0.29** 0.16** 0.53** 0.22** 0.14° 0.37* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) 
occagriskilled -0.11 -0.31** 0.07 -0.18 -0.42** 0.23 -0.11° -0.32** 0.08 -0.17° -0.36** 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) 
Constant 0.52** 0.09 -0.25 0.94 1.56° -0.16 5.91** 5.47** 4.57** 5.68** 5.96** 5.30** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.67) (0.86) (0.87) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.56) (0.72) (0.65) 
             
Individual FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,802 4,408 2,394 6,802 4,408 2,394 6,859 4,444 2,415 6,859 4,444 2,415 
R-squared 0.40 0.34 0.41 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.44 0.36 0.39 0.25 0.27 0.31 
Adjusted R2 0.394 0.328 0.390 0.239 0.244 0.309 0.437 0.351 0.371 0.247 0.268 0.300 
Number of panelid    5,045 3,209 1,836    5,076 3,227 1,849 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month (col. 1-6) and the log of the wage in the last month (col. 7-12). All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for 
the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU and the year dummies. Col. 1-3 and 7-9 are 
estimated by OLS and 4-6 and 10-12 using individual fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table A 2.31.: Wage regressions for employees on small vs. big farms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Big firms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) Big firms (>25 employees) Small firms (<25 employees) 
 Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour 
             
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 -0.44 -0.49 -0.30 -0.08 -0.23 -0.01 -0.20 -0.54 0.13 -0.66 -1.11 0.94 
 (0.30) (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) (0.41) (0.38) (0.35) (0.48) (0.28) (0.80) (0.89) (0.73) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 -0.30 -0.36 -0.10 0.31 -0.06 1.10** -0.03 -0.17 -0.64 -0.02 -0.67 1.90** 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.35) (0.27) (0.29) (0.35) (0.38) (0.46) (0.46) (0.65) (0.78) (0.65) 
sex -0.37**   -0.29**         
 (0.04)   (0.04)         
age -0.00 -0.00° 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01* -0.04° -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.13 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) 
secondaryedu 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.15* 0.25** -0.01 -0.11 -0.26 -0.10 0.07 0.17 -0.31 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.25) (0.13) (0.17) (0.21) (0.29) 
tertiaryedu 0.23** 0.07 0.46** 0.43** 0.47** 0.38** 0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.17 -0.07 -0.54 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.17) (0.26) (0.20) (0.21) (0.24) (0.44) 
firmbig 0.06 0.09* 0.03    -0.02 0.04 -0.10    
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)    (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)    
statefirm -0.37** -0.39** -0.26** -0.52** -0.48** -0.46** -0.08 0.05 -0.25 -0.14 -0.19 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.26) 
occhigh 0.18* 0.14 0.28* 0.18** 0.09 0.32* 0.22 0.21 0.14 -0.25 -0.28 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.17) (0.21) (0.25) (0.16) (0.19) (0.32) 
occ4578 0.32** 0.17° 0.40** 0.19** 0.10° 0.31* 0.12 0.23 -0.15 0.08 0.05 0.54 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.13) (0.14) (0.42) 
occagriskilled -0.22* -0.37** -0.14 0.01 -0.22° 0.29* -0.04 -0.23 0.22 -0.29 -0.42° 0.09 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14) (0.21) (0.24) (0.37) 
Constant 0.90** 0.55** -0.01 0.16 -0.15 -0.55 1.62° 1.82 0.31 0.25 -0.17 4.37 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.17) (0.17) (0.34) (0.94) (1.41) (1.49) (1.19) (1.20) (5.21) 
             
Individual FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,984 1,706 1,278 3,818 2,702 1,116 2,984 1,706 1,278 3,818 2,702 1,116 
R-squared 0.52 0.47 0.51 0.32 0.28 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.39 0.20 0.20 0.34 
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.442 0.473 0.308 0.260 0.335 0.375 0.435 0.376 0.192 0.193 0.323 
Number of panelid       2,439 1,376 1,063 3,211 2,229 982 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, 
the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU and the year dummies. Col. 1-6 are estimated by OLS and 7-12 using individual fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table A 2.32.: District level treatment (30% of PSUs within district treated, 50%, and 70%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 30% Threshold 50% Threshold 70% Threshold 
VARIABLES Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female Full 
sample 
Male Female 
          
 log of the real wage per hour 
          
cottonDistrict*agri*year2009 -0.23 -0.44 -0.07 -0.34 -0.42 -0.21 -0.15 -0.34 -0.01 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.38) (0.24) (0.28) (0.31) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25) 
cottonDistrict*agri*year2011 0.27 0.03 0.45° 0.21 -0.03 0.56* 0.40* 0.12 0.71** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) (0.21) (0.24) (0.25) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) 
sex -0.35**   -0.35**   -0.35**   
 (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   
age 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.10** 0.17** -0.00 0.10** 0.18** -0.00 0.10** 0.18** -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
tertiaryedu 0.33** 0.33** 0.40** 0.34** 0.33** 0.40** 0.34** 0.33** 0.40** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
firmbig 0.02 0.11** -0.10 0.03 0.12** -0.09 0.03 0.11** -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.43** -0.42** -0.41** -0.43** -0.42** -0.41** -0.43** -0.42** -0.42** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
occhigh 0.19** 0.13* 0.32** 0.19** 0.14** 0.32** 0.18** 0.13* 0.32** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) 
occ4578 0.26** 0.17** 0.41** 0.26** 0.17** 0.42** 0.26** 0.17** 0.41** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
occagriskilled -0.11° -0.26** 0.02 -0.10 -0.24** 0.02 -0.12° -0.25** -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
Constant 0.26** 0.21* 0.54** 0.28** 0.28** 0.93** 0.07 -0.26** 0.96** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) 
          
Observations 8,129 5,407 2,722 8,129 5,407 2,722 8,129 5,407 2,722 
R-squared 0.39 0.32 0.41 0.39 0.32 0.41 0.39 0.32 0.42 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.310 0.395 0.387 0.309 0.395 0.386 0.308 0.397 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies (for each district), province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as a 
dummy for cotton district, dummies for the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton district dummy and the year dummies. A district is classified as a cotton 
district, if 30% (50% or 70%) of the PSUs within the district are classified as cotton PSUs according to our main treatment definition.   
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Appendix Table A 2.33.: Other treatment definitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Low level dummy Low level dummy FAO PP1 FAO PP1 FAO PP2 FAO PP2 
 Full Sample Female Full Sample Female Full Sample Female 
       
VARIABLES log of the real wage per hour 
       
cottonPSU*agri*year2009 0.03 -0.16 0.03 -0.16 0.03 -0.16 
 (0.24) (0.41) (0.24) (0.41) (0.24) (0.41) 
cottonPSU*agri*year2011 0.74** 0.94** 0.74** 0.94** 0.74** 0.94** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) 
sex -0.34**  -0.34**  -0.34**  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
age 0.00* 0.01** 0.00* 0.01** 0.00* 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
secondaryedu 0.10** -0.01 0.10** -0.01 0.10** -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
tertiaryedu 0.34** 0.39** 0.34** 0.39** 0.34** 0.39** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
firmbig 0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
statefirm -0.44** -0.41** -0.44** -0.41** -0.44** -0.41** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
occhigh 0.18** 0.32** 0.18** 0.32** 0.18** 0.32** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) 
occ4578 0.26** 0.42** 0.26** 0.42** 0.26** 0.42** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) 
occagriskilled -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) 
Constant 0.45** -0.33 0.45** -0.33 0.45** -0.33 
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22) 
       
Observations 8,129 2,722 8,129 2,722 8,129 2,722 
R-squared 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.42 
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.399 0.389 0.399 0.389 0.399 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the PSU level) in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
The dependent variable is the log of the real wage per hour in the last month. All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview as well as dummies for cotton PSU, 
the year of the interview, a dummy for working in agriculture (agri) and all interactions between agri, cotton PSU and the year dummies. We define a cotton PSU as a PSU located below 1000m in col. 1 and 2. Using GIS 
data from the FAO-GAEZ data base we classify PSUs as cotton PSUs, if the Production Capacity Index for intermediate (col. 3-4) or low (col. 5-6) input level irrigated cotton is >0 for the PSU.  
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Appendix 2 B List of datasets 
Dataset Source Year the data was 
collected Respondents/Content 
Number of Individual 
Observations 
Household Panel Survey 
Tajikistan Living 
Standards Measure-
ment Survey (TLSS) 
2007 
The World Bank website 
(publicly available) 
2007 (harvest season) Representative Sample of 
4860 Tajik Households 
in 270 Primary Sampling 
Units (PSU); 
Additional detailed PSU 
level information on 
socio-economic, demo-
graphic, geographic and 
agricultural characteris-
tics 
30318 individuals 
Tajikistan Living 
Standards Measure-
ment Survey (TLSS) 
2009 
The World Bank website 
(publicly available) 
2009 (harvest season) 1503 Households out of 
the 4860 Households 
from TLSS 2007 (Panel 
data), 167 PSUs 
10069 individuals 
Tajikistan Living 
Standards Measure-
ment Survey (TLSS) 
2011 
The Institute for East and 
Southeast European 
Studies (IOS) in Regens-
burg, Germany 
2011 (harvest season) 1503 Households from 
TLSS 2007 and 2009 
(Panel data), 167 PSUs 
9608 individuals 
 
Detailed statistical information on Tajikistan matched with the TLSS panel data 
Global Agro-Ecological 
Zones Database 
(GAEZ) from the Food 
and Agricultural Or-
ganization (FAO) 
FAO – GAEZ website 
(publicly available) 
1961-1990 
(data published 2012) 
Production suitability 
indices for cotton for the 
territory of Tajikistan 
(GIS data) 
Data matched with all 
270 PSUs in the TLSS 
through GIS GEO-
coordinates of the PSUs 
(which were retrieved 
from various sources, see 
Appendix 2 E) 
Socio-Economic Atlas 
of Tajikistan 2005 
The World Bank and 
GeoData Institute at the 
University of Southamp-
ton; 
data obtained from Cem 
Mete (World Bank), 
Craig Hutton and Andy 
Murdoch (GeoData 
Institute) 
2000 (poverty variables 
are for the year 2003) 
Socio-economic varia-
bles at the sub-district 
(Jamoat) level for Tajiki-
stan for the year 2000; 
GIS information on 
borders of districts and 
oblasts of Tajikistan 
Jamoat data matched 
with all 270 PSUs in the 
TLSS at the sub-district 
level (Jamoats) by hand; 
GIS information on 
district borders matched 
with PSU coordinates 
using Quantum GIS 
Number of land use 
certificates for small 
farms (<25 employees) 
by sub-district 
Land use certificates 
handed out by the Tajik 
State Committee for 
Land and Geodesy 
(SCLG); 
Data obtained during an 
interview with staff of 
World Bank Tajikistan in 
November 2014 
January 2007 until July 
2011 (project ended in 
July 2011) 
Number of land use 
certificates for small 
farms (<25 employees) 
handed out by the SCLG 
at the sub-district level 
(Jamoat)  
Data matched with all 
270 PSUs in the TLSS at 
the sub-district level 
(Jamoats) by hand 
Cotton Sector Statistics 
for Tajikistan 
National Statistics Insti-
tute of Tajikistan 
(TajStat), Year Book for 
the Cotton Sector (pur-
chased in Dushanbe in 
March 2014) 
2007-2011 Cotton sector statistics by 
district (raion or 
hukumat); Cotton pro-
duction and area planted 
with cotton by district 
Data matched with all 
270 PSUs in the TLSS at 
the district level by hand 
FAO Crop Statistics for 
Tajikistan 
FAO Office in Tajiki-
stan; Data obtained 
during an interview with 
a staff member in No-
vember 2014 
2000-2012 Statistics on crop produc-
tion, area harvested and 
yields for various crops 
by district (hukumat) 
Data matched with all 
270 PSUs in the TLSS at 
the district level by hand 
Price Statistics for 
Tajikistan 
National Statistics Agen-
cy of Tajikistan (website) 
2000-2012 FOB cotton export 
prices, CIF wheat import 
price and consumer price 
CPI matched by year; 
FOB export price for 
cotton matched to PSUs 
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index (CPI) for Tajiki-
stan 
in cotton regions, CIF 
import price for wheat 
matched to PSUs in non-
cotton regions 
IMF Commodity Price 
Index 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) website 
2000-2012 Cotton and wheat world 
market price indices 
World market price for 
cotton matched to PSUs 
in cotton regions, CIF 
world market price for 
wheat matched to PSUs 
in non-cotton regions 
Micro datasets collected in Tajikistan in March and November 2014 
GIZ - Political Leader 
Survey 2011 
German Federal Enter-
prise for International 
Cooperation (GIZ), 
Office Tajikistan 
End of 2011 District and Jamoat 
Leaders from all 58 
districts of Tajikistan; 
Questions about the 
agricultural reform 
process in Tajikistan 
672 heads of districts and 
sub-districts 
GIZ Farm Head Survey 
2011 
GIZ Office Tajikistan; 
Survey conducted by 
Mattes Scheftelowitz 
November 2011 until 
March 2012 
Heads of small private 
and large collective 
dehkan farms from 13 
cotton growing districts 
in Tajikistan 
253 farm heads 
GIZ Farm Survey 2013 GIZ Office Tajikistan End of 2013 Heads of all types of 
farms from 51 districts in 
Tajikistan; Information 
on farm characteristics 
4253 farms 
FAO Farm Survey 2005 FAO Publication 
Caccavale (2005) 
2005 Small holder farmers and 
heads of collective 
dehkan farms from all 
districts of Tajikistan 
135 farms 
Statistical data on Tajikistan used for descriptive statistics 
Statistical Year Books 
for Agriculture in 
Tajikistan 
National Statistics Agen-
cy of Tajikistan; Books 
purchased in Dushanbe 
in March 2014 
1995-2013 
(some data only available 
from 2006 on) 
Agricultural statistics by 
district 
 
District level data on 
cotton production by 
farm size 
National Statistics Agen-
cy of Tajikistan; Data 
obtained during an 
interview with a staff 
member in November 
2014 
2007-2011  Cotton production and 
area harvested with 
cotton for small vs. big 
farms (20 ha as thresh-
old) for all districts in the 
provinces Sughd and 
RRP as well as for 
Khatlon province and the 
Republic of Tajikistan 
 
FAO data on the privat-
ization process 
FAO Mission Reports for 
Tajikistan 2009 and 2011 
2006, 2010 Number and area culti-
vated by private vs. 
collective dehkan farms 
 
FAO Agricultural 
Statistics 
FAO website (publicly 
available) 
2000-2012 Production statistics for 
Tajikistan for various 
crops  
 
USDA Foreign Agricul-
tural Service (FAS) 
Database 
US Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) website 
(publicly available) 
2000-2012 Production, harvested 
area, exports and imports 
for various crops and all 
countries  
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Comparison of different treatment definitions 
Treatment Definition Data Source 
Level of Aggregation 
of the treatment defi-
nition 
Description 
1. Baseline TLSS 2007 community 
questionnaire 
Community (PSU) 
level 
Cotton is the first or 
second most important 
crop in the community 
2. FAO PP1 FAO GAEZ data base Community (PSU) 
level 
Production Capacity 
Index for intermediate 
input level irrigated 
cotton is >0 for the 
community 
3. FAO PP2 FAO GAEZ data base Community (PSU) 
level 
Production Capacity 
Index for low input 
level irrigated cotton is 
>0 for the community 
4. Lowland Defi-
nition 
TLSS 2007 community 
questionnaire 
Community (PSU) 
level 
Altitude of the commu-
nity is <1000m 
5. District 
Baseline 
TLSS 2007 community 
questionnaire 
District level The district is treated, if 
more than 30% (50%, 
70%) of the communi-
ties in the sample are 
treated according to the 
baseline treatment 
definition 1 
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Appendix 2 C Theoretical Model 
Theoretical Model for the Labor Market Mechanism 
Based on the insights from the background section, we present a simple model that cap-
tures the main features of the Tajik cotton sector and describes the pass through of the 
world cotton price surge to wages of cotton pickers. 
We assume that there is a representative farm that describes the basic decision problem 
on small private dehkan farms as well as on bigger collective dehkan farms in cotton 
growing areas of Tajikistan. Both farm types only differ in the characteristics of their 
labor supply curves. Both use the same constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion technology to produce cotton or wheat.83 The total land endowment per farm is 
fixed (V̅), because land markets do not exist in Tajikistan and farmers cannot increase 
land endowments in the short and medium run. Thus, the fixed amount of land V̅ is allo-
cated between cotton and wheat production (a common assumption in agricultural eco-
nomics, see Shumway et al. 1984).84 The second production factor is labor (L), whereby 
cotton is more labor intensive than wheat, especially during harvest time.85 
1. Model for the representative farm 
Cotton production (X) X = VYZ[YZ  
Wheat production (Y) \ = V]^[]^  >    Cotton is more labor intensive than wheat (for all relative factor prices) 
                                                 
83
 For farms in Tajikistan that produce cotton, wheat is the main crop alternative (FAO 2009, 2011). Wheat can also 
be grown outside of cotton growing areas (without irrigation infrastructure).  
84
 From the interviews and GIZ farm head survey (Tab. A2.17), we know that farm heads of small and big farms in 
Tajikistan follow world prices of cotton and use this information for their production decisions. They can freely 
allocate land between production of cotton and production of wheat as long as a minimum amount of land is placed 
under cotton (around 40-50%, cotton quotas vary between districts). The fact that wheat area and supply increased 
dramatically in 2009 (in exchange for cotton) as a reaction to the high wheat prices in 2008/2009 further supports the 
hypothesis that farms can freely reallocate land between crops (FAO 2009). For simplicity reasons, we will not in-
clude a minimum share of land to be cropped with cotton in the model. However, it is straightforward to include this 
cotton quota in the model. 
85
 For simplicity reasons, other inputs (N) (like fertilizer, insecticides, fuel and machinery) are left out in this version 
of the model. They can easily be included in the equations. 
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Profit Maximization of the representative farm (decision variables are Zx, Zy, Lx, 
Ly): `a = YX + ]\ − (1 + b)c[Y + [] 
s. t. production functions for X and Y and the resource constraint V̅ ≥ VY + V] 
px is the farm gate price for raw cotton, py is the farm gate price for wheat, r is the inter-
est rate and w is the wage for agricultural labor that is mobile between cotton and wheat 
production. The farm manager has to pre-finance input costs through loans with interest 
rate r. The representative farm is a price taker on product and factor markets. We follow 
Shumway et al. (1984) and do not include costs for the fixed but allocatable input land 
(because it is fixed in the short and medium run at the farm level). 
Solutions to the constraint maximization problem: 
Defining: 
e = (1 − )Y Z ZZ(1 − )]^ ^^ (c(1 + b))
^^ ZZ
 
VY∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ = ghijg     Demand for land in cotton produc-
tion V]∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ = hijg     Demand for land in wheat produc-
tion 
[Y∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅ = k MlZ(jm)Ln oopq ghijg    Demand for labor in cotton 
production 
[]∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅ = k Mr^(jm)Ln oops hijg    Demand for labor in wheat 
production 
X∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ = k MlZ(jm)Ln qopq ghijg    Optimal output in cotton 
production 
\∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ = k Mr^(jm)Ln sops hijg    Optimal output in wheat 
production 
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Comparative statistics: 
1.) Reaction of the labor demand of the farm to an increase in px: 
It is straightforward to show that: t[Y∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅tY = eV̅1 + e u Y(1 + b)cv
Z 1(1 − )Y u2 + e1 + ev > 0 t[]∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅tY = − eV̅1 + ew ](1 + b)cx
^ 1(1 − )Y u 11 + ev < 0 
And the change in total labor demand of the farm: t([Y∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅ + []∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅)tY
= eV̅(1 + e) 1(1 − )Y zu Y(1 + b)cv
Z u2 + e1 + ev
− w ](1 + b)cx
^ u 11 + ev{ 
If  > 	 (cotton is more labor intensive than wheat, this is the main assumption) and MlMr > Z^ total labor demand on the farm increases in px at all values of the independent 
variables (for other cases it is not trivial to show that). This inequality should hold al-
most surely, because the price for a ton of cotton has been higher than for a ton of wheat 
over the last decades. 
Elasticities of labor demand w.r.t. a change in px: 
|}l∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml = 1(1 − ) u1 + 11 + ev > 0 
|}~∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml = − 1(1 − ) e1 + e < 0 
And the difference between the elasticities: 
|}l∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml − |}~∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml = 1(1 − ) u 21 + ev > 0 
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Elasticity of the total labor demand of the farm: 
|}∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml =
e(1 − )zu Y(1 + b)cv Z k2 + e1 + en − u ](1 + b)cv
^ k 11 + en
u Y(1 + b)cv Z e + u ](1 + b)cv
^  
The denominator is always positive. The numerator is positive if  > 	 and MlMr > Z^ . 
Thus, in those cases the elasticity of total labor demand w.r.t. px increases at all values 
of the independent variables. 
 
2.) Reaction of the labor demand of the farm to an increase in w: 
It is straightforward to show that for  > 	 
t[Y∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅tc = eV̅(1 + e)c u Y(1 + b)cv Zz
1 −  − 1 − 1 + e − 1(1 − ) < 0 
And: t[]∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅tc
= − V̅(1 + e)c w ](1 + b)cx
^  1(1 − ) + e1 + e u 1 −  − 1 − v 
If 1 <  + ( − ) gjg with gjg K(0,1) then }r∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hiL > 0  
And the change in total labor demand of the farm: t([Y∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅ + []∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅)tc
= eV̅(1 + e)cz
1 −  − 1 − 1 + e u Y(1 + b)cv Z − w ](1 + b)cx
^{
− V̅(1 + e)c  e(1 − ) u Y(1 + b)cv
Z + 1(1 − ) w ](1 + b)cx
^{ 
If  > 	 and MlMr > Z^ then (}l∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hij}r∗ Ml,Mr,L,m,hiL < 0  
If those conditions hold, total labor demand on the farm decreases in w at all values of 
the independent variables (for other cases it is not trivial to show that).  
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3.) Reaction of cotton production to an increase in px for the representative farm: 
tX∗Y, ], c, b, V̅tY = eV̅1 + e u Y(1 + b)cv
ZZ 1(1 − )Y u + 11 + ev > 0 
Elasticity of cotton production with respect to a change in px: 
|∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml = 1(1 − ) u + 11 + ev > 0 
2. The ginnery as an intermediate monopsonistic trader 
Because the production decisions on both farm types are well described by the repre-
sentative farm, one can assume that the ginnery with a local monopsony for the region 
R faces the supply of raw cotton from a representative farm with the endowment of cul-
tivatable land V̅ in the region R.  
From the interviews, we know that private and collective dehkan farms face the same 
output prices for raw cotton. There is no price discrimination between private and col-
lective dehkan farms. Thus, we can model the supply of raw cotton in the region R as-
suming a representative farm with endowment of land V̅. 
In this model, we assume that the ginnery only has monopsony power in the market for 
raw cotton (due to transport costs and pressure from local politicians and elites). This 
assumption is supported by our interview results. After reforms in 2007/2008, gins have 
less monopoly power in the markets for credit and for inputs. Farmers can get inputs 
and credit from other sources (like microfinance institutions and banks, other retail in-
put suppliers). Gins finance their operations with credit from national banks and are 
price takers regarding the interest rate r.86 
Total supply of raw cotton in the region R: 
X∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ = u Y(1 + b)cv ZZ eV̅1 + e 
Profit maximization of the ginnery: 
The ginnery buys raw cotton X∗  and has to gin this cotton to get NX∗  ginned cotton 
which it can sell on the world market for price L. In Tajikistan, the efficiency parame-
ter N is typically around 0.3 (see Kassam, 2011). The gin pays px for the raw cotton it 
purchases from farmers. There is no price discrimination between farm types. 
                                                 
86
 However, one could add monopoly power for credit and input markets in the profit maximization of the ginnery 
and investigate the reaction of optimal interest rates, the optimal amount of credit given out to farms and optimal 
input prices of the monopoly to a change in the world price of cotton. 
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` = LNX∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ − YX∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ 
Maximazation w.r.t. px gives: 
Y∗ = LN|∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml1 + |∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml 
Where: |∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml = (Z) k + jgn 
1.) Fixed degree of market power (supply elasticity |∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml is constant): tY∗], c, b, V̅ , LtL = N|∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml1 + |∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml 
Then it is trivial to see that|Ml∗Mr,L,m,hi,M,M = 1 
A 100% increase in the world market price would lead to a 100% increase in the farm 
gate price. 
 
2.) Solution with flexible supply elasticity |∗Ml,Mr,L,m,hi,Ml 
Defining: 
e = Y Z 
 = (1 − ) ZZ(1 − )]^ ^^ (c(1 + b))
^^ ZZ
 
Simple algebra leads to the following first order condition for Y∗], c, b, V̅ , L: 2Y∗ + Y∗ Z(Y∗ − LN) = LN( + 1) 
An explicit solution for Y∗  does not exist. Applying the implicit function theorem: tY∗], c, b, V̅ , LtL = NY∗
Z + N( + 1)
2 + Y∗ Z1 −  k2 −  − LNY∗ n
 
The numerator is always positive. 
1.) The denominator and thus Ml∗Mr,L,m,hi,MM  is positive, if 7ZZ > MMl∗  (which should be 
the case for reasonable values of ) 
2.) If 7ZZ < MMl∗  the denominator and thus Ml∗Mr,L,m,hi,MM  is positive, if Ml∗ oopqZ k2 −−cN∗>−2 
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Thus, for reasonable values of the model parameters, the monopsonistic ginnery would 
always increase the farm gate price for raw cotton in reaction to an increase in the world 
market price for ginned cotton. 
3. Partial equilibrium in local labor markets 
Due to extensive labor migration of male to Russia as well as the civil war in the 1990s, 
the agricultural labor force in rural areas of Tajikistan comprises mostly female workers 
(FAO 2009, 2011). Because of strong traditional norms and the Islamic revival, those 
female agricultural workers are not mobile across sub-districts. That is why rural labor 
markets in Tajikistan are best described as local labor markets that are defined by vil-
lages and their neighboring communities (see Interviews in March and November 
2014). For simplicity reasons, we will assume that the region R the gin faces as a mo-
nopoly equals the area of the local labor market. This assumption is realistic, because 
most sub-districts in Tajikistan are controlled by one ginnery.  
Because production on both farm types is well described by the representative farm, one 
can assume that the supply of raw cotton in region R can be described by a representa-
tive farm with endowment of land V̅ in the region R. 
X∗Y, ], c, b, V̅ = u Y(1 + b)cv ZZ eV̅1 + e 
Total labor demand in the region R is: 
[		,∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅ = V̅1 + eu Y(1 + b)cv Z e + w ](1 + b)cx
^{ 
Total labor demand in region R decreases with rising wage w, if  > 	 and MlMr > Z^ : t k[		,∗ Y, ], c, b, V̅ntc
= eV̅(1 + e)cz
1 −  − 1 − 1 + e u Y(1 + b)cv Z − w ](1 + b)cx
^{
− V̅(1 + e)c e(1 − ) u Y(1 + b)cv
Z + 1(1 − ) w ](1 + b)cx
^{ < 0 
Now solve for the partial equilibrium in the local labor market: 
The important difference between private dehkan and collective dehkan farms is that 
both farm types face different local labor supplies. Small private dehkan farms face a 
competitive local labor market that comprises landless females from local villages 
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whose male family members have migrated to Russia for work. In the harvest time, pri-
vate dehkan farms in local labor markets compete for those female agricultural workers. 
In contrast, big collective dehkan farms are still heavily intertwined with local govern-
ments and receive harvest workers sent by the local government. Those workers are 
employed in the public administration, schools, hospitals and other para-statal enterpris-
es and are forced to work at the cotton harvest for minimum picking wages.87 For fur-
ther details please see the Appendix 2 D on the qualitative interviews in Tajikistan. 
We define V,iiiiiii as the land under private dehkan farms (PF) in region R and V,iiiiiii as 
the land under collective dehkan farms (CF) in region R. From Kassam (2011) and FAO 
(2009, 2011) we know that the share of cultivated land under collective dehkan farms 
and state owned enterprises, which have similar organizational structures than collective 
dehkan farms, is about 40% for the whole Republic of Tajikistan.  V,iiiiiii + V,iiiiiii = V̅ 
1.) Partial equilibrium for small private dehkan farms 
Private dehkan farms face a efficiency wage curve, the elasticity of labor supply w.r.t. 
the wage is positive ( > 0). Those farms have to increase wages to attract further pick-
ing workers from local village labor markets. Workers from local villages have a reser-
vation wage that mainly depends on household remittances and the level of subsistence 
production on household plots. [,(c) = c −  
Where k>0 and the reservation wage cm =  
Local labor market partial equilibrium: [		,,∗ Y, ], c∗, b, V,iiiiiii = [,(c∗) 
Leads to: 
0 = V̅,1 + eu Y(1 + b)cv Z e + w ](1 + b)cx
^{− 	c∗ +  
An explicit solution for w does not exist. Applying the implicit function theorem leads 
to: 
 
                                                 
87
 Shareholders on big collective dehkan farms comprise the other part of the coerced labor pool big farms are able to 
exploit. Those mostly female shareholders are bound to the big farm by strong social and traditional norms, a lack of 
human capital and conscience about the agricultural reforms and their shareholder rights as well as missing economic 
resources. 
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tc∗Y, ], c∗, b, V,iiiiiiitY = −  
 = eV,iiiiiii(1 + e) 1(1 − )Y zu Y(1 + b)cv
Z u2 + e1 + ev − w ](1 + b)cx
^ u 11 + ev 
  = eV¡(1 +e)c¢£
¤ 1−− 1−1+e ¥¦
§zu (1+ b)cv 11−−  ¨(1 + b)c
11−
− V¡(1+e)cz e(1 −) u (1+ b)cv 11−+ 1(1 −)  ¨(1+ b)c
11−−  < 0 
If  >  and MlMr > Z^ the denominator F is negative. Other cases are not trivial to solve. 
If  > 	 and MlMr > Z^ the nominator is positive (total labor demand on private dehkan 
farms increases in px; for other cases it is not trivial to show that).  
Thus for  >  and MlMr > Z^ it follows that: tc∗Y, ], c∗, b, V,iiiiiiitY > 0 
For reasonable values of the model parameters, the wages on small private dehkan 
farms increase if the farm gate price for raw cotton increases (cet. par.).  
2.) Partial equilibrium for collective dehkan farms and state owned agricultural 
enterprises 
Collective dehkan farms face an infinitely elastic labor supply due to political connec-
tions and coerced labor. Managers of the collective dehkan farms can dispose of a pool 
of coerced labor and do not have to raise wages to increase labor supply. They pay the 
minimum picking wage (c¡) that is announced by the district government (hukumat) 
each year before the cotton harvest starts. 
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Labor supply for collective dehkan farms is completely elastic until a certain maximum 
amount: [, = [i 
Local labor market partial equilibrium: [		,,∗ Y, ], c¡, b, V,iiiiiii = [, 
Leads to: 
0 = V̅,1 + eu Y(1 + b)c¡v Z e + w ](1 + b)c¡x
^{ −	[i 
Thus, increasing labor demand on collective dehkan farms is met by the respective labor 
supply at the minimum picking wage (c¡) until labor demand reaches the value [i. At 
this point, the pool of coerced labor is exhausted and collective dehkan farms cannot 
further increase labor demand and cotton production. An increase in the farm gate price 
of cotton px would lead to increased cotton production on collective dehkan farms until 
the pool of coerced labor is exhausted, but wages for picking workers on collective 
dehkan farms would stay constant. 
From the evaluation of the interviews, we know that collective dehkan farms always 
paid the minimum picking wage announced by the hukumat. Those farms did not partic-
ipate in local labor markets to attract further workers by rising picking wages. In most 
cases, collective dehkan farms did not exhaust the pool of coerced labor and were able 
to match their labor demand with sufficient picking workers. However, in many cases 
the cotton harvest at collective dehkan farms lasted longer and some collective dehkan 
farms seemed to have problems in meeting their picking labor demand. Statistics on 
cotton production and area under cotton for small vs. big farms show that in some dis-
tricts big collective dehkan farms did increase cotton area and production not as strong-
ly as the small private dehkan farms in 2011 (Fig. A2.15-A2.18). This might be partly 
explained by the labor supply restrictions for collective dehkan farms in those districts.  
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Appendix 2 D Interviews in Tajikistan 
Qualitative Research in Tajikistan 
As part of my dissertation project, I spent eight weeks in March and November 2014 in 
Tajikistan to conduct qualitative interviews and organize additional statistical data on 
the market structure of the Tajik cotton sector and the Tajik agricultural sector in gen-
eral. 
The main motivation for this field research was to better understand the labor market 
channels of global price fluctuations. In our quantitative analysis, we had used the TLSS 
household panel survey in 2007, 2009 and 2011 to investigate the impacts of the sub-
stantial cotton price hike in the year 2010/2011 on rural employment and wages in Ta-
jikistan. Employing a Difference-in-Differences framework to exploit variation in the 
cotton price over time and in the suitability for cotton production across regions, we 
found that due to the price shock real wages per hour for agricultural workers increased 
by over 90% in cotton regions from 2009 until 2011 (compared to non-cotton regions). 
Interestingly, the effect was dominated by workers on small household owned farms. 
Workers on larger cotton farms did not gain from the positive world price shock. At this 
stage of the research project, the exact labor market channel of these found effects could 
not be determined due to the lack of detailed data on the Tajik agricultural sector and 
the cotton sector in particular. The main competing hypotheses for the findings were 
that farms of different size face vastly different labor supplies, or that recent reforms in 
the cotton sector had increased the relative negotiation power of smallholders with cot-
ton ginneries. 
To collect additional data and better understand the institutional structure of the cotton 
sector in Tajikistan, I organized a field research in March and November 2014 in Tajiki-
stan. I applied for financial support at various institutions and finally received a Ph.D. 
scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) as well as an addi-
tional grant from the Münchner Universitätsgesellschaft (MUG). I initiated the research 
cooperation with the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (GIZ) in 
Tajikistan that supported me in logistical matters. Through an agricultural consultancy 
firm (SAROB) that is supported by the GIZ in Tajikistan, I could establish many valu-
able contacts with national and local administration officials, ginnery managers as well 
as many farmers in various regions of Tajikistan. During the field research and with the 
help of a local language interpreter, I was also able to establish contacts to many local 
farmers on my own. I also initiated various contacts to international cotton trading com-
panies (e.g. Reinhart AG, ECOM Agroindustrial Corp. Ltd), NGOs and International 
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Organizations (e.g. the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Food and Agri-
cultural Organization of the UN) involved in or monitoring the cotton sector in Tajiki-
stan. The organizational work involved in this field research project was quite intense 
and took about two months before the first stay in March 2014.  
In total, I conducted 57 qualitative interviews with private and public agents in the cot-
ton sector in Tajikistan, e.g. small holder farmers, workers and managers of larger cot-
ton farms, ginnery managers, staff members of international and Tajik cotton trading 
companies, agricultural finance consultancies and cotton investors, local public admin-
istration officials, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Statistics 
Agency, International Organizations and NGOs. A complete list of the conducted inter-
views can be found below. The main result of the qualitative interviews is that differ-
ences in the world market price pass-through to farm wages were mainly due to farms 
of different size facing different labor supplies. Big collective dehkan farms are still 
heavily intertwined with local governments and receive harvest workers sent by the lo-
cal government. Those workers are employed in the public administration, schools, 
hospitals and other para-statal enterprises and are forced to work at the cotton harvest 
for minimum picking wages. Even school children are still sent to the cotton fields dur-
ing the harvest season. In exchange, the managers of big collective dehkan farms still 
support the local governments in maintaining the public and social infrastructure (e.g. 
funding and sending workers for the construction of schools and hospitals). It also ap-
peared from some interviews that the managers of big collective dehkan farms are still 
colluding with local ginneries and politicians to reap the rents from the cotton sector 
(see Sattar and Mohib, 2006, for a description of this clientelistic system).88 
In contrast, small private dehkan farms lack the strong political connections of big 
farms and have to hire additional harvest workers at the local village labor markets. The 
local labor supply is mostly comprised of landless female workers whose working age 
male family members have migrated to Russia for work. Due to traditional norms and 
the Islamic revival, those landless females are not allowed to travel alone and, thus, lo-
cal labor markets are confined to local villages. The emergence of small private dehkan 
farms due to the agricultural reforms has not only benefitted the households owning 
those farms but has also created new opportunities for landless females bound to the 
villages through the emergence of competitive local labor markets. The cotton price 
hike in 2010/2011 has increased labor demand for cotton pickers in the harvest of 2011 
                                                 
88
 Shareholders on big collective dehkan farms comprise the other part of the coerced labor pool big farms are able to 
exploit. Those mostly female shareholders are bound to the big farm by strong social and traditional norms, a lack of 
human capital and conscience about the agricultural reforms and their shareholder rights as well as missing economic 
resources. 
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on both farm types, but only on small farms picking wages increased because those 
farms faced a competitive local labor market. 
A more detailed overview of the results of the qualitative interviews can be found in 
subsection 2 and 3. The data requests I initiated with various private and public institu-
tions in Tajikistan resulted in obtaining various additional data sets that are presented in 
Appendix 2 B. 
Content 
1.  Lists of conducted interviews 
2.  Results of Interviews in March 2014 
3.  Results of Interviews in November 2014 
1.  Lists of conducted interviews 
Overview of interviews conducted in Tajikistan in March and April 2014 
Interview 
Number 
Date, Time  Location Interview Partners 
1. 5 March 
2014, 11 am 
National Academy of 
Sciences, Dushanbe 
Prof. Dr. Mustafar Olimov, Director 
Research Institute SHARQ 
2. 5 March 
2014, 3 pm 
Office of the German 
Federal Enterprise for 
International Coopera-
tion (GIZ), Dushanbe 
Muhammadi Muminow, Director of the 
agricultural consultancy firm SAROB 
that is supported and funded by the GIZ 
Tajikistan 
3. 6 March 
2014, 2 pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Hartwig Ungethuem, Team Leader of 
the GIZ Divisions "Business Enabling 
Environment" und "Value Chains", GIZ 
Tajikistan 
4. 12 March 
2014, 11 am 
Restaurant, Dushanbe Staff member of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture of the Republic of Tajikistan and 
owner of a family farm in Hissar district; 
another colleague of him that also owns 
a family farm in Hissar district (both 
requested anonymous citation) 
5. 12 March 
2014, 1.30 
Restaurant „Traktor“, Staff members of the Tajik cotton trad-
ing companies Eurotex Ventures Inc. 
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pm Dushanbe and Golden Lion LLC (business partners 
of the international cotton trading com-
pany Reinhart AG) (requested anony-
mous citation) 
6. 12 March 
2014, 5.30 
pm 
Café of the National 
Library of Tajikistan, 
Dushanbe 
Dr. Hafiz Boboyorov, Research Associ-
ate at the National Academy of Sciences 
of Tajikistan and Research Fellow of the 
German research institute “Zentrums für 
Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF)” in Bonn, 
expert for social and political power 
structures in cotton areas of Tajikistan  
7. 13 March 
2014, 9 am 
Hissar district (RRP 
province), courtyard of 
the big collective farm  
Two shareholders of a big collective 
farm (1500 ha), one driver and another 
shareholder 
8. 13 March 
2014, 10 am 
Hissar district, court-
yard of the big collec-
tive farm 
Vice-Manager of the same big collective 
farm (from interview 7), the agronomist 
of the farm 
9. 13 March 
2014, 2 pm 
Hissar district, fields of 
the farm 
Manager of a collective dehkan farm (59 
ha), Agronomist for Hissar district at the 
agricultural consultancy firm SAROB 
10. 13 March 
2014, 3 pm 
Hissar district, fields of 
the farm 
Manager of a collective dehkan farm 
(128 ha) 
11. 14 March 
2014, 9 am 
Hissar district, court-
yard of the big collec-
tive farm 
Director of a big collective farm (605 
ha) 
12. 14 March 
2014, 11 am 
Sharinav district (RRP 
province), fields of the 
farm 
Farm head and one shareholder of a 
family dehkan farm (2 ha) 
13. 14 March 
2014, 12 
pm 
Sharinav district, fields 
of the farm 
Farm head of a family dehkan farm (3,2 
ha) 
14. 14 March 
2014, 1 pm 
Sharinav district, fields 
of the farm 
Farm head of a family dehkan farm (2 
ha) 
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15.  14 March 
2014, 3 pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Sanginboy Sanginow, former staff 
member of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) in Tajikistan, senior 
expert on the agricultural sector in Tajik-
istan 
16.  17 March 
2014, 2 pm 
Kurgonteppa City 
(Khatlon province), 
hotel lobby 
Leading Agronomist for three districts at 
the agricultural consultancy firm 
SAROB (Firuz) and another agronomist 
17. 17 March 
2014, 3 pm 
Bohtar district (Khatlon 
province), sub-district 
Navbahor, courtyard of 
the collective dehkan 
farm 
Manager of a collective dehkan farm 
(230 ha) 
18. 17 March 
2014, 4.30 
pm 
Bohtar district, sub-
district Navbahor, of-
fice of the cotton gin-
nery 
Manager of the cotton ginnery and of a 
collective dehkan farm (120 ha) 
19.  17 March 
2014, 6 pm 
Bohtar district, sub-
district Navbahor, 
courtyard of the farm 
Farm head of a family dehkan farm (10 
ha) 
20. 18 March 
2014, 10.30 
am 
Bohtar district, sub-
district Sargar, house of 
the family 
Farm head of a family dehkan farm (7,5 
ha) 
21. 18 March 
2014, 12 
pm 
Bohtar district, sub-
district Sargar, hospital 
of the sub-district 
Former futurist and cotton trader and 
now manager of a collective dehkan 
farm (106 ha), agronomist of the collec-
tive dehkan farm and also farm head of a 
family dehkan farm (5 ha) 
22. 18 March 
2014, 2 pm 
Bohtar district, sub-
district Sargar, hospital 
of the sub-district 
Shareholder of the collective dehkan 
farm (from Interview 21) 
23. 18 March 
2014, 5 pm 
Kholkozobod district 
(Khatlon province), 
Kholkozobod city, 
Former Minister of Agriculture of the 
Republic of Tajikistan and now farm 
head of a family dehkan farm (10 ha), 
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house of the family district administration official responsi-
ble for irrigation infrastructure 
24. 19 March 
2014, 5 pm 
Vosé district (Khatlon 
province), sub-district 
Miyali, house of the 
family 
Manager of a collective dehkan farm 
(120 ha) 
25.  20 March 
2014, 10 am 
Vosé district, sub-
district Miyali, court-
yard of the farm 
Two shareholders of the collective 
dehkan farm (from Interview 24) and the 
agronomist of the farm 
26. 20 March 
2014, 12 
pm 
Vosé district, sub-
district Miyali, house of 
the family 
Farm head of a family dehkan farm (6 
ha) 
27. 20 March 
2014, 5 pm 
Moskovskaya district 
(Khatlon province), 
fields of the farm 
Shareholder of a family dehkan farm (5 
ha) 
28. 20 March 
2014, 6 pm 
Moskovskaya district, 
fields of the farm 
Farm head and shareholder of a family 
dehkan farm (8 ha) 
29.  27 March 
2014, 9 am 
Kuhjand City (Sughd 
province), office of the 
agricultural consultancy 
firm SAROB 
Director of the agricultural consultancy 
firm SAROB for Sughd province 
30. 27 March 
2014, 3 pm 
Konibodom district 
(Sughd province), sub-
district Selski Soviet, 
fields of the farm 
Manager of a collective dehkan farm (36 
ha) and former head of a kolkhoze bri-
gade 
31. 27 March 
2014, 4 pm 
Konibodom district, 
sub-district Selski Sovi-
et, fields of the farm 
Ten shareholders of the collective 
dehkan farm (from Interview 30) 
32. 27 March 
2014, 5.30 
pm 
Konibodom district, 
sub-district Ortikof, 
house of the family 
Leading Agronomist for Konibodom 
district at the agricultural consultancy 
firm SAROB 
33. 27 March 
2014, 6 pm 
Konibodom district, 
sub-district Ortikof, 
Manager of a collective dehkan farm (74 
ha), agronomist of the collective dehkan 
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house of the family farm and also farm head of a family 
dehkan farm (1,5 ha) 
34. 28 March 
2014, 12 
pm 
Mastchoh district 
(Sughd province), 
house of the family 
Leading Agronomist for Mastchoh dis-
trict at the agricultural consultancy firm 
SAROB and also manager of a collec-
tive dehkan farm (110 ha) 
35. 28 March 
2014, 3 pm 
Mastchoh district, 
house of the family 
Farm head of a family dehkan farm (5 
ha) and former manager of a collective 
dehkan farm (80 ha) 
36. 28 March 
2014, 5 pm 
Mastchoh district, 
house of the family 
Farm head of a family dehkan farm (3,6 
ha) 
37. 29 March 
2014, 8 am 
Kuhjand City, Office of 
the Deputy-Minister of 
Agriculture for Sughd 
province, Tajikistan 
Deputy-Minister of Agriculture for 
Sughd province, Tajikistan 
38. 29 March 
2014, 11 am 
Kuhjand City, office in 
the Ministry of Agricul-
ture for Sughd province 
Leading Agronomist for Sughd province 
at the agricultural consultancy firm 
SAROB and also former Deputy-
Minister of Agriculture for Sughd prov-
ince 
39. 31 March 
2014, 10 am 
World Bank Office, 
Dushanbe 
Bobojon Yatimov, staff member and 
cotton sector expert, World Bank Tajiki-
stan 
40. 31 March 
2014, 2 pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Torsten Swoboda, Agricultural Consult-
ant at the GIZ Divisions "Business Ena-
bling Environment" und "Value Chains", 
GIZ Tajikistan 
41.  1 April 
2014, 9.30 
am 
Statistics Institute of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, 
Dushanbe 
Staff member of the Tajik Statistics In-
stitute 
42 16 April 
2014, 11 am 
Skype phone call, office 
at the University of 
Munich (LMU) 
Former Country-Manager Tajikistan of 
the cotton trading company ECOM 
Agroindustrial Corp. Ltd (requested 
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anonymous citation) 
43 22 January 
2014, 4 pm 
Skype phone call, office 
at the University of 
Munich (LMU) 
Former Central-Asia-Manager for the 
cotton trading company Reinhart AG 
(requested anonymous citation) 
44 14 January 
2014, 11 am 
Skype phone call, office 
at the University of 
Munich (LMU) 
Dr. Andreas Mandler, researcher at the 
research institute „Zentrum für 
Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF)“ in Bonn 
and expert on political power structures 
in rural areas of Tajikistan 
45 1 April 
2014, 12 
pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Zarina Kosymova, Deputy Team Leader, 
Head of "Business Enabling Environ-
ment”, GIZ Tajikistan 
Overview of interviews conducted in Tajikistan in November 2014 
 Date, Time  Location Interview Partners 
46. 11 Novem-
ber 2014, 2 
pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Igor Eromenko, Ph.D., Head of GIZ 
Division “Evidence based decision mak-
ing”, GIZ Tajikistan 
47. 11 Novem-
ber 2014, 4 
pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Hartwig Ungethuem, Team Leader of 
the GIZ Divisions "Business Enabling 
Environment" and "Value Chains", GIZ 
Tajikistan 
48. 18 Novem-
ber 2014, 
11 am 
Ministry of Agriculture 
of the Republic of Ta-
jikistan, Dushanbe 
Head of Program “Information Resource 
Development in Agriculture Sector”, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Tajikistan (re-
quested anonymous citation) 
49. 19 Novem-
ber 2014, 8 
am 
FAO Office within in 
the Ministry of Agricul-
ture of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Dushanbe 
Staff member of the Office of the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 
Tajikistan (requested anonymous cita-
tion) 
50. 19 Novem-
ber 2014, 
1.30 pm 
Café on Rudaki Street, 
Dushanbe 
Former staff member of the ADB team 
that planned and accompanied the Agri-
cultural Reforms in Tajikistan from 
2005-2008 (requested anonymous cita-
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tion) 
51. 20 Novem-
ber 2014, 2 
pm 
Office of the agricultur-
al finance consultancy 
firm, Dushanbe 
Head of an agricultural finance consul-
tancy firm and former staff member of 
the EBRD project Tajik Agricultural 
Finance Framework (TAFF) (requested 
anonymous citation) 
52. 20 Novem-
ber 2014, 5 
pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Torsten Swoboda, Agricultural Consult-
ant at the GIZ Divisions "Business Ena-
bling Environment" und "Value Chains", 
GIZ Tajikistan; Igor Eromenko (Inter-
view 46) 
53. 27 Novem-
ber 2014, 5 
pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Zara Makhmudova, National Coordina-
tor GIZ Tajikistan and former National 
Coordinator of the Tajik Farm Restruc-
turing Project of the World Bank, IMF 
and the Tajik Government 
54. 28 Novem-
ber 2014, 2 
pm 
World Bank Office, 
Dushanbe 
Bobojon Yatimov, staff member and 
cotton sector expert, World Bank Tajiki-
stan 
55 13 Novem-
ber 2014, 6 
pm 
GIZ Office, Dushanbe Shahlo Rahimova, Programme Manager, 
DFID Central Asia 
56 7 October 
2014, 10 am 
Café, Munich, Germany Paul Frijters, Professor of Economics at 
the University of Queensland, Research-
er on Political Economy in Tajikistan 
57. 10 February 
2015, 10 am 
Phone call, office at the 
University of Munich 
(LMU) 
Mattes Scheftelowitz, Project Manager 
at the research institute “Deutsches 
Biomasseforschungszentrum” and for-
mer consultant for GIZ Tajikistan 
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2.  Results of Interviews in March 2014 
In the following document, the main questions in the interviews are followed by typical 
answer categories that occurred during the qualitative and open interviews. For each 
answer category, I assigned the number of the interview where that statement occurred. 
Each interview number identifies one unique interview and the assignment of interview 
numbers is presented in the interview table above. Most interviews were recorded and 
the audio material can be requested from the author. The transcripts of the interviews 
can also be requested from the author. 
1) Cotton price hike in 2010/2011 
Did farm gate prices increase in 2010 and 2011? (spot prices at harvest time vs. 
prices of futurist contracts at start of the season; same for all farm types?) 
Farm gate prices (spot rate) in harvest time increased strongly in 2010 and were still 
higher in 2011 than in 2009. (Quotes: interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43) 
Fixed prices for raw cotton included in futurist contracts at start of the season increased 
from 2010 to 2011. (Quotes: interviews 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43) 
Gins offer higher prices to big farms compared to small farms (big farms deliver higher 
amount of cotton and have a stronger negotiation power; maybe big farms are politically 
connected and collude with the gins). (Quotes: interviews 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 
21, 26, 43) 
Gins offer higher prices to farms that have not signed a future contract with them (that 
are independent). (Interview 18, 43) 
Farm gate prices are the same for all farm types. (Quotes: interviews 5, 40, 42) 
Note: In recent years, most farmers do not demand future contracts with fixed prices, 
but opt to repay futurist credit at spot prices in harvest (if they have the choice, see In-
terview 42, 43 and also other interviews). In almost all interviews farmers told me that 
for futurist contracts the spot price in harvest time is used to repay the credit for inputs 
(farmers who finance inputs with own capital or bank loans sell raw or ginned cotton at 
spot prices in harvest time). The price for ginned cotton is computed using the Liverpool 
stock exchange cotton price index for 2nd quality (middling staple…) minus 3.5% gin 
capital costs, 25% taxes and distribution costs (10% sales tax plus tariffs in Uzbeki-
stan), 60 USD transport costs for train to the Riga port and around 240 USD ginning 
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costs (also see the official methodica in Kassam 2011). 1st quality gives a 10% higher 
price and 3rd quality 4% lower price. (Interview 38) 
Many farmers said that farm gate prices increased for all farm types in2011 (to around 
700 USD per ton of raw cotton in 2011). 
Prices only differ for cotton of different quality. First pick gives higher quality cotton 
and higher prices than consecutive picks. Intermediary traders exist, because gins often 
do not have cash to pay farmers that did not sign future contracts with them (or that 
already delivered the necessary amount of raw cotton and want to sell exceeding quan-
tity). So intermediary traders buy the cotton and give cash to farmers. Later they sell the 
cotton to the gin at higher prices. (Interview 40) 
From the interviews, it seems clear that even in the futurist-gin monopoly case there 
was an increase of farm gate prices in futurist contracts to incentivize farmers to grow 
more cotton. But, because in harvest time international prices had gone down again, 
futurists often did not pay the agreed farm gate price to farmers (only farmers in RRP 
told that). Thus, farmers increased area under cotton in 2011, but did not receive the 
profit expected. Could they pay higher wages to harvest the fields? It is more likely that 
only farmers that benefitted from higher prices because of more competitive gin/futurist 
market or because they are independent of futurists and have own capital, could have 
paid larger wages in harvest 2011?! The official from the Ministry of Agriculture in 
Sughd told me that wages are more driven by the area under cotton than by harvest 
spot prices of cotton. In 2009, because of spring rain many farmers had to sow again 
and this decreased profits strongly. But to harvest the fields and at least cash in the 
crop, they had to pay the same wages than usual, even although profits in this year 
were low. (Interview 37) Thus, in 2011 farmers had to pay the higher wages to harvest 
their fields, even although world prices for cotton had come down during the summer. 
The official from the Agricultural Ministry (Interview 4) told me that managers of col-
lective dehkan farms often sell the cotton for lower prices than private dehkan farms 
because they reap a much larger share of the profits due to intransparent accounting 
(see Sattar and Mohib, 2006; the manager of the collective dehkan farm even accumu-
lates debt for the farm that accrues to every shareholders by putting money in its own 
pockets). Another reason, why collective dehkan farms may sell for lower farm gate 
prices is that a larger share of those farms depends on futurists (see end of section 3) or 
because it is harder for them to store the ginned cotton and wait for better prices (due 
to lack of storage facilities). 
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Did area devoted to cotton increase in 2011 and which crop area was decreased in 
exchange (e.g. wheat)? Did cotton area increase on small private and big collective 
dehkan farms? 
In 2011, area devoted to cotton increased strongly as reaction to the price increase (20-
30%). Area of wheat and also other crops (vegetables, fruits) decreased in exchange. 
(Quotes: interviews 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42) 
This was the case for both farm types (private vs. collective dehkan farms, also at enter-
prises). (Quotes: interviews 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42) 
The increase of area devoted to cotton was mainly on private dehkan farms, because 
state influenced collective dehkan farms are reacting less flexible to price signals. (In-
terview 8, 9, 43) 
Note: An interesting observation is also that a lot of the farmers (collective dehkan farm 
managers and family farm heads) do look at world prices at start of the season or at 
last harvest world prices. In 2011, a lot of them planted more cotton because prices 
were high at harvest 2010 and when season started (January/February 2011). Another 
important reason is that farmers that do not have internet or more entrepreneurial 
knowledge just look what successful neighbors did last year: So in 2010 cotton was very 
profitable and many farmers increased cotton area in 2011 because neighbors got prof-
it out of it last year! (Interview 26, 42) 
It was mainly area devoted to wheat that decreased in 2011 (almost all interviews). 
Did labor demand increase in harvest 2011? Did picking wages increase? 
Yes, labor demand for harvesting increased strongly in 2011, compared to 2010. 
(Quotes: interviews 4, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39, 40, 42) 
Yes, picking wages increased from 2010 to 2011. (Quotes: interviews 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 
16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42) 
Note: Most farmers said that the fact that the world market price declined during the 
curse of the year 2011 was an additional reason, why labor demand increased so much 
in harvest 2011. Farmers wanted to cash in the crop as soon as possible to prevent fur-
ther losses. Thus, cotton area increase and the decreasing world price were the main 
drivers of labor demand in cotton harvest 2011. To harvest before the rain season starts 
is a driver for picking labor demand that did not change in 2011 compared to 2009.  
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Most farmers told me that picking wages increased from around 40 Diram per kg in 
2010 to 70 Diram per kg in 2011 on private family dehkan farms. On collective dehkan 
farms picking wages only slightly increased from around 40 Diram per kg in 2010 to 
around 40-50 Diram per kg in 2011 (differing statements between interviews). 
Did profits for managers of big collective dehkan farms increase in 2011? 
Yes, profits increased strongly. (Interview 4, 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29) 
Notes: In some interviews and meetings in Dushanbe, people told me that the managers 
of the collective dehkan farms made huge profits in 2011 and invested a lot of these 
profits in construction sector in Dushanbe. Also people involved in the cotton trade and 
the ginneries made huge profits and invested in the construction sector. 
The farmer in Interview 13 told me that in Sharinaw the average leasing price for 1 ha 
land is 600 USD. Good quality land costs 800 USD. Most farmers in this region grow 
tomatoes and onions for the Dushanbe markets. Thus, the average profits made by 
farmers in this region are 600-800 USD per ha. 
In some interviews, farmers told me that profits were very high in 2010. However, in 
2011 spot prices in harvest time were already at lower levels and profits were not so 
high (Interview 32, 33, 35). 
2) Rural labor markets 2010/2011  
Do picking wage differences exist between farms and farm types (big vs. small)? 
Yes, picking wage differences exist, because there is a competition between all farm 
types for harvest workers from nearby villages (increased labor demand in 2011). Col-
lective dehkan farms cannot pay higher wages, because they are financially unhealthy 
and lack the necessary cash reserves to pay harvest workers at the spot (depend more on 
futurists than smaller farms, political involvement in decisions on collective dehkan 
farms, collective dehkan farms have to finance part of local government budget; see end 
of section 3). Most private dehkan farms work with own capital (mostly from remit-
tances) or receive loans from banks or microfinance institutions and can pay higher 
wages. (Quotes: interviews 4, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 23, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39, 40, 42, 45) 
Yes, private dehkan farms try to attract harvest workers from nearby villages (and also 
wider family members), because private farmers think more economically and want to 
harvest their fields rapidly to get better output prices from gins and traders. Collective 
dehkan farms use only shareholders and their families to harvest their fields (kind of 
 148 
coerced labor); managers do not have to pay them higher wages, because they are tied to 
the collective (they are not aware of their rights as shareholder, they additionally receive 
cotton stalks and food crops grown on small plots of the big farm; social norms force 
wider family members to help in the harvest for low wages). (Quotes: interviews 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 34, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45) 
Yes, big collective dehkan farms receive harvest workers who work for smaller wages 
from other poorer Jamoats or from other collective dehkan farms (small private dehkan 
farms can only attract workers from nearby villages). Those bus transfers are organized 
by local officials or by private agents. Workers have to pay for the transport, the meals 
and accommodation by themselves. Mostly, those costs are automatically deducted 
from the picking wage and workers receive a lower picking wage in cash. Furthermore, 
farm managers hand out the cash for wages of these workers to an intermediary (organ-
izer of the bus transfer), who keeps a certain part of the cash for himself. (Quotes: inter-
views 15, 18, 21, 29, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40) 
Yes, private dehkan farms employ mostly family members and pay them higher picking 
wages due to social norms. (Quotes: interviews 2, 3, 4, 5, 35, 37, 40) 
No, differences only exist between PSUs due to different degrees of competition per 
PSU (some PSUs only have few big farms and a local monopsony exists that depresses 
wages; in PSUs with a higher number of farms, all farm types have to pay higher pick-
ing wages). (Quotes: interviews 2, 6, 30) 
No, there are no differences. All farm types compete for harvest workers on local labor 
markets (nearby villages in the Jamoat). (Quotes: interviews 2, 3, 5, 6) 
Notes: At least for private dehkan farms, there is competition between farms for sea-
sonal picking workers from nearby villages for sure (farms want to harvest the field 
rapidly because weather gets bad or prices are high at start of harvest season). 
On all farms types, shareholders and their family members work as pickers in the har-
vest season. However, mostly additional pickers are needed and have to be attracted 
from local labor markets (landless laborers from nearby villages, shareholders from 
other farms). The vast majority of picking workers in cotton harvest are female 
(transport and driving activities and maintenance of irrigation channels is carried out 
by male). Landless laborers from nearby villages are almost exclusively female (male of 
these families migrated for work; those female are mostly unemployed during the rest of 
the year and only work on their small household plot where they grow vegetables and 
potatoes, may be some grain; young girls finishing high school and waiting to be mar-
ried are also among those workers), shareholders and their family members on private 
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and collective dehkan farms may also be male (but majority is female). Some farmers 
told me that private dehkan farms have a higher share of male workers are therefore 
more productive (Interview 36). Rustam from Sarob told me that female are much more 
productive than male in cotton picking due to their dexterity and that is one reason why 
more female work in cotton harvest (Interview 38). 
There is a minimum picking wage for each district that is announced by each hukumats 
government at the start of the harvest season. However, each farm is allowed to pay 
more to attract workers. Picking workers will choose those farms that offer higher wag-
es and where wages are paid in cash on the same day. Thus, for farms with big cash 
reserves it is easier to attract picking workers. 
Evidence for forced labor on collective dehkan farms: Andreas Mandler and Hafiz 
Bobojorov told me that in Shartuz; Konibodom and Qumsangir, even landless females 
from local villages (non-shareholders) are still forced to work on the collective dehkan 
farms by local officials for very low or no wages and receive cotton stalks (social and 
cultural norms exist, that create the social pressure for females to work in cotton har-
vest). Furthermore, Mandler and Bobojorov say that the poor and marginalized house-
holds who are shareholders in collective dehkan farms (without connections to local 
power structures) still have to work on the collective dehkan farm (and receive very low 
wages plus cotton stalks) and cannot easily opt out and found an own private dehkan 
farm (because they do not question the status quo, lack of knowledge, capital and politi-
cal connections to get good land; Interviews 6, 44). (However, only 10% of area in 
Shartuz region is under private dehkan farms, so the monopsony story may also hold) 
Due to the highly monopolized cotton market (only one gin and one futurist), all farms 
in this region have to work together with one futurist and this futurist gives cash for 
wages. Thus, wages do not differ between farms in this region (Interview 6). 
Hafiz Bobojorov said that social norms of family bonds are very important to under-
stand, why wider family members work at all farm types for such low wages. The norm 
is not to pay your family members better, but that as a family member you have to help 
in the harvest even for low wages (so coerced labor also because of social norms)! He 
said that even some heads of private dehkan farms withhold the low wages for wider 
family members and just give them cotton stalks (Interview 6) Sanginow (ex-FAO chief) 
told me that on all farms bigger than 10 ha the management system and collusion with 
gins and futurists is the same than 10 years before (Interview 15). Shareholders are 
exploited and receive only cotton stalks, little plots of land and very low wages (not al-
ways, often no cash payments at all!). 
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It seems that at collective dehkan farms the manager only pays the minimum wage an-
nounced by the hukumat and each shareholder is responsible for harvesting his share of 
the field. Shareholders then mostly use family members to harvest the field for such low 
wages (because social norms force families to help each other; another reason may be 
that shareholders on collective dehkan farms want to keep the cotton stalks for them-
selves, Interview 34). (Interview 17, 22, 25, 40, 45) Another hint for low fixed wages 
and coerced labor on collective dehkan farms is the fact that shareholders from collec-
tive dehkan farms (and their family members) try to cheat their manager and sell part of 
the crop to private dehkan farmers, who pay them more per kg than the picking wage on 
collective dehkan farms (some private farmers told us; Interview 7, 15). There is also 
evidence that collective dehkan farm managers force their shareholders to work on oth-
er collective dehkan farms (Interview 18, 21).  
In case there are no picking wage differences between small and big farms in one PSU, 
the effect we find in the quantitative analysis could be because of different levels of 
competition between farms in different PSUs due to different state of the privatization 
process (PSUs with only few collective dehkan farms have a monopsony and low pick-
ing wages, in PSUs with many small private dehkan farms and few collective farms 
picking wages are higher due to more competition). 
One shareholder of a big cooperative farm told me that wages in the harvest season are 
negotiated informally and may differ between farms and even between pickers in one 
farm (wage may also be paid for harvesting a certain area not wage per kg). (Interview 
7) Private dehkan farms are more likely to pay picking wages cash at the spot, whereas 
collective dehkan farms often pay picking wages with a lag of 10 days (Interview 29). 
Another collective dehkan farm and ginnery manager (Interview 18, also 36) told me 
that competition for harvest pickers from local villages is higher in times of bad weath-
er (because the cotton has to be harvested before it rains). 
In Konibodom, I interviewed a brigade manager in a jamoat where the old Kolkhoze 
still exists (specialized on cotton seed production; Interview 30). He told me that there 
are no private dehkan farms in this jamoat and there is no competition for harvest 
workers between the different brigades. All brigades pay the same minimum picking 
wage announced by the hukumat. Additional picking workers are carried by buses from 
nearby villages and receive cotton stalks, meals and the picking wage. Shareholders 
from other brigades come to his fields, when the cotton gets ripe again. However, he 
said that because of migration and remittances from Russia it is very difficult to find 
picking workers. Thus, he also employs school children after school and pays them the 
same wage (although they are less productive).  
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One manager of a collective dehkan farm told me that he would have liked to pay high-
er picking wages to attract more workers, but he could not because he works together 
with a futurist and was short of cash. That is why the harvest of the first pick took two 
weeks at his farm, whereas private dehkan farms could harvest a comparable area in 3 
days. Private dehkan farms could pay higher picking wages and attracted more workers 
that also worked more productively (Interview 33). This manager also told me at the 
same time that collective dehkan farms receive bus transfers of landless picking workers 
who work for lower wages, because they are from poorer Jamoats and do not know 
about higher world prices for cotton etc. (private dehkan farms use only family mem-
bers or females from local villages for harvest). Those workers also receive lower wag-
es in cash, because meals and transport costs (and sometimes accommodation) are de-
ducted (transport costs are paid to the driver) and the cash is handed out to an 
intermediary who keeps something for himself (this guy keeps about 2-4 Somoni per day 
per picking workers; Interview 37, 38). The official from the Agricultural Ministry told 
me that 65% of all collective dehkan farms in Sughd receive bus transfers of workers 
from poorer Jamoats (Interview 37, 38). Those bus transfers are from villages not farer 
away than 40 km from the collective dehkan farm. Rustam told me that there are also 
bus transfers from other districts, where many poor and landless people live (e.g. from 
Isfara to Zafarobod) (Interview 38). Rustam also told me that only collective dehkan 
farms receive those bus transfer workers, but 75% of workforce on collective dehkan 
farm are shareholders and their families and only 25% are those bus transfer workers. 
Did workers on small private farms work faster as workers on big collective farms 
in 2011 (because of higher wages)? 
Yes, harvest workers on family farms work more productive (pick more kg per day), 
because they are better paid. (Quotes: interviews 4, 26, 32, 33, 36, 37, 40) 
Yes, harvest workers on family farms work more productive, because they are mostly 
(wider) family members and may participate in the profits. (Quotes: interviews 4, 20, 
21, 24, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37) 
Note: Some farmers said that harvest workers on family farm workers pick more kg per 
day, perhaps because the picking wage is higher. The average pick per day is about 60 
kg, the maximum is 100-150 kg.  
Some farmers told me that private dehkan farms have a higher share of male workers 
are therefore more productive (Interview 36). 
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Do shareholders from big collective farms also work on small farms sometimes?  
Yes, in the time, when the cotton gets ripe again, shareholders and their family members 
from collective dehkan farms go to harvest on private farms that offer good wages. 
(Quotes: interviews 7, 13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 33, 38) 
Shareholders from private dehkan farms go to other private dehkan farms, when the 
cotton plant gets ripe on their fields. (Quotes: interviews 19, 20, 26, 28, 33, 38, 44) 
Shareholders from private dehkan farms also work for harvest on collective dehkan 
farms. (Quotes: interviews ) 
Shareholders from collective dehkan farms also work on other collective dehkan farms 
due to social norms or pressure from their managers. (Interview 18, 21, 30, 38) 
Note: Cotton harvest works as follows: First pick starts at start of September and eve-
rybody wants to harvest it as soon as possible, because 1.) prices are high for the first 
pick (first pick is best quality cotton and gins give incentives so that farmers harvest 
early) and 2.) the faster you pick the first pick the faster cotton gets ripe again and you 
can pick the second pick! (The quality of the cotton in subsequent picks will be the 
same, if it has not rained since the first pick. Thus, there is an incentive to harvest rap-
idly. Maximum 5 picks from the same field are possible) Thus, there is huge competition 
for harvest workers and everybody that can pay higher picking wages to attract workers 
will do it (you need cash as farm to pay picking workers at the spot!). After one pick, it 
takes maximum 10 days to be able to pick the cotton again. During the time the cotton 
gets ripe, workers from private and collective dehkan farms go picking to other farms 
that offer the best wages. 
Daily wages in harvest season stay constant or decrease until the end of the season. 
Picking rate wages increase from 1st until 5th pick, but less kg can be picked per day 
from 1st until 5th pick (worse quality because of increased rain probability, less cotton 
left on the plants). (Interview 29, 30, 33, 38, 40) Rustam from Sarob in Sughd told me 
that in normal years 75% of the cotton production are harvested in the 1st pick, 15 % in 
the 2nd pick and the rest in subsequent picks (average worker picks 100 kg in 1st pick per 
day, 40 kg in the 2nd and 20 kg in the 3rd). In years without rain until November it is 
60% picked in 1st pick, 30% in 2nd and 10% in the 3rd pick, because first quality cotton 
is picked until the last pick and each time more cotton flowers grow again when there is 
no rain. In total the quantity harvested is much higher, when there is no rain until No-
vember. Rustam said that daily wages for pickers always go down from 1st until the last 
pick, because quantity picked per day decreases much stronger than wages per kg in-
crease (Interview 38). 
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In summary, picking workers at one private farm consist of shareholders and their fami-
lies, of shareholders from other farms (whose cotton has to ripe) and of landless labor-
ers from nearby villages. Collective farms may additionally receive picking workers 
from farer and poorer jamoats, were many landless laborers cohabit. There is also evi-
dence that collective dehkan farm managers force their shareholders to work on other 
collective dehkan farms (Interview 18, 21). It seems unlikely that workers from private 
dehkan farms go to collective dehkan farms to pick cotton (see Interview 3, 44). How-
ever, at collective farms often only shareholders and their families harvest the fields (or 
forced labor from other collective dehkan farms). This may be because of liquidity 
problems of big farms (see end of section 3) or because of higher degree of coerced 
labor (also due to social norms). (Interview 7, 8, 17) Another reason may be that 
shareholders on collective dehkan farms want to keep the cotton stalks for themselves 
(Interview 34). 
Is forced labor still available for harvest season (maybe in 2011 the international 
boycott changed the situation completely?)? Is forced labor available for small and 
big farms? 
No, from 2011 on the government prohibited school children to work on the fields be-
cause of the international boycott. (Interview 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 13, 19, 20, 22, 34, 35, 37) 
Yes, there is still forced labor of females from local villages, students and school chil-
dren on the larger collective dehkan farms, but not on small private dehkan farms. 
(Quotes: interviews 6, 11, 15, 18, 29, 30, 40, 44) 
Notes: Andreas Mandler and Hafiz Bobojorov told me that in Shartuz; Konibodom and 
Qumsangir, landless females from local villages are still forced to work as harvest 
pickers on the collective dehkan farms by local officials (social and cultural norms ex-
ist, that create the social pressure for females to work in cotton harvest; poor landless 
females are extremely stigmatized, they are not allowed to found a small shop or travel 
alone to find work etc., see articles from Mandler and Bobojorov). Mandler and 
Bobojorov say that the poor and marginalized households (without connections to local 
power structures) still have to work on the collective dehkan farm and cannot easily opt 
out and found an own private dehkan farm (Interviews 6, 17, 18, 44).  
Mustafar Olimov told me that before 2011 it was mostly students and school children 
who were picking cotton in the fields (Interview 1).  
There is also evidence that collective dehkan farm managers force their shareholders to 
work on other collective dehkan farms (Interview 18, 21). 
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In Konibodom, I interviewed a brigade manager in a jamoat where the old Kolkhoze 
still exists (specialized on cotton seed production; Interview 30). He told me that there 
are no private dehkan farms in this jamoat and there is no competition for harvest 
workers between the different brigades. All brigades pay the same minimum picking 
wage announced by the hukumat. Additional picking workers are carried by buses from 
nearby villages and receive cotton stalks, meals and the picking wage. Shareholders 
from other brigades come to his fields, when the cotton gets ripe again. However, he 
said that because of migration and remittances from Russia it is very difficult to find 
picking workers. Thus, he also employs school children after school and pays them the 
same wage (although they are less productive).  
Do harvest holidays exist in TJ? 
No, since 2011 there are no harvest holidays anymore. (Quotes: interviews 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 
20, 22, 35, 38) 
Yes, hukumats still send school children with their teachers to harvest cotton on large 
collective dehkan farms on the weekends (pupils pay for transport, accommodation and 
food with the first 20 kg they pick each day). (Interview 29, 30, 33) 
On weekends, school children still work on the fields of their parents and receive pick-
ing wages too (on all farm types). (Quotes: interviews 2, 3, 4, 20, 22, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 
38, 40, 42) 
Did working hours decrease in harvest 2011 and why? 1.) Later in harvest, hours 
worked decrease because of less cotton to pick? 2.) Higher HH income from remit-
tances decreases labor supply in agriculture in all regions of TJ? 
Higher HH incomes due to increased remittances lead to less labor supply at the inten-
sive margin in all rural (and agricultural) regions of Tajikistan. (Quotes: interviews 27, 
29, 34, 37, 40, 45) 
Notes: In Moskovskaya there is a huge shortage of harvest pickers. Both interviewed 
farmers told me that wages go up until 1 Somoni per kg, because it is so hard to find 
workers in harvest time. (Interview 27, 28)  
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3) Credit market and output marketing 
How much ginneries and futurists are operating in this region? Is there competi-
tion between gins and futurists?  
More than 2 gins/ futurists. There is competition between gins (and futurists), contract 
conditions differ between gins. (Quotes: interviews 5, 8, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35, 38, 43) 
There are more than 2 gins/futurists, but there is no real competition. (Quotes: inter-
views 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 23, 34, 36) 
The number of ginneries increased strongly in Tajikistan before 2009 (in 2009 already 
around 50 gins active). Interview (3, 4, 5, 16, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 34, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43) 
Note: Gins and futurists in Tajikistan have enough own capital or lend from national 
banks so that they are not doing any future contracts with international traders any-
more! There are not much international investors in the Tajik cotton sector anymore. 
Those who are left buy the cotton at spot prices in harvest time, there are no fixed future 
contracts with international investors anymore (Interview 2, 40, 42, 43). The official 
from the Ministry of Agriculture told us that Russian and Chinese cotton traders still do 
future contracts with Tajik gins and that in 2011 90% of the Tajik cotton was sold 
through Riga. Now it may be less, because in 2011 Chinese entered the market in a big 
scale (Interview 4, 5) 
According to many interviews and statistical figures, the number of active ginneries 
increased strongly since 2006 (in 2000 there were 23 active gins and from 2006 on the 
number increased to around 50 in 2008/2009). The ADB and the World Bank financed 8 
additional gins in Khatlon that were finished in 2012/2013 and many interview partners 
say that the competition between gins has increased since 2011/2012 (number of active 
gins in 2013 was 65). In 2009, the number of gins was already high and the market 
structure should have been more competitive (by decree 101 from 2007 the collusion of 
gins and futurists was broken up; and the debt cancellation increased the negotiation 
power of farmers because old debt dependencies disappeared and they had more free-
dom in choosing the gin; there were many education programs by international organi-
zations to educate farmers for agricultural activities and to think more market orient-
ed).89 But some interview partners told me that the price shock in 2010/2011 was the 
initial push that really increased competition between gins (farm gate prices for raw 
                                                 
89
 For competition in the cotton markets to exist, a high number of ginneries is not sufficient. It is also important that 
farmers selling their raw cotton screen the market and try to find the best offer for themselves (this was not possible 
before 2008, when farmers were tied to the gins because of the huge debts, and because farmers did not behave mar-
ket-oriented due to socialization in the collective system). 
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cotton increased: 1.) because gins wanted to profit from high world prices and tried to 
increase their turn over and 2.) farmers were more aware of higher prices and looked 
for the gin with the best offer). This higher level of competition was persistent (even 
after the world price has gone down again, farm gate prices for raw cotton are higher 
in the years 2012 and 2013 than before the price shock), because the conscience and 
freedom of farmers has increased and the number of gins is very high. (Interviews: 39, 
40, 42, 43) Due to the high number of gins, turnover per gin is too low to make profits 
leading to a huge price competition between gins (high farm gate prices to increase 
turnover of raw cotton). This will lead to the exit of many gins from the market (natural 
concentration process, see Interview 40, 42, 43). Another problem is that cotton debt is 
piling up again in Tajik banks that finance the gins, because many gins did run losses in 
the last 2-3 years. 
However, some interview partners also told me that the vast majority of active gins are 
still controlled by few people close to the president (through loans of Tajik banks used 
to finance the gins). Thus, although the number of gins is much higher now, competition 
may not be a true competition (only small differences between offered prices…). One 
example is the Shartuz region (Kobodijon and Kumsangir), where the gins and futurists 
all belong to Ismail Somoni 21st century. In this region the freedom to farm (decree 111 
in 2007) did not materialize in higher competition (because the local elites prevented 
it). The debt cancellation could not lead to more independent farmers, because there 
was no competition between gins that could be exploited by farmers. So debt of farmers 
piled up again and only very few farmers opted out of the collective dehkan farms (only 
about 10%)! (Interview 2, 6, 44) The official from the Ministry of Agriculture also told 
me that gins are still colluding with futurists and private farmers without sufficient capi-
tal resources are forced to work with futurists and debts are accumulating for them 
again. So there is only competition between gins for cotton from independent farmers. 
There is no competition between futurists or gins that do futurist services. (Interview 4)  
Sanginow told me that the ADB built 8 new gins and several storage facilities in 
Khatlon, but the credit for the project came from banks controlled by the family of the 
president. Thus, there is no real competition in the cotton market, everything is con-
trolled and exploited by the family (Interview 15). Ismail Somoni 21st century is active 
in the whole South and exploits farmers (there is no free credit access and no freedom 
in output marketing)! 
Monopsonistic market power by gins was mainly executed by undervaluing the quality 
and weight of the delivered raw cotton (and supplying overpriced inputs to farmers at 
start of the season). Gins acting as futurists also tried to prolong the ginning process to 
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increase the interest payment farmers had to repay to gins/futurists after the ginned 
cotton has been sold. With increased competition from 2011/2012 on, those practices of 
gins started to disappear, but farmers are still mistrusting the gins and undervalue their 
cotton weight and quality as well (Interview 42). Sanginow says that this practices are 
still present in many areas! (Interview 15) 
Marco Baenninger from Reinhart AG said that the competition between gins already 
started in 2008 when debt of farmers was cancelled (and the futurist system was abol-
ished). This increased the negotiation power of farmers with gins immensely and thus 
competition between gins. Since then, farm gate prices are more coupled to world mar-
ket prices than before the reforms of 2007 (Interview 5 and 43; the minimum price rule 
according to the methodica introduced by the ADB in 2006 also helped in coupling 
farm gate prices to world prices). However, Antoine Buisson from ECOM argues that it 
took some time before the institutional changes really materialized in real competition. 
Farmers needed some time to understand their new freedoms and to start thinking more 
economically (screen the market, choose another gins than the one they had worked 
with for decades…). The price shock was the trigger for more competition because 
farmers and gins now started to behave more economically. (Interview 42) 
Can farmers sell their output freely in a competitive market? 
Farmers that sign a future contract with the gin, have to sell the raw cotton to this gin to 
repay the credit (any remaining cotton can be sold freely). (Quotes: interviews 4, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45) 
Farmers only have to repay the futurist credit in cash to the gin/futurist, so they can sell 
the cotton freely to any gin. (Quotes: interviews 5, 17, 21, 29) 
Farmers that finance their inputs with own capital or bank loans are free to sell their 
cotton anywhere. (Quotes: interviews 3, 4, 5, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45) 
District authorities still close the borders to neighboring districts in harvest time to pre-
vent selling raw cotton to neighboring gins (tax incentives, participation in rents of gin). 
(Quotes: interviews 5, 15, 16, 34, 38, 40, 42) 
Note: It seems that even if farmers with futurist contracts are allowed to sell the remain-
ing cotton to other gins (after repaying the credit to the gin), they often do not do this 
because of higher transport costs and less market oriented attitude (or information 
costs). Gins still may have some kind of a local monopsony, even if there are several 
gins per district. (Interview 9, 38) 
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Only in 2012/2013, some districts allowed the selling of cotton across its district bor-
ders (Interview 42). 
The official from the Ministry of Agriculture also told me that gins are still colluding 
with futurists and private farmers without sufficient capital resources are forced to 
work with futurists and to grow cotton (they often divert inputs from cotton to other 
crops as Kassam 2011 described, Interview 9, 26); debts are accumulating for them 
again. (Interview 4, 40). Thus, working with futurists is still a bad deal for small farm-
ers (worse farm gate prices). For managers of collective dehkan farms, working togeth-
er with futurists maybe privately profitable because of opaque management and collec-
tivization of the debts (Sattar and Mohib, 2006, and end of section 3). 
Hafiz Bobojorov told me that in Shartuz region (3 districts) there is only one gin and 
one futurist (Ismail Somoni 21st century) and even farmers that finance their inputs in-
dependently are not free to sell their cotton! (Interview 6). Also see Interview 14 for a 
case, where independent farmers were forced to sell at the gin that is owned by power-
ful politician in the hukumat (Alimeidon); the newly constructed Chinese gin had to 
close. Sanginow also told me that there is no freedom to sell the crop (Interview 15). 
It may be that big farms are more forced to work with close gins because they have less 
possibilities of storing the ginned cotton than small farms. (Interview 19)  
There is also evidence that farms that were already founded before 2010 became more 
independent from futurists because of the price hike in 2010/2011 (could increase capi-
tal resources because of profits, Interview 17, 35, 39). Also collective dehkan farms 
became more independent from futurists because of high profits in 2010/2011 (Inter-
view 32).In all districts except Bohtar, the big push in the privatization process seems to 
have taken place before the price shock in 2010/2011. Yatimov from the World Bank 
also told me that the price hike was not the cause of the push in the privatization pro-
cess, but supported the farmers to be more independent from futurist financing. (Inter-
view 39) 
How do contracts with gins/futurists look like? Is quantity of output specified? (get 
copies of contracts) Do offered contracts differ between small vs. large farms? 
Farmers are free to decide, whether they sell raw cotton or pay the ginnery for ginning 
services and later sell the ginned cotton themselves. (Quotes: interviews 4, 8, 17, 18, 21, 
24, 28, 29, 42,) This is only true for the Sughd region. (Interview 2, 3, 5, 30, 32, 34, 35, 
36, 38, 40) 
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Contracts do not differ between small and big farms. All farm types have the same op-
tions of selling raw vs. ginned cotton. (Quotes: interviews 5, 18, 28, 24) 
It is easier for bigger farms to sell ginned cotton themselves and not to the gin (have to 
find traders themselves). (Quotes: interviews 8, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26, 42) 
Note: Since the reforms in December 2007 (decree 101), futurists are not allowed to 
work as before (intermediaries had to leave the market; now it is commercial banks that 
provide gins with capital, Interview 39). Mostly gins overtook the business of futurists 
and most farmers that do not have own capital or bank loans enter into futurist con-
tracts with the gin. These contracts mostly evaluate the raw cotton at harvest time spot 
prices. Some farmers told me that they are free to sell the cotton somewhere else, but 
only have to repay the credit including interest rates back to the gin. However, the ma-
jority said that they have to deliver the raw cotton to gin that provided the credit and 
then the cotton is evaluated by this gin; any remaining cotton can be sold freely. 
Futurist contracts specify the amount and prices of inputs delivered to the farmers and 
include an interest rate on the in kind credit (mostly slightly lower than bank interest 
rates). Only few farmers told me that they are free to choose input suppliers. Mostly, 
farmers enter the futurist contracts because futurists/gins provide a full package of in-
put supply, credit and output marketing and because futurists do not demand any col-
lateral for the credit (only the harvest is collateralized). However, according to the in-
terviews in recent years the credit supply of microfinance institutions increased 
remarkably and many small private dehkan farms can access credits until 20000 USD 
without providing collateral (mostly any existing assets can be used as collateral, e.g. 
dwellings, cars). Big collective dehkan farms need credit higher than 20000 USD and 
cannot access those micro-credits. Thus, big collective dehkan farms seem to be more 
dependent on futurist contracts to grow cotton than small private dehkan farms.  
It seems that in Sughd province most farmers sell the ginned cotton and pay for the gin-
ning services (farmers look for cotton traders to sell the ginned cotton and are less de-
pendent on the gin and its offered prices; interview 2, 3, 5, 40, ). In Khatlon province, 
most farmers sell the raw cotton to the gin and dependencies from the gin are much 
higher (less competition on the cotton buyer side leads to lower farm gate prices; how-
ever in 2013, competition in Khatlon was so high that farmers earned more selling raw 
cotton than farmers in Sughd selling ginned cotton, Interview 29). Another reason is 
that in the South the gins are still owned by the futurists, whereas in the North the gins 
are independent and only provide services to the farmers (so reforms of 2007 were not 
enacted equally in every district; Interview 2). The officials of the Tajik cotton trader 
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told me that in the North the competition is for ginned cotton and between traders (the 
conscience of farmers is different between the North and the South). In the South, farm-
ers are not aware of better profitability of selling ginned cotton and competition is for 
raw cotton and between gins. Thus, in the South in needs much more gins per district to 
increase competition and farm gate prices for farmers (competition started later in the 
South). (Interview 5) 
Farmers in the South told me that they do not sell the ginned cotton, because then they 
have to pay more taxes. If they just sell the raw cotton, they make more profits (Inter-
view 17, 19) 
Many farmers said that gins offer service of ginning cotton for around 200 USD per ton 
of raw cotton and they are free to sell the ginned cotton to traders. This freedom sup-
posedly exists since 5 years (from 2009 on). But see the interviews again. 
The official from the Ministry of Agriculture told me that gins are still colluding with 
futurists and private farmers without sufficient capital resources are forced to work 
with futurists and debts are accumulating for them again. Those farmers that are forced 
to work with futurists are not able to choose selling ginned cotton, independent farmers 
have the choice. (Interview 4) Private dehkan farmers without sufficient capital re-
sources have to grow cotton to be able to get credit from futurists (they often divert in-
puts from cotton to other crops as Kassam 2011 described) (Interview 9). 
How much farmers are still financing cotton production through futurists? 
(%share by farm type) What are other sources of financing? (remittances, bank 
loans, own capital) Why do farmers still use futurists for finance? 
Big collective farms are still much more dependent on futurist financing, because they 
do not receive bank loans (due to less secure land titles and much higher amount of 
credit needed). (Quotes: interviews 4, 19, 20, 21, 23, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 
42) 
Small private dehkan farms mostly finance their inputs with own capital (e.g. from re-
mittances) or loans from banks or microfinance institutions. (Quotes: interviews 4, 8, 
12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45) 
Note: According to the interviews, in recent years the credit supply of microfinance in-
stitutions increased remarkably and many small private dehkan farms can access cred-
its until 20000 USD without providing collateral (mostly any existing assets can be used 
as collateral, e.g. dwellings, cars). Big collective dehkan farms need credit higher than 
20000 USD and cannot access those micro-credits. Thus, big collective dehkan farms 
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seem to be more dependent on futurist contracts to grow cotton than small private 
dehkan farms. 
According to the interviews, the share of farms still dependent on futurist contracts is 
much higher for collective dehkan farms than for private family dehkan farms (in all 
regions of Tajikistan). 
The Ex-Country-Manager from ECOM (Interview 42) told me that his clients from pri-
vate dehkan farms mostly tried to diversify their credit portfolio (with several gins and 
banks) to be less dependent on one lender. He said that collective dehkan farms mostly 
have to recur to futurist contracts (they are too big to receive bank or micro-credit 
loans). It may also be the case that big collective dehkan farms are still connected to 
futurists and gins through political connections and the old system of rent extraction by 
farm managers and futurists/gins (coupled with coerced labor of shareholders) is still in 
place (see Sattar and Mohib, 2006): 
1.) Many big collective dehkan farms are still politically connected and this also means 
that they have to help the local government to finance infrastructure projects, hospitals 
and schools (with cash transfers or by sending shareholders to work in construction; 
Interview 26, 40, 42 gives a hint that collective dehkan farms and gins have to finance 
political campaigns of local politicians; so there is another incentive for hukumats to 
pressure for cotton growing next to the tax incentive of the ginning tax). Politicians 
have a saying in the cropping decision of collective dehkan farms (pressure to grow 
cotton due to connections of local politicians with the gins and cotton traders and be-
cause of national cotton plans….; even pressure to sell to certain gins where politicians 
have stakes), which leads to less market-oriented and inefficient decision making on the 
big farms (big farms are less productive). (Interview 40, 45) Furthermore, the manag-
ers of big farms do not have the same property rights over the land then the private 
dehkan farmer (land titles of private dehkan family farms are 99 years using rights that 
are inheritable; shareholders on collective dehkan farms have 5-10 years using rights 
that are not inheritable). This leads to less willingness of banks to lend big sums of 
money to big farms. And microfinance institutions only lend less than 20000 USD with-
out any securities. Thus, bigger farms may have indeed bigger problems to raise the 
working capital needed to finance inputs and wages in harvest time (by common sense, 
the manager of the collective dehkan farms should have an interest in improving the 
efficiency of the farms, employ more productive harvest workers by paying higher wag-
es and get more profit, because he mainly reaps all profits that are generated; but may-
be he just cannot access enough working capital). (Interviews: 11, 21, 29, 37, 40, 42, 
45) 
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2.) Another argument for inefficiency and cash shortage at collective dehkan farms is 
that the old system of collusion with local politicians and gins ended in 2007: After the 
decree 111 in 2007 (supposedly break up of existing collusions), the managers of col-
lective dehkan farms steadily live with the threat that the local politicians split up the 
farm (local politicians split up the farm, if cotton plan is not fulfilled: so there is pres-
sure of politicians to grow cotton on collective dehkan farms). Many people said that 
after this decree the big farms came to have real problems (because cannot work with 
banks anymore, hard to get cash for inputs after that decree 111 and the abolishment of 
futurists; steady threat of being split up). Before the decree they were subsidized by lo-
cal hukumats, futurists and gins… (see WB 2006 PSIA paper by Sattar and Mohib). 
Now these networks were destroyed and the low productivity of these farms became 
obvious and they cannot raise the necessary cash for inputs and harvest wages (espe-
cially because futurists and intermediaries had to leave the market from 2008 on). (In-
terview 29, 39) Another very important fact that may explain smaller profits at collec-
tive dehkan farms and higher difficulties to get credit is that collective dehkan farms are 
taxed much higher than private dehkan farms (private dehkan farms pay a flat tax of 
6%; collective dehkan farms have to pay the usual social security contributions and the 
income tax for workers that amount to 39% plus the profit taxes). Much smaller share 
of profits is left after taxation at collective dehkan farms (Interview 5, 38, 39, 40). 
3.) The prices shock in 2011 triggered a huge competition between gins. This increased 
competition is persistent because average turnover of raw cotton per gin is too low to 
make profits (too many gins were built). The concentration process will lead to the mar-
ket exit of many gins. The last three years with high farm gate prices have caused many 
gins to run losses. So this also meant that these gins did not have enough capital to lend 
on to farmers and this was an opportunity for banks and microfinance institutions to get 
into the market (Imon bank or Argon entered the agricultural markets!). Small private 
farmers also demanded more loans in 2012 and 2013! However, big collective farms 
cannot access bank loans (need to high amounts of capital) and gins are short of cash 
due to the increased competition: So collective dehkan farms had huge problems to 
raise sufficient cash for inputs and wages! (Interview 42) 
4.) Another reason is that the old system described by Sattar and Mohib (2006) is still in 
place and managers have no interest in increasing efficiency at collective dehkan 
farms: The managers of collective dehkan farms still collude with gins and local author-
ities and extract rents out of the farm to the cost of shareholders (debts are accumulated 
that accrue to all shareholders; no transparent access to the books for shareholders, 
lack of conscience of their rights as shareholders). The managers do not think market 
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oriented and do not want to increase the efficiency of the farm. They just think short 
term rational and want to extract the rents. Thus, they do not invest efficiently in the 
farm and do not pay higher wages to attract more harvest workers; they just exploit the 
shareholders as a pool of coerced labor (plus workers carried from near jamoats who 
work for low wages too). (Interview 4, 6, 11, 15, 26, 40, 45) Sanginow (ex-FAO chief) 
told me that on all farms bigger than 10 ha the management system and collusion with 
gins and futurists is the same than 10 years before (Interview 15). Shareholders are 
exploited and receive only cotton stalks, little plots of land and very low wages (not al-
ways, often no cash payments at all!). Torsten from GIZ told me that the big collective 
dehkan farms often withheld wages for cotton pickers and that is one reason why they 
now have big problems to receive any additional picking workers (Interview 40).  
However, even in the North there are still private farmers that receive credit from the 
ginnery and collateralize their cotton crop (about 40% of farmers). This is not due to 
non-existing credit markets, because bank loans exist! The reason is more that loans 
from ginneries that are tied to futurists provide much easier credit access (ginneries 
also provide seed, which is the most important input)! (farmers do not need to provide 
any securities) So farmers that do not possess any assets can get credit from ginneries. 
30% of farmers have enough assets to finance their inputs themselves and 30% get 
credits from banks and micro credit organizations. (Interview 3, 43) 
The official from the Ministry of Agriculture told me that gins are still colluding with 
futurists and private farmers without sufficient capital resources are forced to work 
with futurists and debts are accumulating for them again (about 20% of private farm-
ers). He said that all collective dehkan farms work together with futurists! (maybe be-
cause the old system of collusion described in Sattar and Mohib 2006 is still in place or 
because big farms do not get any credit from banks). (Interview 4, 45) All collective 
dehkan farms accumulated new debt again, because the manager and the gin still cheat 
shareholders and put money in their pockets that is declared as debt for the whole farm 
(Interview 6, 11, 15). 
A very interesting case is Interview 10: This manager of a collective dehkan farm tried 
to be more independent of the local futurist, because he had enough capital through 
family remittances. This led to huge problems with the local futurist and officials. Inter-
view 11 is another such case. This manager of the very big old kolkhoze tried to stop the 
split up of his big farm. The hukumat that is dominated by Alimeidon (member of the 
president family, futurist and gin owner who controls about 4000 ha in Hissar) said that 
this farm does not fulfill the cotton plan. The farm manager moved to more cattle rais-
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ing and less cotton growing to prevent the split up. This and the political connections of 
the manager lead to keep the farm from being split up. 
Another nice example of strong ties between the managers of collective dehkan farms 
and politicians is the case in Interview 34: This manager received water pumps for ir-
rigation from the local hukumat because he was a former major in the Tajik army (val-
ue of the pumps: 26 000 USD). 
Rustam from Sarob told me that in Sughd 80% of the private dehkan farms work with 
own capital and are independent of futurists. 40% of collective dehkan farms still have 
to work with futurists. Zarina from GIZ told me that the main source for own capital of 
private dehkan farms are remittances (Interview 45). 
4) Farm structure 
What are the main criteria for founding a private dehkan farm in this region (po-
litical connections, HH size, capital resources, entrepreneurial and agricultural 
skills)? When did the privatization process start (and why?) and when did you 
start your dehkan farm? Why were you elected manager of this farm? 
The privatization process started before 2010 (even before 2007), because the hukumat 
pushed for the split up of the local kolkhoze or the bigger collective dehkan farms. 
(Quotes: interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 34, 36, 37, 40) 
The privatization process started because of the reforms in 2007 (debt cancellation for 
farmers in 1 January 2008, freedom to crop etc.) and not because of the price shock in 
2010/2011. (Quotes: interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 20, 21, 23, 27, 29, 32, 36, 38, 39, 
40, 42, 43, ) 
The privatization process was strongly pushed by the price hike in 2010 (circumvention 
of credit constraints). (Quotes: interviews 20, 21) 
Note: Managers of collective dehkan farms all have political connections or connec-
tions to futurists etc. So all of them are backed by local politicians/ officials. In inter-
views, they told me that they were elected by the shareholders, because they were trust-
ed men and already had experience in managing the brigade or kolkhoze (agricultural 
and organizational knowledge). They benefit from the connections in the way that they 
receive better land from the split up kolkhoze, they receive more land (if other private 
farmers have to give their land away because they do not fulfill the cotton plan or can-
not pay their taxes, the land is given to these guys with political connections), they have 
better access to credit (this is not true for big farms according to many interviews, big 
farms are more dependent on futurist credits), they may have more freedom in selling 
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the cotton and they possibly benefit from forced labor. However, they also have to sup-
port local government budgets and help in construction of schools and hospitals. They 
may also have to support political campaigns of local politicians with cash. (Interviews 
17, 18, 21, 24, 34, 45) 
All main criteria for founding a private dehkan farm are relevant for farmers: political 
connections (to receive land with better soil), HH size (family members as workers), 
capital resources (to repay debts or to finance inputs), entrepreneurial and agricultural 
knowledge. (see Interview 6, 8, 22, 24, 34, 39, 44 and article from Mandler). Mandler 
and Bobojorov say that the poor and marginalized households (without connections to 
local power structures) still have to work on the collective dehkan farm and cannot eas-
ily opt out and found an own private dehkan farm (even if they receive remittances). 
In principal (by law), everybody has the right to found an own small family dehkan 
farm. The only requirements from hukumats seem to be that taxes can be paid and that a 
certain amount of cotton is grown (in some districts hukumats do not allow too small 
family farms to prevent cases where taxes are not paid or cotton is not grown…). The 
hukumat has the right to take the land away from private dehkan farms, if taxes are not 
paid and the cotton plan is not fulfilled. There are several types of cotton plans and 
there is evidence that those plans are used to take land from less influential farmers to 
farmers with good political connections. (Interview 6, 8, 24) 
The huge drop in cotton area harvested in 2009 was due to increased area for wheat on 
dehkan farms (because of huge wheat shortage in 2008 due to drought and high wheat 
world prices; see FAO 2009 and interviews). This is a sign that reforms of 2007 (free-
dom to crop, abolishment of cotton quotas, privatization process) were already effec-
tive, because dehkan farms in Tajikistan could react to high wheat prices in 2008 and 
switch from cotton to wheat on a big scale. (However, the government also supported 
the increase in wheat production in 2009 by provision of higher quality seeds to farm-
ers.) So the privatization process may have happened already before the price shock! 
(Interview 37, 38) 
In summary, the privatization process started at different years in different districts (in-
terview 2, 3, 29): In many districts the big Kolkhoze was split into some big collective 
dehkan farms around 2000-2002 and the futurist cotton financing scheme was estab-
lished (so cotton production expanded). This explains the increase in cotton production 
from 2000-2004 (also the end of the civil war and catch up effect starting in 1999 as 
well as increasing cotton prices from 2001 on). Then smaller private farms could be 
founded, when the farmers wanted to opt out (criteria to opt out: HHsize, credit access, 
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agricultural knowledge, political connections to get good land). Maybe some districts 
still prevented too small farms, because they thought they would not be able to pay tax-
es (see Vose, Interview 24). In 2007-2009 there was a new founding wave of small pri-
vate dehkan farms due to the reform process starting in 2007 pushed by the internation-
al community (debt cancellation in 1 January 2008 etc., information campaign to foster 
agricultural and economic knowledge of farmers and inform them about legal rights to 
opt out of the collective, abolishment of cotton plans, restructuring of the cotton financ-
ing scheme and increased credit supply). (Interview 39) 
However, in the TLSS data, we see that in Khatlon there was an increase in workers on 
private dehkan farms from 2009 until 2011. Farmers in Bohtar told me that the price 
shock triggered a huge increase in farmers opting out because they wanted to use the 
high prices to sustain themselves building up own capital (circumvent credit con-
straints; Interview 20, 21). Thus, if workers on private farms are more productive, this 
selection into private farms could be one channel for our effect. But we also find our 
results only looking at private farm workers that worked at private farms in 2009 and 
2011! There is also evidence that farms that were already founded before 2010 became 
more independent from futurists because of the price hike (could increase capital re-
sources because of profits, Interview 17). 
The privatization process maybe correlated with the rents that can be extracted from 
agriculture. In cotton regions privatization process may be much more difficult than in 
non-cotton regions, because in cotton regions rents are much higher from selling the 
cash crop and local elites are heavily involved in rent extraction (Satar and Mohib, 
2006; Interview 6, 44). One example is the Shartuz region (plus Kobodijon and 
Kumsangir), where the gins and futurists all belong to Ismail Somoni 21st century. In 
this region the freedom to farm (decree 111 in 2007) did not materialize in higher com-
petition due to the local and national elites trying to maintain their privileges (21st cen-
tury is owned by the family of the president). The debt cancellation could not lead to 
more independent farmers, because there was no competition between gins that could 
be exploited by farmers. So debt piled up again and very few farmers opted out of the 
collective (only about 10% of farmers are private dehkan farmers)! (Interview 2, 6, 44) 
One official from the Agricultural Ministry (Interview 4) told me that in 2014 already 
95% of farms are private dehkan farms. In 2011 this number was not so high; the main 
push was from 2011 on. The collective dehkan farms that still exist are run by managers 
that have strong political connections. It is very profitable to be a manager of a collec-
tive dehkan farm, but only the ones with political connections can keep their farm from 
being split up (due to pressure from the international community there is a big trend 
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towards splitting up the collective dehkan farms). (see Interview 11 as as a case of a 
manager fighting against the split up, see also Interview 45) 
The official from the biggest Tajik cotton trader told me that it is the private dehkan 
farmers that have good political connections, because only with good political connec-
tions you will receive good quality land that makes it worth it to found a small farm. 
And he said the private dehkan farms have to pay fewer taxes and thus have higher 
profits. (Interview 5, 8) There are also private dehkan farms with less political connec-
tions and capital, but those are not the successful ones. (Interview 15, 24) 
Hafiz Bobojorov said that the collective dehkan farms are still highly influenced by the 
Jamoats. The private dehkan farms that exist received the high quality land because of 
good political connections. For the remaining shareholders of the collective farms it is 
hard to opt out of the collective, because there is no good quality land left or the man-
ager will only give bad land to the shareholders that leave the farm. (Interview 6, 24, 
45) 
A very good example for the effects of the reform process initiated in 2006 by the inter-
national community and the government is interview 36: This head of a family dehkan 
farm (farm exists since 2004) told me that before the debt cancellation in 2008 (1 Janu-
ary 2008), he was totally dependent on the futurist. This dependency was formally due 
to large debts that accumulated every year (20000 USD in 2008). However, he was also 
caught by his own passivity and lack of conscience that persisted because the futurist 
provided him with a complete service package: At the start of the season, the futurists 
supplied him with a certain amount of fertilizer, pesticides and seeds per ha and later 
he just fetched the crop. The farmer did not have any deep agricultural knowledge 
about seeds, fertilizer or pesticides use, he did not know about cotton world market 
prices, he did not know about different gins to sell the cotton… Due to the debt cancel-
lation in 2008, the prohibition of the old futurist system (collusion of gins and futurists 
forbidden in 2008, intermediaries had to leave the market and commercial banks now 
provide gins with capital directly), the new well defined user right of 99 years for his 
land (private dehkan farm certificate as quasi property rights) and various information 
campaigns by the government and international donors he started to think much more 
about agriculture, input use and marketing of the crops. In this example we see that 
competition in the cotton market and productivity in the Tajik agriculture can only in-
crease, if farmers are more aware of price signals and try to improve their knowledge 
about agriculture. A very important incentive for this to happen is that they have well 
defined property rights on their land. (also see Interview 39, 45) 
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Yatimov from the World Bank told me that the split up of the big collective dehkan 
farms (mainly pushed by the reforms in 2006/2007) was very important for breaking up 
the old monopoly of big collective dehkan farms, futurists and gins. Thus, it was crucial 
for introducing more competition in the cotton market and to increase freedom to crop 
and to diversify the Tajik agriculture (increase food security in the country). He said the 
vast majority of private dehkan farms was already found in 2009. (Interview 39) The 
collective dehkan farms that still exist are not as strongly connected to gins and local 
politicians as before the reforms, those farms have big problems to raise the necessary 
cash for inputs (because futurists had to leave the market). He also told me that the 
price in 2010/2011 hike was not the cause of the push in the privatization process, but 
supported the farmers to be more independent from futurist financing (majority of pri-
vate dehkan farms already found in 2009). (Interview 39) 
Who makes the decisions for land use and labor allocation? Who purchases inputs 
and how are inputs financed (futurist, own capital)? How is the crop sold (by the 
manager)? How are shareholders paid? Is profit shared between all shareholders? 
Or do they just receive a maintenance and picking wage and some premia at end of 
the season? 
I finance my inputs with own capital and the major part is from remittances of family 
members. (Interview 10, 17, 19, 20, 27, 28, 30, 35, 36, 45) 
Note: In all interviews it is evident that the managers of the collective dehkan farms 
make all decisions only consulting their agricultural expert (agronom). The crop is sold 
by the manager and he is also responsible for acquiring the inputs by signing a contract 
with the gin or taking a loan from a bank (he often provides equity as collateral; how-
ever, debts seem to accrue to all shareholders of the collective dehkan farm). Share-
holders have no transparent access to the accounts of the farm and are not participat-
ing in the profits. They receive a very low monthly wage for maintenance work (around 
200-300 Somoni), which is not sufficient for living expenses (the families of those 
shareholders can only survive, if other family members migrate to Russia or work in 
another business). However, shareholders work only around 10-15 days per months 
during the normal season. At harvest time they are mostly paid the minimum picking 
wage that is announced by the hukumat. They also receive the cotton stalks and are al-
lowed to crop a small area for own subsistence consumption. At the end of the season, it 
may be that the manager hands out some premia like in old Soviet times (a carpet, a 
television set or maybe money). However, there is no transparent participation of 
shareholders in profits (although by law this should be the case!). The manager of the 
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collective dehkan farm invests part of the profits in the farm (inputs, machinery) and 
keeps the rest for himself (Interviews: 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 29, 31, 33, 
34, 38, 40, 42, 45) Furthermore, the hukumat or other local politicians may take part in 
the profits or use them to pay for social services (hospital, school…) (Interview 11, 40, 
42, 45, Sattar and Mohib 2006) In some interviews, people told me that the managers of 
the collective dehkan farms made huge profits in 2011 and invested a lot of these profits 
in construction sector in Dushanbe. 
At private dehkan farms, household heads are often running the farm as non-
transparent as managers of collective dehkan farms. The household head often makes 
the decisions on his own, maybe after consulting some family members. The household 
head often pays wages even to brothers and sons who are shareholders (he has to at-
tract them to work at his farm, also in harvest time). He administers the accounts of the 
farm and sells the crop. Thus, there is no equal transparent participation of all share-
holders in profits of private dehkan family farms (the household head and several parts 
of the family may receive higher shares of profits than others). Some private farm heads 
told me that they do not share profits with family members, because this would create 
expectations and obligations to do that each year (e.g. see Interview 6, 42). The house-
hold head finances the budget of the core family that lives in his house. But mostly, sons 
who are shareholders of the family farm already live in another house with their fami-
lies and have to finance their own budget (but financial aid from household head to 
sons is more likely than from collective dehkan farm manager to shareholders from oth-
er families). (Interviews: 20, 42) It is also possible, that profits at family farms are allo-
cated according to other logics like social norms (the brother/son that wants to marry 
in the near future receives a larger share…). (Interview 37, 40) There is also evidence 
that family members migrate to Russia (mostly joint decision of the family) and send 
back remittances that are used to buy inputs for the private dehkan farm. Zarina from 
GIZ told me that the main source for own capital of private dehkan farms are remit-
tances (Interview 45). 
Family dehkan farms have land area until 10 ha and often have 10-15 shareholders that 
all belong to one family. When more families are working on one dehkan farm (as it was 
the case in Sharinaw), the farm structure is more likely to be similar to the collective 
dehkan farm! (there is one guy making the decisions, providing the capital or securities 
for credit and selling the crop and deciding about profit sharing etc.; see Interview 13). 
The number of shareholders is less than number of families at all farm types, families 
always name more than one member as shareholder. 
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Sanginow (ex-FAO chief) told me that on all farms bigger than 10 ha the management 
system and collusion with gins and futurists is the same than 10 years before (Interview 
15). Shareholders are exploited and receive only cotton stalks, little plots of land and 
very low wages (not always, often no cash payments at all!). 
In Interview 31, several shareholders of a collective dehkan farm told me that they only 
receive a picking wage of 20-25 Diram per kg and in the rest of the season only 40-60 
Somoni per month. The manager had told me about 40 Diram per kg and 300 Somoni 
per month. Thus, the exploitation at collective dehkan farms may often be understated 
by managers in many interviews (maybe because part of the wage is paid in cotton 
stalks that are evaluated at market prices?). The official of the Agricultural Ministry in 
Sughd also told us about a picking wage of 15-30 Diram per kg (Interview 37). 
Do you employ additional workers from local villages for harvest time? Are these 
mostly wider family members? What picking wage do they get? Is this picking 
wage different from picking wage paid to shareholders? 
Yes, I employ additional harvest workers from nearby villages (landless laborers) and 
shareholders from other farms. (Quotes: interviews 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 13, 16, 19, 21, 23, 
24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 38, 40, ) 
All additional workers are family members of shareholders. (Quotes: interviews 6, 7, 8, 
9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 25, 34) 
I harvest the fields with my shareholders only. (Quotes: interviews 20, 33, 35, 36) 
Picking wages are the same for all harvest workers. (Quotes: interviews 3, 6, 9, 17, 22, 
25, 26, 33, 34, 40, 42) 
Picking wages for family members are higher than for workers from local villages. (In-
terview 4, 5) 
Note: Hafiz Bobojorov said that social norms of family bonds are very important to 
understand, why wider family members work at all farm types for such low wages. The 
norm is not to pay your family members better, but that as a family member you have to 
help in the harvest even for low wages! (Interview 6) 
At collective farms often only shareholders and their families harvest the fields. This 
may be because of liquidity problems of big farms (see end of section 3) or because of 
higher degree of coerced labor. (Interview 7, 8; see section 2) Another reason may be 
that shareholders on collective dehkan farms want to keep the cotton stalks for them-
selves (Interview 34). Family farms often employ additional harvest pickers to harvest 
the fields rapidly (they think more market-oriented). 
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One shareholder of a big cooperative farm told me that wages in the harvest season are 
negotiated informally and may differ between farms and even between pickers in one 
farm (wage may also be paid for harvesting a certain area not wage per kg). (Interview 
7) 
Collective dehkan farms also receive bus transfers of picking workers who may work for 
lower wages than shareholders, because they are from poorer Jamoats and do not know 
about higher world prices for cotton etc. (private dehkan farms use only family mem-
bers or females from local villages for harvest). Those workers also receive lower wag-
es in cash, because meals and transport costs are deducted and the cash is handed out 
to an intermediary who keeps something for himself. (Interview 33, 34) 
Are family farms more productive than bigger collective farms? 
Yes, because shareholders on family farms have more incentives to work hard due to 
better defined property rights. (Quotes: interviews 4, 20, 21, 24, 27, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 
40, 42, ) 
Note: 99 years of inheritable using rights for a clearly defined piece of land at pri-
vate/family dehkan farm vs. 5-10 years using rights (that are not inheritable) for unde-
fined piece of land for shareholders at collective dehkan farms. 
Some farmers told me that private dehkan farms have a higher share of male workers 
are therefore more productive (Interview 36). 
Yatimov from the World Bank told me that private dehkan farms are much more flexible 
in reacting to price signals (they are more market oriented, less political influence in 
decisions on the farm etc.) and they are much more efficient (invest in new seeds and 
fertilizer etc.). Productivity on private dehkan farms increased immensely in the last 
years as well as diversification of crops. (Interview 39) 
When are production decisions made? Are production decisions based on crop 
prices of the last year or on prices at the beginning of the season? 
Production decisions are based on prices at start of season. (Quotes: interviews 8, 26, 
40,) 
Production decisions are based on prices in last harvest period (because farmers look at 
profits neighbors made with certain crops or they look at price information of harvest 
last year). (Quotes: interviews 3, 4, 9, 21, 26, 29, 40, 42) 
Note: Production decisions are made in January/February. 
Interview 4: Production decisions are made in November for the next year. 
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Is there still a cotton quota for this jamoat/district? 
Yes. (Quotes: interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 40, 45) 
No. (Quotes: interviews 11, 12, 13, 17, 30, 35, 38) 
Note: It seems that cotton quotas still exist and are enforced by the Jamoat administra-
tion or the hukumat. The cotton quotas are used to calculate the taxes the farm has to 
pay (predicted yield times area under cotton gives predicted output and amount of taxes 
to pay). If the farm cannot pay its taxes anymore because of too little profit, the 
Hukumat can take the land and give it to someone else. Thus, the farms have to grow 
cotton to be able to pay the taxes. There are also different kinds of cotton plans the 
hukumat can use to take land away from the private farmers (plans with unrealistically 
high yields lead to farms not being able to pay the taxes and the land is taken and given 
to politically connected people; Interview 6). Furthermore, the Jamoat supervises crop 
area and output statistics and also enforces a certain cotton quota. If the farm does not 
plant enough cotton, the Jamoat cuts irrigation water or electricity for the farm or pre-
vents the farm from joining Jamoat meetings etc. (see Interviews in Vose, Interview 24, 
26). 
In the North and the South there are still requirements of the hukumat government to 
place a certain amount of land under cotton. This is due to tax incentives for the 
hukumat (tax on ginned cotton), but also due to corrupt structures in the district: local 
officials, ginnery managers and futurists are connected through clan structures or other 
bonds and act as local elite that exploits farmers (they want to secure a certain supply 
of raw cotton to capture rents)! (Interview 3, 26) Interview 42 gives a hint that collec-
tive dehkan farms and gins have to finance political campaigns of local politicians; so 
there is another incentive for hukumats to pressure for cotton growing next to the tax 
incentive of the ginning tax. 
It seems that all over Tajikistan there are still cotton quotas of 50% and above that are 
enforced by local officials. 
Tachmina from Sarob told me that the reason, why cotton is still grown on more than 
50% of irrigated land in the whole country, is not because of cotton quotas, but because 
1.) cotton has much larger market size (other crops are only sold domestically and mar-
ket size is small) and 2.) there are tax incentives to grow cotton (50% less land tax for 
area devoted to cotton). (Interview 29) 
Rustam told me that in districts with a dysfunctional irrigation system (Mastchoh and 
Zafarobod), the soil is already so bad and other crops than cotton do not grow any-
more. That is why mainly cotton is grown there. (Interview 38) 
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5) What did you do with your profits at end of season in 2011? 
Investments in inputs for the next year? (fertilizer, renting/buying machines) 
(Quotes: interviews 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 26, 35) 
Family consumption (also status consumption) 
(Quotes: interviews 6, 12, 14, 26) 
Repaying wedding debts 
Interview 9, 26 
Repaying futurist debts 
Interview 35 
Investment in the dwelling 
(Quotes: interviews 6,) 
Investment in education of the children or health 
(Quotes: interviews 6,) 
Notes: In some interviews, people told me that the managers of the collective dehkan 
farms made huge profits in 2011 and invested a lot of these profits in construction sec-
tor in Dushanbe. Also people involved in the cotton trade and the ginneries made huge 
profits and invested in the Tajik construction sector. 
The official from the Agricultural Ministry in Sughd told me that additional income of 
farmers is often spent according to the following priorities: 1.) dwelling 2.) new car 3.) 
marriage 4.) agriculture (Interview 37). 
6) 2008 and 2009 season 
Did drought in 2008 affect cotton and wheat in the same way? What other crops 
were affected? 
Wheat was much more affected, because big share of wheat is rain fed in Tajikistan. 
(Quotes: interviews 33, 34, 35, 37, 38) 
Notes: Decisions about planting are made in January/February, because seeds have to 
be bought. Drought in planting season is bad for cotton and for wheat. However, if the 
drought is early enough in spring, farmers can buy cotton seeds again and sow a se-
cond time (until mid of May; wheat needs much more time and is already sown in Feb-
ruary making a second planting more difficult). Farmers that do not have enough capi-
tal or credit to buy new seeds will be strongly affected by the drought. 
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Cotton is always planted on irrigated fields in Tajikistan (even using pumps), so 
drought only affects cotton output through low water availability in the lakes. Wheat is 
much more affected by drought, because a lot of wheat is grown rain-fed in Tajikistan. 
Wheat on non-irrigated fields was completely destroyed in 2008. Cotton harvest was 
finally quite ok, because there was good weather in harvest time (cotton production did 
only decline by around 10% from 2007 to 2008, see cotton statistics book from Tajik 
statistics agency). 
If winter wheat is grown, it is possible to grow two crops in one season (with cotton or 
summer wheat only one crop can be grown per year). Winter wheat is planted in Sep-
tember and harvested in May/June, making a planting of onions (or other vegetables) or 
corn in June possible. Summer wheat is planted in February, whereas cotton is planted 
End of March or April. 
Why did wheat area and production increase so much in 2009 (and cotton area 
and production decreased)? 1.) Wheat was more affected from drought in 2008, 2.) 
prices for wheat very high in 2008 in TJ so cotton was substituted by wheat or 3.) 
good weather for wheat in 2009 (rain in spring…) 
All three reasons are true. (Quotes: interviews 29, 30, 34, 35, 37) 
When we look at production and area statistics, we see that there seem to have been a 
drought in 2000 and 2007/2008 (but wheat was much more affected than cotton in 2008 
drought). The huge drop in cotton area harvested in 2009 was due to increased area for 
wheat (because of huge wheat shortage in 2008 due to drought and high wheat world 
prices). This is a sign that reforms of 2007 (freedom to crop, abolishment of cotton quo-
tas, privatization process) were already effective, because farms in Tajikistan could 
react to high wheat prices in 2008 and switch from cotton to wheat on a big scale. 
However, the government also supported the increase in wheat production in 2009 by 
provision of higher quality seeds to farmers (Interview 38). 
In 2009, the rain in spring affected cotton production on good soil negatively, because 
this soil then becomes too heavy and plants cannot grow (for wheat the spring rain is 
very good and this is one of the factors for the good wheat harvest in 2009). For many 
cotton farmers, it was possible to sow again (it was only more costly, but seeds are 
much cheaper than fertilizer), but area devoted to cotton still decreased somewhat due 
to the rain issues. However, cotton production did not shrink so much in 2009, because 
the weather in harvest time was very good and harvest was extended until November. 
(Interview 38) Official statistics from the Tajik statistics agency show that weather is-
sues have not played a big role in the drop of cotton area and production in 2009: the 
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area devoted to cotton and cotton production did not increase anymore from 2009 to 
2010! So spring rain could not have affected the area and production of cotton so much 
in 2009! (the main reason was the switch from cotton to wheat) 
But why do we not see any decrease in labor supply and wages from 2007 until 2009, 
when area and production of cotton decreased so much in 2009 (because labor demand 
in harvest time should have decreased strongly)? (lack of wage decrease could be due 
to minimum picking wages announced by hukumats, but labor demand should have de-
creased) Our found effect in 2011 exists compared to 2007 not to 2009, thus our results 
cannot be confound by drought or weather issues in 2009!  
The huge increase in cotton area and production from 2000-2004 was due to farm re-
structuring (kolkhozes were split up into collective dehkan farms), increasing world 
cotton prices from 2000-2004 and catch up effects from the civil war. 
It is clear that in 2011 cotton area increased to the extent of decreasing area for wheat 
and other crops. There is no problem of changing crops from one year to the next, be-
cause almost all farm types do not grow only one crop! It is even important to change 
crops to prevent salination of the soil. All farm types grow cotton and other crops joint-
ly and rotate crops on the fields. 
7) Additional information 
1.) Jamoat borders from the WB Atlas 2005 are wrong. Using Jamoat level variables by 
matching PSUs and Jamoats with GEO codes makes no sense. (said Martin Lenk from 
the GIZ and the National Statistics Agency that has worked with that data) For this rea-
son, I had to match Jamoats from the World Bank data with PSUs from the TLSS by 
hand (looking up Jamoat information for all PSUs). 
2.) Many private farmers apparently suffer from the split up of the bigger farms, be-
cause irrigation infrastructure and access to machinery and other inputs (fertilizer, pesti-
cides etc.) deteriorated strongly (since the breakup of the SU; this caused the huge drop 
in cotton yields in Tajikistan in the 1990s). The destruction of the old Soviet system of 
input and machinery supply was not compensated (especially the human capital left 
Tajikistan because of the civil war; e.g., nobody is left that has the knowledge for night 
irrigation, Interview 15). There needs to be a new initiative by the national government 
to solve those problems: Coordination of atomized private farmers to form new 
cooperations that use scale effects for negotiating with input suppliers and gins (better 
prices), that care jointly for the irrigation system and that share machinery that is suita-
ble for the smaller field sizes. (Interview 4, 5) The lack of machinery, irrigation and 
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input supply is also a reason some why small private dehkan farmers do not grow cotton 
anymore (Interviews 12, 13, 15). Sanginow also told me that in Soviet times, around 
20% of the raw cotton was processed in Tajikistan (now only 3-5%).(Interview 15) He 
also said that input prices (fertilizer, pesticides, machinery) became too expensive after 
the breakup of the SU. Social benefits for cotton farmers, like free health care and sub-
sidized food do not exist anymore. Thus, growing cotton is not profitable for Tajik 
farmers anymore (also because picking wages increased due to outmigration to Russia). 
In SU times, wages of cotton growers were the same than industrial wages. Now wages 
in Russia are 10 times larger than wages in the cotton sector. 
Sanginow said that the only way to save the Tajik cotton sector is 1.) clear access to 
land and credit for farmers and 2.) freedom in output marketing. At present state, there 
are no incentives to invest in technology or infrastructure for any farmer. These reforms 
are only possible, if the international community puts pressure on the government: the 
president and his family have absolutely no incentive to change those structures, be-
cause they profit immensely from the status quo. The international community has not 
done enough to change the incentive structure for the government, because it heavily 
depends on the Tajik government due to the retreat of troops from Afghanistan.  
Hartwig Ungethuem from the GIZ told me that the main impediments for increased co-
operation of private dehkan farms (to solve issues of irrigation, machinery use and input 
supply and output marketing) are 1.) markets for land do not exist in Tajikistan due to 
the lack of regulation and due to social norms (people feel tied to their land and do not 
sell), 2.) lack of regulation for founding larger entities or cooperatives of private dehkan 
farms and 3.) mentality of farmers is against delegating responsibilities to larger entities 
again (in general in Tajikistan it is very difficult to convince people that cooperation in 
business associations or local cooperative banks is beneficial, because experiences in 
the last decades with Soviet style cooperatives were very bad). (Interview 3) 
3.) An interesting statement is that production of wheat, vegetables and fruits are more 
profitable than cotton, because those crops are sold in local markets and cannot be taxed 
easily (tax evasion is high). So farmers that are not forced to grow cotton will naturally 
try to grow more of those crops. (Interview 5) However, it seems that access to larger 
markets is also important for the profitability of growing vegetables and fruits. Around 
Dushanbe, many farmers grow onions and other vegetables because the market of Du-
shanbe is close. (Interview 2, 9, 10, 13, 26) 
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4.) A general issue for the Tajik cotton sector is that due to migration to Russia the labor 
supply in rural areas decreases at the extensive margin. As a consequence, picking wag-
es rise every year. (Interview 13, 40) 
3.  Results of Interviews in November 2014 
In November 2014, I conducted interviews with experts on the Tajik cotton sector in 
Dushanbe. During these interviews, I collected anecdotal evidence on political interfer-
ence and coerced labor on big collective dehkan farms that I present along with other 
statements below. Most of the interviews were recorded and the audio material can be 
requested from the author. 
Interview 46 
Igor, senior economist GIZ Tajikistan, supports our story with qualitative evidence. All 
he knows and has heard points to the direction that big farms are still heavily inter-
twined with local politicians and administrations like in kolkhoz times. Managers of big 
farms are appointed by the political leaders and are committed to them. The managers 
of big farms get credit through the collusion network of futurists, ginneries and local 
politicians and reap parts of the benefits of the extractive system. The managers of big 
farms can count on administrative support for coercing their shareholders and their fam-
ilies to harvest the big farm cotton fields. Those shareholders are not allowed to simply 
found an own farm (administrative hurdles, only bad quality land is allocated to them 
etc.) Only shareholders with good political connections and capital can found an own 
dehkan farms successfully.  
Igor says that the reforms have no resulted in a really more competitive cottons sector 
and cotton intermediary system. The same guys still own the gins, but now through oth-
er financial constructions etc.  
Interview 47 
He also strongly supports the coerced labor story on big farms. There shareholders live 
in feudal structures and are forced to harvest a certain part of the field. They cannot just 
go to harvest elsewhere on private farms (and also their family members do not have 
those rights). 
He also says that small private farms are competing for pickers from local villages and 
pay higher wages to attract them and to make them harvest the field faster. This would 
not happen on big farms where managers are colluding with local politicians and gin-
neries and extract the rents from shareholders according to the old system. Small farm 
managers think much more market oriented. 
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Splitting up the big farms increases productivity in a first step, because it destroys the 
old rent seeking structures that prevented change towards productivity increases. Farm-
ers start to think more market oriented because of better defined property rights and 
because of less dependence on futurists and farm managers. 
Interview 48 
Behruz showed us all the agricultural production plans of the national government that 
are still in place and are enforced by the hukumat. Political capital is connected with 
those plans, so when plans are fulfilled the hukumat government gets political capital 
and its members may rise in the ranks. So there is still high political influence in the 
production process besides the private interests that are at stake (politicians owning part 
of the gin or being involved in cotton trading etc.) 
Regarding the channel for our effect, he mentioned that big farms are badly managed 
and often have not enough cash to additionally attract and incentivize pickers. He also 
said that the big farms managers do not think market oriented. They just think that they 
do not have to harvest the fields rapidly and they do not have to incentivize picking 
workers to harvest faster. They also do not have to attract further workers with higher 
wages. They use their own shareholders and close families for that (those guys have to 
harvest the fields of the big farms irrespective of the amount of the wage). Big collec-
tive dehkan farms additionally receive students to work on the fields from universities 
and higher schools in the hukumat. Those coerced workers do not go to small farms, but 
are carried by the hukumat to the big farms. (both guys said that, Behruz and his friend 
that entered the room) 
Interview 49 
He is FAO staff member in Tajikistan. He says that in villages often children and pupils 
go to the fields for the harvest to earn some money or they go with their family. 
He said that Rudaki district was the pilot district for the land reform. Thus, already in 
2003/2004 there was only individual dehkan farms in this district (1-2 ha). But, those 
farms can also grow cotton. They were forced in 2004 to grow cotton so that 20% of the 
whole land in Rudaki was devoted to cotton. The yield on those small farms was even 
much higher than the yield on the big farms, although they did have more difficulties in 
organizing the technology and irrigation (bad cooperation between the small farms). 
But, he also said that he knows from some cases where the big collective dehkan farms 
send requests to local schools and technical universities to provide them with students 
and school children for the harvest! And they do not have to pay higher wages to attract 
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them. The students are just carried by buses to the big farms organized by the authori-
ties and they get the minimum picking wage.  
They also use their shareholders and their families to harvest the fields. Those guys 
have the obligation to harvest a certain area of cotton at the big farms. They cannot just 
leave and go to the small farms to earn higher picking wages. If they would leave the 
big farm, they would lose the possibility to grow their food on the special small plots 
provided by the big farm to their shareholders (and their close family) for subsistence 
consumption. The casual wages the shareholders receive from the manager during the 
rest of the season for channel maintenance or other carrying and driving works are so 
small that they cannot finance the families living expenses. So the argument of insur-
ance by the big farms is not valid (that big farms hire shareholders through the whole 
year and that is why shareholders accept lower wages at harvest time). In most cases, 
the shareholders of big farms have other family members that send remittances or work 
in other better paying jobs (like teacher etc.) and those guys are maintaining the family. 
The shareholders do not leave the big farm, because they would just be unemployed 
otherwise, because there are no other employment opportunities in rural areas in Tajiki-
stan. They cannot found an own dehkan farm due to a lack of capital, agricultural 
knowledge, political influence (to receive good land) and too small HH size. So they are 
somehow bonded to the big farms (they would lose the little land where they grow crops 
for subsistence consumption). 
The small farms, on the other hand, mostly use the pool of landless females from local 
villages that are just unemployed and at home during the whole year. The males from 
those families are mostly in Russia for work and the female are not allowed to travel to 
other hukumats for work. They are bonded to their local villages because of the Islamic 
revival and traditional norms. So there are isolated local labor markets with a flexible 
supply of landless female workers (that do not have to go to big farms anymore, they 
are not bonded and can freely chose to go to the small farm that offers the highest wag-
es). Before the agricultural reforms, those female were forced to work at the big farms 
for the offered wages on those monopsonistic big farms. The creation of many small 
farms and the breakup of the exploitive collusion of big farms, futurists and gins in-
creased competition for workers and created competitive labor markets for those land-
less females. So Shahlos statement is absolutely correct that the land reforms created 
employment opportunities for those increasingly immobile and depreviated landless 
females in rural Tajikistan.  
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Interview 50 
He is currently consultant for the ADB. But from 2004 until 2008 he worked together 
with Hans Woldring at the ADB team that drafted the decree 111 for the reform of free-
dom to farm. In 2008, the ADB left the cotton sector due to disagreement with the gov-
ernment bailout of futurists in the debt resolution. Thus, the ginnery construction pro-
gram after 2008 was not financed by the ADB, but only by the IFC and World Bank 
together with national Tajik banks.  
The main push for the increase of the numbers of ginneries was the decree 111 in De-
cember 2007. The futurist system was abolished and the entrance of new investments 
was encouraged. By investing in new gins with a better turnover rate of raw cotton (40 
% instead of below 30%) huge profits could be made, because those new gins would 
attract farmer’s raw cotton due to higher farm gate prices etc. 
Main content of decree 111: 
1.) Freedom of farming 
Prior to 2006/2007, cotton quotas of over 70% were enforced by the administration in 
all districts. There was definitely no choice for all kinds of farmers. According to him, 
this changed with the decree 111. But, in the interviews we saw that still in 2013 there 
exist cotton quotas that are enforced by the Jamoat or the Hukumat because local offi-
cials are involved in the cotton sector. The GIZ political leader data set also proves that 
cotton quotas still exist. 
2.) More competitive ginning sector 
Prior to the decree, farmers were locked in the district and could not sell to other gins 
outside of the district. Thus, gins had a monopsony. This was due to the tax code (tax on 
ginned cotton in the hukumat belongs to the district) that incentivized hukumat govern-
ments to block the borders to other districts to secure that all raw cotton was ginned 
within the district borders. The other reason was that gins in the district were interested 
to be the monopsonist and colluded with the hukumat to preserve that rent seeking 
structure. Mostly, hukumat officials also had a stake in the gin through family connec-
tions etc. This was also due to the political solution of the civil war that implied that old 
civil war gangs were allowed to take over certain hukumats and extract the rents there 
(so those gangs took over the gins, big farms and the political administration of the 
hukumat). The reason that in some regions, like Shartuz, the old futurist system is still 
in place (and cotton debts are piling up again) is that the gangs operating there are still 
behaving differently than gangs in other parts of the country and the central government 
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has not enough power to stop that practice without risking the political peace concord 
after the civil war (at least that was told by Irna and Hafiz, Interview 6). 
This monopsonistic ginning sector was broken up by the decree 111. Investments in the 
ginning sector increased and the number of gins increased strongly from 2008 on. It was 
mostly national futurists and banks that invested in new gins. However, the competition 
between gins over district borders (price competition for raw cotton) only started due to 
the huge price shock. This price shock was the trigger that was needed so that the dif-
ferent parts of the president family started to compete with each other (profits were ex-
tremely high end of 2010 and this triggered a change in the collusion behavior of the 
ginning sector). 
3.) Cotton financing was separated from the ginning sector 
The competition in the financial sector was increased by opening up the agricultural 
credit market for banks and micro finance institutions. Futurists were not allowed to 
work anymore (whatever this means because it is obvious that the same people started 
to call themselves investor now and still do the same business in the name of the gin; 
farmers told me that in the interviews). However, the same comments like to the gin-
nery sector apply here (futurists were also part of the ruling elite in the hukumat, like 
big farm managers, ginnery managers and local politicians). The whole value chain of 
cotton was colluding and extracting the rents out of the sector (big farm managers, fu-
turists, gins and local politicians through taxes and private involvement in the cotton 
sector). 
4.) Debt cancellation for farmers 
He said he does not know when the debt was effectively cancelled. However, Rustam 
from Sarob told me that the debt was cancelled 1st January 2008. This had indeed a 
strong impact on farmer behavior and their freedom to farm. Now, the dependence on 
futurists was not that strong anymore and at least they could think about using remit-
tances or other resources to start planting another crop. With debt to futurists still active, 
there was no choice than just to accept the inputs provided by the futurist and grow cot-
ton to the conditions the futurist provided. 
On coerced labor and local rural labor markets for female: 
He also said that village female are strongly bound to the village and maybe villages 
close by. The reason is mainly traditional norms in rural Tajikistan and only second 
comes the Islamic revival.  
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In 2011, there were still those requests of big farms to schools and local technical uni-
versities to provide pickers for the cotton harvest. But, it was not a massive phenome-
non. Big farms mostly use the shareholders and their close families for the harvest of 
cotton. The shareholders are treated as workers on the big farms and they receive a very 
low flat wage during the whole year (they are not treated as shareholders). That is why 
the picking wage is not increased for them (they do not have to be attracted). They al-
ready receive a wage in other parts of the season. But this wage is very low and I think 
the main thing the big farm provides to them is the area to grow crops for subsistence 
consumption (plus the necessary seeds, fertilizer and machinery). However, Shuhrat 
said that they do not leave the farm mainly because they own parts of the farm and do 
not want to leave back that land. However, based on the interviews and other papers, I 
would argue that the shareholders of the big farms do not have any conscience about 
property of that land (they feel as workers and not as shareholders with land titles). This 
is described in the WB Report 2012 and other reports I read (look at Sattar and Mohib 
2006 again). 
Interview 51 
He worked in the TAFF project (agricultural finance program from the EBRD) as con-
sultant for agricultural micro-credits and now has his own agro-finance consultancy. 
The number of banks currently active in Tajikistan is 17, 16 commercial banks and 1 
state bank (Amonatbonk). Until decree 111, there was no rural agro-finance by banks, 
only futurists colluding with the gins served the farmers with in kind credit and exploit-
ed them. After decree 111 and the TAFF program (starting in 2007), agro-lending in 
rural areas started. But in 2008, there were only 3 banks starting this high risk business 
that requires deep knowledge about the sector (many banks still do not have enough 
knowledge for this business; that is why he founded his firm and now consults banks 
wanting to expand into this business). In 2010, there was a big increase in agro-lending, 
because the Tajik Ministry of Finance provided a big amount with cheap interest rates 
(14% for Somoni loans) to increase credit supply for farmers, but especially for cotton 
farmers. So maybe this was just another step in government involvement in cotton fi-
nancing and farmers could not freely decide which crops to grow with this loan? But he 
said from 2010 on more banks entered the agro-lending sector and credit supply in-
creased for farmers. 
The competition in the ginnery sector materialized only with the cotton price shock. So 
in 2010/2011 farm gate prices started to jump. However, even in 2009 there already was 
a slow increase in farm gate prices due to increased competition between gins. 
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In general, cotton growing is very unprofitable in Tajikistan due to very high transport 
costs for inputs. Fertilizer, seeds and fuel have to be imported because there are not pro-
duced in Tajikistan. So the natural crop choice of farmers should be other crops. But the 
national government and the hukumats as well as the gins are highly interested in assur-
ing a certain amount of cotton to reap the rents of the old processing and distribution 
system that is still in place. 
He said that there are still requests by big farms to universities and schools to provide 
students for the cotton harvest. But it is mostly from agricultural universities and 
schools.  
The landless females in rural villages are organized in brigades of around 20 people and 
offer their labor services to farms that pay the best wages. Small farms compete for 
those females at the start of the harvest time. 
He said the quotas still exist in all the districts were cotton can be grown. They are at 
least 50% of land to be grown with cotton. Before the decree 111 the quotas were at 
least 70%. So it is an improvement, but the interests of the hukumat due to the tax on 
ginned cotton and of the stakeholders of the gin with good contacts to local politicians 
are still strong and that is why the quotas for cotton still exist. They are enforced by the 
hukumat or the jamoat by just cutting electricity, irrigation etc. (see the interviews in 
Vose). And this is still the case in all the cotton growing districts. 
Interview 52 
Igor Eromenko said that the statistics agency collects much more data on cotton sector, 
but only for governmental use. E.g. cotton picked is registered every two weeks during 
the harvest in the agency for every district or jamoat. This is used to react and bring 
additional workers to jamoats, where too little cotton is picked due to too little labor 
supply (many people migrated…). This shows that cotton is still a strategic crop and the 
national government is strongly interested in assuring a certain amount of cotton to be 
produced in the country for export earnings. In spite of the freedom to farm decree 111 
and efforts of international donors and the government to increase food security and 
increase free crop choice of farmers, the government also has a strong interest in a min-
imum production of cotton for export earnings. Other important reasons for the persis-
tence of cotton quotas and political influence to grow cotton is the tax on ginned cotton 
that goes to the hukumat (incentives for the hukumat to enforce cotton quotas and hin-
der farmers to sell their cotton across district borders) as well as private involvement of 
political elites in ginneries and cotton trading. 
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Torsten Swoboda has real evidence on those bus transfers that are organized to help 
jamoats or districts that are too slow with the cotton harvest due to too little supply of 
picking workers. In Asht district, this year the hukumat authorities (government agron-
omists of the district and the oblast) send 600 picking workers by bus from a district 
that does not grow much cotton and has an excess labor supply to Asht. The farms had 
to pay those workers. Those guys also worked on some small farms, but mainly on the 
big farms. Most small farms had already attracted the local laborers and had harvested 
their fields and those workers mainly worked on big farms that were late in finishing the 
harvest. The story shows in general that authorities are still heavily involved in the cot-
ton sector (see notes above). 
Another very important story is that in Asht Jamoat authorities still force all people ex-
cept children to go to the harvest! So there is still strong political and social pressure to 
harvest cotton. It may be that cotton is so heavily intertwined with local social identities 
that helping in cotton harvest just belongs to your social identity. But there are also so-
cial sanctions involved for deviating behavior. The powerful big farm managers are 
using those social identities for their own benefits (also the hukumat government and 
the private interests in ginning and cotton trading). 
Maybe this strong coercion to work in the cotton harvest is stronger in districts with less 
labor supply? (would be in line with the paper by Acemoglu et al. about labor coercion) 
But interestingly, labor supply is especially low in the core cotton districts because of 
the strong change in conditions in those districts. In SU times, workers in the cotton 
districts were at the upper end of the wage distribution. Now, cotton farmers and pickers 
are at the lower end of the wage distribution. This deception triggered many people 
from cotton regions to migrate to Russia for work.  
Gins are also still doing futurists schemes, where they pre-finance taxes and irrigation 
payments that farmers later have to pay in raw cotton to the gins. Thus, new dependen-
cies are created for farmer. The old elites are still trying to take a hold on the rents in the 
sector and will not give easily up this profitable business.  
Torsten says that cotton quotas are decreasing, but are still existent. 
Farmer behavior could be best explained by following your neighbor behavior. If the 
technology works with the neighbor or this crop was profitable for the neighbor, you 
will also try it out. So you always need a first mover in those regions to bring new tech-
nologies to use etc. (it all takes time). 
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Interview 53 
She coordinated the whole farm restructuring program of the World Bank, IMF and the 
Tajik government. 
Regarding the Lerman (2012) numbers for the farm restructuring program of the World 
Bank, she said that the huge increase of certificates of individual dehkan farms hap-
pened from mid of 2010 until 2011. The reason was that the program deadline was close 
and that the money had to be spent and program goals had to be reached. So this huge 
increase in individual dehkan farm certificates from 2010 until 2011 is probably not a 
real privatization, but only privatization on paper. She said that many farms still work 
like the collective dehkan farm with one manager organizing everything and reaping the 
profits and the rest of the farmers are workers on this farm, although each farmer has a 
new individual farm certificate! The farmers have no conscience and knowledge and the 
old structures still persist in spite of the new legal frame. So it is hard to find reliable 
figures on how much farms are still big farms and how much real individual private 
farms exist. The data from Lerman (2012) about the World Bank privatization program 
is not reliable. It only tells the legal frame story not the process of real structural change. 
Firuza Ganieva from Sughd province (personal assistant to Rainer Woytek) and Zara 
told me that there is still coercion of state employees and employees of public institu-
tions to work in the cotton harvest. The parents of Firuza work as a doctor in a hospital 
and at the Khujand airport and in both institutions all divisions had to close for a certain 
time (not all at the same time) to help in the cotton harvest. They would have lost their 
job, if they would not have participated in the cotton harvest! All those forced people go 
to the big state related farms like joint stock companies or big collective dehkan farms 
(whose managers have strong political ties). So there is even coerced labor from other 
jobs to the cotton harvest. 
People in the villages also face a strong social pressure to go to the cotton harvest. Also 
students and older school children are forced to harvest cotton (requests from big para-
statal farms to schools and universities). If they do not participate in the obligatory har-
vesting activities, they might be dismissed from the Universities or even get problems in 
the school! Even smaller school kids have to help in the harvest, although the official 
version is that they do it to earn some money. In fact, in most cases the money is not 
paid to them, Zara said. 
The privatization is often only on the paper. E.g. in Asht (example Torsten was talking 
about in Interview 52) formally there are only individual dehkan farms left. But if you 
go there, you see that the central place of the old kolkhoz is still the central meeting 
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place where cotton pickers come and are allocated to the fields. The individual farmers 
still get the machines from there and all decisions about selling the crop and employing 
machines etc. are made by the old manager of the big farm. So the real privatization 
process is much slower than the legal one on paper. The interests involved are very 
strong (farm managers, politicians and cotton sector business men) and it takes long 
time to change the conscience of farmers and to change social and cultural habits and 
structures (individual farmers often do not know anything about agriculture etc.; so they 
still go to the old boss and he then has a leverage to still exploit them; he would not give 
inputs or advice, if they do not hand over the crop to him). The real structural change is 
not going to happen from year to another like Yatimov from the World Bank said (In-
terview 54). 
Interview 54 
He presented the official story that the habits and the conscience and mentality of the 
farmers changed in the moment the new certificates are in their hands and the debt was 
cancelled. So for him, every individual dehkan farmer that has an individual dehkan 
farm certificate in his hands has absolutely free crop choice, sense of his right and his 
property, will never be forced to work by the old big farm manager (only works in cot-
ton harvest, if he agrees to the wage) and will only grow cotton himself, when he thinks 
it is profitable (because an export market exists and because he can use it as a collateral 
for credit). But, I think, this is impossible: Mentality and conscience cannot change that 
rapidly, because most shareholders on big farms also do not have any agricultural 
knowledge. So they are still dependent from the old agronomist and managers for 
knowing about inputs, technology etc. This does not change from one day to another. 
And the interests of gins, local hukumats and big farm managers are against that pro-
cess. So there are many ways to still maintain the old power structures and cotton rent 
seeking structures, e.g. enough negative sanctions (like electricity cuts, irrigation cuts 
by the Jamoat, social sanctions etc., see Interview 26). E.g. the collective dehkan farm 
of Zafar was also helping his shareholders and people in the village with money for the 
wedding: If those guys would not go to the cotton harvest, they would not receive any 
help anymore (Interview 24, 25; same for small farmers dependent on administration 
etc.). 
For Yatimov, after decree 111 in 2007 there were no cotton quotas anymore and free 
crop choice was suddenly established. Competition between gins increased strongly, 
because small farmers had no debt anymore and could freely choose to get credit from 
microfinance institutions (and the number of small farms went strongly up, number of 
big farms still dependent on gins went down). Decreased dependence of small farms on 
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certain gins led to a huge increase of competition for farmers between gins. The decree 
111 also abolished the incentive of hukumats to close the border and opened the compe-
tition between gins of different districts. That is why farm gate prices for raw cotton 
increased from 400 USD to 800 USD per ton from 2009 to 2010. (actually I think the 
main reason was the huge world market price increase that triggered the competition) 
After the price shock, prices for raw cotton still remained high. 
The majority of new small and much more efficient gins were build from 2006 until 
2009 from new investors. The reason was that those investors foresaw the decree 111 
and the increased competition between gins, where the old Soviet gins would miss out 
because of their huge inefficiencies and old machinery. After the decree 111, futurist 
financing (the intermediary system) was totally abolished and the supply of micro-
finance institutions increased tremendously. Small farmers only need little amounts of 
credit and were now independent of gins. Big farms, however, had huge credit con-
straints, because they needed much higher amounts of credit and microfinance institutes 
would not give them those amounts without collateral. But, the managers of those farms 
do not have collateral, because they do not own the farm. All shareholders now have to 
agree to give their land as collateral. This is often not possible or the bank does not ac-
cept that. In most cases the big farms had to recur to the gin for input financing and thus 
had to still grow huge amounts of cotton. Thus, big farms are less flexible in their crop 
choice. 
He said that 3 dehkan farm types still exist: 1-5 ha are private dehkan farms, 5-25 ha are 
family dehkan farms, 25-200 ha are collective dehkan farms. Joint stock companies 
(private cotton seed or livestock enterprises) also still exist. And you also have coopera-
tives, which are 3-4 collective dehkan farms working together. As of 2014, 149000 
dehkan farms exist with an average area of 7 ha. (see Lerman 2012) 
He says no forced labor exists. If so, only few cases where big farm managers are 
friends of hukumats and public enterprise managers etc. (but actually those cases are 
widespread, because the farm manages were backed by the local government, they ex-
tracted the rents together before; why should they suddenly not continue to extract those 
rents? They have means of sanctioning the farmers and force local people to cotton 
picking, if those farmers and people are not important politicians or have good political 
connections) If directors would follow requests for harvest help of pupils, the director 
would go to jail (he says). 
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Interview 55 
Private Sector is doing what we expect them to do - small private cotton farms are re-
sponsive to market realities and tend to make use of female labour at competitive price. 
Considering that Tajik female workforce is increasingly not mobile, farms indeed are 
offering an employment choice locally.  
The government also recognises that cotton farming has a strong social aspect. It seems 
that women are better off working for small private farms rather than large state farms 
affiliated with influential groups where pay is not as great. 
Interview 56 
In Tajikistan, the current regime is becoming more and more powerful in the last years, 
because they can play out the different foreign interests and receive a lot of money from 
Russia, China and Western countries. 
The regime tried to crack down on former Pamirean military commanders in 2012 and 
2014 to enlarge its control of the country (this triggered uprisings…; but now they si-
lently move more military in this area to be able to control the region effectively). Until 
those events, the Pamireans had supported the Tajik national identity that the regime 
tries to establish to maintain power (the elite is highly rational and ruthlessly interested 
in appropriating the rents for their own family and clan; other Tajik people are outsiders 
and do not participate, the regime is not interested in any welfare of the Tajik people; 
without participation in the rents, the risk is high that other groups might try to fight 
against the regime and that is why the regime tries to push the national identity story to 
prevent conflict between ethnicities or other groups…) 
The government extracts the rents trough explicit and implicit taxation in different 
fields: taxes of remittances through control of the banking system, very low educational 
quality to prevent opposition, trade taxes, cotton monopsony in financing and sale, alu-
minum and electricity exports. It receives loans from China (in exchange for territory 
with minerals) and bribes from Russia (in exchange for letting the Russians control the 
border and participate in the drug trade). They even tax the fundamentalism in the coun-
try by posing high taxes on the construction of mosques in the country from Saudi Ara-
bia or Quatar. They play the game in all fields and try to extract as much rents as possi-
ble. 
Thus, concerning the cotton sector, there is definitely no real break up of old mo-
nopsony and monopoly structures! All “privatization” is carried out to accommodate 
international donors somewhat, but the regime still strongly taxes the cotton sector by 
other means. There is huge pressure on private farms to grow cotton and sell it to certain 
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gins (sanctions are: cutting electricity or irrigation or just taking away the land again). 
The ginnery sector and cotton trade seems to be more competitive (number of gins and 
traders went up), but in the end the elite is still controlling the major banks and holdings 
and captures the rents. 
Also at the farm level there is still huge repression and coercion. Only some of the big 
farms were “privatized” (The government still owns the land and is able to take it away 
easily. Only 99 year usage rights were given out.). On the other big farms, the share-
holders are still tied strongly to the land and do not have the option to found an own 
dehkan farm. The managers of those big farms are still colluding with the local elites 
and implicit taxation exists that prevents shareholders from opting out (receive only bad 
soil when opting out, are forced to grow cotton and sell at certain gins, cutting of elec-
tricity and irrigation…, placing high debt on farmers that want to opt out). All private 
farms that received good land are necessarily connected to the elites. 
Family members of shareholders on big farms have to work on the big farms in harvest 
time, if not the shareholder would be sanctioned by the manager and has no choice (has 
no own land…). It is still a feudal system at those big farms. They cannot just go to pri-
vate farms that offer higher wages. 
Interview 57 
He did the farm head and shareholder survey end of 2011 and February/March 2012. He 
interviewed 237 shareholders and 257 farm heads. 
He had a direct impression of the consequences of the cotton price shock in 2011 and 
said that the shareholders at the big farms were still like serf laborers in feudalist times. 
They have absolute no conscience of their rights as shareholders and do not know that 
they own a part of the land. They have been working at the big farm for several decades 
and have always been the workers receiving very low wages, cotton stalks and cotton 
oil as well as the possibility of planting crops for own consumption in exchange for 
their work at the big farm. The reforms have not triggered down to them yet, the old 
realities and habits are still in place and farm managers can still exploit them. So wages 
at the big farm do not have to go up to incentivize those people to come to the cotton 
harvest there. They not even think about going to another farm because wages are high-
er there. They have to first harvest at the big farm and then the small farms have already 
harvested the first sort of cotton at their fields (the later sorts will not bring much addi-
tional income).  
They also have no other job choices than working at the big farm (no employment op-
portunities exist at the rural areas in TJ) and the small farms would only hire extra peo-
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ple for the harvest time (not for the whole year). At the big farm they have the possibil-
ity of planting their crops for consumption using the inputs provided there, thus they do 
not risk sanctions from the farm head for not harvesting first the big farm fields that 
were assigned to them. They do not have the entrepreneurial and agricultural knowledge 
for opting out of the big farm with their own share of the land (mostly, they do not 
know about this option). It is only those guys who have entrepreneurial and agricultural 
knowledge, good political connections to get good land and also access to capital for 
inputs that opt out of the big farms and found a smaller family farm. 
The small farms mostly get additional pickers from nearby villages: the unemployed 
and landless females whose husbands are working in Russia. The other pickers at small 
farms are wider family members that do not have the obligation to pick at the big farms 
first.  
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Appendix 2 E Data Cleaning and Matching 
The main dataset we use in our empirical analysis is the Tajikistan Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (TLSS). This household survey was conducted in 2007 and 2009 
by the World Bank and in 2011 by the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies 
(IOS) in Regensburg (Germany). The first two waves can be downloaded at the website 
of the World Bank. My co-author Alexander Danzer was part of the team at the IOS that 
conducted the third wave and had access to the data.  
Unfortunately, the three waves of this potential panel household survey had not been 
matched at the individual level so far and I had to undertake this task. Furthermore, hav-
ing closer looks at the data during the matching procedure, I found many inconsisten-
cies and errors in the identifiers at the individual, household and village level (primary 
sampling units, PSUs) as well as in many other variables. It was the work of more than 
six month to clean and match this household panel dataset. Additionally, I matched this 
dataset with further data from the FAO-GAEZ database, the World Bank Socio-
Economic Atlas for Tajikistan as well as data on the privatization process I organized 
during my field research in Tajikistan (Appendix 2 B). Moreover, I had to digitalize by 
hand many statistics I obtained in Tajikistan that we use for descriptive purposes in the 
paper (Appendix 2 B). This additional data matching and digitalization took another 
four month. In this appendix, I will describe the main steps of the data cleaning and 
matching procedures. 
Data cleaning and matching of the three waves of the Tajikistan Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (TLSS) 
The first wave of the TLSS household panel survey was conducted in 2007 by the 
World Bank (World Bank 2008). 30318 individuals in 4860 households living in 270 
primary sampling units (PSUs) in Tajikistan were interviewed (18 households per PSU). 
The survey sample is based on the national census in the year 2000 and is representative 
for Tajikistan (World Bank 2008). Out of the 4860 households in the TLSS 2007, a ran-
dom sample of 1503 households in 167 PSUs was revisited and 10069 individuals inter-
viewed in 2009 by the World Bank (9 households per PSU, World Bank 2010). In 2011, 
the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS) revisited 1503 households 
in 167 PSUs and interviewed 9608 individuals (Danzer et al. 2013).90 
                                                 
90
 159 households included in the TLSS 2009 could not be located in 2011. Those 159 missing households were 
replaced by 114 households from the TLSS 2007 and 45 new households randomly selected in PSUs with no house-
holds left for replacement (Danzer et al. 2013). During the data cleaning procedure, I noticed that in 2011 two house-
holds were wrongly coded as one household and the number of households in 2011 increased to 1504. 
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Within each wave of the panel survey, around 40 blocks of variables (sections) exist 
that are defined at different observation levels (individual, household and PSU level). 
There is a unique household identifier (hhid) and an identifier for individuals (or mem-
bers) within one household (memid) that are specific to each wave and can be used to 
merge the various blocks of variables within each wave. For merging the data across 
waves, one needs to use the PSU identifier (psuid) and another household identifier that 
is only unique for households within one PSU (hhuid). Furthermore, the waves in 2009 
and 2011 include the member identifiers within households (memid) from former waves 
to facilitate the matching of individuals across waves (memid07in09 is memid for 2007 
reported in 2009, memid07in11 is memid for 2007 reported in 2011 and memid09in11 
is memid for 2009 reported in 2011). However, many of those member identifiers for 
former waves as well as household identifiers (hhuid) were incorrect. I corrected all 
detected inconsistencies of identifiers across waves using the cleaning procedures de-
scribed in the next paragraphs. Another major issue was the matching of variables 
across waves. Variable names and in some cases variable values were not the same 
across waves. So I had to redefine variable names and values in each wave before merg-
ing the waves. The do-files for these procedures can be obtained from the author. In the 
following, I will describe the major steps of the data cleaning procedure.  
During a first step of data cleaning, I noticed that five pairs of households had the same 
household identifiers (psuid and hhuid) in the 2011 wave. I contacted the local partner 
institute that had conducted the survey in 2011 and they were successful in obtaining 
the correct identifiers from the original interview questionnaires. In the 2007 wave, I 
found another 2 pairs of households with the same PSU and household identifier 
(hhuid). I was able to assign the correct household identifier by looking at the house-
holds within the same PSU in the 2009 wave. During the merging of blocks of variables 
within waves, I had to reorganize variables within blocks and found many inconsisten-
cies in variable values. I corrected the errors where possible, e.g. missing values coded 
wrongly as 9999. In some cases, I had to leave out variables with too many obviously 
wrongly coded values. I even noticed some errors of individual identifiers in some vari-
able blocks and could correct them by looking at other similar variable blocks and com-
paring names and characteristics of individuals. 
Trying to match individuals across waves, I noticed many inconsistencies in the mem-
ber identifiers for former waves as well as in the PSU and household identifiers through 
several checks. The first check was to look if member identifiers for former waves iden-
tify one unique individual. In the 2009 wave, I found 10 pairs of individuals with the 
same identifier for 2007 (same psuid, hhuid and memid07in09). In the 2011 wave, I 
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found 41 pairs of individuals with the same identifier for 2007 (same psuid, hhuid and 
memid07in11) and 37 pairs of individual observations with the same identifier for 2009 
(same psuid, hhuid and memid09in11). I corrected all of those wrongly assigned identi-
fiers by comparing members in the same households across waves. In the 2007 and 
2011 waves, the detailed names of the individuals are reported and I used this infor-
mation as my main criteria to identify individuals within households across waves and 
to allocate the correct memid07in09, memid07in11 or memid09in11. Additionally, I 
used information on age, gender, ethnicity, education, occupation, marital status and 
memid of the spouse to identify individuals. It was impossible to program a matching 
algorithm, because names in 2007 are reported in cyrillic letters and in 2011 in latin 
letters. Furthermore, names were mostly written differently across the two waves. The 
other mentioned variables also showed inconsistencies across waves (reported age, eth-
nicity, education and marital status were not consistent for individuals). To obtain a 
clean and reliable dataset I opted for the described data cleaning by hand instead of try-
ing to match individuals across waves through an error prone programmed matching 
procedure.  
During this first cleaning procedure, I noticed many additional inconsistencies of mem-
ber identifiers for former waves within households with beforehand detected coding 
errors. I even found two households with wrong household identifiers (hhuid) in 2011 
and could identify the correct hhuid by looking at all households within the same PSU 
in 2007 and 2009. In both cases, it was possible to identify the correct household by 
comparing names of members of all households between 2007 and 2011. During the 
first check of the individual matching procedure, I corrected 250 cases of incorrect 
memid07in09, memid07in11 and memid09in11 as well as two incorrect household 
identifiers in 2011. Additionally, I corrected at least one of the variables gender, age, 
ethnicity and identifier of the spouse for ten individuals. The overwhelming majority of 
the coding errors were typos (e.g. 9 entered instead of a 3) and entries shifted by one 
line. 
For the second check, I detected households that were not observed in all three waves 
by using the PSU and the household identifier (hhuid). There are households only ob-
served in 2007, households only observed in 2007 and 2009, households only observed 
in 2007 and 2011 and households only observed in 2011. The second check consisted in 
looking at the member identifiers for former waves (memid07in09, memid07in11 and 
memid09in11) for the households only appearing in 2007 and 2009, only in 2007 and 
2011 and only in 2011. I found six households where member identifiers for a former 
wave were reported although the household did not appear in that wave. The reason for 
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this inconsistency was that the household identifier hhuid was incorrect. I corrected the 
hhuid by looking at all households within the same PSU in all other waves and com-
pared households across waves through names and other characteristics of their mem-
bers like in the first check described above. I also corrected 20 inconsistencies of mem-
ber identifiers for former waves. 
The third check consisted in merging the three waves using PSU, household and mem-
ber identifiers for former waves. For many individuals in the 2009 and 2011 waves, 
former member identifiers were reported, but they could not be matched with individu-
als from the former waves. Thus, either the member identifier for the former wave was 
incorrect, should have been a missing or the household identifier was incorrect. Again I 
used the cleaning procedure described above for the first and second check to correct 
the member and the household identifiers. I corrected 8 household identifiers and 200 
member identifiers for former waves reported in 2009 or 2011. 
In the fourth check, I used a similar procedure like in the second step. In the 2009 and 
2011 wave, I looked at households that were included in the former wave but reported 
missing values for the member identifiers for that former wave for all or a high share of 
its household members. I looked in detail at those households using the same cleaning 
procedure described above and was able to correct another 60 individual identifiers. I 
also detected 5 wrongly coded household identifiers and even two households that had 
been assigned to the wrong PSU in 2011. I assigned the correct PSU identifier to these 
households by searching for the household head and its members in the former waves 
using the name, age and other individual characteristics.  
In the fifth check, I tried to extract as much information as possible from the data to 
match the individuals across all three waves. There were many individuals in 2009 with 
missing values in memid07in09, but they could be matched to the 2011 wave (using 
non-missing values in memid09in11) where they had non-missing values in 
memid07in11. Using this procedure, I could replace 253 missing values in 
memid07in09 with memid07in11. Additionally, I compared non-missing values of 
memid07in11 with the non-missing values of memid07in09 and detected 220 inconsist-
encies for those member identifiers. I corrected those inconsistencies by the cleaning 
procedure described above. Similar to the missing values in memid07in09, many indi-
viduals in 2011 had missing values in memid07in11, but could be matched to the 2009 
wave (using memid09in11) where they had non-missing values in memid07in09. I 
could replace 77 missing values in memid07in11 from memid07in09. After that step, I 
could match the 2007 wave with the 2009 wave and the 2011 wave using memid07in09 
and memid07in11 and look at inconsistencies in memid09in11 by comparing 
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memid09in11 with memid09 in the 2009 wave. I found another 40 inconsistencies in 
memid09in11 and corrected them using the cleaning procedure described above for the 
first and the second check. 
After matching the individuals across the three waves using PSU, household identifiers 
and member identifiers for former waves, I performed a sixth check for consistency of 
the individual matching. I compared gender and age for individuals across waves and 
found another 170 wrongly coded member identifiers for former waves (those were cas-
es with varying gender or too strong age differences). I corrected the member identifiers 
using the cleaning procedure described above. After the data cleaning, there were still 
110 individuals left that showed varying gender or too strong variance in age and I 
cleaned those inconsistencies using the following procedure. For individuals that appear 
in all three waves, I replaced the inconsistent gender value by the value that appeared in 
the two other waves. For individuals only appearing in two waves, I corrected gender by 
looking at the name of the individual and the gender of the spouse in case the individual 
was married. I determined the typical gender for a name by sorting the data and looking 
at the gender of other individuals with the same name. I only corrected age differences, 
if age values changed by more than 5 between two panel waves. For individuals appear-
ing in all three waves, I interpolated the age values of two waves that were close to each 
other to the third wave. For individuals only appearing in two waves, I could only cor-
rect the age values, if the family member status indicated a clear miscoding, e.g. in cas-
es where the grandmother was 70 years old in one wave and 25 years in the other wave.  
Using the corrected PSU, household (hhuid) and member identifiers, I was able to 
match 6097 individuals across all three waves, 1987 individuals across 2007 and 2009, 
1052 individuals across 2009 and 2011 and 769 individuals across 2007 and 2011. For 
our main empirical analyzes, we only include the 167 PSUs from the TLSS 2007 that 
were revisited in 2009 and 2011.91 In total, the cleaned and matched panel data set in-
cludes 22616 individuals and 38618 individual-time-specific observations. 1345 house-
holds are included in all three waves, 158 households only appear in 2007 and 2009, 
114 households only appear in 2007 and 2011, 45 households only appear in 2011 and 
1388 households only appear in 2007.92 The reason why so many households only ap-
pear in 2007 is that in the TLSS 2007 18 households per PSU were visited, whereas in 
                                                 
91
 Including the other 103 PSUs (with 11377 individuals) from the TLSS 2007, the number of total individual-time-
specific observations increases to 49995. If we include those individuals from 2007 in the empirical analyzes, the 
results do not change.  
92
 As described in the footnote on the first page of this Appendix, I noticed that in 2011 two households were wrongly 
coded as one household and the number of households in 2011 increased to 1504. Those two households were house-
holds that had been in the TLSS 2007 already. 
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2009 and 2011 only 9 households per PSU were interviewed.93 The selection procedure 
for selecting 9 out of the 18 households in the revisited 167 PSUs for the TLSS 2009 
and 2011 was based on random sampling and should not influence our results (Danzer 
et al. 2013). 
The following step consisted in the construction of variables for our empirical analysis. 
During this step, I noticed inconsistencies in the monthly wages reported in 2007. Ten 
individuals working in agriculture reported wage outliers of 9999 Somoni. The next 
smaller value was 5000 Somoni, the 99% percentile was 3000 Somoni, the median 
wage around 200 Somoni and the mean wage 400 Somoni. Thus, I decided to impute 
the wages for these ten agricultural workers in 2007 using the median wage for 2007 for 
workers with the same gender, same education and the same occupation. Using other 
imputations, e.g. the mean wage instead of the median wage or excluding the observa-
tions does not change the empirical results. In addition, 1517 individual-year observa-
tions reported having a job but did not indicate any wage in cash or in kind. Over 90% 
of those observations work on small household farms as unpaid family workers. We 
decided not to impute wages for those workers because they are not participating in ru-
ral labor markets and are mostly engaged in subsistence farming. 
Matching the TLSS panel dataset with additional external datasets 
For our empirical analysis, we decided to match the TLSS household panel survey with 
additional data at the PSU, sub-district or district level (an overview of those additional 
datasets is presented in Appendix 2 B). The main problem for matching those additional 
datasets with the TLSS was that the information on the GEO-coordinates of the 270 
PSUs as well as on the names of PSUs and sub-districts in the TLSS was not reliable. I 
had to conduct an extensive cleaning procedure before matching the datasets that lasted 
another two month. The cleaning procedure for the matching of each dataset is de-
scribed below.  
The first dataset I matched with the TLSS is the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) 
Database from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). This dataset contains 
detailed information on the suitability of cultivatable land for the production of various 
crops for many countries of the world. I downloaded information on the suitability of 
cultivatable land in Tajikistan for the production of cotton. The downloaded indices 
evaluate information on the soil quality and climatic and geographic conditions to report 
production capacity for cotton based on different assumptions on the irrigation infra-
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 Those 1388 households only appearing in the TLSS 2007 comprise 10088 individuals that only appear in 2007. If 
we exclude those individuals, our regression results do not change. 
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structure and the quality of inputs used.94 Based on those indices, we construct an alter-
native treatment definition defining PSUs as cotton or non-cotton PSUs. The data in the 
FAO-GAEZ database is coded in the Geo Information System (GIS) implying that the 
data can only be matched with PSUs using GEO-coordinates. 
Unfortunately, the information on the GEO-coordinates of the 270 PSUs in the TLSS 
2007 was completely wrong. The World Bank dataset had switched longitude and lati-
tude information and even after correcting this reported for more than 60 PSUs coordi-
nates that lie outside the borders of the assigned districts or even outside of Tajikistan. It 
was extremely difficult to obtain the correct GEO-coordinates for the 270 PSUs because 
for many PSUs the village name or the name of the sub-district (Jamoat) was not report-
ed or had already changed since 2007.95 Furthermore, within districts many villages 
have the same names and it was very difficult to identify the correct village or sub-
district. In addition, there was no single source of information on GEO-coordinates of 
Tajik villages. I had to use six different websites to identify villages and retrieve GEO-
coordinates. In all of these six websites, village names were differently spelled and I 
spent a lot of time to combine information from the different websites.  
In the first step of the cleaning procedure, I entered the coordinates of all 270 PSUs 
from the TLSS in the GIS program Quantum GIS and noticed that many PSUs lay out-
side the borders of Tajikistan. I found out that longitude and latitude information was 
switched in the TLSS dataset and corrected that. However, using GIS information on 
district borders from the Socio-Economic Atlas of Tajikistan (Appendix 2 B), it ap-
peared that still more than 60 PSUs lay outside the borders of the assigned districts or 
even outside of Tajikistan. I sorted PSUs by district and computed the distances of lon-
gitude and latitude from the district mean for each PSU to identify outliers. In a next 
step, I started to look for information on GEO-coordinates of Tajik communities in the 
Internet and found six websites whose information I could combine to identify the cor-
rect GEO-coordinates for PSUs (websites are listed at the end of this Appendix). The 
Tajikistan Water Supply and Sanitation (TajWSS) database includes the up to date list 
of all villages within sub-districts for the whole Republic of Tajikistan. Because village 
and sub-district names in the TLSS are from 2007 and many names have changed in the 
last years, I used the Wikipedia website to retrieve information on past sub-district 
names. In most cases, I was able to map sub-district names from 2007 to present sub-
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 For our empirical analysis, we use several indices that assume the use of low or intermediate level inputs and differ 
with respect to the quality of irrigation infrastructure. 
95
 Due to the new political strategy of the Tajik government to create a nationalist Tajik identity, many village-and 
sub-district-names from former Soviet times (e.g. Karl Marx, Telman or Soviet) were changed to new Tajik names 
(mostly ancient Persian writers, kings or religious figures). 
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district names because in most districts not more than two sub-districts had changed 
names. 
The other four websites contain information on GEO-coordinates of Tajik communities. 
At the longitudestore website the user can enter the name of the community or the 
GEO-coordinates and the website will show the location of the community on google 
maps. GEO-coordinates for points on the map are always displayed. Unfortunately, I 
could not find many PSUs on the website because this website uses completely different 
spellings of Tajik communities (compared with the TLSS and the TajWSS website) and 
only includes very few communities. I mainly used this website to enter GEO-
coordinates of PSUs from the TLSS and check where they are located. I also used this 
website to retrieve GEO-coordinates for a point in the map, where another website 
(mapcarta) reported the village I was searching. The mapcarta includes most villages for 
Tajikistan on its detailed map, but it did not report any GEO-coordinates and used com-
pletely different spellings for communities then the TLSS or the TajWSS website.96 
Thus, I could not search the communities using the search engine at the website. I need-
ed to know in which sub-district (Jamoat) and close to which bigger community (that I 
could find on google maps) the PSU lies to be able to search the PSU in the surround-
ings of this bigger community at the mapcarta website by hand. I retrieved information 
on bigger communities within the sub-district of the PSU from the TajWSS website. 
When I found the PSU at the mapcarta website, I first tried to retrieve its coordinates 
using the geoco website that used the same spellings of community names then the 
mapcarta website. If I could not find the GEO-coordinates of the PSU at the geoco web-
site, I tried to find them at the Islamic Finder website. This website includes the option 
to search for communities in the surrounding of bigger communities and presents the 
detailed GEO-coordinates for listed communities. This website included many commu-
nities that were not included in the geoco website, but did not include all communities. 
Thus, I finally had to use the longitudestore website to retrieve GEO-coordinates by 
hand for the point the mapcarta website indicated as the location of the village of inter-
est. 
I succeeded in retrieving the GEO-coordinates for almost all obviously wrongly located 
PSUs from the TLSS 2007.97 Only for two PSUs I had to use the GEO-coordinates of 
the sub-district center, because I could not find those communities at the mapcarta-
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 As of March 2015, this website now includes the exact GEO-Coordinates of Tajik villages. However, I corrected 
the TLSS GEO-coordinates for PSUs in spring 2013 when the website did not include this information. 
97
 As noted above, I defined outliers by computing the difference of latitude and longitude to the district mean of 
PSUs in the TLSS. I also used district borders and Quantum GIS to infer, if the coordinates lie inside the borders of 
the reported district. 
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website. Due to the low reliability of the location data in the TLSS, I decided to check 
the location information for every single PSU of the 270 PSUs included in the TLSS 
using the procedures described in the last paragraph.98 During these procedures, I rec-
orded old and updated names for PSUs and sub-districts in case they had changed in the 
last decade. This proofed to be important for matching the subsequent datasets with the 
TLSS panel dataset. After having corrected and checked the GEO-coordinates of all 270 
PSUs, I matched the FAO-GAEZ data with the PSUs in the TLSS using the program 
Quantum GIS. 
The second dataset I matched with the TLSS is the Socio-Economic Atlas of Tajikistan, 
which includes many socio-economic variables at the sub-district (Jamoat) level for the 
year 2000 (Appendix 2 B; World Bank 2005). I am very thankful to Cem Mete from the 
World Bank and to Craig Hutton and Andy Murdoch from the GeoData Institute of the 
University of Southampton for providing me with the raw data of the Atlas. The raw 
data for sub-districts is available in GIS format as well as reported for old sub-district 
names in the year 2000. Unfortunately, the GIS information on sub-district borders in 
the Atlas is not reliable and I could not match the sub-districts with PSUs using the cor-
rected GEO coordinates. Instead, I had to match the 270 PSUs from the TLSS to the 
356 sub-districts using the mapping of old and new sub-district names as well as the 
TajWSS website. I succeeded in matching all 270 PSUs to its respective sub-district 
information for the year 2000. 
The next step was to match information on the privatization process per sub-district 
with the TLSS dataset. During a field research stay in Tajikistan, I had obtained detailed 
sub-district-level data on the number of new certificates for small farms (<25 employ-
ees) handed out by the Tajik State Committee for Land and Geodesy (SCLG). I am very 
thankful to Bobojon Yatimov from the World Bank Office in Dushanbe for providing 
me with this data. To match the data with the TLSS, I first had to digitalize the infor-
mation because I was provided with a hard copy. Then I had to match the up to date 
sub-district names from this dataset with the older sub-district names of the 270 PSUs 
from the TLSS. I succeeded in matching all 270 PSUs to their respective sub-district 
using the mapping of old and new sub-district names I had prepared before. Two addi-
tional datasets, which I had also collected during the field research in Tajikistan, contain 
detailed information on the production of and area cultivated with cotton and wheat by 
district (hukumat). I obtained this information during interviews with staff members of 
the National Statistic Agency and the FAO Office in Dushanbe (Appendix 2 B). Again, 
I had to digitalize this information and then matched the data with the TLSS at the dis-
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 I detected another two PSUs with correct GEO-coordinates but wrongly assigned district identifiers. 
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trict level by assigning the district identifier of the TLSS to the new data. I also matched 
the TLSS with information on world prices of cotton and wheat from the IMF as well as 
import and export prices for Tajikistan obtained from the National Statistics Institute. 
Preparing additional statistics for descriptive purposes 
For our empirical analysis, we use further datasets I obtained during the field research in 
Tajikistan (Appendix 2 B). I am indebted to the GIZ Office in Tajikistan that provided 
me with three very valuable micro datasets from surveys conducted by the GIZ in 2011 
and 2013. One datasets contains information from farm heads on the organizational 
structure and the business operations of 253 farms of all sizes in 13 cotton growing dis-
tricts of Tajikistan in 2011. The second dataset reports information on farm characteris-
tics of 4253 farms of all sizes in 51 (out of 58) districts of Tajikistan for the year 2013. 
The third dataset contains information on the personal opinion of district and sub-
district leaders on the agricultural reforms in Tajikistan for the year 2011. I also ob-
tained data on business operations of 135 farms from the FAO for the year 2005. Before 
we could use the information from those four datasets for our empirical analysis, I had 
to clean some inconsistencies and entry errors in the datasets. I also had to merge differ-
ent blocks of variables for the political leader dataset. The do-files for this procedure 
can be requested from the author. 
For descriptive purposes, we also use data on the agricultural sector and the privatiza-
tion process I obtained during interviews with officials from the National Statistics In-
stitute of Tajikistan (Appendix 2 B). This information was provided at hard copies and I 
had to digitalize this data by hand. I also downloaded data on the production and area 
harvested for several crops from the websites of the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) as well as from the FAO. 
Websites used to identify GEO-Coordinates for PSUs: 
Tajikistan Water Supply and Sanitation (TajWSS) Database (2014). Accessible at: 
http://tajwss.tj/site/en/tajwss-data-base2  
Wikipedia information on Jamoats in Tajikistan (2014): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jamoats_of_Tajikistan 
Longitudestore Website: http://www.longitudestore.com/find-coordinates.html 
Mapcarta Website: http://mapcarta.com  
Geoco Website: http://geoco.org 
Islamic Finder Website: http://www.islamicfinder.org 
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3 Transitory income shocks and household behavior: im-
pacts of a cotton export price surge on rural households in 
Tajikistan 
3.1 Introduction 
How do short run income fluctuations due to trade openness affect the behavior of poor 
households in developing countries? Answering this question is crucial for evaluating 
the overall effects of globalization and trade on poverty in developing countries. So far, 
there is a broad consensus among economists that trade openness is beneficial for coun-
tries in the long run. Nonetheless, changes in trade openness have distributional impacts 
that may lead to adverse effects for poor households (Winters et al. 2004). Particularly 
in the short run, changes in trade openness cause adjustment processes and income fluc-
tuations that might have strong impacts for poorer households, especially in developing 
countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007; Attanasio et al. 2004). Although important parts 
of the population in developing countries are strongly exposed to income risk caused by 
world price fluctuations, the literature has, thus far, mainly focused on how households 
in developing countries deal with income risk induced by weather shocks or illness 
(Wolpin 1982, Paxson 1992, Gertler and Gruber 2002).  
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the impact of a surge in the 
world market price of cotton on income and behavioral responses of rural households in 
a developing country, namely Tajikistan. In contrast to many other empirical studies 
that face identification problems due to the endogeneity of trade related income shocks, 
this paper exploits a natural experiment to identify the effects of a positive transitory 
income shock on several dimensions of household behavior. In Tajikistan, around 67 
percent of the working population is employed in agriculture. The most important agri-
cultural product is cotton, which is almost exclusively exported accounting for around 
30 percent of export earnings (FAO 2011). However, Tajikistan exports only around 1 
percent of world cotton exports and is a price taker on world cotton markets. Thus, the 
surge of the world market price for cotton from August 2010 to March 2011 by over 
300 percent, which was triggered by a drought and subsequent cotton import surges in 
China, can be treated as exogenous to Tajikistan (Fig. A3.2, Tab. A3.14). Furthermore, 
within Tajikistan, only specific areas command the climatic and geographic precondi-
tions for cotton growing. The remaining rural areas exclusively produce crops for the 
domestic market and are not affected by cotton price fluctuations. I exploit this geo-
graphic variation in the suitability for cotton production combined with the surge in the 
world market price of cotton to identify the causal effect of cotton prices on rural 
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household income. Using a novel household panel dataset and a difference-in-difference 
estimation, I find that the cotton price shock increased real monthly income of agricul-
tural households in cotton regions by over 70 percent compared to agricultural house-
holds in non-cotton regions.  
Furthermore, this paper investigates how agricultural households responded to this posi-
tive income shock on several dimensions of household behavior. There is a broad litera-
ture that shows to what extent credit constraints in developing countries influence 
household decisions on investments in productive assets and human capital 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Udry 1995, Jacobi and Skoufias 1997, Björkman-
Nyqvist 2013). A positive transitory income shock may be a unique opportunity to cir-
cumvent those credit constraints and increase household investments. Recent literature 
finds that households in developing countries react to such positive transitory income 
shocks by increasing household investments in health and education (Qian 2008, 
Maccini and Yang 2009, Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005, Rose 1999). In addition, Yang 
(2008) finds that increased household income due to a positive shock in remittances 
leads households to enhance entrepreneurial activity and start capital-intensive house-
hold enterprises. This study contributes to the literature by using a natural experiment to 
identify the causal effects of a transitory income shock due to an export price increase 
on household investments in health, education, migration and entrepreneurial activity. 
In addition, this paper adds to a broader literature that discusses the various strategies 
households in developing countries apply to cope with income shocks and to smooth 
household consumption (Besley 1995, Morduch 1995, Townsend 1995, Deaton 1992). 
Due to non-existing or imperfect credit and insurance markets, households in develop-
ing countries create a broad set of behavioral responses to smooth consumption, e.g. by 
depleting and accumulating non-financial assets (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Udry 
1995, Attanasio and Szekely 2004), adjusting labor supply (Kochar 1999) or using re-
mittances as insurance device (Yang 2007). If those coping strategies sufficiently re-
place perfect credit and insurance markets, household consumption should not react to 
(positive or negative) transitory income shocks (Morduch 1995, Townsend 1995). This 
paper focusses on a trade induced positive transitory income shock and identifies its 
causal effects on household consumption and labor supply. In contrast to most of the 
related literature on consumption smoothing, I focus on the impacts of a positive (not a 
negative) transitory income shock. 
Regarding consumption, I find that rural households in Tajikistan cannot fully insure 
against transitory income shocks. Household consumption significantly increases by 29 
log-points in response to the positive income shock. Interestingly, households that have 
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at least one migrant abroad and, thus, can use remittances to insure consumption against 
income shocks do not increase household consumption in response to the shock. House-
holds without migrants significantly increase consumption by 36 log-points. Moreover, 
I find that households with at least one migrant abroad significantly increase the number 
of migrants in response to the positive income shock. These findings indicate that mi-
gration and remittances act as an insurance device for transitory income shocks in de-
veloping countries (Yang and Choi 2007). Furthermore, I find that consumption in non-
food products, durable goods and services increases much stronger than food consump-
tion. The income elasticity of non-food products with respect to the transitory income 
shock is 0.71, whereas the one for food products is only 0.29. This indicates that house-
holds use the positive transitory income shock more for investment or savings related 
disbursements than for simple consumption motives (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, 
Attanasio and Szekely 2004, Yang 2008). Interestingly, the main drivers for the increase 
in non-food consumption are personal care products and beauty services, spending for 
marriage gifts and ceremonies as well as household articles, which are important mar-
riage gifts in Tajikistan. These findings indicate that Tajik households invest parts of the 
positive transitory income shock in creating, stabilizing and extending social relation-
ships that may work as an insurance mechanism in lean times (Grimard 1997). In Tajik-
istan, marriages are an essential social ritual to ensure and stabilize social networks and 
hierarchies in local communities and create new linkages between families (Bloch et al. 
2004, Brown et al. 2011, Danzer 2013).  
Analyzing household investments in human capital, I find some evidence that spending 
for enrolled females increases stronger in reaction to the positive income shock than 
spending for enrolled males (Björkman-Nyqvist 2013). Enrollment of students slightly 
decreases due to the cotton price surge, which could indicate that households use stu-
dent members for working on household farms in harvest times. The impact of the tran-
sitory income shock on health spending is strong and positive. Households increase 
spending per treated member as well as per overall member meaning that health spend-
ing increases at the extensive and the intensive margin. Concerning investments in en-
trepreneurial activity, I find strong increases of labor supply on household and family 
enterprises in reaction to the income shock. The number of household members working 
at family enterprises significantly increases by 0.9, whereas at the intensive margin 
hours worked at entrepreneurial activities do not increase. The probability of at least one 
household member owning a small enterprise increases by 11 percentage points, but is 
not significant. These findings indicate that the positive income shock has been used by 
households to circumvent credit constraints and invest in entrepreneurial activity, in line 
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with findings by Yang (2008). In addition, I find strong positive effects of the transitory 
income shock on investments in migration. The number of foreign migrants per house-
hold increases significantly. However, the probability of having at least one migrant 
abroad does not increase. These results indicate that the fixed costs of international mi-
gration are high. Due to migration networks, households already having a migrant 
abroad face lower fixed costs for an additional migrant and significantly increase the 
number of migrants in reaction to the positive income shock (Massey et al. 1998, Stark 
and Bloom 1985, Görlich and Trebesch 2008). This is in line with the insurance motive 
for remittances (Yang and Choi 2007). For households with no migrants, fixed costs of 
migration are still too high and the income shock was not sufficient to circumvent credit 
constraints. Those households strongly increased consumption in reaction to the income 
shock showing that they do not command of sufficient mechanisms to smooth consump-
tion (Morduch 1995).  
Analyzing labor supply reactions, I find that households facing the cotton price surge 
and enhanced demand for cotton pickers on rural labor markets increase labor supply at 
the extensive margin in agricultural activities. The increase in the supply of agricultural 
workers on rural labor markets is dominated by female agricultural workers. The reason 
is that cotton picking in Tajikistan is highly labor intensive and mostly done by females 
(due to higher dexterity and labor migration of male to Russia). The number of female 
non-agricultural workers per household slightly decreases, but does not explain the 
strong increase in female agricultural workers. The results indicate that agricultural 
households in cotton regions substitute leisure or household production for labor supply 
at local labor markets to take the opportunity of further increasing their household wage 
income. This is in line with the results of Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006), who find that 
rural households in Vietnam increase labor supply at formal labor markets in reaction to 
the price increase for rice. At the intensive margin, households slightly reduce hours 
worked in agriculture, especially for male agricultural workers. Hours worked in non-
agriculture do not change. Thus, I do not find reallocation effects of labor supply be-
tween agriculture and non-agriculture at the intensive margin.  
The article closest to this study is Yang (2008), who investigates the effects of a transi-
tory exchange rate shock on remittances and household income, consumption and in-
vestments in education and entrepreneurial activity for migrant households in the Phil-
ippines. Compared to Yang (2008), this paper has the advantage of using three waves of 
a genuine household panel survey to control for unobserved heterogeneity as well as 
pre-trends in dependent variables. Furthermore, by exploiting an exogenous shock in the 
world market price for cotton, this paper investigates the short term adjustment costs of 
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a transitory income shock due to trade openness for households in a developing country. 
Thus, the paper adds to the literature on trade and poverty and provides insights on short 
term household responses to transitory income shocks caused by trade price changes 
(Winters et al. 2004). 
The remainder of this article is as follows. The second section will introduce some 
background information on the Tajik cotton sector and the cotton price hike in 
2010/2011. The third section will present the data and the empirical methodology. In the 
fourth section, I will present the results and discuss further robustness checks and the 
fifth section will offer concluding remarks. 
3.2 Tajikistan and the cotton sector 
Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia. It is land locked and located between 
Afghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. With a GDP per capita (PPP) of 2216 
USD in in the year 2011, Tajikistan ranked 150 out of 185 countries according to the 
IMF. It is populated by 7.6 million inhabitants and around 67 percent of its working 
population is employed in agriculture, in rural areas this share comes close to 100 per-
cent (FAO 2011). Because agriculture is the least paying sector of this poor economy, 
there is large-scale temporary labor emigration from rural areas to Russia, particularly 
of males who work in the Russian construction industry and other low-skilled occupa-
tions (van Atta 2009, Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010). In 2008, around 33 percent of the 
economically active population was engaged in external labor migration (FAO 2011) 
and remittances accounted for 49.3 percent of the Tajik GDP according to the World 
Bank (in 2011, this share was 46.9 percent). Due to this large-scale labor emigration of 
males, the economically active population in rural areas of Tajikistan mainly consists of 
women (FAO 2011). 
Most of Tajikistan’s territory is hilly or mountainous, making crop production only fea-
sible on around 800 000 hectares or 7 percent of its total land surface (FAO 2011). The 
most important crops grown in Tajikistan are cotton, wheat and vegetables (FAO 2009). 
Cotton is a cash crop that is almost exclusively exported accounting for around 30 per-
cent of Tajik export earnings.99 Cotton is grown on only around one third of the arable 
land, because it relies on specific climatic and geographic preconditions leading to a 
concentration of growing areas in the few flat regions below 1000m above sea level, 
which command irrigation as well as transport infrastructure (Fig. 3.1.). Apart from cot-
                                                 
99
 Only around 3 percent of ginned cotton produced in Tajikistan is sold on domestic markets. After the decline of the 
manufacturing industry due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan is only now trying to establish a textile 
industry (van Atta 2009, Kassam 2011). 
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ton, wheat and vegetables are important crops that are grown on all parts of the arable 
land in Tajikistan. Those crops are predominantly produced for the domestic market, 
whereby wheat production only covers around 50 percent of the domestic demand lead-
ing to a strong dependence on wheat imports from Kazakhstan and other neighboring 
countries (FAO 2011). In Tajikistan, rural labor markets are local and there is no large 
scale labor migration between agricultural districts. This is mainly due to the remote 
territory and the Islamic revival, which impedes women to travel without male family 
members (who are mostly working in Russia). 
Agricultural production in Tajikistan takes place on three types of farms which use 
comparable production techniques and land qualities. During the privatization process, 
state-owned farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) have been split up into bigger collective 
dehkan farms and state owned enterprises (from 20 to over 1000 hectares) as well as 
smaller private family (dehkan) farms (<20 ha).100101 As described in chapter 2.2, col-
lective dehkan farms and state owned enterprises are very similar in their organizational 
structure. They are still heavily intertwined with local governments and rents from cot-
ton production are appropriated by farm managers, cotton ginneries and local elites. 
According to the law, farmers organized in those farms are shareholders of the farm and 
free to opt out to found own private farms using their respective land shares. However, 
in reality strong dependencies due to credit constraints, social norms and political pres-
sure exist that tie those shareholders to the big farms and their managers. In addition, in 
many districts of Tajikistan, cotton production quotas are still enforced by local gov-
ernments to ensure a steady supply of raw cotton for rent appropriation. Although exist-
ing small private family farms also have to comply with cotton quotas to some degree, 
they command more freedom over production and investment decisions on their land 
than shareholders on bigger collective dehkan farms (Sattar and Mohib 2006, World 
Bank 2012). Less political interference and better defined land titles on small private 
dehkan farms may explain why there are no productivity differences between the two 
farm types, in spite of possibly larger effects of scale on bigger collective farms (chapter 
2.2).  
On world markets for cotton, Tajikistan is a small producer accounting for only about 1 
percent of world cotton exports. Thus, the world market price for cotton can be treated 
as exogenous to Tajikistan. From August 2010 to March 2011, the world market price 
                                                 
100
 As shown in chapter two, the share of arable land cropped by (private and collective) dehkan farms and state 
owned enterprises did not change significantly over the last years. The split up of larger collective dehkan farms into 
smaller private dehkan farms mainly took place until 2009 and decelerated from 2009 until 2011. In the last chapter, I 
show that our results are robust to controlling for the privatization process at the sub-district level. 
101
 In Tajikistan, household plots are another agricultural production unit, but they solely produce food for subsist-
ence consumption and local markets (FAO 2009). 
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for cotton increased by over 300 percent, which was triggered by a drought and subse-
quent cotton import surges in China (Fig. A3.2, Tab. A3.14). This surge in the world 
market price directly affected the FOB export price for Tajik cotton leading to an in-
crease in the area cropped with cotton by around 26 percent in the year 2011 (Fig. 
A3.3). Due to the high relative price for cotton in the harvest of 2010 and the sowing 
season of 2011 (January until March), all farm types located in cotton regions of Tajiki-
stan had increased the area cropped with cotton and decreased the area cropped with 
wheat and other crops (FAO 2011, Fig. A3.4 and A3.5). Because harvesting cotton is 
much more labor intensive than harvesting of wheat or vegetables, the labor demand for 
harvest workers in 2011 significantly increased on all farm types. In chapter two, my 
co-author and I showed that due to political interference and coerced labor on big col-
lective dehkan farms, this increase in harvest labor demand only led to rising picking 
wages on small private dehkan farms, but not on bigger collective farms. We found that 
real wages per hour increased by around 93 percent on small private farms due to the 
price shock, whereas wages on big collective farms did not change. Because the over-
whelming majority of the economically active population in rural areas is female and 
they have a comparative advantage in cotton picking (due to higher dexterity), it is al-
most exclusively women that pick cotton in Tajikistan. Consistent with this fact, we find 
that harvest wages only increased for female agricultural workers, not for male ones. 
Interestingly, small private farms do not only hire family members, but also landless 
female workers from local villages. Thus, the export price increase did not only benefit 
small holders and their families, but also poor landless females from local villages that 
lack other income opportunities. However, we also find strong positive effects of the 
price shock on profits of mostly male managers on big farms as well as smaller increas-
es for owners of small farms.  
Building on those insights on the labor market effects of the export price shock, in this 
paper, I will analyze the impact of the positive transitory income shock for rural house-
holds in cotton regions on several dimension of household behavior. The central ques-
tion for the empirical strategy of this paper is to define an adequate treatment and con-
trol group of households. I apply various reasonable categorizations that I will present 
along with the dataset in the next section. 
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3.3 Data and empirical strategy 
3.3.1 Data 
The dataset I use in this paper is based on the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey 
(TLSS) conducted by the World Bank and UNICEF in 2007 and 2009 and a follow up 
survey for 2011 conducted by the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies 
(IOS). The three waves of this representative household panel survey were all conduct-
ed in harvest time of each year (September-November), so that I have comparable 
measures of harvest time household income, expenditures, labor market participation of 
household members and various other household characteristics. In 2007, 4860 house-
holds living in 270 primary sampling units (PSUs) in Tajikistan were interviewed (18 
households per PSU). This sample was reduced to only 167 PSUs and 9 households per 
PSU resulting in 1503 revisited households in 2009 and 2011 (Danzer et al. 2013). In 
the analysis, I will only include households living in the 167 PSUs that were revisited in 
2009 and 2011.102 
The data I obtained from the World Bank and the IOS was quite erroneous regarding 
individual and household identifiers across waves. Thus, to be able to correctly aggre-
gate individual level variables within households and to link them across waves, I had to 
apply extensive cleaning procedures that are described in Appendix 2 E. In addition, the 
single modules of the raw data on household income and expenditures as well as on 
education, health and migration of household members had to be cleaned and merged 
internally before it was possible to connect them to the individual level dataset, which I 
had already constructed for the research presented in the last chapter.103 After applying 
all these corrections, I constructed the final household level panel dataset for this study 
by aggregating over individuals within households. The final dataset contains 3050 
households, whereby 1345 households appear in all three waves in 2007, 2009 and 
2011. 158 households only appear in 2007 and 2009, 114 households only in 2007 and 
2011 and 45 households only in 2011. This is due to the fact that in 2011, 159 house-
holds could not be located by the interviewers and were replaced by 114 reserve house-
holds in the respective PSU from 2007 and 45 newly sampled households.104 Further-
                                                 
102
 As noted in Appendix 2 E, I conducted robustness checks including those 103 PSUs and results of the last chapter 
and also of this chapter do not change. 
103
 The most serious issue was that missing values were coded differently across modules and waves. Sometimes they 
were coded as 99, 999, 9999, as “.” or as negative values. Another issue was that remittances in 2007 were apparently 
reported in USD by some interviewers and in Somoni by others (but this was not explicitly indicated in the dataset). 
The applied cleaning procedure is described in Appendix 3 B. 
104
 As noted in Appendix 2 E, after cleaning the data set the number of households only in the dataset in 2007 and 
2009 was reduced to 158 and the number of households in 2011 increased to 1504. 
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more, due to the reduction of the survey sample from 18 to 9 households per PSU in 
2009 and 2011, 1388 households only appear in 2007. Although those sample adjust-
ments were carefully conducted to prevent selection issues (Danzer et al. 2013, World 
Bank 2010), I present robustness checks in the Appendix that show that those sample 
adjustments are indeed random conditional on our independent variables and that they 
do not change our main results (Tab. A3.26, A3.27).105 
3.3.2 Empirical strategy 
The identification strategy of this paper exploits Tajikistan’s geographic variation in the 
suitability for cotton production combined with the surge in the world market price of 
cotton in 2010/2011 to identify the causal effects of cotton prices on income and behav-
ioral responses of rural households. The baseline approach uses the 2007 community 
survey that was conducted alongside the TLSS to classify the 167 primary sampling 
units (PSUs) into cotton and non-cotton PSUs. PSUs in which cotton was reported as 
the first or second most important crop, are defined as cotton communities. Non-cotton 
communities are all remaining PSUs which are predominantly characterized by agricul-
tural production (Fig. 3.1 and Table A3.15 and Table A3.16). 
As expected, cotton PSUs are characterized by lower altitude, better connectivity to 
federal or district capitals and by better infrastructure (roads, irrigation) than non-cotton 
PSUs while population size and school enrolment do not differ significantly (Table 
A3.17). In the main empirical specification, I include district dummies as well as prov-
ince-year dummies and in robustness checks I also control for sub-district and commu-
nity level variables pre-shock in 2007 (Table A3.20).106 For further robustness checks, I 
also use three additional definitions for cotton communities using external GIS data 
from (i) the FAO GAEZ data base (FAO 2013), (ii) the World Bank (World Bank 2005) 
as well as (iii) a definition based on altitudes below 1000m sea level. In addition, I de-
fine cotton communities at the district level, whereby all communities in a cotton dis-
trict are defined as cotton communities.107 
                                                 
105
 To be precise, solely the reduction of the number of households per PSU from 18 to 9 seems to have affected our 
control group somewhat more than the treatment group. However, this reduction of the sample was the most carefully 
conducted one (World Bank 2010). In addition, excluding those households dropping out of the sample after 2007 
does not change our results. Results also do not change, if I exclude each of the other sub-groups of households that 
are not in the dataset in all waves (Tab. A3.26, A3.27). 
106
 Tajikistan comprises 5 provinces (Oblasts), 58 districts (Hukumats/Raions) and 406 sub-districts (Jamoats). I 
decided not to control for the additional community and sub-district level variables in the main regression, because 
unfortunately some of those variables are not available for all PSUs. 
107
 For a detailed description of the different cotton community and cotton district definitions, see chapter 2.2. For all 
those different treatment definitions for cotton communities, the main results of this paper hold. Results are not 
shown here, but can be requested from the author. In chapter two, I show that the effects of the cotton price shock on 
wages are highly robust to using any of those other treatment definitions for cotton communities. 
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Because of the cotton price spike in 2010/2011 and the increased harvest labor demand 
in 2011, harvest wages for agricultural workers increased strongly in cotton growing 
communities in 2011 (see chapter 2). Thus, I expect household income for agricultural 
households in cotton communities (treatment group) to increase from 2009 until 2011 
relative to the agricultural households in non-cotton communities (control group). In the 
baseline, I define an agricultural household as a household, where at least one member 
is working in agriculture. The main driver for increased household income of the treat-
ment group should be household wage income. From 2007 to 2009, cotton prices and 
wages slightly decreased and I expect a negative or no effect on household income of 
the treatment group relative to the control group (see chapter 2). To control for selection 
effects, I will also include non-agricultural households in the estimation by using a Dif-
in-Dif-in-Dif estimator. Non-agricultural households are defined as households with at 
least one member working in non-agricultural activities, but no one working in agricul-
ture. I will present various robustness checks for these definitions of agricultural and 
non-agricultural households in Table A3.20.108 
I will estimate the following linear model for all households with at least one working 
member using OLS: ln(HH	income))*= α + β(cottonPSU × year09) + β7(cottonPSU × year11)+ β9cottonPSU + β:year09 + β;year11 + βC(agriHH × year09)+ βE(agriHH × year11) +	βF(agriHH × cottonPSU) + 	βGagriHH+	βH(cottonPSU × year09 × agriHH)+	β(cottonPSU × year11 × agriHH) +	X)*=γ + τ+	u)*																													(1) 
for household i at time t. 
The dependent variable is the contemporary log of real household income per month for 
household i in year t. Since regional CPIs are unavailable, I deflate income by national 
CPI and control for province-year dummies (which also pick up other differential time 
trends across provinces, e.g. GDP growth or weather shocks). CottonPSU is a dummy 
that indicates whether the PSU/community is a cotton growing community or not and 
agriHH is a dummy that turns one for an agricultural household and zero for a non-
agricultural household. I interact the year dummy for 2011 (year11) with the dummy for 
                                                 
108
 For example, I exclude households containing agricultural as well as non-agricultural workers from the treatment 
group, I define agricultural households as households with at least 2 members working in agriculture or I include 
households without any member working as non-agricultural households (TableA3.20). 
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cotton PSU and the agricultural household dummy to capture the effect of the rising 
cotton price on income of the treatment group (β11) in the year 2011. The coefficient β10 
tests whether the income growth between cotton and non-cotton agricultural households 
differed already in the pre-price hike period from 2007 to 2009. In addition, the dum-
mies for the years 2009 and 2011, the cotton PSU dummy, the agricultural household 
dummy and their remaining interactions are included separately. The vector of control 
variables X includes household size, the age of the household head, the share of house-
hold members with age below 17, the share of members already retired as well as dum-
my variables for the household head being married, being single, being female, having 
secondary education, having higher education and three dummy variables for the occu-
pational group of the household head.109 I also include dummies that indicate in which 
decile of the household income distribution the household was located in 2007. To con-
trol for time invariant institutional and other characteristics of the 58 districts, I also 
include district fixed effects τ in the model. Because interviews were conducted over the 
harvest time period of 3 months and many variables including wage income are reported 
for the last month, I control for the month of the interview in every specification. Stand-
ard errors are clustered at the PSU/community level throughout all specifications. 
As shown in chapter two, only harvest wages of female agricultural workers increased 
in reaction to the cotton price surge. Thus, I would expect that household income should 
only increase in agricultural households with at least one female working. To investi-
gate this I will split the sample into households with at least one female member work-
ing and households with only male members working and estimate the described speci-
fication for each sub sample separately.110 Furthermore, I will also use various 
continuous treatment definitions to check for the robustness of the man specification. 
Instead of the agricultural household dummy, I will use the share of agricultural work-
ers, the number of male and the number of female agricultural workers per household. 
Moreover, because only agricultural wages for women on small private farms had in-
creased due to the cotton price surge, I will estimate the main specification only for ag-
ricultural households and replace the agricultural household dummy with a dummy for 
containing at least one female working on a small private farm. Again, I will also use a 
continuous treatment definition by replacing the dummy with the number of females 
working on a small private farm per household. However, due to the fact that in chapter 
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 For household income as dependent variable, I include the number of migrants in the measure for household size. 
For other dependent variables, household size only comprises household members living in Tajikistan. 
110
 As robustness check, I will also look at households with at least two female members working (Table A3.20). 
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two we also found strong increases of profits for male owners on big and small farms, I 
will prefer the main specification throughout this paper.111 
Because there is no measure for monthly household income in the dataset, I had to con-
struct this variable making different kinds of assumptions that are discussed in Appen-
dix 3 B. In the main specification, monthly household income comprises wage income 
last month plus last bonuses and average monthly in kind payments, average monthly 
remittances, social benefits paid last month, average monthly household income from 
other sources as well as a monthly average of net household transfers. In Table A3.20, I 
show regression results for other measures of household income, e.g. excluding in kind 
payments or using a monthly average for social benefits and bonuses instead of the 
amounts paid last month. Because 286 of our 6012 household-year observations report 
zero household income, I impute wages and remittances for those 286 households and 
check if the results are robust to using the imputed measure of household income (Table 
A3.20).112 I also check, if including the households with zero income by using 
log(1+income) changes the results (Table A3.20). 
Besides income, I will use many other dependent variables to investigate the effects of 
the transitory income shock on several dimensions of household behavior. In most of 
these specifications, I will estimate a reduced form model using OLS, where I include 
the same set of explanatory variables as described above.113 Thus, I will analyze the 
impact of the cotton price surge on those other dependent variables for agricultural 
households in cotton PSUs (treatment group) compared to agricultural households in 
non-cotton PSUs (control group). In addition, I will use a Two-Stage-Least-Square 
(2SLS) instrumental variable model to estimate the elasticity of household consumption 
with respect to household income for different product groups. In this specification, I 
will instrument the independent variable nominal household income using the interac-
tion of the cotton PSU dummy with the agricultural household dummy and the year 
2011 dummy as external instrument.  
In the Appendix Table A3.18 and A3.19, I present descriptive statistics for the control 
and the treatment group. Table A3.19 presents the means of all dependent and inde-
pendent variables for the control and the treatment group in the year 2007. Using un-
                                                 
111
 The main specification includes all households with at least one member working, whereby owners of the farms 
reported themselves working (as managers/owners). This specification includes 5214 households and, thus, another 
advantage for preferring this specification compared to only including the 1983 agricultural households is efficiency.  
112
 I only impute wages for household members that were working, but did not report a wage. Accordingly, I only 
impute remittances for households with migrants that did not report remittances. The detailed imputation procedure 
can be found in Appendix 3 B.  
113
 For dependent variables that are weighted by household size, I will exclude the independent variable household 
size. In case the weighting is by oxford scales, I will additionally exclude the shares of young and old household 
members.  
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paired T-tests, I also test, whether there are significant differences between the control 
and the treatment group. Apparently, there is no significant difference in household in-
come for control and treatment group. Interestingly, the treatment group purchases more 
food on markets, whereas the control group shows a larger total food consumption 
meaning that those households produce more food in subsistence farming. Monthly 
spending in education and health as well as school enrollment do not differ significant-
ly. The share of migrant households and the number of migrants is significantly higher 
in the agricultural households in non-cotton PSUs, whereas the number of workers and 
agricultural workers, the share of female agricultural workers as well as hours worked 
per worker are significantly higher in agricultural households in cotton PSUs. House-
hold characteristics do not differ significantly between treatment and control group, 
except the share of young members, which is higher in the treatment group, and the 
share of old members, which is higher in the control group. Regarding PSU and sub-
district level characteristics, results are similar to the ones shown in Tables A3.15 - 
A3.17.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Income 
In a first step, I present the results for the main specification and the dependent variable 
log of real household income in Table 3.1. For the overall sample (column 1), I find that 
due to the cotton price surge in 2010/2011 real household income increases by 29 log-
points in agricultural households in cotton PSUs (treatment group) compared to agricul-
tural households in non-cotton PSUs (control group). In the period of stable cotton 
world market prices from 2007 until 2009, there was no differential trend in household 
income between the control and the treatment group. Because women perform most of 
the cotton harvesting activities in Tajikistan, household income should have mainly in-
creased in households with women working. As expected, the treatment effect of the 
cotton price surge on household income is most pronounced for the subsample of 
households with at least one female member working (col. 3). For these households, 
real household income increases by 61 log-points compared to the control group and the 
effect is significant at the 1 percent level. For households with no female working (col. 
2), I find no significant effects of the cotton price surge on household income.  
To check for the robustness of the main specification presented in Table 3.1, I test for 
different kinds of treatment definitions in Table 3.2. In the first column, I use the same 
specification than in column 3 of Table 3.1, but I replace the agricultural household 
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dummy by the share of agricultural workers per household. In Columns 2 and 3, I in-
clude all households and replace the share of agricultural workers by the number of 
male and female agricultural workers, respectively. These continuous treatment defini-
tions render very similar results compared to the main specification. If the share of agri-
cultural workers increases by 10 percentage points, real household income significantly 
increases by 6.1 log-points after the cotton price surge in 2011, but not before in 2009 
(col. 1). In columns 2 and 3, the results indicate that this increase is exclusively due to 
female agricultural workers. The number of female agricultural workers has a signifi-
cant and strong positive effect on household income after the cotton price spike, where-
as before the price shock the effect is even slightly negative. The number of male agri-
cultural workers has no significant effect on household income after the cotton price 
spike. In columns 4 and 5, I only include agricultural households and replace the agri-
cultural household dummy with a dummy for containing at least one female working on 
a small private farm (col. 4) and with the number of females working on small private 
farms per household (col. 5). As expected from the results of the last chapter, the in-
come increases for agricultural households due to the cotton price shock are mainly 
driven by females working on small private farms.  
Although it is reassuring that the results are robust to other treatment definitions and 
consistent with the findings of chapter two, I will use the main specification from Table 
1 column 3 throughout this paper. For this specification, I conduct additional robustness 
checks for the discrete definition of an agricultural household, for the definition of a 
household with females working and for various other measures of the dependent varia-
ble real monthly household income (Tab. A3.20). In column 6 of Table A3.20, I addi-
tionally include pre-shock control variables at the PSU and the sub-district level and in 
column 7 I add dummy variables for each household. The results are very robust to all 
these changes of the specification.114  
Due to the results of the last chapter, I expect that the main driver for the increased 
household income of the treatment group is household wage income. In Table 3.3, I 
present the results for the effects of the cotton price surge on different sources of house-
hold income using the sub-sample of households with at least one female working. It is 
evident that household wage income is the main driver for the increased household in-
come due to the cotton price shock. Wage income increases by 70 log-points and the 
effect is significant at the 1 percent level. The other sources of income do not show sig-
nificant increases for the treatment group compared to the control group in 2011. Solely 
                                                 
114
 Solely including household dummies strongly reduces the degrees of freedom and leads to insignificant coeffi-
cients. However, the size of the treatment effect is still in the same ballpark.  
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household transfers received increase significantly by 185 log-points. However, only 
266 household-year observation show non-zero transfers meaning that for the whole 
sample transfers cannot explain the significant increase of household income in the 
treatment group compared to the control group in 2011. Hence, I conclude that the 
treatment effect in column 1 is the causal effect of the world cotton price surge on real 
household income of the treatment group. 
3.4.2 Consumption of food, durable goods and services 
In the next step, I analyze the impact of the increased household income on consump-
tion of several food and non-food product groups. As described above, I first employ a 
reduced form model based on the main specification, where I replace the dependent 
variable log of real income by log of consumption spending. Second, I use a Two-
Stage-Least-Square (2SLS) instrumental variable model to estimate the elasticity of 
household consumption with respect to household income. In this specification, I will 
instrument the independent variable nominal household income using the interaction of 
the cotton PSU, the agricultural household and the year 2011 dummy as external in-
strument.115 Columns 1-4 in Table 3.4 present the results of the reduced form estimation 
for purchased food products, consumed food products (purchased plus self-produced 
food and in kind payments in food), non-food consumption and total consumption. Col-
umns 5-8 present the results for the 2SLS instrumental variable approach. As mentioned 
above, because the exogenous cotton price surge only affected the income of house-
holds with at least one female working, I will only use this subsample for the rest of the 
paper. 
Columns 1 and 2 show that the rise in household income by 61 log-points (col. 3 of Tab. 
3.1) results in a slight increase of food purchased and food consumed by 20 and 21 log-
points, respectively. These effects correspond to income elasticities of 0.27 and 0.29, 
respectively, but the elasticities are not significantly different from zero (col. 5 and 6). 
In contrast, the consumption of non-food items strongly increases by 50 log-points lead-
ing to a rise in total consumption by 29 log-points (both coefficients are significant at 
the 5 percent level). The income elasticity for non-food products is 0.71 and significant 
at the 5 percent level (col. 7). Hence, it is evident that households in Tajikistan cannot 
fully insure consumption against transitory income shocks. Moreover, in response to the 
positive transitory income shock, households increase their consumption in possibly 
investment and savings related non-food products more than consumption of food. 
Hence, households might have used the positive income shock for accumulating non-
                                                 
115
 Due to efficiency reasons, I use the imputed measure for household income Table A3.20 column 10. 
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financial assets to insure against future negative income shocks (Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin 1993, Attanasio and Szekely 2004).  
To further investigate the underlying consumption patterns, I estimate the reduced form 
equation for 7 food product (Tab. 3.5) and 13 non-food product categories (Tab. 3.6). 
The results in Table 3.5 indicate that households took advantage of the positive income 
shock and increased the consumption of fruits and sweets by 51 and 61 log-points, re-
spectively. In Tajikistan, a large share of those products is imported and households 
used the increased wage income to purchase those products on the local markets (FAO 
2009, 2011; Tab. A3.22). It seems that Tajik households mainly adjust consumption in 
those two product groups to smooth consumption of the remaining food items. In the 
presence of a positive transitory income shock, consumption of fruits and sweets strong-
ly increases, whereas consumption of other food items does not change. This indicates 
that in Tajikistan fruits and sweets are not considered as basic necessities and their con-
sumption is highly elastic to income changes (Tab. A3.23).116 Due to the increased con-
sumption of fruits, the income shock may have longer lasting positive effects on the 
health of household members through increased vitamin supply. 
Regarding the consumption of non-food product groups, I find very interesting effects 
depicted by Table 3.6. The main drivers for the increase in non-food consumption are 
personal care products and beauty services (col. 1), spending for marriage gifts and cer-
emonies (col. 13) as well as household articles (col. 7), which are important marriage 
gifts in Tajikistan (e.g. dishes, household linens, kitchen utensils and household hand 
tools). Due to the positive income shock, household consumption of those three sub-
categories significantly increases by 48, 101 and 89 log-points, respectively.117 These 
findings indicate that Tajik households invest parts of the positive transitory income 
shock in arranging and celebrating marriages as well as in other social ceremonies. In 
Tajikistan, marriages are an essential social ritual to ensure and stabilize social networks 
and hierarchies in local communities and create new linkages between families (Bloch 
et al. 2004, Brown et al. 2011, Danzer 2013). Thus, the results indicate that Tajik 
households invest parts of the positive transitory income shock in creating, stabilizing 
and extending social relationships that may work as an insurance mechanism in lean 
times (Grimard 1997).  
                                                 
116
 Table A3.23 presents the estimation of the income elasticities of consumption for the seven food product groups. 
117
 In Table A3.24, I present the IV estimates for the income elasticities of consumption for the 13 non-food product 
groups. Due to smaller sample size and low values for the partial F-Test, some of these estimates should be taken 
with cautiousness. 
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To investigate the effects of the positive income shock on poverty and to make my re-
sults comparable to the development literature, I apply a standard methodology used in 
this literature and weight overall consumption in food and non-food products by oxford 
scales.118 Using these weighted variables as dependent variables in the reduced form 
estimation, gives very similar results compared to the results on consumption presented 
above (Tab. A3.21).119 Weighted total household consumption significantly increases 
by 29 log-points due to the positive income shock. Thus, poverty as measured by 
weighted household consumption is strongly reduced in households that are affected by 
the positive transitory income shock.  
3.4.3 Migration 
To analyze the effects of the positive income shock on investments in migration, I esti-
mate the reduced form equation using an indicator for having at least one migrant 
abroad, the number and the share of migrants per household as dependent variables 
(Tab. 3.7 col. 1-3). I find strong positive and significant effects of the positive transitory 
income shock on the number and the share of foreign migrants per household. The 
number of migrants increases by 0.36 and the share of migrants by 5 percentage points 
(significant at 5 percent level). Before the cotton price shock from 2007 until 2009, the 
number and the share of migrants per household did not increase in the treatment rela-
tive to the control group. Interestingly, the probability of having at least one migrant 
abroad does not increase due to the positive income shock. These results indicate that 
for Tajik households the fixed costs of international migration are high. Due to migra-
tion networks, households already having a migrant abroad face lower fixed costs for an 
additional migrant and significantly increase the number of migrants in reaction to the 
positive income shock (Massey et al. 1998, Stark and Bloom 1985, Görlich and 
Trebesch 2008). For households with no migrants, fixed costs of migration are still too 
high and the income shock was not sufficient to circumvent credit constraints and start 
sending household members abroad. Table A3.25 supports this argument by showing 
that household income increased due to the cotton price shock for both, households with 
and without migrants, by the same amount. 
                                                 
118
 The weight for a household is computed by allocating 1 to the first adult, 0.7 to any other adult and 0.5 to each 
children and then summing up over all household members.  
119
 I do not use the results for the weighted consumption measures as main results, because the weighted consumption 
measure implicitly contains the independent variables household size and number of young household members. 
Thus, I have to exclude those variables from the right hand side. This is problematic for the IV estimation, because it 
reduces the strength of the instruments and may introduce omitted variable bias (if other independent variables are 
correlated with household size or the number of young household members).  
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Furthermore, I find very interesting evidence that migrant households use remittances to 
insure consumption against income shocks (Yang and Choi 2007). I split the sample of 
households affected by the income shock into households with at least one migrant and 
households without migrants and estimate the consumption equation for each sub-
sample separately. I find that households without migrants strongly increase the con-
sumption of food and non-food products in reaction to the positive income shock (Tab. 
3.7 col. 7-9, Tab. A3.25 col. 3). This shows that they do not command of sufficient 
mechanisms to smooth consumption (Morduch 1995). In contrast, households with at 
least one migrant abroad do not increase household consumption in response to the 
positive income shock (Tab. 3.7 col. 4-6, Table A3.25 col. 6). Moreover, those house-
holds use the rising income to significantly increase the number of migrants. In line 
with the insurance motive for remittances, those additional migrants and their remit-
tances may act as an insurance device for negative transitory income shocks in the fu-
ture (Yang and Choi 2007). 
3.4.4 Education and health 
In a next step, I investigate the effects of the positive income shock on household in-
vestments in education and health. Table 3.8 shows the results of the positive income 
shock on the enrollment of school children and students per household, whereby I dif-
ferentiate between male and female members. Controlling for the number of household 
members in enrollment age (6-30 years), the total number of enrolled household mem-
bers decreases by 0.26 due the shock, but the coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero (column 1).120 There is no major difference between male and female mem-
bers (col. 2, 3). Looking at enrollment of school children vs. students, it seems that the 
decrease in enrollment is mainly driven by a decrease in student enrollment (col. 4-9). 
This could indicate that households use student members for working on household 
farms in harvest times or that students have to join the cotton harvest on bigger collec-
tive farms. However, the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero. 
Another interesting insight from Table 3.8 is that the number of male children has a 
stronger effect on school enrollment of males (89 log-points) than the number of female 
children on school enrollment of females (80 log-points). Thus, the share of male school 
enrollment is higher than the share of female school enrollment throughout the whole 
sample (a fact also corroborated by Table A3.19). This is also true for student enroll-
                                                 
120
 Instead of using enrollment shares as dependent variables, I include the number of household members in the 
respective enrollment age as independent variable. Because this variable is strongly correlated with household size, 
using enrollment shares as dependent variable could lead to severe endogeneity issues. However, using enrollment 
shares as dependent variables does not strongly change the results. The tables for these estimations can be requested 
from the author. 
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ment. However, I find no evidence that the positive income shock increased school en-
rollment, neither for male nor for female children (Qian 2008, Björkman-Nyqvist 2013).  
In Table A3.9, I investigate whether monthly household spending in education was af-
fected by the positive income shock. Although the coefficient estimates for the treat-
ment effects are not significantly different from zero at standard significance levels, I 
still find interesting patterns regarding differential treatment of boys and girls. Total 
monthly spending for education of females increases due to the positive income shock 
by 28 log-points (col. 3), whereas spending for education of males only increases by 17 
log-points (col. 2). Even more pronounced are the effects per enrolled members. Spend-
ing on education per female member increases by 35 log-points due to the income 
shock, but decreased before the price shock in the treatment compared to the control 
group (col. 6). Spending per enrolled male is almost not affected by the positive income 
shock (col. 5). The same pattern also appears, when I look at spending for school chil-
dren (col. 7-8) or spending for students (col. 9-10). Due to the positive income shock, 
spending for female school children and for female students increases by 29 and 124 
log-points, respectively. Spending for male school children slightly decreases by 15 log-
points due to the price shock, whereas spending for male students increases not half as 
strongly as for female students. These findings are in line with results of Björkman-
Nyqvist (2013), who reports for households in Uganda that negative income shocks lead 
to a stronger decrease in resources allocated to the education of girls than to the educa-
tion of boys. Households smooth consumption by varying resources allocated to the 
education of girls and mainly shelter resources allocated to the education of boys. I find 
that in the presence of a positive income shock households seem to use the available 
resources to positively adjust the spending for the education of girls. Regarding fertility 
and health status, this effect has been shown by Rose (1999) and Maccini and Yang 
(2009). They find that in reaction to a positive income shock households increase their 
spending for the nutrition and nurturing of girls more than for boys.  
Regarding household investments in health, I find strong increases in spending on 
health due to the positive income shock (Table 3.10). Total spending for the treatment 
of ill household members increases by 53 log-points due to the positive income shock, 
whereas before the shock there was no differential trend between the treatment and the 
control group (col. 1). Due to many households showing zero health spending, the sam-
ple size for this regression reduces to 1036 households leading to insignificance of the 
treatment effect. However, I find a strong and significant positive treatment effect on 
spending for ambulatory medical assistance of 122 log-points (col. 2). Households seem 
to use the additional resources due to the positive income shock to send more members 
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to ambulatory care, but also to increase the spending per treated member (col. 4-6). Alt-
hough the effects are not significant due to the small sample size, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is large. Because I control for province-year dummies, seasonal effects and 
many household characteristics, I assume that the number of ill household members 
conditional on the covariates does not change in time and between the treatment and the 
control group. Thus, the increased spending for ambulatory care reflects a better medi-
cal treatment of ill household members due to the positive income shock. This enhanced 
medical treatment of ill household members may lead to a shorter period of illness. In-
deed, I find that the number of hours household members were not able to work during 
the last month because of illness decreased due the positive income shock (col. 10).121 
Regarding spending for hospitalization, I find no effects in response to the positive in-
come shock (col. 7-9).  
3.4.5 Entrepreneurial activity 
To investigate how the positive income shock has affected entrepreneurial activity of 
rural households in Tajikistan, I estimate the reduced form equation using a dummy for 
owning a family enterprise, the number of workers and hours worked in that enterprise 
as dependent variables (Table 3.11). I find that the probability of owning a family enter-
prise increases by 11 percentage points in response to the positive income shock, but the 
effect is not significant at standard levels of significance (col. 1). However, I find that 
households that already own a family enterprise significantly increase the number of 
workers engaged in entrepreneurial activities by 0.9 due to the positive income shock 
(col. 2). At the intensive margin, hours worked in the family enterprise do not increase, 
if I control for the number of household members working there (col. 3). Thus, I only 
find weak evidence that households in Tajikistan use the positive income shock to start 
new enterprises (Yang 2008). However, entrepreneurial activities within existing family 
enterprises significantly increase due to the shock.  
3.4.6 Labor supply 
Finally, I analyze the effects of the cotton price surge and the enhanced demand for cot-
ton pickers on the labor supply decisions of households (Tab. 3.12, 3.13). I find that 
households in cotton PSUs significantly increase labor supply in agricultural activities 
at the extensive margin by 0.5 workers compared to non-cotton PSUs in 2011 (Tab. 
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 This variable was not included in the TLSS 2009. Thus, I can only look at changes from 2007 until 2011. 
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3.12 col. 2).122 This increase is dominated by female agricultural workers (col. 5, 8). 
The reason is that cotton picking in Tajikistan is mostly done by females (due to higher 
dexterity and labor migration of male to Russia). The number of female non-agricultural 
workers per household slightly decreases by 0.14, but does not explain the strong signif-
icant increase in female agricultural workers by 0.3 (col. 5, 6). The number of males 
working in non-agricultural activities does not change in response to the shock (col. 9). 
The results indicate that, at the extensive margin, agricultural households in cotton re-
gions substitute leisure or household production for labor supply on local labor markets 
to take the opportunity of further increasing their household wage income. This is in 
line with the results of Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006), who find that rural households in 
Vietnam increase labor supply at formal labor markets in reaction to the price increase 
for rice. 
Regarding child labor, I find no significant effects of the cotton price shock on the 
number of children working, although the coefficient for the treatment effect is positive 
(col. 10, 11). The probability of sending household member to other farms for harvest-
ing activities increases by 10 percentage points due to the shock, although the effect is 
not significantly different from zero (col. 12).123 At the intensive margin, households 
slightly reduce hours worked in agriculture, especially for male agricultural workers 
(Tab. 3.13 col. 7-12).124 However, the coefficients are not significantly different from 
zero. Hours worked in non-agriculture do not change (col. 10, 12). Thus, I do not find 
reallocation effects of labor supply between agriculture and non-agriculture at the inten-
sive margin. The insignificant decrease in hours worked by male workers could be in-
terpreted as weak evidence for an income effect, i.e. the positive income shock may 
have led to a reduction in labor supply of males at the intensive margin (col. 3, 11). Be-
cause I use the log of hours worked as dependent variable, households with zero hours 
worked drop out of the sample and this may lead to a selection bias in the estimation. 
To address this issue, I estimate quantile regressions for the first, second and third quar-
tile of the dependent variable hours worked using the same independent variables as in 
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 I use a Dif-in-Dif and not the Dif-in-Dif-in-Dif specification here, because the dummy for an agricultural house-
hold would be endogenous to the number of agricultural workers as dependent variable. For comparability, I use this 
specification for all dependent variables in Table 3.12. The same applies to columns 7-13 in Table 3.13.  
123
 This variable does not appear in the TLSS 2009 and, hence, I can only look at the change from 2007 to 2011. 
124
 Instead of using log of hours worked per respective worker as dependent variable, I use log of hours worked for 
the whole household as dependent variable and include the number of respective workers as independent variable. 
Because the number of workers is strongly correlated with household size, using log of hours worked per worker as 
dependent variables leads to severe endogeneity problems. 
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the reduced form estimation. The results are shown in Table A3.28 in the Appendix and 
support the results shown here.125 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper exploits a natural experiment to identify the effects of a transitory income 
shock due to trade openness on several dimensions of household behavior for rural 
households in Tajikistan. Although important parts of the population in developing 
countries are strongly exposed to income risk caused by world price fluctuations (Win-
ters et al. 2004, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007), the literature has, thus far, mainly focused 
on how households in developing countries deal with income risk induced by weather 
shocks or illness (Wolpin 1982, Paxson 1992, Gertler and Gruber 2002). In this paper, I 
focus on agricultural households living in the sharply defined cotton regions of Tajiki-
stan and are additionally exposed to income risk caused by fluctuations of the world 
price of cotton. Agricultural households living in non-cotton regions of Tajikistan com-
prise the control group and are solely exposed to income risk induced by domestic 
shocks. Exploiting an exogenous surge in the world price of cotton in 2010/2011 and 
the geographic variation in the suitability for cotton production, I find that the cotton 
price shock increased real monthly income of agricultural households in cotton regions 
by over 70% compared to agricultural households in non-cotton regions. 
Furthermore, in this paper I investigate how agricultural households responded to this 
positive income shock on several dimensions of household behavior. Credit constraints 
in developing countries strongly influence household decisions on investments in pro-
ductive assets and human capital (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Udry 1995, Jacobi and 
Skoufias 1997, Björkman-Nyqvist 2013). Thus, a positive transitory income shock may 
be a unique opportunity to circumvent those credit constraints and increase household 
investments (Qian 2008, Maccini and Yang 2009, Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005, Rose 
1999, Yang 2008). I find compelling evidence that the trade induced positive transitory 
income shock led agricultural households in cotton regions of Tajikistan to increase 
their investments in education, health, migration and entrepreneurial activity. Due to the 
positive income shock, spending for ambulatory medical treatment of household mem-
bers significantly increased at the extensive and intensive margin. In addition, I find 
large but insignificant effects of the income shock on spending for the education of 
household members, whereby spending for the education of girls increased much more 
than for boys. These findings are in line with other studies reporting that households 
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 I do not include the quantile regression results for hours worked by activity or for kids and old people, because the 
estimation procedure using these dependent variables did not converge. 
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smooth consumption by varying resources allocated to the education and nutrition of 
girls and mainly shelter resources allocated to the education of boys (Björkman-Nyqvist 
2013, Rose 1999, Maccini and Yang 2009). Regarding entrepreneurial activity, I find 
that households affected by the positive income shock significantly increase their entre-
preneurial activity on existing family enterprises. Concerning investments in migration, 
I find that households with at least one migrant abroad use the positive income shock to 
further increase the number of migrants. However, for households without migrants the 
increase in available resources was not sufficient to pay for the fixed costs of starting 
external migration. 
In addition, this paper adds to a broader literature that discusses the various strategies 
households in developing countries apply to cope with income shocks and to smooth 
household consumption (Besley 1995, Morduch 1995, Townsend 1995, Deaton 1992). I 
find that rural households in Tajikistan cannot fully insure against transitory income 
shocks. Household consumption significantly increases by 29 log-points in response to 
the positive income shock. Interestingly, the rise in consumption is mainly driven by 
non-food products, which indicates that households use the positive transitory income 
shock more for investment or savings related disbursements than for simple consump-
tion motives (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Attanasio and Szekely 2004, Yang 2008). 
In particular, households increase the spending for personal care products and beauty 
services, marriage gifts and ceremonies as well as household articles, which are im-
portant marriage gifts in Tajikistan. These findings indicate that Tajik households invest 
parts of the positive transitory income shock in creating, stabilizing and extending social 
relationships that may work as an insurance mechanism in lean times (Grimard 1997). 
In addition, I find that households that have at least one migrant abroad and, thus, can 
use remittances to insure consumption against income shocks do not increase household 
consumption in response to the shock. Moreover, those households significantly in-
crease the number of migrants in response to the positive income shock. These findings 
indicate that migration and remittances act as an insurance device for transitory income 
shocks in developing countries (Yang and Choi 2007).  
The article closest to this study is Yang (2008), who investigates the effects of a transi-
tory exchange rate shock on remittances and household income, consumption and in-
vestments in education and entrepreneurial activity for migrant households in the Phil-
ippines. Compared to Yang (2008), this paper has the advantage of using three waves of 
a genuine household panel survey to control for unobserved heterogeneity as well as 
pre-trends in dependent variables. Furthermore, by exploiting an exogenous shock in the 
world market price for cotton, this paper investigates the short term adjustment costs of 
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a transitory income shock due to trade openness for households in a developing country. 
Thus, the paper adds to the literature on trade and poverty and provides insights on short 
term household responses to transitory income shocks caused by trade price changes 
(Winters et al. 2004). Unsurprisingly, poor agricultural households in a developing 
country like Tajikistan are less well insured and less able to cope with income shocks 
than are non-poor households in developed countries (Jalan and Ravallion 1999). This 
makes it particularly important to consider the effectiveness of mechanisms available to 
poor households for consumption smoothing when introducing trade reforms likely to 
increase the variability of their incomes (Winters et al. 2004). Next time, the shock in 
the world price of cotton may be a negative one and rural households in the cotton re-
gions of Tajikistan will have to reduce their consumption and investments in human 
capital and entrepreneurial activity. Thus, in developing countries, rising trade openness 
should be accompanied by improvements in domestic credit and insurance markets to 
provide sufficient mechanisms to insure consumption against the extended income risk 
induced by trade price fluctuations. 
For future research, it seems promising to further investigate the various mechanisms of 
income smoothing that are available to rural households in developing countries like 
Tajikistan as well as the institutional context facilitating the use of those mechanisms 
(Morduch 1995). In this study and chapter two, I find that small private as well as big-
ger collective farms in Tajikistan strongly react to the cotton price surge in 2010/2011 
and increase the area devoted to cotton production in exchange for area devoted to the 
production of other crops. It is not clear, if this substitution between crops would be 
feasible on all farm types in case of a relative decline in the price for cotton. In Tajiki-
stan, there is still a strong interference of local politicians and elites in the cotton sector, 
especially on big collective dehkan farms. Managers of big farms, cotton gins and local 
politicians appropriate the rents from exporting ginned cotton and try to secure a steady 
supply of raw cotton. Breaking up those monopolistic structures to increase the freedom 
of crop choice for all farmers is a necessary precondition for the appropriate use of in-
come smoothing mechanisms for rural households in Tajikistan. It remains an open 
question, what other precondition like knowledge and credit supply are still necessary 
for rural households in Tajikistan to adequately apply mechanisms of income smooth-
ing.  
Building on the dataset and insights presented in this paper, another promising direction 
of future research is the analysis of the effects of gender specific income changes on 
household behavior (Qian 2008). Because the increase in household income due to the 
cotton price surge is mainly driven by female wage income, the results in this paper 
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already suggest interpretations in line with the findings by Qian (2008). For example, I 
find that spending for the education of girls increases more due to the positive income 
shock than for the education of boys. However, this argument needs to be analyzed in 
more detail to be able to contribute to the literature on empowerment of women and its 
effects on household behavior, e.g. on fertility, nutrition and education of girls versus 
boys.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 3.1.: Regional variation of cotton production in Tajikistan (cotton/non-cotton 
communities in the TLSS 2007) 
Note: Cotton/non-cotton communities (PSUs) from TLSS 2007 (in green/white), cotton communities are communities that grow 
cotton as first or second most important crop. FAO - GAEZ – Production capacity index for cotton (for current cultivated land and 
intermediate input level irrigated cotton). Administrative units are districts (hukumats or raions); there are 58 districts in Tajikistan. 
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Table 3.1.: Effects on log of total real household income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log of HH income Log of HH income Log of HH income 
    
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.05 -0.34 0.07 
 (0.16) (0.27) (0.22) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.29° -0.36 0.61** 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) 
HH head married 0.19** 0.16* 0.22** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
HH head single 0.17 0.21 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.10) 
HH size 0.06** 0.07** 0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head age 0.01** 0.01** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.06° 0.10° 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
HH head tertiary education 0.18** 0.18** 0.15* 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
HH head high occupation 0.14** 0.11* 0.12* 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.25** 0.23** 0.24** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
HH female head 0.22** 0.11 0.24** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
HH share of young members -0.46** -0.53** -0.39** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
HH share of old members -0.22* -0.08 -0.28* 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) 
Constant 4.97** 4.84** 5.24** 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.24) 
    
Observations 5,074 2,479 2,595 
R-squared 0.51 0.50 0.57 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.48 0.55 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village/PSU level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the 
deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a 
cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. 
The first column shows results for the whole sample of households with at least one member working, the second column shows 
results for the subsample of households with no female member working and the third column the results for the subsample of 
households with at least one female member working. An agricultural HH is defined as a household with at least one member work-
ing in agriculture. 
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Table 3.2.: Alternative Treatment Definitions (log of total real household income) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Log of HH 
income 
Log of HH 
income 
Log of HH 
income 
Log of HH 
income 
Log of HH 
income 
      
Cotton PSU*year 2009*small farm agricultural HH    -0.16  
    (0.22)  
Cotton PSU*year 2011*small farm agricultural HH    0.69**  
    (0.23)  
Cotton PSU*year 2009*number/share of agricultural workers -0.04 -0.15° -0.14°  -0.18 
 (0.24) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.11) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*number/share of agricultural workers 0.61* -0.08 0.29**  0.28* 
 (0.24) (0.09) (0.11)  (0.13) 
HH head married 0.22** 0.18** 0.19** 0.27** 0.27** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
HH head single 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.63** 0.62** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16) 
HH size 0.06** 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head age 0.00* 0.01** 0.01** 0.00° 0.00° 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.01 0.07* 0.07* 0.08 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
HH head tertiary education 0.14* 0.17** 0.18** 0.12 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) 
HH head high occupation 0.10* 0.14** 0.15** 0.24** 0.23** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or8 0.21** 0.25** 0.27** 0.34** 0.34** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
HH female head 0.24** 0.20** 0.23** 0.51** 0.52** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) 
HH share of young members -0.38** -0.51** -0.44** -0.71** -0.68** 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) 
HH share of old members -0.28* -0.22* -0.22* -0.10 -0.08 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.19) 
Constant 5.27** 4.99** 4.90** 4.67** 4.76** 
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.24) 
      
Observations 2,595 5,074 5,074 1,899 1,899 
R-squared 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.56 
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.54 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the 
deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household (or a continuous treatment 
variable), a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household 
dummy (or continuous treatment) and the cotton PSU dummy. The first column shows results for continuous treatment defined as 
the share of household working members that work in agriculture. This specification includes all households with at least one fe-
male member working. The second and third columns include all households with at least one working member. The specification in 
the second column defines continuous treatment as the number of males in the household that work in agriculture. The third column 
defines continuous treatment as number of females that work in agriculture. The fourth and the fifth column only include house-
holds with at least one member working in agriculture. The fourth column defines discrete treatment as households that have at least 
one female working in agriculture on a small farm. The fifth column defines continuous treatment as the number of female house-
hold members that work on small farms in agriculture.  
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Table 3.3.: Effects on different sources of household income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Log of HH Log of HH Log of HH Log of HH Log of HH Log of HH Log of HH 
VARIABLES income Wage 
income 
remittance
s 
Other 
income 
Social 
benefits  
Transfers 
received 
Transfers 
sent 
        
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH 0.07 0.14 -0.61 0.92 -0.09 -1.17 -2.47 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.51) (0.74) (0.24) (1.26) (2.71) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.61** 0.70** 0.48 1.00 -0.27 1.85° 0.06 
 (0.21) (0.24) (0.53) (0.73) (0.28) (1.12) (2.28) 
HH head married 0.22** -0.13 0.37* -0.01 0.25* -0.44 0.79 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.17) (0.21) (0.10) (0.49) (0.64) 
HH head single 0.12 -0.04 0.09 -1.62** -0.13 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.23) (0.54) (0.20) (0.66) (0.00) 
HH size 0.06** 0.06** 0.02 0.05* 0.02° 0.08° -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) 
HH head age 0.00* 0.01** 0.01 0.00 0.01** -0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
HH head secondary education 0.01 0.00 -0.15 0.19 0.09 -0.11 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.16) (0.06) (0.27) (0.37) 
HH head tertiary education 0.15* 0.16* 0.01 0.28 0.24* -0.03 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.17) (0.21) (0.09) (0.46) (0.49) 
HH head high occupation 0.12* 0.37** -0.08 0.24 0.06 0.09 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.21) (0.10) (0.34) (0.35) 
HHhead occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.24** 0.52** -0.04 0.20 -0.17° 0.14 -0.17 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.21) (0.42) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation -0.02 0.16* -0.10 0.12 0.14 0.64° -0.19 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.15) (0.17) (0.09) (0.34) (0.55) 
HH female head 0.24** -0.24** 0.26° -0.30 0.01 -0.47 0.72 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.19) (0.09) (0.46) (0.61) 
HH share of young members -0.39** -0.08 -0.26 -0.15 -0.19 -0.42 1.00 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.25) (0.31) (0.18) (0.47) (0.84) 
HH share of old members -0.28* -0.78** -1.23° -0.70 0.65** 0.04 -1.20 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.66) (0.51) (0.19) (0.80) (1.86) 
Constant 5.24** 5.12** 4.47** 3.50** 2.93** 6.32** 4.12 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.66) (0.99) (0.39) (1.15) (2.74) 
        
Observations 2,595 2,454 393 543 1,071 266 164 
R-squared 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.31 0.49 0.44 0.65 
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.46 0.38 0.16 0.44 0.13 0.32 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the 
deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a 
cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. 
Column 1 shows the baseline results from column 3 of Table 1. Column 2 until 7 show results for the same specification than in 
column 1, but for different sources of household income as dependent variables. 
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Table 3.4.: Effects on household consumption 
 OLS Reduced Form (1-4) IV (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of Log of 
VARIABLES Food purchased Food consumed Non-food 
spending 
total 
consumption 
Food purchsed Food consumed Non-food 
spending 
total 
consumption 
         
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.16 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.23) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.24) (0.13) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.20 0.21° 0.50* 0.29*     
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.22) (0.13)     
HH head married 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.17 -0.10 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) 
HH head single 0.19 0.14° -0.10 0.10 0.15 0.10 -0.19 0.04 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) 
HH size 0.07** 0.07** 0.08** 0.07** 0.05** 0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
HH head age 0.00** 0.00** 0.01* 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.10* 0.08** 0.18** 0.10** 0.10* 0.08* 0.17** 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
HH head tertiary education 0.19** 0.12** 0.34** 0.17** 0.16* 0.09° 0.27** 0.12* 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) 
HH head high occupation 0.13* 0.12** 0.14* 0.12** 0.09 0.08° 0.04 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
HHhead occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.12** 0.09** 0.09° 0.09** 0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06° 0.02 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
HH female head -0.01 -0.07° -0.12 -0.07° -0.09 -0.15* -0.32* -0.19** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) 
HH share of young members -0.14 -0.04 -0.26* -0.10 -0.02 0.09 0.04 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) 
HH share of old members -0.55** -0.43** -0.86** -0.54** -0.43** -0.30* -0.55** -0.36** 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.21) (0.13) 
Log of HH income     0.27 0.29 0.71* 0.41* 
     (0.23) (0.18) (0.34) (0.20) 
Constant 3.60** 4.15** 4.36** 5.84** 2.26° 2.72** 0.86 3.82** 
 (0.21) (0.14) (0.29) (0.15) (1.16) (0.91) (1.76) (0.99) 
First stage (log of HH income instrumented)         
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH     0.70** 0.70** 0.70** 0.70** 
     (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Partial F-Test (F-statistics)     12.98 13.03 13.09 13.03 
         
Observations 2,647 2,652 2,650 2,652 2,646 2,651 2,649 2,651 
R-squared 0.47 0.52 0.33 0.50 0.45 0.46 0.21 0.41 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.50 0.30 0.48 0.43 0.44 0.18 0.38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Consumption is measured in Tajik Somoni. 
Food purchased and consumed is reported for the last 7 days, whereas food consumed includes food purchased plus self-produced food and in kind payments in food. Non-food consumption and overall consumption is 
computed as a monthly average. 
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Table 3.5.: Effects on consumption detailed food items 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Log of 
grains 
cons. 
Log of 
vegetables 
cons. 
Log of 
fruits cons. 
Log of 
meat cons. 
Log of 
milk cons. 
Log of 
beverages 
cons. 
Log of 
sweets 
cons. 
        
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.18 0.07 -0.07 0.32° 0.03 0.01 -0.20 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.23) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.10 0.09 0.51° 0.31 0.05 0.14 0.61° 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.30) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.35) 
HH head married 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) 
HH head single 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.27° 0.13 0.23 0.07 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.21) (0.16) (0.11) (0.23) (0.20) 
HH size 0.09** 0.06** 0.06** 0.04** 0.07** 0.03** 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head age 0.00* 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.03 0.12** 0.15* -0.01 0.14** 0.08° 0.14* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
HH head tertiary education -0.04 0.15** 0.22** 0.12* 0.22** 0.15* 0.18* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
HH head high occupation 0.07 0.08° 0.09 0.11° 0.10* 0.20** 0.10 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or8 0.05 0.02 0.11* 0.12** 0.11** 0.11* 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08° 0.14* 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
HH female head -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.00 -0.06 -0.10 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
HH share of young members -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
HH share of old members -0.40* -0.62** -0.41° -0.29° -0.22° -0.29° -0.88** 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.21) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) 
Constant 2.78** 1.98** 1.35** 2.49** 2.33** 0.61° 1.35** 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.32) (0.36) 
        
Observations 2,652 2,651 2,370 2,077 2,625 2,610 2,629 
R-squared 0.47 0.34 0.22 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.32 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.31 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.27 0.29 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the 
deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a 
cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. 
Consumption is reported for the last 7 days and measured in Tajik Somoni. It includes purchased items on local markets as well as 
self-produced food and in kind payments in food. 
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Table 3.6.: Effects on consumption detailed non-food items 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
VARIABLES Personal 
care 
Cleaning 
products 
Fuel and 
transport 
informati-
on 
Other 
articles 
Clothing 
and shoes 
HH arti-
cles 
Hobbies, 
Services 
Cars and 
dwellling 
Personal 
articles 
For travel Insurance 
and taxes 
Marriage, 
oth. cer. 
              
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricu. HH -0.13 -0.14 0.36 -0.13 -0.31 0.15 -0.19 -0.13 0.39 0.29 0.79 0.36 0.73° 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.28) (0.59) (0.57) (0.24) (0.32) (0.80) (0.65) (0.97) (1.15) (0.44) (0.42) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricu. HH 0.48° 0.15 0.43 -0.21 0.84 0.31 0.89* -0.06 0.38 0.03 0.22 0.72 1.01* 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.38) (0.47) (0.64) (0.22) (0.40) (0.55) (0.52) (0.89) (1.45) (0.50) (0.39) 
HH head married -0.05 -0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.16 -0.10 -0.46 0.32* -0.13 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.08) (0.13) (0.23) (0.25) (0.36) (0.62) (0.14) (0.16) 
HH head single -0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.36 -0.47 -0.16 -0.27 0.67 -0.57 0.13 2.79** -0.37 -0.25 
 (0.24) (0.18) (0.38) (0.48) (0.40) (0.28) (0.27) (0.46) (0.36) (0.87) (0.65) (0.47) (0.40) 
HH size 0.05** 0.06** 0.08** 0.06** 0.05* 0.08** 0.05** 0.05* 0.01 0.08* 0.07 0.04* 0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head age 0.00 0.00 0.01* -0.01 0.01 0.00° 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02° -0.00 0.01° -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.04 0.07 0.16 -0.19 0.04 0.13* 0.06 0.25° -0.03 -0.34 -0.16 0.12 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.17) (0.27) (0.35) (0.12) (0.10) 
HH head tertiary education 0.15* 0.18** 0.31* -0.07 -0.11 0.23** 0.22° 0.48* 0.15 -0.14 0.14 0.09 0.20 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.20) (0.08) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21) (0.32) (0.46) (0.14) (0.13) 
HH head high occupation 0.14** -0.01 0.16 0.23* 0.35* 0.21** 0.04 0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.68° -0.14 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.07) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.36) (0.14) (0.11) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or8 0.13** 0.08° 0.21** 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.14 0.06 0.23 -0.02 0.12 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.14) (0.15) (0.05) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.27) (0.14) (0.10) 
HH head skilled agricult. occupation 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.20 -0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.42* 0.18 -0.18 -0.03 0.15 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.22) (0.18) (0.07) (0.10) (0.24) (0.19) (0.38) (0.46) (0.14) (0.13) 
HH female head -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 0.22 -0.10 -0.26* 0.10 0.09 -0.31 -0.27 0.17 -0.22 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.15) (0.24) (0.07) (0.12) (0.20) (0.24) (0.35) (0.60) (0.14) (0.15) 
HH share of young members -0.13 0.10 -0.36* -0.23 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.13 0.29 -0.21 -0.36 -0.09 -0.77** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.25) (0.33) (0.11) (0.19) (0.34) (0.28) (0.52) (0.76) (0.19) (0.21) 
HH share of old members -0.68** -0.33* -0.46° 0.12 -0.02 -0.97** -0.73* -0.03 -0.75 2.38** -0.01 -0.32 -0.47 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.24) (0.36) (0.46) (0.27) (0.33) (0.63) (0.68) (0.72) (1.10) (0.41) (0.36) 
Constant 2.64** 2.33** 2.75** 2.42** 2.42** 4.86** 2.58** 2.89** 4.13** 6.38** 5.60** 1.45° 5.31** 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.46) (0.73) (0.62) (0.28) (0.49) (0.97) (0.95) (1.61) (1.71) (0.74) (0.57) 
              
Observations 2,518 2,556 1,777 568 918 2,537 1,646 594 881 396 355 771 1,580 
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.24 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.21 0.43 0.53 0.34 0.20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.16 0.11 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dum-
mies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricul-
tural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Consumption is measured in Tajik Somoni and reported for the last month (columns 1-5), the last 6 month (columns 6-8) or the last 12 months (columns 9-13). 
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Table 3.7.: Migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
    Households with migrants Households without migrants 
VARIABLES HH with 
migrants 
Number 
of 
migrants 
Share of 
migrants 
Log of 
food 
consumpti
on 
Log of 
non-food 
consump-
tion 
Log of total 
consumption 
Log of food 
consumption 
Log of non-food 
consumption 
Log of total 
consumption 
          
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.22 0.37 0.15 -0.10 -0.16 -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.02) (0.29) (0.68) (0.34) (0.13) (0.25) (0.14) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.12 0.36* 0.05* -0.00 0.36 -0.00 0.27° 0.53* 0.36* 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.02) (0.28) (0.56) (0.30) (0.14) (0.24) (0.15) 
HH head married 0.20** 0.22** 0.05** -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 0.04 0.10 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.08) (0.17) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) 
HH head single 0.12° 0.15 0.02° 0.03 -0.24 -0.04 0.14 -0.14 0.09 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.01) (0.18) (0.25) (0.18) (0.10) (0.21) (0.11) 
HH size 0.02** 0.06** 0.07** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
HH head age -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 0.01* 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.11° 0.30* 0.15* 0.07° 0.13* 0.08* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
HH head tertiary education -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.11 0.35° 0.15 0.10* 0.29** 0.14* 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.18) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
HH head high occupation -0.05* -0.09** -0.01** 0.16° 0.07 0.15 0.11** 0.15° 0.12** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 -0.06** -0.09** -0.02** -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.09** 0.09 0.10** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06° -0.02 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
HH female head 0.30** 0.36** 0.07** -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) 
HH share of young members -0.32** -0.64** -0.08** -0.27 -0.48 -0.36° -0.03 -0.29* -0.09 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.01) (0.19) (0.32) (0.19) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) 
HH share of old members -0.20** -0.17° -0.06** -0.36 -0.52 -0.41 -0.46** -0.96** -0.58** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.01) (0.35) (0.58) (0.36) (0.10) (0.17) (0.11) 
Constant -0.21* -0.17 -0.03 4.86** 4.38** 6.61** 4.03** 4.35** 5.73** 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.02) (0.37) (0.90) (0.41) (0.16) (0.32) (0.17) 
          
Observations 2,652 2,652 2,652 472 472 472 2,180 2,178 2,180 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.61 0.45 0.61 0.52 0.32 0.50 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.51 0.31 0.51 0.50 0.29 0.48 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dum-
mies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricul-
tural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Columns 4-6 show the results of the consumption equations for the sub-sample of households with migrants and columns 7-9 the results for the sub-sample of house-
holds without migrants. 
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Table 3.8.: Effects on education - Enrollment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Number of 
enrolled 
HH mem-
bers 
Number of 
enrolled 
male HH 
members 
Number of 
enrolled 
fem. HH 
members 
Number of 
enrolled 
school 
kids 
Number of 
enrolled 
male 
school 
kids 
Number of 
enrolled 
female 
school 
kids 
Number of 
enrolled 
students 
Number of 
enrolled 
male 
students 
Number of 
enrolled 
female 
students 
          
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.26) (0.18) (0.15) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH -0.26 -0.11 -0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.27) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
HH head married -0.23° -0.11° -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
HH head single -0.53* -0.29* -0.25* -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15° -0.12** -0.05 
 (0.20) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) 
HH size -0.05** -0.04** -0.06** -0.03** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** -0.01** -0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head age -0.02** -0.01** -0.01** 0.00° 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education -0.22** -0.10* -0.13** 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
HH head tertiary education -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.00 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
HH head high occupation 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.04° 0.13** 0.08** 0.04° 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or8 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04° 0.05° 0.03 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
HH female head -0.18° -0.08 -0.12° -0.06° -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
HH share of old members 0.33° 0.27* 0.19° -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.24** -0.05 -0.14** 
 (0.20) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
Number of HH members in respective enrollment age 0.48** 0.63** 0.54** 0.87** 0.89** 0.80** 0.11** 0.18** 0.12** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Constant 1.81** 0.80** 0.93** -0.19 -0.04 -0.08 0.42* 0.22* 0.25** 
 (0.35) (0.19) (0.23) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) 
          
Observations 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 
R-squared 0.35 0.52 0.42 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.19 0.23 0.18 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.51 0.40 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.16 0.20 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for 
living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Instead of using enrollment shares as dependent variables, I include the number of household members in the 
respective enrollment age as independent variable. Because this variable is strongly correlated with household size, using enrollment shares as dependent variables could lead to severe endogeneity problems. 
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Table 3.9.: Effects on education – Spending per month 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Log of 
spending on 
educ. 
Log of 
spending 
educ. for 
male 
Log of 
spending 
educ. for 
fem. 
Log of ed. 
spend. per 
enroll. 
member 
Log of ed. 
spend. per 
enroll. male 
Log of ed. 
spend. per 
enroll. 
female 
Log of 
spending 
school for 
male 
Log of 
spending 
school for 
female 
Log of 
spending for 
male stu-
dents 
Log of 
spending for 
female 
students 
Log of 
spend. for 
adults and 
children 
            
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH 0.01 -0.01 -0.32 0.02 0.19 -0.18 0.11 0.19 0.38 -1.40 0.02 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.28) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27) (0.29) (0.26) (0.80) (1.58) (0.29) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.18 0.17 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.35 -0.15 0.29 0.53 1.24 0.29 
 (0.34) (0.38) (0.35) (0.29) (0.34) (0.31) (0.36) (0.29) (0.83) (1.80) (0.34) 
HH head married -0.14 -0.16 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 0.14 -0.31 -0.15 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.51) (0.49) (0.10) 
HH head single -0.57* -0.63** 0.09 -0.39° -0.47* 0.01 -0.50* 0.01 -0.18 0.42 -0.57* 
 (0.28) (0.20) (0.29) (0.20) (0.20) (0.28) (0.25) (0.30) (0.87) (0.88) (0.27) 
HH size 0.05** 0.04** 0.03** 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.03 0.05 0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) 
HH head age -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.16* 0.20* 0.18* 0.16* 0.21** 0.16* 0.20** 0.15* 0.51 0.61 0.18* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.33) (0.45) (0.07) 
HH head tertiary education 0.38** 0.41** 0.29* 0.37** 0.38** 0.33** 0.35** 0.16 0.71 0.88° 0.40** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.48) (0.51) (0.10) 
HH head high occupation 0.26** 0.26* 0.21* 0.20* 0.22* 0.17° 0.13 0.25* 0.22 0.55 0.27** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.30) (0.42) (0.09) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.13° 0.07 0.16° 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.16° 0.11 0.55 0.11 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.29) (0.43) (0.07) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.12 0.18° 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.56 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.35) (0.49) (0.08) 
HH female head -0.10 -0.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.26 0.20 -0.12 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.44) (0.46) (0.11) 
HH share of young members -0.10 -0.93** -0.24 -1.15** -1.39** -0.72** 0.30° 0.73** 0.20 -1.29 -0.11 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.62) (0.96) (0.15) 
HH share of old members -0.10 0.22 -0.54 -0.06 0.19 -0.35 0.40 -0.15 -1.48 -1.43 -0.02 
 (0.34) (0.47) (0.38) (0.32) (0.45) (0.36) (0.46) (0.36) (1.44) (2.17) (0.35) 
Constant 3.68** 3.34** 2.98** 3.44** 3.33** 3.00** 2.51** 2.00** 1.15 3.21° 3.73** 
 (0.43) (0.52) (0.49) (0.40) (0.49) (0.47) (0.57) (0.45) (1.47) (1.72) (0.45) 
            
Observations 1,988 1,538 1,426 1,988 1,538 1,426 1,382 1,288 296 218 2,006 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.52 0.28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.16 0.19 0.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Spending in education is reported in Tajik 
Somoni on average per month.   
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Table 3.10.: Effects on household investments in health 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Log of total 
health 
spending 
Log of 
spend. for 
ambulatory 
care 
Log of 
spend. for 
hospital 
Number of 
treated in 
ambulatory 
care 
Log of 
ambulatory 
spend. per 
treated  
Log of 
ambulatory 
spend. per 
capita 
Number of 
members in 
hospital 
Log of 
hospital 
spend. per 
treated 
Log of 
hospital 
spend. per 
capita 
Log of 
hours not 
worked due 
to illness 
           
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH 0.10 0.73 0.30 0.06 0.72 0.69 -0.08 0.28 0.55  
 (0.49) (0.58) (0.38) (0.18) (0.60) (0.63) (0.14) (0.40) (0.42)  
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.53 1.22° 0.37 0.14 0.84 0.97 0.01 0.42 0.35 -0.23 
 (0.57) (0.68) (0.55) (0.14) (0.67) (0.74) (0.15) (0.55) (0.55) (0.41) 
HH head married -0.02 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.17) (0.07) (0.22) (0.26) (0.05) (0.17) (0.21) (0.19) 
HH head single -0.08 -0.27 0.24 -0.17 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.16 0.32 -0.35 
 (0.55) (0.73) (0.40) (0.12) (0.85) (0.92) (0.09) (0.40) (0.73) (0.27) 
HH size 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.07** -0.03°  0.06** -0.01  0.03° 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) 
HH head age 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00° 0.00 -0.02** 0.00 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.21° 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.05) (0.16) (0.17) (0.03) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
HH head tertiary education 0.36° 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.18 0.34 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.14 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.17) (0.05) (0.23) (0.23) (0.05) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) 
HH head high occupation -0.36* -0.04 -0.28* -0.10* -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.27° -0.22 -0.15 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.04) (0.16) (0.17) (0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 -0.15 -0.27° -0.08 -0.02 -0.20 -0.19 0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.17) (0.03) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.02 -0.19 -0.03 -0.04 -0.17 -0.23 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.05) (0.17) (0.18) (0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
HH female head -0.08 0.13 -0.12 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.12* -0.20 -0.02 -0.17 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.17) (0.07) (0.21) (0.24) (0.05) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17) 
HH share of young members -0.22 -0.70° -0.30 -0.16° -0.67° -1.70** -0.14* -0.28 -1.12** -0.45* 
 (0.28) (0.37) (0.22) (0.08) (0.38) (0.35) (0.07) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) 
HH share of old members -0.06 -0.68 0.24 0.31** -0.86 0.73 0.07 0.11 1.54** 0.17 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.44) (0.11) (0.52) (0.50) (0.09) (0.42) (0.45) (0.39) 
Constant 4.01** 3.73** 6.00** 0.19 3.62** 3.72** -0.19 6.24** 5.51** 1.92** 
 (0.61) (0.96) (0.59) (0.19) (0.95) (0.95) (0.16) (0.53) (0.62) (0.49) 
           
Observations 1,036 592 707 2,652 592 592 2,652 707 707 598 
R-squared 0.17 0.27 0.19 0.13 0.26 0.29 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.19 
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for 
living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Spending on health is reported in Tajik Somoni. Spending for ambulatory medical assistance is reported for the 
last month and spending for hospital treatment for the last year. For total spending on health in column1, I compute the monthly average for hospital spending and add ambulatory spending.  
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Table 3.11.: Effects on entrepreneurial activity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES HH owns a 
family enter-
prise 
N. of workers 
in family 
enterprise 
Log of hours 
worked in 
family enter-
prise 
    
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.01 0.43 -0.27 
 (0.11) (0.35) (0.22) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.11 0.90* -0.08 
 (0.13) (0.35) (0.19) 
N. of workers in family enterprise   0.43** 
   (0.02) 
HH head married 0.02 -0.17° 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) 
HH head single -0.07 -0.19 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.17) (0.24) 
HH size 0.01* 0.16** -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
HH head age -0.00 -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education -0.02 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) 
HH head tertiary education -0.02 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.06) 
HH head high occupation -0.04 0.12 -0.09 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.17** 0.37** 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.05 0.62** -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.05) 
HH female head 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) 
HH share of young members -0.01 -0.93** 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.08) 
HH share of old members -0.01 -0.07 -0.56** 
 (0.08) (0.16) (0.17) 
Constant 0.28* 0.24 3.08** 
 (0.11) (0.30) (0.24) 
    
Observations 2,652 2,652 1,539 
R-squared 0.17 0.39 0.58 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.37 0.55 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the 
deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a 
cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy.  
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Table 3.12.: Effects on extensive labor supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES N. of 
workers 
N. of agr. 
workers 
N. of non-
agr. workers 
N. of 
female 
workers 
N. of fem. 
agr. workers 
N. of fem. 
Non-agr. 
workers 
N. of male 
workers 
N. of male 
agr. workers 
N. of male 
Non-agr. 
workers 
N. of kids 
working 
N. of kids 
working in 
agric. 
N. of old 
working 
HH sends 
mem. to 
oth. farms 
              
Cotton PSU*year 2009 0.10 0.30* -0.20 0.07 0.27** -0.20** 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.02  
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)  
Cotton PSU*year 2011 0.33* 0.50** -0.16 0.17° 0.30** -0.14° 0.16 0.19° -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.02  
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH             0.10 
             (0.13) 
HH head married -0.16* -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.13* -0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04* -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
HH head single -0.20 0.11 -0.31* -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 0.13 -0.23* -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.11) 
HH size 0.31** 0.20** 0.11** 0.12** 0.11** 0.01* 0.19** 0.09** 0.10** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
HH head age -0.00 -0.01* 0.01** -0.00** -0.01** 0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00** -0.00** -0.00* 0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education -0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.04 -0.10* 0.06° 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
HH head tertiary education -0.02 -0.29** 0.27** -0.00 -0.12* 0.12** -0.02 -0.16** 0.15** -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
HH head high occupation 0.66** 0.08 0.58** 0.04 -0.06 0.10** 0.62** 0.14** 0.48** -0.05** -0.05** 0.16** -0.15** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.54** -0.20** 0.74** 0.01 -0.12** 0.13** 0.53** -0.08* 0.61** 0.00 -0.02 0.10** -0.09** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.85** 1.25** -0.40** 0.19** 0.44** -0.25** 0.66** 0.81** -0.15** 0.04 0.05° 0.19** -0.15** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) 
HH female head -0.30** -0.21** -0.09 0.14* -0.00 0.14** -0.44** -0.20** -0.23** 0.04 0.05 0.03° -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
HH share of young members -2.11** -1.22** -0.89** -0.94** -0.62** -0.31** -1.17** -0.59** -0.58** 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.20** 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
HH share of old members -0.52** -0.02 -0.50** -0.09 -0.02 -0.07 -0.43** -0.00 -0.43** -0.00 0.02 1.27** -0.17° 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) 
Constant 1.25** 0.54* 0.71** 1.15** 0.40* 0.76** 0.10 0.14 -0.05 0.09 0.03 -0.37** 0.10 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.21) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.18) 
              
Observations 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 1,252 
R-squared 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.29 0.44 0.38 0.52 0.43 0.42 0.10 0.11 0.36 0.29 
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.52 0.43 0.26 0.42 0.35 0.51 0.40 0.40 0.06 0.07 0.34 0.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Columns 1-12 use the number of workers of a 
specific type per household as dependent variables. I do not use the Dif-in-Dif-in-Dif specification here, because the dummy for an agricultural household would be endogenous to the number of agricultural workers. For 
comparability, I use this specification for all dependent variables. Column 13 uses a dummy as dependent variable that indicates whether the household had sent members to other farms for harvesting activities. This varia-
ble is only available for the years 2007 and 2011. 
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Table 3.13.: Effects on intensive labor supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES Log of 
hours 
worked 
Log of h. 
worked 
by female 
Log of h. 
worked 
by male 
Log of h. 
worked 
by kids 
Log of h. 
work, by 
fem. kids 
Log of h. 
worked 
by old 
Log of 
hours 
worked in 
agricu. 
Log of h. 
worked in 
non- 
agricu. 
Log of h. 
w. of 
fem. in 
agric. 
Log of h. 
w. of 
fem. in 
non-agri. 
Log of h. 
w. of 
male in 
agric. 
Log of h. 
w. of 
male in 
non-agri. 
Log of h. 
w. of kids 
in agric. 
              
Cotton PSU*year 2009       -0.13 0.05 -0.13 0.11 -0.23* 0.07 -0.71* 
       (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.34) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011       -0.14 -0.04 -0.16 -0.10 -0.24 0.04 -0.07 
       (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.54) 
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.19° -0.25* -0.43** -1.77* 0.00 0.16        
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.88) (0.00) (0.61)        
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH -0.10 -0.17 -0.24 0.23 0.71 -0.92        
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.66) (0.62) (0.67)        
Number of respective workers 0.33** 0.53** 0.50** 0.66** 0.72** 0.75** 0.38** 0.49** 0.52** 0.63** 0.53** 0.56** 0.67** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.23) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) 
HH head married -0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.10 -0.15 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.12° 0.01 -0.11 -0.03 0.17 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.27) 
HH head single -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.43* -0.08 0.47** -0.01 0.68** -0.03 0.00 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.17) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.19) (0.14) (0.00) 
HH size 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.05° 0.00 -0.01° 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
HH head age 0.00* 0.00° 0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
HH head secondary education -0.05° -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.49** 0.03 -0.01 -0.06° -0.00 -0.02 -0.10* -0.05 -0.14 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.15) 
HH head tertiary education -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.44° -0.17 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.24) (0.16) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.22) 
HH head high occupation 0.11** -0.00 -0.06 -0.34° -0.44° 0.15 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.14** -0.33 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.18) (0.24) (0.18) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.22) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.19** 0.06° 0.06* 0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.07 0.12** -0.05 0.11** 0.06 0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.14) (0.24) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.08* -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.21 -0.11 0.08° 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.14) (0.20) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) 
HH female head -0.13** 0.04 -0.08° 0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.13* -0.08° 0.00 0.04 -0.24** -0.02 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.25) 
HH share of young members -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 0.16 -0.61 -0.26 0.02 -0.07 0.03 -0.15° 0.08 -0.06 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.31) (0.50) (0.42) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.36) 
HH share of old members -0.40** -0.27* -0.14 0.77 0.24 0.03 -0.55** -0.21° -0.55** -0.19 -0.07 -0.15 0.60 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.62) (0.97) (0.35) (0.17) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.26) (0.15) (0.77) 
Constant 3.36** 2.89** 3.51** 2.92** 1.77 3.57** 3.11** 3.37** 3.35** 2.86** 3.36** 3.60** 3.24** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.97) (1.28) (0.69) (0.39) (0.16) (0.30) (0.20) (0.49) (0.19) (0.94) 
              
Observations 2,648 2,639 1,969 193 141 210 1,428 1,947 1,335 1,420 819 1,404 161 
R-squared 0.62 0.48 0.54 0.72 0.80 0.61 0.68 0.57 0.59 0.32 0.61 0.47 0.74 
Adjusted R-squared 0.60 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.32 0.66 0.55 0.56 0.27 0.56 0.43 0.51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1   Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the house-
hold income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. The depend-
ent variable hours worked is reported per week during the last two weeks. Instead of using hours worked per respective worker as dependent variable, I include the number of respective workers as independent variable. Because this variable is strongly 
correlated with household size, using hours worked per worker as dependent variables leads to severe endogeneity problems. 
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Appendix 3 A Tables and Figures 
 
Appendix Figure 3.2.: Cotton world market price (100=2000) 
Note: The vertical lines mark survey dates. Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices (Cotton Outlook 'A Index', Middling 1-3/32 inch staple, 
CIF Liverpool, US cents per pound) and Statistical Agency of Tajikistan. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 3.3.: Cotton production and land area harvested (100=2000) 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
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Appendix Figure 3.4.: Wheat world market price (100=2001) 
Note: Vertical lines mark survey dates. Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices (Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf 
of Mexico, US$ per metric ton) and Statistical Agency of Tajikistan 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 3.5.: Wheat production and land area harvested (100=2000) 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
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Appendix Table A 3.14.: Cotton exports and imports by country 
Share of world export for ginned cotton (lint) Rank-
ing according to 2011 
Cotton imports (in 1’000 480 lb. Bales) Ranking according 
to 2011 
 Country  2010  2011 
 
Country  2009 2010  2011 
1 United States 40.5% 25.5% 1 China 10,903 11,979 24,533 
2 India  14.1% 24.1% 2 Bangladesh  3,900 3,700 3,200 
3 Brazil 5.6% 10.4% 3 Turkey 4,394 3,350 2,382 
4 Australia 7.1% 10.1% 4 Indonesia 2,500 2,400 2,300 
5 Uzbekistan 7.5% 5.4% 5 Vietnam 1,695 1,569 1,625 
6 Pakistan 1.9% 2.7% 6 Thailand 1,806 1,752 1,263 
7 Malaysia n.a. 2.2% 7 South Korea 1,010 1,038 1,170 
8 Greece 2.1% 2.2% 8 Malaysia 271 290 1,125 
9 Turkmenistan 3.1% 1.6% 9 Mexico 1,393 1,196 1,000 
10 Mali 1.3% 1.4% 10 Pakistan 1,574 1,443 900 
12 Tajikistan 1.1% 1.1%      
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)  
 
Appendix Table A 3.15.: Two most important agricultural crops in cotton and non-cotton 
communities (communities included in the TLSS) 
  First crop in PSU Second crop in PSU 
  
Non-cotton 
PSUs Cotton PSUs 
Non-cotton 
PSUs Cotton PSUs 
Cotton-growing 0 44 0 60 
Gardening 5 1 20 2 
Grain crops 32 6 8 26 
Plant growing 3 1 0 0 
Vegetable growing 21 51 33 16 
Vineyard 2 1 0 0 
Legumes 0 0 2 0 
Total 63 104 63 104 
Source: TLSS 2007 
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Appendix Table A 3.16.:Two most important economic activities in cotton and non-cotton 
communities (PSUs) 
  First economic activity in 
PSU 
Second economic activity 
in PSU   
  
Non-cotton 
PSUs 
Cotton 
PSUs 
Non-cotton 
PSUs 
Cotton 
PSUs 
Agriculture 55 56 1 2 
Mining 5 6 2 5 
Manufacturing 0 5 2 5 
Energy, Gas and Water 0 1 1 1 
Construction 1 1 3 9 
Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 1 30 13 21 
Transport 0 1 3 5 
Finance, Real Estate and Insurance 0 0 0 2 
Public Administration and Defense 0 0 2 2 
Education 0 3 29 14 
Health and Social Services 0 0 0 8 
Other Services 0 0 0 11 
Other 1 1 3 1 
Total 63 104 59 86 
Source: TLSS 2007 
 
Appendix Table A 3.17.: Comparison of Cotton and Non-Cotton communities (Double T-
tests or Ranksum-tests) 
Variable Cotton PSUs  Non-Cotton PSUs 
P-Value for group com-
parison test (H0: no 
difference) 
Population  6600 7210 68% 
Altitude 684m 1301m 0% 
Distance to Dushanbe 152km 257km 0% 
Hours to drive to Dushanbe 5.9h 9.8h 1% 
Distance to District Capital 13km 25km 0% 
Hours to drive to District Capital 0.24h 1h 4% 
School enrolment  same median same median 97% 
Weeks school close because of 
agriculture 0.4 0.2 15% 
Share of population working in 
agriculture lower than median higher than median 0% 
Quality of Roads better worse 1.6% 
Part of crops planted on irrigated 
fields higher than median lower than median 2% 
Source: TLSS 2007 
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Appendix Table A 3.18.: Number of households in controland treatment groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 2007 2009 2011 
Control group (agricul-
tural households in non-
cotton PSUs) 
479 195 156 
Treatment group (agri-
cultural households in 
cotton PSUs) 
595 291 267 
Non-agricultural house-
holds in non-cotton PSUs 
493 293 306 
Non-agricultural house-
holds in cotton PSUs 
1085 536 518 
Total 3050 1503 1504 
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Appendix Table A 3.19.: Initial Characteristics of treatment and control group in 2007 
Variable 
Mean 
Control 
Group 
Mean 
Treated 
HH 
Difference 
Control 
minus 
Treated 
HH 
SE of 
Difference 
P-value 
(two-
sided-
TTest) 
N 
Control 
group 
N Treat-
ment 
group 
Dependent variables 
 
HH income (monthly) 549.36 597.82 -48.46 48.57 0.32 479 595 
HH income per capita (monthly) 79.52 89.79 -10.27 7.41 0.17 479 595 
HH wage income (monthly) 361.04 417.71 -56.67 42.24 0.18 479 595 
Remittances (monthly) 606.08 748.91 -142.83 86.32 0.10 112 90 
Other HH income (monthly) 14.42 39.95 -25.53 14.66 0.08 479 595 
Social benefits received (last month) 22.70 19.94 2.75 2.89 0.34 479 595 
Transfers received (monthly) 119.50 86.42 33.08 24.33 0.18 58 50 
Transfers sent (monthly) 132.38 32.57 99.81 44.69 0.04 18 6 
Food purchased (last 7 days, oxford 
scales), in Somoni 18.39 21.60 -3.21 1.02 0.00 479 595 
Food consumed (last 7 days, oxford 
scales), in Somoni 38.11 32.80 5.31 1.55 0.00 479 595 
Non-food consumed (per month, oxford 
scales), in Somoni 52.06 43.32 8.74 3.46 0.01 479 595 
Total consumption (per month, oxford 
scales), in Somoni 204.51 174.53 29.98 7.91 0.00 479 595 
HH spend on education per enrolled 
member (monthly) 21.86 21.79 0.07 3.45 0.98 374 482 
Ed. Spend. per enrolled kid (monthly) 11.82 10.92 0.90 0.87 0.30 362 465 
Share of kids enrolled 0.77 0.79 -0.02 0.02 0.32 398 506 
Share of female kids enrolled 0.75 0.78 -0.03 0.03 0.35 297 379 
Share of male kids enrolled 0.81 0.83 -0.02 0.02 0.47 324 395 
Health spending per member (monthly) 4.73 2.56 2.17 1.30 0.09 479 595 
Health spend. per ill member (monthly) 88.29 60.54 27.75 23.18 0.23 131 149 
Share of ill members 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.22 479 595 
HH with migrant (dummy) 0.23 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.00 479 595 
Number of migrants 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.04 0.00 479 595 
Share of migrants 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 479 595 
Number of workers 2.44 2.65 -0.21 0.09 0.02 479 595 
Number of non-agr. workers 0.60 0.58 0.02 0.05 0.74 479 595 
Number of agri. workers 1.84 2.07 -0.23 0.08 0.00 479 595 
Share of agri. workers 0.79 0.81 -0.02 0.02 0.33 479 595 
Number of female workers 0.95 1.27 -0.32 0.06 0.00 479 595 
Share of female workers 0.36 0.46 -0.10 0.02 0.00 479 595 
Number of female agri. workers 0.84 1.16 -0.32 0.06 0.00 479 595 
Share of female agri. workers 0.32 0.43 -0.11 0.02 0.00 479 595 
Hours worked per worker (per week) 42.38 46.35 -3.97 0.88 0.00 479 595 
Hours worked p. fem. work. (per week) 39.10 44.45 -5.34 1.20 0.00 305 468 
Hours worked p. male worker (per week) 43.78 48.25 -4.47 0.99 0.00 430 516 
Hours worked per kid work. (per week) 34.95 45.86 -10.91 2.89 0.00 51 76 
Hours worked per fem. kid (per week) 38.96 46.80 -7.83 3.63 0.04 28 57 
Hours worked per agr. Work. (per week) 41.57 46.43 -4.87 1.04 0.00 479 595 
Hours work. p. fem. agr. work. (p. week) 39.48 45.11 -5.62 1.30 0.00 281 445 
Hours worked per non-agr. w. (per week) 43.04 44.79 -1.75 1.33 0.19 204 245 
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HH Characteristics 
 
HH size (excluding migrants) 7.22 7.39 -0.17 0.17 0.31 479 595 
HH size 7.54 7.60 -0.06 0.17 0.74 479 595 
HH head single 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 479 595 
HH head age 52.66 51.70 0.96 0.79 0.22 479 595 
HH head sec educ 0.58 0.65 -0.07 0.03 0.02 479 595 
HH head ter educ 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.01 479 595 
HH head occhigh 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.02 479 595 
HH head occ4578 0.13 0.18 -0.06 0.02 0.01 479 595 
HH head occ ag skill 0.38 0.34 0.04 0.03 0.18 479 595 
HH head low skill 0.35 0.38 -0.03 0.03 0.36 479 595 
HH fem head 0.11 0.14 -0.03 0.02 0.18 479 595 
HH sh young 0.37 0.39 -0.02 0.01 0.08 479 595 
HH sh old 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 479 595 
Household in deciles 1 and 2 of income 
distribution 0.35 0.24 0.12 0.03 0.00 479 595 
Household in deciles 3 and 4 of income 
distribution 0.15 0.22 -0.08 0.02 0.00 479 595 
Household in deciles 5 and 6 of income 
distribution 0.13 0.18 -0.05 0.02 0.04 479 595 
Household in deciles 7 and 8 of income 
distribution 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.43 479 595 
Household in deciles 9 and 10 of income 
distribution 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.02 0.60 479 595 
PSU and Sub-District Characteristics 
 
Distance of PSU to the province capital 3.63 1.03 2.60 0.20 0.00 358 530 
Urban location (dummy) 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.14 479 595 
Male employment in the PSU (ordinal 
scale) 1.95 2.09 -0.14 0.07 0.03 479 595 
Importance of non-agricultural activities 
in PSU (ordinal scale) 1.47 2.01 -0.54 0.08 0.00 479 595 
Share of sub-district population below 
the poverty line (defined by 4th percentile 
of consumption distribution in Tajikistan 
in 2005) 
41.94 45.08 -3.14 1.24 0.01 479 595 
Percent of working population economi-
cally active in sub-district in 2005 56.80 71.59 -14.79 1.07 0.00 479 595 
Percent of female working population 
economically active in sub-district in 
2005 
49.46 67.86 -18.40 1.35 0.00 479 595 
Dependency ratio in sub-district in 2005 90.16 95.33 -5.17 0.87 0.00 479 595 
Unemployment rate in sub-district in 
2005 2.99 3.30 -0.31 0.24 0.19 479 595 
Percentage of population above 17 with 
no or primary education in sub-district in 
2005 
20.89 20.51 0.38 0.43 0.37 479 595 
Percentage of population above 17 with 
secondary education in sub-district in 
2005 
72.19 73.45 -1.26 0.41 0.00 479 595 
Population density in sub-district (popu-
lation per km2) 101.85 174.61 -72.76 9.85 0.00 454 500 
Percentage of households with electricity 
in sub-district in 2005 92.25 93.73 -1.48 0.54 0.01 479 595 
Percentage of households with landline 
telephone in sub-district in 2005 17.71 18.81 -1.10 1.29 0.39 479 595 
Notes: All income and spending figures are in Tajik Somonis of 2007. 
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Appendix Table A 3.20.: Effects on total real HH income further robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc 
            
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH 0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.16 0.14 -0.03 -0.07 0.19 0.09 0.01 -0.36 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.27) (0.54) (0.27) (0.56) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.31) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.61** 0.55* 0.63** 0.61* 0.60° 0.61* 0.44 0.52* 0.76** 0.67** 0.54° 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) (0.36) (0.27) (0.56) (0.22) (0.24) (0.19) (0.29) 
HH head married 0.22** 0.10 0.22** 0.21** 0.14 0.24** 0.03 0.23** 0.23** 0.23** 0.35** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.41) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
HH head single 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.47 0.21° -0.15 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.32** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.29) (0.12) (0.45) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
HH size 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.05** 0.06** 0.12** 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head age 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.00* 0.00° 0.00* 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
HH head tertiary education 0.15* 0.13* 0.15* 0.14* 0.16 0.15° -0.06 0.14* 0.14* 0.11° 0.18* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) (0.28) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
HH head high occupation 0.12* 0.14* 0.13* 0.14* 0.07 0.11° 0.20 0.15** 0.10* 0.16** 0.21** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.24** 0.21** 0.24** 0.22** 0.19* 0.23** 0.37* 0.26** 0.26** 0.26** 0.32** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
HH female head 0.24** 0.10 0.25** 0.19* 0.27° 0.25** 0.39 0.25** 0.27** 0.27** 0.33** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.36) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
HH share of young members -0.39** -0.39** -0.39** -0.40** -0.68** -0.42** -0.61 -0.39** -0.44** -0.52** -0.39** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.21) (0.10) (0.48) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) 
HH share of old members -0.28* -0.30* -0.28* -0.27° 0.14 -0.32° -0.21 -0.33* -0.38** -0.29* -0.37* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.44) (0.17) (0.91) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) 
Constant 5.24** 5.50** 5.24** 5.22** 5.50** 4.50** 4.87** 5.19** 5.23** 5.00** 2.34** 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.50) (1.57) (0.91) (0.24) (0.26) (0.20) (0.39) 
            
Observations 2,595 2,087 2,595 1,891 703 1,848 2,595 2,576 2,594 2,651 2,650 
R-squared 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.82 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.52 0.54 0.43 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. The first column shows the baseline results for 
households with at least one female working member from table 1. Column 2 defines agricultural households as households with at least two members working in agriculture. Column 3 also considers the second occupa-
tions of individuals for the definition of agricultural HHs. The fourth column excludes all mixed households that have both agricultural and non-agricultural workers, whereas column five defines female households as 
households with at least two female working members. Column six excludes additional control variables at the village and sub-district level that are described in the summary statistics table. Column seven includes dum-
mies for each household. In column eight until column eleven, I use the same specification as in column 1, but other measures for household income. Column eight uses household income excluding in kind payments and 
column nine includes a monthly average for bonus payments and social benefits instead of the payments received last month. In column ten, I treated households with zero income by imputing wage income and remittances 
for households that reported having workers or migrants, but did not show any wage earnings or remittances. Finally in column eleven, I simply included households with zero income by using log(1+income) instead of 
log(income).  
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Appendix Table A 3.21.: Effects on consumption (weighting consumption using oxford scales) 
 OLS Reduced Form (1-4) IV (5-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Log of Food 
purchased 
Log of Food 
consumed 
Log of non-
food spending 
Log of total 
consumption 
Log of Food 
purchased 
Log of Food 
consumed 
Log of non-
food spending 
Log of total 
consumption 
         
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.14 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.20) (0.13) (0.24) (0.14) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.20 0.21° 0.49* 0.29*     
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.21) (0.13)     
HH head married -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15* -0.26* -0.18* 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) 
HH head single 0.27° 0.22** -0.04 0.18° 0.24° 0.19* -0.13 0.12 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.18) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.20) (0.11) 
HH head age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00° -0.01° -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.11* 0.09** 0.19** 0.11** 0.10* 0.08* 0.17** 0.10* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
HH head tertiary education 0.21** 0.13** 0.36** 0.18** 0.17* 0.10° 0.28** 0.13* 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
HH head high occupation 0.18** 0.17** 0.18** 0.17** 0.15* 0.13** 0.09 0.11* 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.16** 0.13** 0.13* 0.13** 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.06 0.08* 0.03 0.07* 0.06 0.09* 0.05 0.08* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
HH female head 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.24* -0.10 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) 
logHHinc     0.28 0.30 0.71* 0.42* 
     (0.24) (0.19) (0.34) (0.20) 
Constant 2.91** 3.50** 3.70** 5.19** 1.58 2.06* 0.26 3.18** 
 (0.23) (0.15) (0.29) (0.16) (1.21) (0.96) (1.72) (1.01) 
First stage (log of HH income instrumented)         
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH     0.70** 0.70** 0.70** 0.70** 
     (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Partial F-Test (F-statistics)     12.98 13.03 13.09 13.03 
Observations 2,647 2,652 2,650 2,652 2,646 2,651 2,649 2,651 
R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.13 0.31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.25 0.42 0.41 0.35 0.10 0.28 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Consumption is measured in Tajik Somoni and 
weighted by oxford-scales. Food purchased and consumed is reported for the last 7 days, whereas food consumed includes food purchased plus self-produced food and in kind payments in food. Non-food consumption and 
overall consumption is computed as monthly average. 
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Appendix Table A 3.22.: Effects on consumption detailed food items (comparing purchased vs. subsistence consumption) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Log of 
grain 
purch. 
Log of 
grain not 
purch. 
Log of 
meat 
purch. 
Log of 
meat not 
purch. 
Log of 
fruits 
purch. 
Log of 
fruits not 
purch. 
Log of 
sweets 
purch. 
Log of 
sweets not 
pur. 
         
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.30 0.09 0.35° 0.00 0.14 -0.31 -0.13 -0.54 
 (0.29) (0.24) (0.18) (0.65) (0.27) (0.27) (0.22) (0.42) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.08 -0.05 0.35 1.04 0.55° -0.23 0.85* 0.29 
 (0.24) (0.32) (0.22) (1.06) (0.32) (0.32) (0.36) (0.71) 
HH head married 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.41 0.08 -0.11 -0.00 0.15 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.25) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.21) 
HH head single -0.05 0.13 0.19 0.88* 0.07 -0.33 0.25 -0.07 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.18) (0.43) (0.23) (0.24) (0.19) (0.58) 
HH size 0.08** 0.10** 0.04** 0.10** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
HH head age 0.00 0.01* 0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
HH head secondary education -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.17 -0.02 0.20** 0.11° 0.18 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) 
HH head tertiary education 0.02 -0.08 0.15* -0.47° 0.11 0.18° 0.16° 0.33* 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.25) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) 
HH head high occupation 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.07 0.02 0.11* -0.31° 0.14** 0.01 0.04 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.19) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.16 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.22 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.19) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.14) 
HH female head 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.15 -0.06 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.19) 
HH share of young members -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.45 -0.18 0.06 -0.06 0.41 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.36) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.25) 
HH share of old members -0.45* -0.54* -0.32* -0.17 -0.50* 0.09 -0.58** -0.62* 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.15) (0.81) (0.23) (0.27) (0.18) (0.31) 
Constant 2.16** 1.94** 2.48** 0.95 1.47** 1.43** 1.55** -0.37 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.22) (0.89) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.66) 
         
Observations 2,447 1,791 1,919 271 1,804 1,371 2,312 1,359 
R-squared 0.38 0.26 0.31 0.52 0.24 0.27 0.32 0.26 
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.21 0.29 0.20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. Consumption is reported for the last 7 days and 
measured in Tajik Somoni. Food purchased includes all items purchased on local markets. Food not purchased includes as self-produced food and in kind payments in food, but is also evaluated at market prices. 
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Appendix Table A 3.23.: IV Effects on consumption detailed food items 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Log of 
grains cons. 
Log of 
vegetables 
cons. 
Log of fruits 
cons. 
Log of meat 
cons. 
Log of milk 
cons. 
Log of 
beverages 
cons. 
Log of 
sweets cons. 
        
Log of HH income 0.13 0.11 0.69 0.42 0.06 0.19 0.90 
 (0.21) (0.28) (0.46) (0.30) (0.27) (0.30) (0.57) 
HH head married 0.02 -0.06 -0.18 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.30° 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.18) 
HH head single 0.15 0.08 -0.01 0.15 0.12 0.21 -0.05 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.22) (0.20) (0.11) (0.23) (0.20) 
HH size 0.09** 0.06** 0.03 0.03 0.06** 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
HH head age 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
HH head secondary education 0.03 0.12** 0.15* -0.03 0.14** 0.08° 0.14* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
HH head tertiary education -0.06 0.13* 0.16° 0.07 0.21** 0.13° 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) 
HH head high occupation 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.17* -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.06 -0.14 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.01 0.09° 0.08 0.09 0.08° 0.15** 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) 
HH female head -0.11 -0.08 -0.28° -0.21* -0.02 -0.11 -0.37* 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.18) 
HH share of young members 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.13 -0.00 0.13 0.52° 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.24) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.27) 
HH share of old members -0.35* -0.57** -0.12 -0.12 -0.19 -0.21 -0.50 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.29) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.32) 
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.18 0.07 -0.06 0.30 0.03 0.01 -0.19 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.26) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19) (0.28) 
Constant 2.15* 1.45 -2.03 0.49 2.02 -0.32 -3.09 
 (1.08) (1.41) (2.28) (1.46) (1.38) (1.55) (2.90) 
First stage (log of HH income instrumented)        
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.70** 0.70** 0.72** 0.71** 0.69** 0.70** 0.67** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Partial F-Test (F-statistics) 13.03 13.06 12.02 11.44 12.69 12.92 11.84 
Observations 2,651 2,650 2,369 2,076 2,624 2,609 2,628 
R-squared  0.47 0.33  0.22 0.39 0.29 0.03 
R-squared (un-centered) 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.96 0.97 0.71 0.82 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. The table presents estimates for the income 
elasticity of consumption for 7 different food product groups using a Two-Stage-Least-Square (2SLS) estimation. I instrument the independent variable nominal household income using the interaction of the cotton PSU, the 
agricultural household and the year 2011 dummy as external instrument. Because for the 2SLS estimation using the ivregress-command in Stata the R-squared could not be computed for two columns, I also include the un-
centered R-Square from a GMM-estimation using ivreg2.  
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Appendix Table A 3.24.: IVEffects on consumption detailed non-food items 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
Log of 
spending 
VARIABLES Personal 
care 
Cleaning 
products 
Fuel and 
transport 
information Other 
articles 
Clothing 
and shoes 
HH articles Hobbies, 
Services 
Cars and 
dwellling 
Personal 
articles 
For travel Insurance 
and taxes 
Marriage, 
oth. cer. 
              
Log of HH income 0.64° 0.23 0.58 -0.24 2.39 0.43 1.16° -0.20 0.26 0.04 0.24 0.86 1.80° 
 (0.38) (0.36) (0.52) (0.54) (2.76) (0.31) (0.62) (1.66) (0.37) (1.14) (1.36) (0.63) (1.08) 
HH head married -0.21° -0.10 -0.07 0.06 -0.38 -0.10 -0.39° 0.12 0.10 -0.11 -0.56 0.10 -0.60° 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.21) (0.63) (0.12) (0.23) (0.44) (0.23) (0.40) (0.74) (0.22) (0.36) 
HH head single -0.11 0.01 -0.22 0.37 2.79 -0.23 -0.45 0.58 -0.58° 0.16 2.78** -0.41 -0.50 
 (0.22) (0.17) (0.40) (0.47) (3.86) (0.27) (0.31) (0.82) (0.35) (1.17) (0.53) (0.43) (0.32) 
HH size 0.02 0.04* 0.05° 0.07* -0.07 0.06** -0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.00 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.14) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
HH head age -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head secondary education 0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.20 -0.21 0.13* 0.00 0.25° -0.04 -0.34 -0.12 0.03 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.13) (0.40) (0.06) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.23) (0.40) (0.15) (0.14) 
HH head tertiary education 0.08 0.16* 0.25° -0.05 -0.46 0.19* 0.06 0.50° 0.10 -0.14 0.18 0.09 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.16) (0.52) (0.08) (0.18) (0.28) (0.20) (0.33) (0.48) (0.15) (0.19) 
HH head high occupation 0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.29° -0.25 0.13 -0.12 0.14 -0.10 0.02 -0.75 -0.35° -0.35 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.16) (0.76) (0.09) (0.14) (0.47) (0.19) (0.30) (0.52) (0.20) (0.25) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.23 -0.28 -0.05 -0.20 0.15 -0.19 0.06 0.15 -0.22 -0.35 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.21) (0.57) (0.10) (0.20) (0.53) (0.16) (0.22) (0.54) (0.20) (0.32) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.40* 0.18 -0.18 0.04 0.17 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.21) (0.38) (0.08) (0.13) (0.23) (0.18) (0.35) (0.39) (0.17) (0.16) 
HH female head -0.28* -0.13 -0.19 0.06 -0.60 -0.23° -0.67** 0.14 0.02 -0.32 -0.37 -0.07 -0.74* 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.19) (0.18) (1.07) (0.12) (0.25) (0.39) (0.24) (0.38) (0.77) (0.24) (0.37) 
HH share of young members 0.14 0.20 -0.10 -0.24 1.36 0.17 0.32 -0.02 0.44 -0.18 -0.29 0.29 0.17 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.29) (0.25) (1.79) (0.18) (0.31) (1.26) (0.34) (0.99) (0.78) (0.32) (0.60) 
HH share of old members -0.41° -0.23 -0.26 -0.00 0.65 -0.83** -0.30 -0.08 -0.56 2.37** 0.09 -0.19 0.09 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.28) (0.45) (1.08) (0.27) (0.44) (0.77) (0.71) (0.72) (1.20) (0.45) (0.55) 
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.18 -0.14 0.41 -0.18 0.74 0.13 -0.15 -0.19 0.27 0.29 0.91 0.35 1.06 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.30) (0.62) (1.79) (0.22) (0.37) (1.12) (0.55) (0.89) (1.49) (0.47) (0.68) 
Constant -0.43 1.17 -0.19 3.58 -10.16 2.76° -3.08 4.01 2.72 6.17 4.34 -3.21 -3.68 
 (1.89) (1.87) (2.72) (2.91) (14.74) (1.59) (3.15) (9.43) (2.18) (6.46) (7.56) (3.59) (5.46) 
First stage (log of HH income instrumented)              
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.76** 0.65** 0.74** 0.82* 0.37 0.72** 0.77** 0.30 1.34** 0.67 0.90 0.83** 0.56* 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.38) (0.30) (0.20) (0.24) (0.37) (0.32) (0.62) (0.64) (0.28) (0.26) 
Partial F-Test (F-statistics) 14.71 11.63 10.55 4.61 1.48 13.34 9.84 0.67 17.61 1.2 1.99 9.02 4.69 
Observations 2,517 2,555 1,776 567 917 2,536 1,645 593 880 396 355 771 1,579 
R-squared 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.32  0.25 0.03 0.27 0.23 0.44 0.54 0.12  
R-squared (un-centered) 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.85 0.67 0.98 0.87 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.91 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. The table presents estimates for the income 
elasticity of consumption for 13 different food product groups using a Two-Stage-Least-Square (2SLS) estimation. I instrument the independent variable nominal household income using the interaction of the cotton PSU, 
the agricultural household and the year 2011 dummy as external instrument. Because for the 2SLS estimation using the ivregress-command in Stata the R-squared could not be computed for two columns, I also include the 
un-centered R-Square from a GMM-estimation using ivreg2 
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Appendix Table A 3.25.: Real monthly household income for HHs without/with migrants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Households without migrants Households with migrants 
VARIABLES logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc 
       
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.18 -0.49 -0.07 0.23 0.11 -0.16 
 (0.17) (0.30) (0.24) (0.35) (0.50) (0.52) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.19 -0.55* 0.59** 0.57* 0.12 0.51 
 (0.16) (0.25) (0.20) (0.28) (0.43) (0.48) 
HH head married 0.08° 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.10 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.28) (0.11) 
HH head single -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.25 -0.10 0.27 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.21) (0.49) (0.25) 
HH size 0.06** 0.05** 0.06** 0.04** 0.05** 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
HH head age 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head secondary education 0.06° 0.10° 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) 
HH head tertiary education 0.17** 0.17** 0.13* 0.16 0.17 0.12 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.21) (0.14) 
HH head high occupation 0.18** 0.10 0.21** 0.05 -0.11 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.16) (0.13) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.29** 0.23** 0.31** 0.11 0.02 0.11 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation -0.04 -0.06 -0.00 0.02 0.11 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.10) 
HH female head 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.03 -0.08 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.23) (0.11) 
HH share of young members -0.28** -0.32** -0.22* -0.24 0.04 -0.39° 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.29) (0.20) 
HH share of old members -0.09 0.06 -0.16 -0.07 0.74 -0.98* 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.13) (0.33) (0.54) (0.43) 
Constant 4.99** 4.92** 5.28** 5.64** 5.52** 5.54** 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.26) (0.38) (0.62) (0.52) 
       
Observations 4,294 2,167 2,127 780 312 468 
R-squared 0.53 0.51 0.60 0.51 0.66 0.55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.52 0.48 0.58 0.44 0.53 0.43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles 
of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as 
well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. This table reproduces the 
results of Table 1 for the subsamples of households with and without migrants. Columns 1-3 show the results of the HH income equations 
from Table 1 for the sub-sample of households without migrants and columns 4-6 the results for the sub-sample of households with migrants.  
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Appendix Table A 3.26.: Attrition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES HHattrit HHattrit HHattrit HHattrit HHattrit HHattrit 
       
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -0.03 -0.08* -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH -0.03 -0.13* -0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
HH head married -0.01 -0.02° -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
HH head single -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HH size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head age -0.00 -0.00° 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.00 0.01 0.02° 0.02° 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head tertiary education 0.01 0.00 0.02° 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
HH head high occupation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02° 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
HH female head 0.00 -0.03* 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
HH share of young members 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05** 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
HH share of old members 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant 0.27** 0.36** 0.26** 0.38** 0.10* 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) 
       
Observations 7,996 4,082 4,282 2,174 4,159 2,114 
R-squared 0.75 0.78 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.29 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.78 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles 
of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as 
well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. The data set is now 
constructed to include every household in every year (independent variables for households not appearing in every year are taken from the 
earliest year possible). The dependent variable indicates, whether the household appears in that year (1) in the dataset or not (0). The first 
column shows the results for the whole sample of households with at least one worker, the second column only includes households with at 
least one female working member. Column 3 and 4 are equal to column 1 and 2, only that they exclude households only in the data set in 
2007. Column 5 and 6 exclude households only in the dataset in 2011. 
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Appendix Table A 3.27.: Robustness of the main specification to attrition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc logHHinc 
      
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.10 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH 0.61** 0.70** 0.76** 0.73** 0.69** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) 
HH head married 0.22** 0.26** 0.28** 0.30** 0.29** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
HH head single 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
HH size 0.06** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH head age 0.00* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HH head secondary education 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
HH head tertiary education 0.15* 0.19** 0.19** 0.18* 0.19* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
HH head high occupation 0.12* 0.16** 0.17** 0.18** 0.17* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 0.24** 0.28** 0.28** 0.27** 0.30** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
HH female head 0.24** 0.25** 0.27** 0.28** 0.27** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
HH share of young members -0.39** -0.46** -0.43** -0.49** -0.46** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
HH share of old members -0.28* -0.38* -0.38* -0.32 -0.33 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) 
Constant 5.24** 5.05** 4.96** 4.99** 4.99** 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) 
      
Observations 2,595 1,976 1,956 1,835 1,733 
R-squared 0.57 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the village level); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles 
of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agricultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as 
well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. The first column shows 
the baseline results for households with at least on female member working. Column 2 excludes households only in the data set in 2007, 
column 3 additionally excludes HHs only in the dataset in 2007, column 4 additionally excludes HHs only in the data set in 2007 and 2009 
and the last column additionally excludes HHs only in the data set in 2007 and 2011. 
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Appendix Table A 3.28.: Quantile Regressions Effects on intensive labor supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (7) (8) (9) 
 Hours worked Hours worked by female Hours worked by male 
VARIABLES q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75 
          
Cotton PSU*year 2009*agricultural HH -25.25* -26.94** -16.91* -18.90** -14.72* -6.29 -5.47 -8.09* -5.84° 
 (10.02) (9.12) (8.55) (6.58) (6.13) (5.28) (4.40) (3.21) (3.01) 
Cotton PSU*year 2011*agricultural HH -11.14 -18.57° -16.52° -11.05° -8.98 -3.19 -6.43 -11.17** -6.93* 
 (9.15) (10.07) (9.42) (6.02) (5.54) (5.84) (4.78) (4.31) (3.30) 
Number of respective workers 33.14** 41.60** 49.10** 31.61** 39.17** 48.68** 37.23** 43.83** 51.86** 
 (1.15) (1.23) (1.13) (1.29) (1.27) (1.29) (0.82) (0.80) (0.78) 
HH head married -1.36 3.38 0.37 0.15 1.22 1.88 0.13 -0.26 -0.08 
 (3.20) (2.84) (2.67) (2.13) (1.76) (1.63) (0.69) (0.73) (0.81) 
HH head single 3.17 2.89 -4.25 -0.00 2.27 -2.52 0.22 -0.07 0.99 
 (6.09) (4.77) (5.73) (5.14) (4.12) (5.23) (0.82) (0.79) (1.42) 
HH size 0.32 -0.09 -0.03 -0.49° -0.31 -0.00 -0.12 -0.09 0.05 
 (0.50) (0.44) (0.48) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) 
HH head age 0.10 0.07 -0.11 0.14* 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
HH head secondary education -0.13 -3.03 -4.98* 1.62 0.20 -2.43° -0.14 -0.44 -1.33 
 (2.48) (2.14) (2.39) (1.55) (1.25) (1.39) (0.59) (0.65) (0.85) 
HH head tertiary education -0.12 -4.78° -6.19* 0.95 -1.54 -4.80** 0.01 -0.54 -1.77° 
 (2.94) (2.79) (3.00) (1.90) (1.67) (1.86) (0.76) (0.80) (1.03) 
HH head high occupation 2.35 -0.55 -4.70° 0.42 -0.02 -1.09 0.20 0.06 -1.75° 
 (2.65) (2.36) (2.59) (1.58) (1.38) (1.48) (0.79) (0.77) (0.94) 
HH head occupations 4,5,7 or 8 7.75** 4.04* 2.73 1.82 1.47 1.07 0.87 1.03 0.81 
 (2.26) (2.00) (2.36) (1.46) (1.24) (1.25) (0.80) (0.80) (1.00) 
HH head skilled agricultural occupation -1.49 1.11 1.18 -0.63 -0.06 1.44 -0.33 2.25 0.97 
 (3.42) (2.85) (2.71) (1.85) (1.65) (1.72) (1.54) (1.42) (1.24) 
HH female head -2.24 0.37 -2.10 0.23 1.78 1.26 -0.44 -1.06 0.08 
 (2.89) (2.68) (2.44) (2.03) (1.59) (1.49) (0.96) (0.83) (0.86) 
HH share of young members 1.16 0.89 -0.64 1.25 0.76 -2.09 0.48 0.51 1.16 
 (4.36) (4.22) (4.12) (2.81) (2.36) (2.44) (1.04) (1.01) (1.28) 
HH share of old members -9.72 -7.85 4.80 -10.52* -8.69* -0.10 -1.05 -0.23 1.71 
 (6.64) (6.08) (5.46) (4.64) (3.80) (3.86) (1.18) (1.14) (1.32) 
Constant -5.11 1.36 14.56 -11.84° -7.13 -0.72 0.49 1.81 7.39* 
 (11.05) (9.51) (10.10) (6.67) (5.66) (6.47) (3.27) (2.66) (3.18) 
          
Observations 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (400 replications); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ° p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include district dummies, province-year dummies, dummies for the month of the interview, dummies for the deciles of the household income distribution in 2007, year dummies, a dummy for agri-
cultural household, a dummy for living in a cotton PSU as well as all interaction terms between year dummies, the agricultural household dummy and the cotton PSU dummy. 
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Appendix 3 B Data Cleaning and Matching 
The dataset I use in this paper is based on the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey 
(TLSS) conducted by the World Bank and UNICEF in 2007 and 2009 and a follow up 
survey for 2011 conducted by the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies 
(IOS). In 2007, 4860 households living in 270 primary sampling units (PSUs) in Tajiki-
stan were interviewed (18 households per PSU). This sample was reduced to only 167 
PSUs and 9 households per PSU resulting in 1503 revisited households in 2009 and 
2011 (Danzer et al. 2013). In the analysis, I only include households living in the 167 
PSUs that were revisited in 2009 and 2011.126 The data I obtained from the World Bank 
and the IOS was quite erroneous regarding individual and household identifiers across 
waves. Thus, to be able to correctly aggregate individual level variables within house-
holds and to link them across waves, I had to apply extensive cleaning procedures that 
are described in Appendix 2 E. 
In addition, for the research presented in this chapter, I had to clean and prepare the sin-
gle modules of the raw data on different sources of household income and various types 
of expenditures as well as on education, health and migration of household members. 
Only then it was possible to merge these modules internally and across waves and to 
connect them to the individual level dataset, which I had already constructed for the 
research presented in the last chapter. The most serious issue was that in each single 
module of the raw data missing values were coded differently across waves, e.g. they 
were coded as 99, 999, 9999, as “.” or as negative values. I had to look closely at the 
raw data using several descriptive statistics to determine whether a certain value may 
have been used as the identifier for missing responses. If the frequency of a certain val-
ue containing only the number 9 (e.g. 99, 999 or 9999) was more than 10 times higher 
than for other values above or below that value, I assumed that this value indicates 
missing responses.127 In some cases, I could retrieve the correct information on the cod-
ing of missing values in the respective module from the original questionnaires. I 
changed all values indicating missing responses into a true missing symbol “.” in Stata. 
For an additional robustness check, I decided to impute wages and remittances and the 
respective procedure is described below. Furthermore, I also had to correct miscoded 
individual and item identifiers in single modules by closely looking at the structure of 
                                                 
126
 As noted in Appendix 2 E, I conducted robustness checks including those 103 PSUs and results of the last chapter 
and also of this chapter do not change. 
127
 In cases where this value was the highest one of the whole distribution and smaller values were bigger than half of 
that value, I did not change the data. However, in most cases the highest value was 9999 and the next smaller value 
appearing in the data was less than half that value, e.g. 4000. In those cases I turned the 9999 into missing.  
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the data. For example, in the module for transfers received the identifiers for donors per 
household were often not unique. 
Because there were no constructed measures for most of the variables I use in this pa-
per, I had to construct those measures making different kinds of assumptions. The vari-
able that needed the most attention was monthly household income. In the survey, dif-
ferent sources of household income are reported in different modules for different time 
horizons at the individual or the household level. Wages paid in cash are reported at an 
individual basis for the last month, but the money equivalent of wages paid in kind is 
reported for the whole year. The amount of bonuses paid is reported for the last event 
together with an average number on how many bonuses are received per year. Remit-
tances are reported at the household level and per year in Tajik Somoni in 2007, on av-
erage per month in USD in 2009 and on average per month in several currencies in 
2011. Unfortunately, it seems that many interviewers misunderstood the question and 
asked for yearly remittances in USD in 2007. I applied a cleaning procedure to this is-
sue that is described below. Furthermore, in 2007 and 2009 remittances in cash and in 
kind are separated in the questionnaire, but in 2011 they are not. Thus, I use the sum of 
remittances in cash and in kind throughout the analysis. Social benefits received from 
the state are reported at the household level for the last month together with the time 
period the payment refers to. Transfers received and sent by the household as well as 
other income sources like rent income are reported per year at the household level. In 
the main specification, I define monthly household income in Tajik Somoni as the sum 
of wage income last month plus last bonuses and average monthly in kind payments, 
average monthly remittances, social benefits paid last month, average monthly house-
hold income from other sources as well as a monthly average of net household transfers. 
I assume that current income in terms of last bonuses and social benefits paid last month 
is more relevant for current household decisions, e.g. food consumption that is reported 
for the last 7 days, then the monthly average per year. However, for robustness checks, I 
use many other measures for household income, e.g. using a monthly average for social 
benefits and bonuses instead of the amounts paid last month or excluding wage in kind 
payments. The results do not depend on the specific definition of monthly household 
income (Tab. A3.20). 
Because 286 of our 6012 household-year observations report zero monthly household 
income, I impute wages and remittances for those 286 households and check if the re-
sults are robust to using the imputed measure for household income (Tab. A3.20). How-
ever, I only imputed wages for household members that were working, but did not re-
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port a wage.128 Accordingly, I only imputed remittances for households with migrants 
that did not report remittances.129 I imputed wages in cash and in kind using the median 
wage for workers with the same gender, same education and the same occupation in the 
same year. Using other imputations, e.g. the mean wage instead of the median wage, 
does not change the empirical result. Following Yang (2008), I imputed average month-
ly remittances using the lowest percentile of the unconditional remittance distribution in 
the respective year. However, for another robustness check, I also used the median of 
the distribution, because the distribution of monthly remittances is quite concentrated 
around the median and not skewed. I used the simple unconditional median because 
more than 95% of Tajik migrants are male that work in the Russian construction indus-
try and other low skilled occupations and earn about the same foreign wage per month 
(Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010, descriptives of this dataset). The results are robust to 
using any of that imputed measures for remittances and household wage income. I also 
check, if including the households with zero income by using log(1+income) changes 
the results. Results are also robust to using this procedure (Table A3.20). 
Another variable I had to construct using some assumptions is health spending. For 3 
provinces in the TLSS 2007, the questions on health spending did not include spending 
for medicaments. Thus, I constructed one measure for spending on health excluding 
spending for medicaments in all three waves and another one, where I assume that the 
missing question in 2007 lead households to report the amounts spent on medicaments 
in the question for spending on ambulatory medical care. The results do not change us-
ing both measures indicating that households may have reported spending on medica-
ments within the other spending category. Concerning the definition of an agricultural 
household, I conducted many robustness checks that are explained in the paper and pre-
sented in Table A3.20. The only one not explained in the paper is the one presented in 
column 3 of Table A3.20. For this robustness check, I additionally used the second oc-
cupation of workers to determine, whether they work in agriculture or not. I also defined 
workers as agricultural workers, if they work in non-agriculture as first occupation but 
in agriculture as second occupation. Thus, the number of agricultural households with at 
least one female working slightly increased due to this definition from 1414 to 1430, 
whereas the number of non-agricultural households with at least one female working 
decreases from 1238 to 1222. However, the results are not affected by this change com-
pared to the main specification in column 1, where I only use the first occupation to 
                                                 
128
 I did not impute missing wages for other working individuals living in households with non-zero income, because 
many workers in the dataset are unpaid family workers. 
129
 For another robustness check, I imputed the remittances for all households with migrants and zero or missing 
remittances, not only for the households that also reported zero household income. The results do not change. 
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determine an agricultural worker. In column 2, I define an agricultural household as a 
household with at least two agricultural workers, whereas the definition of a non-
agricultural household remains the same. The same is true for column 4, where I ex-
clude mixed households, i.e. households with agricultural and non-agricultural house-
holds, from the treatment group. Thus, the sample is reduced in column 2 and 4 com-
pared to column 1 by the number of households with only one agricultural worker and 
the number of mixed households, respectively. The construction of the other variables is 
more straightforward and can be inferred from the main text of the paper. I have accu-
rately documented the construction of the variables within the do-files, which can be 
requested from the author. 
Another important issue I had to address during the data cleaning procedure was the 
miscoding of remittances in 2007. In the questionnaire, household remittances should 
have been reported per year in Tajik Somoni in 2007, on average per month in USD in 
2009 and on average per month in several currencies in 2011. Unfortunately, it seems 
that many interviewers misunderstood the question and asked for yearly remittances in 
USD in 2007. I detected this problem by closely looking at the descriptive statistics for 
remittances and the sum of wages earned by migrants abroad per household. The medi-
an of the sum of monthly wages earned abroad per household was 300 USD in 2007, 
but the median of yearly remittances only 1720 Tajik Somoni equivalent to 42 USD per 
month. In 2009 and 2011, the median of monthly remittances was 200 USD and the 
median wage earned abroad was 400 and 500 USD, respectively. Thus, I assumed that 
in the TLSS 2007 yearly remittances were on average not reported in Somoni, but in 
USD. The average exchange rate in 2007 was 3.44 Somoni/USD and I multiplied the 
reported remittances with this value leading to the new median for monthly remittances 
of 143 USD in 2007. However, apparently some households actually reported remit-
tances in Tajik Somoni and I identified and corrected those cases using the following 
procedure. I computed the ratio of monthly remittances divided by the sum of the 
monthly foreign wages of all migrants per household. For all observations with a ratio 
higher than 1.5, I assumed that remittances were actually reported in Somoni (because it 
is unlikely to remit 150% of the foreign wages earned). For those cases, I divided remit-
tances by the average exchange rate in 2007. For cases with a ratio between 1 and 1.5, I 
had a closer look on the occupation and education of the migrants. In most cases it was 
obvious, that in the respective occupations it was very unlikely to remit amounts higher 
than 1000 USD per month and I assumed that remittances were reported in Somoni not 
in USD. In some cases, interviewers or coders had mistakenly added a zero and I 
cleaned those cases too. I did not change any remittance values for households that had 
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not reported the foreign wages of their migrants. I also applied the described procedure 
to the remittances sent in kind (not in cash) in 2007, which apparently have also been 
reported in USD on average, not in Tajik Somoni as indicated in the questionnaire. In 
addition, I also applied the described procedure using the ratio of remittances and the 
sum of foreign wages earned by migrants to detect errors in the remittances reported for 
2009 and 2011. In particular in 2011, there were many cases where remittances had 
been reported in Ruble but the interviewer indicated USD as currency. I cleaned those 
cases applying the average exchange rate of the Ruble to the USD in 2011. The detailed 
do-files on the cleaning procedure described here can be requested from the author.  
After applying all these corrections, I first merged the new data files internally and then 
with the dataset I had constructed for the analysis presented in the last chapter. Finally, I 
constructed the final household level panel dataset for this study by aggregating over 
individuals within households. This final dataset is presented in the data section of this 
paper.  
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